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FOREWORD 
This report  is  submitted by Space Division, North 
American Rockwell Corporation, to  the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Marshall  
Space Flight Center ,  Huntsville, Alabama. 
The report  provides the resul ts  of the ' 'Saturn 
S-I1 Problem Resolution History" conducted under 
Contract NAS7-200, Task Authorization 
NO.  2026-TA-12. 
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INTRODUCTION 
+ @A!! Space Division North Amencan Rockwell 
This document provides a summary of S-I1 P rogram problems and the 
solutions that were implemented. 
start ing with the initial design concepts and contiwing through the launch of 
the tenth S-I1 flight stage-a period of nine yea.rs (1962 to mid-1971). This 
information is provided for  disseminktion and use,  to the extent practical, 
on other NASA programs where the extensive Saturn S-I1 experience can 
contribute to the avoidance o r  solution of s imi la r  problem areas, 
The problems occurred during a period 
After considering various techniques for presenting the problem 
information (i. e . ,  film, video tape, briefings, e tc . ) ,  the published docu- 
ment form was selected as the most  useful. 
.Information i s  from nine separate disciplines within the S-I1 Program: 
design, facil i t ies,  logistics , manufacturing, mater ia l ,  program management, 
quality assurance,  safety, and t e s t .  If a particular problem is  applicable to 
more than one discipline, i t  i s  included in a l l  relevent sections. The basic 
concept for  problem selection by NR was to provide the information that 
would be useful to  other persons and companies facing s imilar  problems in 
these disciplines.  
ducted and where problems occurred were considered in selecting problems 
for inclusion into this repor t .  
All geographical a r e a s  where S-I1 activities were con- 
Each problem i s  presented in a summary form identified by and 
sectionalized by discipline a s  follows: 
1 .  Design 6 .  Program Management 
2 .  Facil i t ies 7 .  Quality Assurance 
3 .  Logistics 8.  Safety 
5.  Logistics 
. h .  Manufacturing 9 .  Test  
The information presented descr ibes  the problem, i t s  effect, and the 
solutions a s  they affected that discipline. The two digit code followi'ng the 
1 
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discipline name represents  the i tem,  operation, o r  function within the 
discipline affected by the problem a s  follows: 
01 
02 
03 
04 
* 05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1 5  
16 
17 
18 
19 
Do cumentat i on 
Tapes 
Ins ula ti on 
We ldin g 
Fab ri cation 
Corrosion 
C onne cto r s 
Relays 
Valves 
Wiring /Cable s 
Structures 
Building s /Grounds 
Contract 
Handling /Packaging 
Management System 
Color Coding /Marking 
Contamination 
Flight 
Purging 
20 Seals 
21 B-nuts/Sleeves 
22 Component Acceptance 
23 Line Assemblies 
24 Static Firing 
25, Soldering ’ 
26 Propellants /Loading 
27 Calibration 
28 X-ray 
29 Commercial  Electr ical  Power 
30 Bearings 
31 Transportation 
3 2 Ele c t r i c a1 /Instrument a ti on 
33 Limited Life /Time Cycle 
34 Pressurizat ion 
35 Proof-loading 
36 Stage/Hardware Protection 
37 Vendor Equipment 
38 Ground Support Equipment 
The las t  two digits in the summary sheet identification a r e  sequential num- 
be r s  for’each i tem in the subcategory. For example: 
Facilities 12-02 
/ /   Second facilities problem 
Facilitie s di s ci pline Buildings /Grounds 
related to Buildings /Grounds 
References indicate sources  of additional detail information available 
from either N R  o r  NASA/MSFC. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
* 
Most problems contained in this report  would not have developed i f  
they could have been anticipated, permitting corrective action ear ly  in the 
developmental activities of the program. 
being deferred o r  unrecognized a r e  apparent.  
in this report  m a y  benefit some future program by contributing to  corrective 
action a t  the appropriate t ime. 
Many valid reasons for aotion 
It is hoped that the information 
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CRlTlCA LI TY I DENTlFl CAT1 ON CRITERI 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Early in the  Saturn S-II Program development effort, concern existed 
a s  t o  how t o  achieve, initial high reliability, in view of histor ical  data OA 
similar  la rge  programs which indicated achievement of high reliability only 
af ter  repeated failures,  redes i  ns, and schedule slippages. The mission 
requirement of the Saturn launch vehicle was such a s  to dictate extremely 
high reliability since schedule and cost factors  were heavy dr iver@ which 
virtually precluded a " t r ia l  and e r r o r "  approach. 
ing a unique criticality analysis and identification methodology, was devel- 
oped t o  provide a basis  for the attainment of initial high reliability. 
Subsequent to incorporation of the NR/SD approach, the NASA requested the 
S-11 Program to  use an analysis technique for criticality identification which 
differed considerably (less depth) f rom the NR method, but which was 
intended to  produce consistency and u n i f o r k t y  with other launch vehicle and 
payload contractors techniques. 
modate the NASA request €or the implementation of the methodology without 
losing those gains accomplished with the past use of the NR method. 
A reliability plan, involv- 
The problem existed a s  t o  how t o  accom- 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The solution resulted in an agreement to  utilize both methods and to  
merge the criticality identifications in failure reports  and onalysis effort to  
indicate c lear ly  the mission impact potential. 
DISCUSSION 
The reliability analysis technique employed f rom the outset of the S-XI 
Program was directed toward the identification of cri t ical  systems and com- 
ponents for  the express  purposes in: (1) highlightin a r e a s  for  design redun- 
dancy provision considerations; (2) design, development and tes t  controls; 
and (3) designing an emergency detection system (EDS) to  sense cri t ical  
fa i lures  and enable preventive o r  evasive action. The analysis, known best 
by the t e r m  Fai lure  Mode Wect Analysis (FMEA), was performed in depth 
taking into account up to, and induding third order  {three independent fail- 
u re s  combining together t u  produce the undesirable effect) type failures. 
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Fai lure  modes were  defined with respect  t o  t ime between occurrence and the 
resultant effect. The definitions were  identified a s  follows: 
0 to  500 milliseconds - Catastrophic 
500 milliseconds to  5 seconds - Critical  
5 seconds and grea te r  - Deferred 
In addition, categories of I, I1 and 111 were assigned per  the c r i te r ia  listed in 
Table 1:  
Table 1. NR Developed Definitions 
Category 
I 
I1 
I11 
Definition I 
I 
1st  Order - Catastrophic 
2nd Order - Catastraphic 
3rd Order - Critical  
2nd Order - Critical  
3 r d  Order - Catastrophic 
1st  Order - Deferred 
2hd Order - Deferred 
3rd Order - Critical  
The t ime to hazard identification was designed to  enable the develop- 
ment of an emergency detection system (EDS) wherein certain failure modes 
involving a cr i t ical  o r  deferred condition could be detected and displayed 
in the command module for  crew information and appropriate action. 
envisioned EDS was never developed because of severa l  reasons,  one of 
which was the difficulty in definitizing the r e a l  constituents of the system. 
The 
In all, the FMEA effort, was most valuable in highlighting cr i t ical  
a r e a s  for either design change consideration o r  for  imposition of controls 
t o  as  sure  attainment of the high reliability requirements. 
Approximately midway in the S-11 development program, the require- 
ments of NASA headquarters Directive No, 26, Saturn V Single Fai lure  Point 
Control, was imposed on the S-11 Program. 
analysis of all S-11 systems to  determine which components could, with any 
degree of probability, contribute to  a crew loss  o r  mission loss. Single o r  
first order  failures only, were  to  be identified. 
This directive required an 
This directive was imposed 
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upon all launch vehicle contractors and, this with the resul ts  obtained, 
presented t o  NASA a uniform display of cr i t ical  a r e a s  ac ross  the entire 
launch vehicle. 
The accomplishment of this analysis effort, known as the Saturn V 
Reliability Analysis Model (RAM), placed two methods of failure effects 
analysis on the S-XI Program, each with different definitions of the t e r m s  
Criticality I, 4 and III. A reference to  Table 1 and Table 2 will reveal  
the ,differences. 
Because of differences in the definitions and criticality cr i ter ia ,  and 
the existence of two methods of effect analysis, consideration was given to  
deleting the requirements of the analysis per  the S-I1 Reliability P rogram 
Plan, SD 62- 128. 
NR-developed analysis technique, cr i ter ia ,  definitions and the attendant 
controls, could impact the overall  S-I1 reliability. 
directed by NASA t o  continue but with formal  document submittals deleted 
effective S-11-5 and S-II-8 for  the N R  and NASA analysis methods, 
respectively. 
Trade-off considerations indicated that t o  delete the 
Both analyses were 
The use  of both analyses techniques created a problem since the 
definitions of Table 1 and Table 2 for  the same crit icali ty category numeric, 
A solution was needed on how to  assign criticality to  hardware failures in 
the failure reporting and failure analysis system, wherein the t rue  impact 
of a failure would be readily identifiable and understandable for  either of the 
definitions of Table 1 and Table 2 ,  
Table 2 ,  NASA (RAM) Definitions 
Single failure (1st Order)  points which 
could resul t  in crew loss  
Single failure points which could resul t  
in mission loss, but not crew loss  
Fa i lures  which would not resul t  in 
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Negotiations with NASA resulted in a solution to  the problem whereby 
hardware fai lures  would be categorized by Roman numerals  I through Tv and 
Arabic numerals  1 through 9. 
tions of Table 1 ,  and the la t ter  covered the definitions of Table 2 ,  Com- 
binations of these two numerals  and the applicability to  fa i lures  and the 
associated effects a r e  found in Table 3 .  
The first categorization covered the defini- 
Classes  1, 2, and 5, in combination with the respective category 
cri t icali t ies,  comprise a l l  types of fa i lures  which have impact potential on 
the c rew and mission, 
The combifiation of these definitions in a cornrnon categorization for 
fa i lure  analysis Bas  enabled an accurate display of hardware criticality, 
and has  thus served the purpose of providing the necessary preventive 
action emphasis in a r e a s  where mission reliability could be in jeopardy. 
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PART NUMBER CONTROL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Due to  many interpretations (and misinterpretations) of the governing 
rules  for  par t  number identification and reidentification, many par t s  have 
been changed without reidentification where new par t  numbers should have 
been assigned, and, conversely, configurations have been reidentified where 
change conditions have not warranted such reidentification, resulting in too 
few par t  numbers on one hand and too many par t  numbers on the other hand, 
for effective par t  number control and effective configuration management, 
RESOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
On the Saturn S-I1 .Program a t  North American Rockwell Corp. , a 
thorough study was rnade of par t  number identification and reidentification 
that resulted in the Company- publication (Drawing Requirements Manual, 
Article 7422A) of par t  number control instructions. 
graph i s  a res t ruc ture  of that publication to describe the fundamental 
principles of reidentification due to  design or  requirements revisions; the 
conditions under which new part  numbers should or  should not be assigned, 
as applicable; and the conditions under which component par t  reidentifica- 
tion should o r  should not cause higher assembly level reidentification. 
h the Discussion para-  
DISCUSSION 
P a r t  numbers  a r e  assigned to  component parts,  assemblies,  and end 
i tems to  identify in common a l l  configurations which a r e  interchangeable in 
a l l  applications where used, and to distinguish differing configurations when 
new or  chonged designs result  in noninterchangeable conditions. The pr ime 
function of a par t  number,  a s  stated in goverhing NASA and DOD publications, 
i s  t o  control assembly and replacement on the basis of interchangeability o r  
exchangeability . 
Certain t e r m s  and concepts a r e  employed which a r e  consistent with 
the governing NASA and DOD directives;  certain other t e r m s  and concepts 
a r e  introduced in order  t o  clarify these directives. 
The t e r m  l'exchangeability" is w e d  t o  describe the capability of two 
differently numbered pa r t s  to be exchanged either completely or  condition- 
ally in all applications. * hterchangeable par t s  a r e  capable of being completely 
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exchanged, either one for the other without selection for fit or performance; 
substitutable par t s  a r e  capable of being conditionally hanged, new f o r  old 
but not old for  new without alteration; and replaceme r replaceable pa r t s  
are functionally interchangeable but physically differ that replacement 
of new par t  for  old requires  certain installation operations. When none of 
these three  conditions of exchangeability a r e  met, then the par t  
exchangeable cxr non- inter changeable. 
A "full effectivity" change is one which is effective on all i tems on 
which the affected par t  is used; a l'limited effectivity" change is one which 
is effective on some but not all of the items on which the affected par t  is 
used. A design change is one which affects the hardware or  configuration of 
the affected part;  a cler ical  change is one which affects only the document o r  
drawing, but does not affect the hardware per  se. 
is a design change which affects the initial baselined hardware o r  configura- 
tion requirements. A "rnake-playfl change is one that is necessary to  make 
a par t  meet its initial design requirements and perform in i t a  initial 
application. 
A requirements change 
A permanent assembly is one that cannot be disassembled without 
destruction of one or  more  of its component par ts ;  a repairable or separable 
assembly i s  one which can be disassembled without destruction of i ts  compo- 
nent parts.  Either a separ ib le  or  a permanent assembly may ox may not be 
capable of being "reworked" t o  accomplish a change. 
A n  installation delineates the attachment of par t s  in end i tem position 
and i s  not a par t  per  se; therefore, an installation is treated differently 
f r o m  an assembly in certain cases.  
A mandatory change is one which must  be accomplished; a non- 
mandatory change is one which i s  desirable but not absolutely ncsceseary. 
mandatory design or  requirements change is one which must be accomplished 
at the specified effectivity point during manufacturing, 
ier a mandatory design and requirements change which must have full 
effectivity application. 
A 
A make-play change 
The following paragraphs list the rules  for  component part ,  assembly 
identification, and reidentification due to  changes. These rules  a r e  s u m -  
marized in Figure 1 which graphically shows the various rules  a s  applied 
to  the noted conditians. 
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A. Changes Requiring Reidentification 
A, 1 Change Level 1 P a r t  Number Requirements (The level to  which a 
requirements change is directed i s  called Change Level 1. ) - A new par t  
number shall  be assigned to  a component par t  when a Level 1 requirements 
change causes  any one o r  more of the following conditions t o  occur, regard-  
l e s s  of whether the change i s  applied to some o r  to all  of the item8 on which 
the component par t  is  effective. 
A. 1. 1 When performance o r  durability i s  affected to  the extent that super- 
seded components must be discarded for  reasons of safety, malfunction, o r  
reliability, 
A. 1. 2 When superseded and superseding components a r e  not directly and 
completely interchangeable with respect to  installation and performance. 
A. 1, 3 When superseded components a r e  limited in  use and superseding 
components a r e  not so limited in use. 
A. 1, 4 When a component must be al tered o r  selected. 
1 
A, 1. 5 When a material ,  process ,  o r  treatment is  changed such that any of 
the above conditions exist. 
A. 2 
shall  be assigned to  a Level 2 using assembly when a Level 1 component is 
reidentified and any of the following conditions occur: 
Change Level 2 P a r t  Number Requirements - A new par t  number 
A. 2. 1 A Leyel 1 requirements change is applied to  a captive part. 
captive par t  and its parent permanent assembly shall be reidentified. 
Both the 
A, 2, 2 A Level 1 requirements change i s  applied to  the wire  list portion of 
a harness  and the change is directed to  full effectivity with deferred change 
points; o r  if t o  limited effectivity, the Level 2 harness  assembly requires  
r eident ificat ion. 
A. 2. 3 The new Level 1 component is  applied t o  some but not a l l  i tems on 
which the old Level 1 component was effective, i. e , ,  limited effectivity, 
and the new Level 1 component cannot supersede the old. 
NOTE: This condition also applies when a Level 1 component par t  i s  
removed f r o m  o r  added to  the Level 2 assembly, or when the 
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quantity of a component par t  is changed; o r  when an existing 
corrunercial control o r  standard par t  i s  replaced by a non- 
interchangeable part .  
A, 2 . 4  A new par t  number shal l  not be assigned to  a Level 2 using assembly 
iwhen either of the following conditions occur: 
(a) The new Level 1 component is applied to  some but not a l l  i tems 
on which the old Level 1 component was effective (limited 
effectivity), and the new Level 1 component can supersede the 
old. 
(b) The new Level 1 component is applied to  a l l  i tems on which the 
old Level 1 component was effective except for  conditions in 
Paragraphs A. 2, 1 and A. 2. 2. 
A, 3 
Level 2 using assembly i s  reconfigured, the Level 3 next  higher assembly 
shall  be reidentified if it cannot be reworked to  accept the new Level 2 
assembly, 
reasons,  it i s  desired to  reconfigure a Level 3 o r  higher assembly when 
such reconfiguration i s  not required per  the above rules ,  permission to  
accomplish additional reconfiguration must be obtained f rom the program 
Configuration Management function. 
B. 
Change Level 3 and Higher P a r t  Number Requirements - When a 
Reidentification of Level 3 or  higher assembly is required when- 
, ever  rework action cannot be accomplished or is unacceptable. If, fo r  valid 
Changes Not Requiring New Identification 
When a par t  o r  assembly i s  changed in such a manner that none of 
the conditions in Paragraph A occur, the par t  number shall  not be changed. 
Under no condition shall  the number be changed when a new usage is found 
for  an existing par t ,  
B. 1 Examples of changes not requiring reidentification: 
(a) Correcting c le r ica l  e r r o r s  
(b) Incorporating outstanding EO'S without changes 
(c)  
(d) Revising usage data 
Adding view and reference data 
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(e) Adding information without which it is impossible to complete 
the part 
Correcting P / L  changes to detail part material specification ( f )  
(g) Changes to reference documents 
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DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES TO KSC SPECIFICATIONS AND CRITERIA 
* ,  . .  
' ::q 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The change procedure f o r  the KSC Specifications and Cr i te r ia  document 
was such that i t  did not reflect  the actual hardware configuration of the 
stage. 
been made to  the document. 
ability caused confusion. 
In addition, the revised pages did not indicate the changes that had 
This incompatibility and lack of change t race-  
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
The problem was resolved by revising the KSC specifications and 
cr i te r ia  change procedure. It now requires  the Revision Change Notice 
(RCN) to be submitted with the ECP to MSFC/NASA for approval on al l  
changes. 
pages in a change package. 
requirement changes and the applicable RCN number,  which indicates the 
page revision log that identifies the current  status of every page in the 
document by  i ts  latest  issue.  
Approved by MSFC, the RCN's a r e  re leased a s  document change 
These change pages contain the MSFC-approved 
' . delta f rom one revision to the  next. The change package also contains a 
DISCUSS ION 
Initially, t e s t  requirement changes to  the KSC Specification and 
Cr i te r ia  document were  written and coordinated between Seal Beach Engi- 
neering and KSC as  problems occurred. 
were documented on RCN's  and sent a s  a package to MSFC for  approval. 
If, after two weeks no dissenting comments were received, the package was 
assumed to be in effect, These RCN's were subsequently incorporated as  a 
revision to  the document. 
difference f r o m  one change to the next, there  was no indication of the change 
status. 
These tes t  requirement changes 
Since the revised document did not show the 
Implementation of the present system was supplemented by final NASA 
concurrence of the changes a t  KSC through NASA submittal of a Notification 
of Requirements Acceptance (NORA) fo rm to  MSFC to  close the change loop. 
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DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES TO AUTOMATIC CHECKOUT PROGRAMS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Improper documentation of changes to  the automatic checkout programs 
will  resu l t  in the need f o r  a complete review after each revision to ensure 
correctness of changes and to  maintain awareness  of program details.. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
This was solved f o r  the S-LI by attaching computer-generated IS-WAS 
listing sheets  to the software modification sheet (SMS). 
official program change authorization that defines the changes to be made to  
the checkout tape. The IS-WAS listings provide the customer with informa- 
tion on what changes were  made in the ATOLL and what portions of the 
program were  affected. 
The SMS is the 
For future  programs it is recommended that both the SMS and IS-WAS 
This will make available more  informa- 
listing f o r  all program changes be attached as an appendix to the released 
Program Listing Document (PLD). 
tion, concerning the checkout programs,  to testing personnel. 
DISCUSSION 
S-I1 stage changes that affect automatic checkout software programs 
mus t  be implemented and documented, as they are  authorized, in time to 
support stage checkout. 
particular checkout program. However , the process  of implementation is 
s i i ch  that a retranslation of the  revised ca rd  image tape is required before 
generating new program listings and checkout tapes. 
listing is a document of the checkout program in symbolic language (ATOLL). 
Normally a change only affects portions of a 
The new program 
The following information is contained in a n  SMS: 
1. SMS Number (Program revision number) and date 
2. MCR or GO number 
3 .  Revision 
4. Pr io r i ty  
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5. Hardware affected 
6. Title of change 
7. Initiator 
8. P rogram number, old and new 
9. Description of change 
10. Reason for  change 
11. References 
12. Verification required 
YES - N O  13. Program tape change required 7 
14. Program document change required __ Y E S  I_ NO 
15. Space f o r  r emarks  
16. Space for engineering, s i te  manager and customer approval, 
signature and dates. 
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DOCUMENTATbON OF LARGE WIRING INSTALLATIONS 
PROBLEMSTATEMENTANDEFFECT 
Engineering drawings documenting wire  harness  routing on the S-II 
a r e  very large because the routing for complete areas, i. e . ,  aft, forward, 
LH2 tank, e tc . ,  is shown on single drawings. These large multiple-sheet 
drawings are extremely hard for  the various using organizations to handle. 
SO LUTIONIRECOMMENDATION 
v 
The problem was partially solved by breaking the la rge-area  drawings 
Recommendations for further simpli- into smal le r  area segment drawings. 
fying the documentation are as follows: 
1. To eliminate the views showing the differences in installation 
procedures by creating a ship-by-ship drawing release,  for each 
vehicle. 
2 .  To establish ground rules for clamp installations and to utilize a 
.matrix of tabulation blocks and eliminate the pictorial  represen-  
tation. Actually to revise  the drawing format. 
3 .  To establish the necessary photographic log books (contractual), 
to depict the actual ins tallation pictorially, and to fabricate, 
install, and inspect accordingly. 
4. To revise  the DRM and specifications to allow more  lateral 
tolerances in depicting detailed i tems. Those i tems presently 
simplified a r e  clamps and connectors shown in box form. 
Harnesses  could be shown as single heavy lines on the drawing 
in lieu of depicting the actual s ize  and specific enlarged views 
required . 
DECUSSION 
The documentation required to descr ibe large electr ical  installations 
are justifiably large. 
narness  installation location, hardware requirements,  and proper identifi- 
cation. 
Many pictorial  views are required to show wire  
W i r e  harness  routing is documented by using information taken 
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f rom a wir ing mockup. 
installed vary due to dimensional tolerances. 
views to be added to the drawings to document the differences between 
vehicles, i. e . ,  the as-installed configuration; thereby the s ize  and 
complexity of the drawing is increased. 
The actual vehicles on which the harnesses  are 
This variation causes more 
The procedures for documenting large wiring installations, developed 
ear ly  in the S-11 program, consisted of using a single multiple-sheet 
drawing for each major  a r e a  on the vehicle. 
extremely large and cumbersome as  the program progressed. 
These drawings became 
, 
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MAINTENANCE OF STAGE ELECTRICAL SCHEMATICS 
PROBLEM STATEhrIENT AND EFFECT 
r ly  in the S-II Program., each stage electr ical  
par t  of the as-built  data package was updated 
ematic book which 
h ree  incrementa 
to correspond to  (1 )  the stage a s  initially delivered to the static firing site, 
(2) as initially delivered to  the launch site, and (3) to the final flight config- 
uration. This caused concern during in-process modifications and trouble- 
shooting in that it wag difficult to ascer ta in  the exact as-built configuration. 
SOLUTION / RECOMMEND AT ION 
A schematic change package re lease  system was implemented t o  allow 
design changes to  be released incrementally and incorporated into the 
as-built  schematic book upon physical modification to the stage. 
DISCUSSION 
Implementation of the above resolved the problem with the S-II and 
In each case,  periodic reviews during manufacturing and at  
a modification of this system was implemented for  GSE and end-to-end 
schematics. 
the test  and launch sites a r e  required to verify compatibility of the a s -  
des'igned mas ter  schematic with the as-built mas ter  schematic. 
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AUTOMATIC CHECKOUT PROGRAMS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Automatic checkout tes t s  a r e  normally constructed to verify complete 
Component replacement requires  r e t e s t  to s tage  subsystems performance. 
ensure proper system and/or component operation. 
automatic checkout programs will require rerunning of entire subsystem 
tes t s  ; thus increasing checkout time unnecessarily. 
Improperly constructed 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
The S-I1 automatic checkout programs were re-writ ten in modular 
fashion f o r  checkout of system functions and individual components. 
example, the electr ical  power automatic checkout program has five different 
par t s  or procedures that had to be run to verify performance of the six dc 
bus networks, A repaired fai lure  in one bus network could be verified by 
selecting the electr ical  power program and going to the procedure that 
checks out the repaired bus power network and components. 
F o r  
; 
Adequate program options and program execution flexibil i ty a r e  essen-  
Display of prerequisite and initial conditions, and warnings of potential tial. 
hazardous conditions a t  the beginning of each of the modularized procedures 
wil l  provide the tes t  personnel with valuable tools. 
DISCUSSION 
Checkout of the S-XI stage at the manufacturing and static fir ing s i tes  
was accomplished by execution of computer software programs written to 
meet requirements per acceptance t e s t  specifications a t  t he  system level. 
Computer programs were writ ten to verify flight readiness of each S-I1 
stage by checkout of the following subsystems: ( 1 )  e lectr ical  power, 
( 2 )  pressurizat ion,  ( 3 )  engine, (4 )  propellant feed, ( 5 )  measurement,  
(6)  propellant management, (7)  propellant dispersion and range safety, 
(8) separation and, (9) engine actuation. 
Al l  programs were run and a l l  systems verified pr ior  to running the 
final simulated f l i gh t  program at the manufacturing and static fir ing s i tes .  
In the course of running the subsystem programs,  a component failure 
could occur within a system that had previously passed all acceptance tes t  
requirements,  A component fa i lure  in a system which invalidates a pre-  
requisite requirement f o r  testing another system will require  corrective 
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action pr ior  to successful checkout of the la t ter  system. 
corrective action has been taken and the defective component has been 
repaired o r  replaced, the problem is performing only that portion of 
retesting required to verify satisfactory operation of the first system. 
the r e t e s t  requirements a r e  fixed by system design, the amount of r e t e s t  
which must  be accomplished is governed by the construction of the  checkout 
program. The checkout programs for t h e  nine S-I1 subsystems mentioned 
above were writ ten in a modular form to accomplish checkout of individual 
components; thus simplifying the task of re tes t ,  
Once this 
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FUNGUS CONTROL 
LEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During functional checkout of the S-LI at the Mississippi Tes t  Facil i ty 
During these periods,  areas of 
1' , 
(MTF) the stage was often positioned in the test stand exposed to  the ele- 
ments fo r  periods of up to  several months. 
insulation on  the sidewall and forward sk i r t  darkened 9 s  a resu l t  of fungal 
attack. The degree of discoloration was severe enough to be noticeable at 
a distance of 100 yards f r o m  the vehicle. 
the infestation was concentrated on cork insulation ramps  coated with a 
fungus-resistant polyureth&e seal coat and fungus -resistant vinyl top 
coating. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDAT ION 
Visual assessment' revealed that 
The problem was resolved by cleaning the discolored insulation 
coatings with a solution of trisodium phosphate, chlorine, and water  
followed by re-application of the white vinyl top coat, when necessary.  
addition, periodic inspection of the vehicles was implemented to identify the 
fungal attack in i ts  ea r ly  s tages  and to arrest its growth with the cleaning 
solution. It was recommended that € o r  future exter ior  coatings where the 
mater ia l  will  be exposed to long t e r m ,  static,  outdoor exposure,  that 
periodic cleaning o r  fungus-inhibiting (not fungus resistant) coatings be 
resor ted  to. 
In 
DISC USS ION 
Laboratory evaluation revealed that the infestation occurred a6 a 
resu l t  of microbiological organisms present  in t h e  Mississippi atmosphere 
which attached themselves to the r amp  areas of the stage. 
were  nourished not by the coating, but r a the r  by particulate matter (dir t ,  
g rease ,  body oil, etc. 1 which accumulated on the stage surface. 
These organisms 
Rubber, plastic coatings, and paint films serving as physical b a r r i e r s  
between materials and microorganisms may prevent deterioration so long a s  
they remain  continuous and intact. 
erodes,  o r  becomes damaged o r  wet, degradation proceeds ra ther  rapidly. 
Although paint films are seldom broken down by microorganisms,  they are 
frequently splotched and blackened by mildew. 
of paint films subject to high humidity cause d i r t  to adhere to these films, 
Once the protective coating c racks ,  
Fungi growing on the surface 
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and the fungus then obtains nutrients f rom the di r t  and proliferates, 
compounds the problem of discoloration. 
This 
Because of the many contacts between the Lop coating mater ia l  and 
humans during operations, and due to ambient conditions and the  availability 
of nutrients, elimination of microbial  contamination is virtually impos Bible. 
The problem can be minimized, however, through good housekeeping and 
control measures .  The most  practical  and economical approach to resolu-  
tion of the present discoloration problem involves the use of a surface- 
active agent to wash the  stages followed by a resurfacing with a top coat 
containing a compatible fungicide. 
, 
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SPRAY FOAM EROSION ON LH2 TANK SIDEWALL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Use of an  erodable external insulation resulted in degradation of 
insulation quality around protuberances in high heating and shear  a reas .  
These protuberances contained components, such as LHZ feed lines and 
pyrotechnics , which must be protected from boundary layer  heating. 
SOLUTION / R E  COMMEN DATION 
Erosion b a r r i e r s  were installed to protect the spray foam insulation. 
In certain cr i t ical  a r e a s ,  foam was replaced with a honeycomb foam insula- 
tion, with high temperature  covers.  
erodable mater ia ls  be avoided in a reas  in which system o r  component fa i lure  
could r e su l t  f rom mater ia l  loss.  
erodable mater ia l  with an erosion bar r ie r .  
It is recommended that the use of 
If such use cannot be avoided, protect the 
1 DISCUSSION 
Spray foam insulation was proposed to replace the helium-purged 
foam-filled honeycomb insulation a s  the LH2 tank sidewall insulation. 
spray foam provided lower overal l  costs and weights for a more  efficient 
thermal  insulation. Pre l iminary  tes ts  indicated a good resis tance to 
erosion at  room temperature ,  and a good resis tance to thermal degradation 
a t  very low shear  s t r e s s .  
The 
The simulation requirement for a flight-environment time history of 
temperature  and shear  s t r e s s e s  led to  a t e s t  program on the X-15 airplane. 
The use of t e s t  data (including t ra jectory information, static and pitot 
p re s  su re  measurements ,  in-flight photography, post-f light examination, grid 
imbedded thermocouple data) and digital computation programs with detailed 
thermal  models,  led to a method of predicting the erosion-time history for  
panels experiencing the basic sidewall environment and the environment 
near  protuberances. The predictions of erosion near protuberances led to 
requirements f o r  protection of the foam against those losses  which would 
permit  hot boundary layer gas  to impinge on temperature sensitive com- 
ponents, such as LHZ feed lines and pyrotechnics. 
bonded to the sp ray  foam and penetrating the foam to a position close to the 
tank wall was proposed, Difficulties a rose  in preventing debond of the  cork 
f rom the foam, o r  cracking and debonding of the foam f rom the tank sidewall. 
High-density cork 
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Thus ,  in especially cr i t ical  regions near protuberances,  the spray-foam 
cork ba r r i e r  is replaced with a foam fil led honeycomb with a high 
temperature  cover. 
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CORK/FOAM DEBOND BACKGROUND 
RROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Upon S-I1 propellant detanking the  cryopumped gasses  expand and 
build up p r e s s u r e  within the insulation causing cork foam debonds. 
were  made to  seal all potential leakage areas. 
not successful in eliminating the cork/foam debond problem. ~ 
Attempts 
This solution technique was 
SO L U  T ION /RE C OMMEN DATION 
The source of the leakage was t raced to the fairing standoffs. Isolating 
the cork f r o m  the fair ing standoffs has  eliminated these as potential problem 
areas. Testing (Reference 1) has shown no problems around the isolated 
standoffs and tanking his tor ies  on S-11-9 and subs have shown no debonds 
originating f r o m  the isolated fair ing standoffs. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
Cord bonded over foam is used in conjunction with the cork and core  
rail configuration to protect t he  underlying foam f r o m  excessive erosion 
during the boost phase of the Saturn V mission. The cork over foam design 
has been proven adequate through laboratory testing (Reference 2 )  and stage 
preflight tests. 
debonds as the r e s u l t  6f the  cryopumping of condensible gasses  through leak 
paths in the insulation. 
There have been problems,  however, with cork to foam 
A test program with analysis was undertaken to attempt to duplicate the 
conditions leading to the debond problems, 
(Reference 3 )  that ,  if l eaks  occur in the insulation and if air is allowed 
to cryopurnp, the cryopurnped gasses  on expansion will resu l t  in the debond 
conditions observed in the S-I1 insulation. 
This program did confirm 
Various techniques were  considered f o r  solving the cork debond 
problem. 
to reduce the s ize  of any debond area, grooving t h e  foam surface under the  
cork to allow fo r  venting of any cryopurnped gasses, sealing of all a r e a s  
which could constitute a potential leak path, and isolating potential leak paths 
f rom the  cork/foam areas. 
These included perforation of the cork with a specific hole pattern 
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The resu l t s  of the effort to groove the foam o r  perforate the cork 
(Reference 1) showed these techniques to be unsuccessful in preventing 
large debonds f r o m  occurring. Sealing of the leakage areas has been suc- 
cessful to some degree as observed from the stage post-test observations. 
However, it has been shown tha t  100 percent giealing cannot be achieved and 
cork/foam debonds will  still occur where there are sufficient leakage 
conditions, 
REFEREN.CES 
1. ''S-E- 12 Cork Debond Investigation and Evaluation of Repair 
Techniques, ' I  Ltr 7685-4553 (May 11, 1970). 
2. Structural  Verification of Cork Over Spray Foam in Hot-Spot 
Areas  of Saturn S-I1 Stage, (July 15, 1970) SD 69-96. 
3 ,  "Cork Debond Evaluation When Subjected to Entrapped, Vaporized 
LN2, I '  Ltr 7159-4540 (February  27, 1970). 
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The heat t ransfer  through the common bulkhead was found t o  be higher 
than predicted because the effective gas heat t ransfer  was grea te r  than p re -  
dicted due to  convective circulation in the 3 / 8  by 4. 75-inch honeycomb cells. 
The increased heat t ransfer  caused the pressurizing gas in the LOX tank to  
be chilled more  than planned, thus resulting in a GOX pres su re  decay. The 
heat ra te  to  the liquid hydrogen was a l so  increased. 
SOLUTION / REG OMMENDATION 
* The heat t ransfer  through the corrrmon bulkhead was reduced by con- 
necting a vacuum pump to  the bulkhead and reducing the pressure .  
reduced the quantity of gas in the honeycomb which therefore reduced the 
heat t ransfer  by changing the heat t ransfer  mode f rom convection t o  conduc- 
tion. In determining the heat t ransfer  through a honeycomb structure,  the 
convection a s  well a s  the conduction of the gas should be included in the 
o r ig ina 1 he at  t ransfer  eva lua t i on. 
This 
DISCUSSION 
Prior to  liftoff the LOX tank i s  pressurized with helium gas. 
chilling of the gas during f i r s t  stage boost caused the tank pressure  to  drop. 
Pre-chilling the helium t o  below 350 F a s  delivered to the LOX tank was 
impractical ,  a s  was the redesign of the valving and tank structure.  During 
pre-launch, there  was a purge of the cavity between the two facing sheets 
of the common bulkhead, 
modified and vacuum pumps were utilized to  lower the pressure,  thus reduc- 
ing heat leak and changing heat t ransfer  mode f rom circulation in the 
individual cells  to  conduction, 
Added 
The requirement for a continuous purge was 
1 
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HONEYCOMB RAIL DEBOND 
During LHz/LOX cryogenic tankage of the first S-II s-tages utiliz 
SOFI (spray-on foam insulation) at the Mississippi Test  Faci  
1 ' foam debonds occurred, Detailed investigation revealed that 
honeycomb r a i l  was debonded f rom the LHz tank wall, The r a i l  had been 
bonded with a 0. 0035-inch-thick glass scrim/Lefkoweld adhesive system 
utilizing vacuum bag p res su re  to maintain intimate contact. The r a i l  wag ~ 
8 feet long, approximately 7- 1 /2 inches wide, and 1. 6 inches deep a t  the 
heel tapering to  0. 4 inch at  the toe, The r a i l  was debonded acrosB the width 
for the full length except for approximately 3/4 inch a t  the toe. A cursory 
evaluation brought the thickness of the adhesive system into questidn. Pre- 
liminary measurements  revealed the adhesive thickness a t  the heel t o  be a 
nominal 50 mil thickriess.tapering across  the width to  20 mils. The debond 
had occurred a t  a t ime that the stage was subjected to -423  F temperatures 
a t  a s t r e s s  level of around 54000 p s i  in the base metal, At this  time, it was 
suspected that the thick adhesive had caused excessive shear s t ra ins  a t  the 
bond line. The problem was to  prove the cau'se of debond, determine the 
allowable adhesive thickness, and modify the design and processing to 
prevent recurrence.  
I 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The bonding process  was changed to  a s su re  r a i l  bond line thicknesses 
No failures were encoun- 
of l e s s  than 0. 023 inch, 
jected to a second cryogenic proof p re s su re  test ,  
tered,  
failures were  encountered during cryogenic proof tes ts ,  
DISCUSSION 
The damaged stage r a i l s  were reworked and sub- 
All subsequent stages were built by the new process. No further 
Spray foam insulation was partially or  totally used on the S-11-4 and 
subsequent stages t o  replace the 1, 6-inch honeycomb thermal  insulation. In 
the single and multiple shock protuberance areas ,  it was found that the foam 
experienced excessive heating and erosion, thereby requiring protection 
f rom aerodynamic shear. 
The foam 
erosion was prevented by bonding foam-filled 3/8-inch honeycomb core  
The erosion mainly occurred in the regions 
2 feedline fairing and the fill-and-drain fairings. 
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r a i l s  in a rectangular arrangement  around the fairings. Sheets of 
30-pound-per-foot, 1 /4-inch-thick cork were  bonded over the foam and r a i l s  
so that the cork protected the foam f r o m  aerodynamic shear,  
F r o m  previous experience it was known that relatively thick bond lines 
will fail  due t o  the rma l  s t r e s s e s  when chilled to  cryogenic temperatures .  
The main question concerned the specific value of the maximum allowable 
thickness, A t e s t  p rogram was initiated to  identify the cr i t ical  bond line 
thickness, The testing was accomplished by constructing aluminum dogbone 
tensile specimens 3 inches wide and 24 inches long and bonding a represent-  
ative c r o s s  section of the r a i l  to  the aluminum, 
were  then subjected to  tensile s t r e s s  of 54, 000 psi, at -423  F. 
men failed in bond line shear  a t  various tensile s t r e s s e s  depending on the 
particular adhesive thickness. After testing, each r a i l  bond line was 
removed and the thickness was measured in a grid pattern. The adhesive 
thermal  s t ra in  plus the applied mechanical strain were  than calculated as  
a function of the bond line thickness for each tes t  specimen. The thermal  
s t ra in  increased with thickness, thereby increasing the thermal  portion of 
the bond line shear ,  
failed at  lower applied mechanical s t ra ins .  
thermal  plus mechanical s t ra in  of less than 0. 00105 inch  per  inch passed 
with no failures,  whereas a l l  specimens subjected to  total s t ra ins  above 
0. 0011 inch per  inch failed, F r o m  these data, it was apparent that the 
0, 050-inch stage ra i l s  had failed f rom excessive thermal  strain.  
culated stage cryogenic plus mechanical s t ra ins  were then calculated versus  
bond line thickness for the cryogenic proof tes t  and superimposed on the test 
resul ts ,  
stage s t ra ins  revealed the maximum allowable bond line thickness to  be 
0. 023  inch. The stage rail bond line thickness was mapped and it was found 
that the a r e a s  on the rail toe which did not debond were  l e s s  than 0. 023 inch 
while the debonded portions were grea te r  than this value. 
These dogbone specimens 
The speci- 
The t e s t s  revealed that the thicker bond line specimens 
A l l  specimens with a total 
6 
The cal-  
The crossing of t h e  0, 00105 inch-per-inch allowable line and the 
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FLEXIBLE CLOSEOUTS (RUBBER DOUBLERS) 
AND EFFECT 
During cryogenic testing of the first S-I1 flight stages, cracking of the 
insulation rubber doublers occurred. Cause of the problem, and redesign 
implementation if required,  had t o  be determined in time to  support launch 
schedules; otherwise, launch delays would occur. 
SO LUTIQN/RECOMMENDATIQN u 
The rubber doublers (RTV 560 silicon rubber tape)  were replaced with 
nylon/Narmco 7343 wet layups which proved capable of withstanding environ- 
mental  ext r eme s. 
DISCUSSION 
- The S-11-1, S-11-2, and S-11-3 were  thermally insulated with 3/4-inch 
cell  foam-filled HRP honeycomb core  1. 6 inches deep with a phenolic nylon 
outer facing sheet. 
quar ter  panels over the ent i re  surface a r e a  except for  a 5-inch region 
around the per imeter .  
welded into the complete LH2 tank. 
was then filled with bonded insulation s t r ips  to comp,lete 1 00-percent insula- 
tion of the LH2 tank, 
outer phenolic nylon facing had to be spliced a t  the butted edges, 
accomplished by using 2-inch-wide RTV 560 silicon rubber tape to  bridge 
the butted joint, 
These insulation panels were bonded to  the hydrogen tank 
This region was not insulated until a l l  panels were 
The close-out a r e a  over the weld lands 
Due t o  s t ructural  compatibility requirements,  the 
This was 
During LH2 tankage t e s t s  at the Mississippi Test  Facility these flexible 
closeouts began to  c rack  due t o  the cold environment. 
system was designed for  continuous gaseous helium purging, leaks occurred, 
causing a n  overload on the ground purge system. 
dinal closeouts 90 degrees  apar t  and six circumferential  closeouts with a 
total  length of approximately 19, 000 inches. 
in some places long s t r ip s  of the rubber ma te r i a l  fractured, The RTV 5 6 0  
silicone had undergone a second-order transit ion and become brit t le due t o  
excessively low temperatures  even though this mater ia l  was reported by 
specification to  be usable down to  -220 F. The worst  outer surface temper-  
a ture  was predicted to  be -160 F on a 28 F Florida day with 0. 8 inch of f ros t  
over the surface. 
Since the insulation 
There were  four longitu- 
Numerous c racks  occurred and 
i Since the stage would be re-tanked with LH2 on the 
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countdown demonsfration t e s t  a t  Kennedy Space Flight Center in Florida and 
on launch it was imperative that the cause of the problem be 
nd that the necessary redesign and rework be accomplished 
tdown demonstration test .  
hvestigations a s  to  the cause of the problem revealed that the flexible 
In the 
closeouts had become excessively cold. 
was designed to  be filled with isocyanate foam to  prevent convection, 
normal  fabrication process,  the phenolic facing sheet was first bonded to  
the HRP 3 /4  inch honeycomb core,  
100 by 300 inches. 
the open side and recessed  1 / 8  inch to  allow purge circulation under the 
vented core. 
size to  fit the quarter  panels. 
hexcells which gave little support to  the impressed isocyanate foam. On 
l a te r  closeout assemblies  the facing sheets had t o  be spliced for  s t ra in  com- 
patibility; however, there  was no requirement f o r  core  splicing since no 
shear  forces  existed. 
foam on the assembled stages in the butted imperfect cells  under the flexible 
closeouts. When the L H 2  tank was la te r  filled with liquid hydrogen, convec- 
tion occurred in the open cells under the closeout, causing the silicone rubber 
closeout to  reach temperatures  a s  low a s  -240 F. Since a l l  rubber com- 
pounds have a second- order  transit ion a t  various cryogenic temperatures ,  
the mechanical propert ies  of RTV 560 were determined by tensile testg. The 
t e s t s  revealed that the secbnd-order transit ion occurred somewhere between 
-50 F to -100 F. 
increasingly brittle. 
temperature  that the elongation of the rubber could stand under s t ra in  appli- 
cation was -160 to  -180 F. 
eliminated and a phenolic nylon closeout was used with a polyurethane bond- 
ing system, 
foam was replaced in the core  butts pr ior  t o  bonding the closeouts. 
cryogenic tankages of the reworked stages proved to  be trouble free.  
The 3/4-inch cel l  honeycomb core  
The panel s ize  was approximately 
The isocyanate foam was then pressed  into the cells on 
It was found that the bonded assembly was la ter  t r immed to  
This tr imming operation left cut or  partial  
Later  evaluation revealed that there  was no isocyanate 
f 
Below these temperatures  the rubber compound became 
Evaluation t e s t s  indicated that the lowest allowable 
For  this reason, the RTV 560 closeout was 
On the rework o r  repa i r  operations for the stages the isocyanate 
Later 
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FAILURE OF OUTER LAMINATE FOR 1 .&INCH PURGED INSULATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Ear ly  tes t  and flight stages utilized purged insulation for  thermal  
protection of the LH2. 
foam supported in a heat  res is tant  phenolic (HRP) honeycomb co re  and 
sealed on the outer surface by a tedlar-nylon-phenolic laminate. The 
composite was bonded to the external surface of the LH2 tank. Channels 
were cut diagonally through the bottom of each cel l  in the HRP core  to 
permit  the passage of the helium purge gas along the surface of the LH2 
tank structure.  The purge gas  served the dual function of ( 1 )  preventing 
intrusion of air which could condense along the cryogenic surfaces and 
(2 )  providing a capability for identification of s t ructural  leaks through 
analysis of the effluent purge gas. The system was pressurized in the 
cours-e of manufacturing and ins tallation to ensure s t ructural  integrity of 
the composite. 
were  loaded. 
ienced in the adhesive bond line that joined the outer laminate to the HRP core. 
The insulation composite was made of polyurethane 
It was also pressurized to operational levels while cryogens . 
During these periods of pressurization failures were exper- 
I 
Fai lure  of this type during cryogenic operations voided insulation 
performance, created hazardous cryopumping conditions, and precluded 
detection of leaks in the LH2 tank structure.  
SOLUTION /REG OMMENDATION 
An extensive program was undertaken to determine the causes of the 
failures and establish correct ive actions. Changer, were  made to: 
1 .  
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6. 
Strengthen specifications 
Enhance producibility and improve quality 
Improve quality assurance 
Bring fabrication of the basic 'insulation in-house 
Expand manufacturing capability and sophis tication 
Develop repair  capability. 
B 
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The principal technical problem was found to be the choice of adhesive 
ing the outer laminate to the HRP core. 
f rom Type I to Type I1 to increase the bond line thickness. 
The HT 424 adhesive was 
The initial significant defect was the delamination of a large section of 
the forward bulkhead insulation on the CBTT. 
mately six feet long by three fee t  wide. 
p ressure .  
previously, fo r  example: 
This section was approxi- 
Fai lure  occurred  a t  low internal 
Analysis of this one failure tr iggered each of the actions lieted 
1. Areas  with little o r  no imprint f r o m  the honeycomb core indicating 
that the supplier did not apply proper bonding p res su re  a t  the 
time of fabrication. 
2. Lack of stubble (small pieces of core)  in the imprint which 
indicates substandard adhesive strength, possibly due to overage 
adhesive. 
i 3 .  Inclusion of small pieces of core  and foam lying flat ac ross  the 
imprints--no bond to HRP. 
4. Wrinkles in the adhesive indicating that the adhesive o r  co re  was 
moved af ter  being put in place and before bonding. 
The HT424 adhesive is a modified epoxy supported on fiberglas c a r r i e r  
I t  was initially selected based on laboratory demonstration of ability cloth. 
to meet  temperature and s t ructural  requirements. 
s e l  
change to Type I1 adhesive approximately doubled the bondline thickness. 
This provided the advantage of a m o r e  generous fillet between the laminate 
and the HRP co re  and is  more  tolerant of mismatches and defects in the 
core.  This change, combined with the improved processing, quality, manu- 
facturing, and test procedures,  resulted in elimination of bondline failures 
due to fabric a tion. 
Type I adhesive was 
because i t  is  approximately 50 percent of the weight of Type 11. The 
, 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
On the S-I1 insulation system, seve ra l  changes were  made during 
development. 
in cryogenic technology generated by NASA/MSFC, o r  (2)  des i re  for product 
improvement. The insulation sys tem resulting from each change has met  o r  
exceeded the s y s  t em requirements.  
Each change was instituted a s  a resul t  of (1) new knowledge 
SO14UTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The insulation sys tem design as initially proposed was based upon the 
An insulation sys tem using 0. 3 3  inch 
requirement that i t  limit the LH2 boiloff during ground hold to less than 
6 percent of tanked quantity per  hour. 
of foam supported by phenolic glass  honeycomb and sealed with glass phenolic 
laminate w a s  proposed. 
i Following an extensive investigation of the phenomenon of stratification 
of LHz in large diameter tanks, NAsA/MSFC required the insulation thick- 
n e s s  to be extended to 0. 8 inch. 
include effective thermal  conductivity of 0. 7 Btu/in. per  f t 2 / h r / " F  to meet  
a l l  program missions.  
This requirement was la ter  changed to 
Following an evaluation program, the design was changed to a 1.6-inch- 
thick foam-filled honeycomb helium-purged system. This design was later 
changed to sprayable polyurethane foam, which resulted in an improvement 
i n  performance and a marked reduction in  weight. 
DISCUSSION 
The chronological evolution of the insulation system is shown in 
Figure 2. While helium was used to preclude the intrusion of air into the 
insulation, it a lso provided for a sys tem to detect defects in the LH2 tank 
s t ruc ture  with no weight penalty to the stage by passing the helium through 
the channels cut in the bottom of the honeycomb. 
Although six insulation sys tems were  evaluated on the program, only two 
were  installed on the flight stages.  
1 .  The 1. 6-inch honeycomb helium purged insulation was used on 
stages 23-11-1 through S-11-7. 
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2. Spray foam insulation was employed on S-11-8 through S-LI-15. 
Table 4 is a matrix which shows the insulation used in individual areas on 
each stage. 
Performance of all stages in flight has  exceeded requirements as 
follows : 
1. Ground hold LH2 boiloff 
Allow ab le 
P r i o r  stages 
S-11-8 
S-11-9 
s-11- 10 Not measured 
159 lb LH2 per  minute (6  percent pe r  hour) 
110 lb LH2 pe r  minute 
49. 5 lb LH2 per  minute (MTF - cold day) 
57 lb LH2 per minute (MTF - hot day) 
2. Flight, total heat to LH2 from all sources  
’ Allowable . 209 ,000  B ~ u  
P r i o r  stages 140,000- 170,000 Btu 
S-11-8 65,000 Btu 
s-11-9 65, 000 Btu  (estimate) 
s-11- 10 65, 000 Btu (estimate) 
3 .  LH2 temperature  a t  engine inlet at T-22 seconds 
Redline -420. 5 F 
S-11-8 -422. 1 F 
S-11-9 -422 F 
s-11- 10 -421.8 F 
4. LH2 temperature  a t  engine s t a r t  
Allow able 
S-11-8 
S-11-9 
s-11- 10 
-416. 3 F (43.7 psia) 
:422.0 F ( T  t 165 sec)  
-422,4 F ( T  t 166 sec)  
-422.2 F (T t 162 sec)  
Total  cryogenic experience is shown in Table 5 .  
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WELDED 6061 ALUMINUM FOR AEROSPACE HARDWARE 
PRORLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Base metal c racks  occur f rom high frequency arc impingement during 
manual gas  tungsten arc  welding of 6061 aluminum alloy. 
i n g  occurs  on many fillet weld joints which resu l t s  in excessive repairs .  
This type of crack-  
Cracking also occurs  on manual butt and fillet welds at start and stop 
areas on material thicknesses of less than 0.050 inch. 
a par t  number of this type showed that 50  percent of the assemblies  required 
f rom one to  seven rework operations pe r  part .  
An investigation of 
Heat t reatment  of 6061 welded assemblies  has a lso been a problem 
These weld assemblies  a r e  extremely during S-I1 hardware fabrication. 
crack-sensit ive , resulting in numerous repairs and hardware schedule 
delays. 
j SO LU TLON /KECOMMEN DATION 
High-frequency cracking is a typical problem associated with the 
There is no known solution to this xvelding of 6061 aluminum mater ia l .  
problem except a change in the material to  be welded. 
operators  were given special  training to improve their  welding technique 
\s.-tiic h reduced the magnitude of the problem. 
However, the welding 
* 
The weld "heat treat" problem was solved by a design change to an  
"as welded" assembly. 
A recommendation was made to replace all 6061 material requiring 
welding with the 5000 Series  alloys on any follow-on contract. 
will completely eliminate the high frequency cracking on the par t s  h 
question. 
This change 
UIS c u ss ION 
The 6061 welding problem originates with the development of the alloy 
by the a l m i n u m  producers.  Cracking has always been present ,  but in  the 
past  this alloy was the only weldable alloy that could be heat t reated after 
\veldiiig. A welding technique f o r  2014 alloy was developed on t h e  Saturn 
Program, and 2219 and 2021 weldable alloys are ve ry  recent  developments. 
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Although the aluminum companies still list 6061 as a weldable alloy, their 
technical representatives admit the inferior characteristics of this material. 
Since the melting practices for the 6061 are  not as closely controlled as 
other structural alloys, the cracking sensitivity appears to be related to the 
purity of the alloy. In recent years the industry trend has been to eliminate 
6061 material from welded assemblies and to replace it with more readily 
weldable alloy such as the 5000 Series materials. 
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WELD I N T E R S E C T I O N S  AND STRESS RELIEFS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
A review of the LH2 tank cylinder welds was performed in 1964 af ter  
receipt of new test data concerning weld allowable strength.  
the s t r e s s  analysis indicated a marginal  condition in the ver t ica l  weld joining 
the circumferent ia l  weld (weld c ros sove r ) ,  
iinposed on the ver t ica l  weld juncture,  the circumfergntial  weldland thickness 
was reduced (commonly r e fe r r ed  to as "s t ress  relief ' I )  in t h e  f i r s t  bay on 
each side of the c rossover  (F igure  3 ). 
to the S-11-7 proof p r e s s u r e  test revealed a crack in each of the two " s t r e s ~ i  
reliefs. I '  
At this t ime 
In an effort  t o  reduce the load 
An inspection per formed subsequent 
SO LU TION /RE COMMEN DAT IOB 
Tes t s  were  per formed on sma l l  laboratory specimens which reproduced 
the plastic deformation of t h e  "s t ress  relief I I  region and ass i s ted  in stress 
analysis of the weld c rossover  region. 
for  use in the Mater ia l  Review disposition of the S-PI-7 cracked regions and 
was verified by test of welded panels. 
S-U-9 and subsequent vehicles. 
S-zl[- 11 and subsequent designs which improved the c rossover  design 
(F igure  3 ). 
s t ruc tura l  integrity of the c rossover  region fo r  a l l  f l i g h t  stages.  
descr ibed above a r e  documented in detail  i n  the reference.  
I A r epa i r  technique was developed 
"Stress re l ie fs"  were  eliminated on 
Large  gussets  w e r e  incorporated into the 
Subsequent la rge  panel t e s t s  were  performed which verified the 
The tests 
Although the addition of "stress re l ie fs ' '  in t h e  LHZ tank may have 
reduced the stress levels at the weld c ros sove r ,  the discontinuity stresses 
induced into the "stress rel ief"  a r e a  by local notch effects resul ted in a 
marginal  condition. Therefore ,  the overal l  design of the c rossover  region 
w a s  not improved. 
notch effects. 
One solution would have been a "s t ress  relief ' I  without 
The solution incorporated into t h e  S-E- 11 design was to add a l a r g e r  
transit ion gusset  at the weldland intersection. 
gusset caused the total  load at the weld intersect ion to be distributed over 
a l a rge r  a r e a  thereby reducing the peak stress level at the weld intersection. 
The addition of the l a r g e r  
1-41 
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
LONGITUDINAL LOADING 
Design 04-02 
t t  t3 
", 
3r 
WELD CROSSOVER VERTICAL WELDLAND 
STRESS RELIEF ORIGINAL DESIGN 
It 2 I / 1 CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDLAND/ 
I i i  I 3  3 3 
13 
HOOP 
1OADlNG 
OMITTED FOR CLARITY) 
Figure  3 .  LH2 Tank Weld Intersection 
It is recommended extra attention be given to  design improvements 
Component testing which may induce marginal  conditions in other areas. 
would be recommended to avoid such problems. 
DISCUSSION 
Weld c rossovers  in the Saturn S-XI LH2 tank are formed by the  inter-  
section of longitudinal and circumferential  weldlands (Figure 3). 
circumferential  weldland thickness causes a "belly band" res t ra in t  in  and 
nea r  the land which results in a hoop stress at the land which is about 80 per -  
cent of the basic membrane hoop stress. 
reduced in the circumferent ia l  land, the hoop load per  inch is increased. 
This apparent contradiction is due to  the fact that the weldland hoop load is 
the product of the weldland hoop stress and land thickness which is greater 
than the product of the skin hoop stress and skin thickness. 
the highest hoop loads (and stress) occurring at the  weld crossovers .  
The 
Although the hoop stress is 
This resul ts  in 
Receipt of new test data concerning weld allowable strength and sub- 
sequent stress analysis of the weld crossover  indicated a marginal condition. 
In an effort to reduce the load imposed on the  ver t ical  weld junction it was 
first recommended tha t  t he  circumferential  weldlands be reduced in thickness \ 
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between each stringer boss, 
resulted in a design having the reduced w 
stringer bay on each side of the crossover. T 
incorporate these "stress reliefs" was S-II-2. 
a problem existed until the room-temperature 
(pneumostat) of the S-U-7 Stage. An inspection performed subsequent to the 
pneumostat revealed a crack in each of the  two !!stress reliefs. ' I  
However, th 
Several actions were started soon after the results of t h e  S-XI-7 
pneumostat were known. 
specimens which reproduced the plastic distortion of the 'Istress relief 
found on S-II-7 and assisted in s t r e s s  analysis of the weld+crossover region. 
A repair technique was  developed for usre in Material  Review disposition of 
the S-II-7 cracked regions and was verified by test of welded panels. 
Further inspection was performed on previous production articles, and 
prior Material Review actions were reappraised. 
that. the "stress reliefs 
region, the decision was made to revise the design at the earliest possible 
change point, 
and the exact amount of interaction between the  crossover weld and the 
l 'stress reliefs" was not known. 
was taken. 
models. 
a t  the crossover. 
into the crossover to be distributed over a larger area,  reducing the peak 
s t ress  at the intersection. 
Tests were performed on small  laboratory 
When it became apparent 
did not improve the overall strength af the crossover 
At  this  time, the large panel tests had not been performed 
Therefore, a conservative design approach 
"Stress reliefs" were eliminated at  §-11-9 and subsequent 
The §-LI-11 design was changed to have a larger gussetted region 
The addition of the larger gusset caused the total load 
Evaluation of the test resultas found (in retrospect) that removal of the 
"stress reliefs" was not mandatory, As  documented in the reference, an 
adequate factor of safety exists in any "stress relief" that has passed inspec- 
tion subsequent to proof test. 
improved the  crossover region. 
Also,  the larger gussets of the S-Lt-11 design 
REFERENCES 
1. Vroman, G. A . ,  and Johneon, D. W. , "Weld Repair and Defect 
Simulation, Test Program Structural Evaluation Report, I '  
N R  STR-SS-69-1, (January, 1969). 
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CRACKING OF 2020-Tb EXTRUSIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Skin-stringer assem'blies on the S-11-4 forward  s k i r t ,  aft sk i r t ,  
in ters tage,  and thrus t  cone were  found to have many cracked s t r ingers .  
cracks were  in the vicinity of the s t r inger  foot-sidewall intersection aqd 
usually occurred  nea r  r ing frames. 
the 2020 aluminum alloy. 
The 
The S-11-4 was  the first vehicle using ' 
An extensive investigation was  initiated to determine the cause of the 
s t r inger  cracking and to  recommend the necessary  remedial  action to  be 
used on the nonpressurized s t ruc tu res  of the S-LZ vehicle. 
of 2020 aluminum alloy, and the weight-saving it afforded, was dependent 
upon the r e su l t s  of this  investigation. 
The continued use 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The cracked  s t r inge r s  w e r e  replaced,  and new installation procedures  
were  introduced to  insure  special  handling of the 2020 aluminum alloy. 
impact f a s t ene r s  (conventional r i ve t s )  were  replaced by nonimpact fasteners 
(screws ,  bolts,  Hi-loks). Also, s t r inger  foot dihedral  angle limitations 
were  imposed on the  s t r inger  extrusions which, with new shimming requi re -  
ments ,  prevented unacceptable built-in s t r e s s e s  in the s t r inge r  feet. 
All 
DISCUSSION 
A redes ign  of the nonpressurized sections of the S-I1 vehicle (forward 
sk i r t ,  aft sk i r t ,  in te rs tage ,  and thrus t  cone) was initiated f o r  the purpose of 
saving weight, thus increasing the payload capability of the Saturn V booster. 
In addition to the use of a lower factor  of safety (1.3 ver sus  1.4), a change i n  
s t r inger  material was introduced, with 2020-T6 aluminum extrusions sub- 
stituted f o r  the 7075 alloy, The s-11-4 was selected as the first vehicle to  
incorporate  the weight-saving changes. The 2020 alloy offered the following 
advantages : 
1. High tensile and compressive s t rength 
2. High modulus of e las t ic i ty  
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3 .  Low density 
4. Favorable elevated temperature performance 
lxowever , the alloy also had the following unfavorable properties : 
1. Poor ductility, especially in the transverse direction 
2. Low resistance to tearing 
3 .  Crack propagation energy is low 
4. Notch sensitive 
Fabrication experience on 2020 aluminum alloy is  very limited. 
N R  Columbus Division used it in plate and sheet form on the A-5C airframe, 
but this was the f i r s t  time the material  was used in the extruded form. Only 
limited knowledge was available concerning its behavior, metallurgical 
characteristics, the effects of the extrusion processes,  and the special 
provisions required in the design and manufacturing of deliverable items 
when the material  is used in this form. Tests were runon the new material  
to determine its chemical and mechanical properties, and these tests 
indicated that all specification requirements were met. Limited tests were 
also conducted to  obtain information on machining, drilling, and riveting of 
this material ,  and no problems were disclosed. This led to the erroneous 
conclusion that the 2020  alloy could be handled by existing shop techniques 
adapted to high-strength aluminum alloys. 
The 
In February,  1966, stringer cracks were discovered in panel 
assemblies of the 5-11-4 interstage. 
launched to determine the cause of the cracks,  the extent of the problem, 
and the remedial  action required. 
a s  well as within, were consulted. 
f o r  the investigation, the details and results of the extensive test effort 
expended, and the conclusions reached concerning the cause of the cracks. 
Reference 2 delineates the results of a meeting with expert Alcoa laboratory 
representatives, and a review of their t e s t  and manufacturing data. Details 
and results of a follow-on laboratory test effort, recommended by the initial 
investigation, a r e  also included. Reference 3 summarizes the test  results 
and conclusions drawn from the completed investigation into the  problem of 
2020 aluminum extrusion cracking, plus the design and manufacturing 
changes required f o r  the continued use of t h i s  alloy. 
the structural  and acoustic tests conducted on panel assemblies and the 
results obtained. 
An exhaustive investigation was 
Technical personnel outside the Company, 
Reference 1 describes the plan of action 
Reference 4 describes 
i 
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A complete inspection of the S-II-4 nonpressurized s t ruc ture  revealed 
that  no s t r inge r s  w e r e  cracked before they w e r e  installed in panel a s sem-  
blies. Twenty to  thir ty  percent  of all installed extrusions had c racks ,  and 
these c racks  w e r e  in the vicinity of t h e  s t r inge r  foot-sidewall intersection. 
The c racks  occurred  mos t  frequently in locations where  the sidewalls were  
constrained o r  nea r  r ing f r a m e s .  All c racks  found were  associated with t h e  
point of impact  of a riveting gun. The conclusion drawn f r o m  the investiga- 
t ion was that the c racks  were  mechanical failures due ei ther  to  static 
(tensile) overload result ing f r o m  overs t ress ing  during installation, o r  to 
bending result ing f r o m  mismatching of the ma te r i a l  to the mating pa r t s .  
There  was no stress cor ros ion  cracking. Y 
It became evident that  the 2020 aluminum alloy requi res  gentler c a r e  
in  handling, improved tooling, t ighter tolerance on extrusion shape control,  
m o r e  comprehensive quality control procedures ,  and new joining techniques. 
The ma jo r  innovations initiated included the use of non-impact f a s t ene r s  
(hi-loks,  s c rews ,  and bolts) in place of impact f a s t ene r s  (conventional r ive ts ) ,  
.rigid shimming requirements  in hard attachment zones to  eliminate exces-  
sive s t r a in  during assembly ,  and s t r i c t e r  design s t r inger  contour control to 
minimize s t r inge r  to parent  s t ruc ture  mismatch. These changes, together 
with improvements in handling, tooling, machining, and inspection 
procedures ,  renewed confidence in the use  of th i s  new alloy. 
Successful comprehensive testing (acoustic and s t ruc tura l )  of panel 
assemblies fabricated using the revised techniques, completed the clean bill 
of health given to  2020-T6 extrusions.  
The major  lesson  learned  f r o m  the 2020 cracking problem is  t h a t  new 
mater ia l s  requi re  m o r e  than the usual specification verification tes t s  f o r  
chemical  and mechanical propert ies .  
expended to provide guidelines f o r  sat isfactory handling and fabrication 
procedures .  
cially suspect  and signal a need fo r  special  attention. 
Additional testing efforts mus t  be 
Mater ia ls  with adverse  t r ansve r se  propert ies  should be espe-  
REFERENCES 
1. SID 66T- 18, hvestigatrion of X2020-T65 11 Aluminum Alloy Stringer 
Cracking Problem,  March 23, 1966 
2. Addendum to SID 66T-18, June 21, 1966. 
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3 .  SID 66T-15A, J 
March 16, 196 
4. Addendum 1 to SID 661'-15, May, 1966. 
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STRESS CORROSION SUSCEPTIBLE PARTS ON S-I I STAGE 
L 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Subsequent to initial design release of the S-II stage, approximately 
300 components were identified a s  fabricated from s t r e s s  corrosion- 
susceptible materials. 
s t r e s s  corrosion failures on production vehicles. 
Redesign and controls were required to preclude 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Material changes were made, where feasible, and a ,corrosion inspec- 
tion specification (MA0609-009) was written encompassing all the susceptible 
parts. This specification covered the  inspection procedure, part  number, 
actual location of each part,' and when each inspection should take place. 
In addition to the conltrols noted in MA0609-009, a recommendation 
was made to the customer to replace all susceptible materials for  follow-on 
contracts with nonsusceptible materials. 
DIS c u SSION 
Although i n  t h e  early stages of the S-I1 design some consideration was 
given to s t r e s s  corrosion susceptible materials,  the Customer requested a 
review of all S-11 hardware from a s t ress  corrosion standpoint. 
Customer also requested that adequate controls be established to preclude 
and/or minimize the possibility of stress corrosion failures on production 
vehicle 8 .  
The 
When the identification review was complete, an evaluation team 
composed of Design, Stress ,  Reliability, and Materials and Processes 
established the criticality of each item. 
ceptible parts were determined to be critical from a mission loss gtand- 
point and it was deemed necessary to take action to minimize the possibility 
of s t r e s s  corrosion failures on production vehicles. 
Approximately one-third of sus- , 
The review of t h e  S-I1 stage hardware from a s t ress  corrosion stand- 
point established the necessity of materials, processes,  and design action 
early in a program's conception. 
treatment tempers,  and surface protection coatings increase hardware 
reliability and reduce the program's overall cost. 
established that adequate specification control (MA0609- 007, MA0609-009 
Selection of proper materials,  heat 
The S-I1 Program also 
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if;ndMA0610-001)does reduce corros roblems and as 
reliability of space vehicles. It shou o be noted that 
unique to the "state-of-the-art" and is the only known spec 
this type of corro 
REFERENCES 
MA0609-007, Corrosion Control of Metallic Components of Saturn S-I1 Stage. 
MAOB09-009, Corrosion Control - Saturn S-I1 Stage. 
MA0610-001, Methods of Clea.ning and Cleanliness Requirements for Saturn 
S-I1 Fuel and Oxidizer Tanks. 
X I  
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Moisture entrapped between the external dryfilm 
tions of the center engine LOX feedline torsion bellows initiated corros.ion 
through the bellows parent metal creating a l e a k  path. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Specific supplier processes (Solar) were pinpointed that showed where 
moisture, resulting from line cleaning operations, was not totally removed 
from the highly compressed torsion bellows convolutions. 
process /operation was revised to insure total drying. 
heater blankets, a s  required, were added to the bellows housing to aid the  
drying after all cryogenic exposure. 
film was added after i t  was found the prior dryfilm contributed to the corro- 
sion problem. 
DISCUSSION 
The suspect 
Purge ports and 
Also, a new corrosion inhibiting dry- 
Leakage was noted on one center engine feedline torsion bellows (the 
S-1;-12 failure),  however, r u s t  and water marks were seen on several  
others that were assessed during the f a i lu re  investigation. 
the supplier, after cleaning and rineing cycles, was not drying the line 
assembly at a sufficient time or  temperature to totally dry the line assembly. 
Also, adequate protection was not being exercised in keep 
tion media away from the torsion bellows area,  
incorporate changes in these areas. 
MTF to dry the torsion bellows a rea  post-static firing, and at  KSC if sub- 
sequent cryogenic exposure is not within 4 weeks. 
(ECOALUBE replaced LUBECO 905) inhibits corrosion to the degree that 
pre-post CDDT leak checks a r e  not required (as is done with the  outboard 
engine inlet ducts, and was done with the center engine lines pr ior  to the 
change, and after the problem came about). Effectivities for the above 
changes were: center engine LOX feedline, S-11-9 and subs; and center 
engine LHz feedline, 5-II-10 and subs. 
Xt was found that 
swab pas siva- 
Processes  were revised to 
Heater blankets were added at Solar and 
The new dryfilm * 
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BENDIX CONNECTOR RECESSED CONTACT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
i 
The failure of an S-IV-8 LOX control valve; on the MRAC S-IV 
flight was attributed to a recessed contact in a Bendix CE connector, 
contacts in these connectors are retained by an interference f i t  between the 
contact and a rigid plastic disc sandwiched between the front insert and the 
r ea r  grommet of the connector. 
The 
A recessed contact in a connector used in a critical circuit could 
cause the failure of a component resulting in mission loss and loss of life. 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
,e 
Revise al l  connector assembly specifications'to require mandatory 
performance of a contact retention tes t  on all  contacts to verify proper con- 
tact seating and locking, Inspect a l l  connectors used in critical applications 
on completed articles by performing a contact retention test. 
DISCUSSION 
On January 16, 1970, NASA advised NR that MDAC had experienced an 
After earth-orbit insertion burn of 
Pr ior  to initiating trans 
anomaly on the S-IV-B 507 flight. 
S-IV-B, a LOX control valve failed to  close. 
insertion burn the open LOX valve was discovered and cycled closed manually. 
It was concluded from the MDAC analysis of this failure that the cause was 
a recessed contact in a Bendix C E  connector. This assessment was satis- 
factorily substantiated by MDAC by testing a similar connector with a de2ib- 
erately recessed contact and thereby duplicating the anomaly, 
A, hardware analysia conducted by NR revealed that the Bendix CE 
connectors a r e  used only in two places on the S-U. 
non-critical; however, the Amphenol connectors used on the S-11's up to  
and including S-11-10 a r e  similar in design insofar a s  the contact retention 
system is concerned and were therefore suspect. 
Both applications a r e  
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AMPHENOL CONNECTOR RECESSED CONTACTS, GAGES 4 A N D  0 
PROBLEM STAT ENT AND EFFECT 
During fabrication and installation of the S-I1 electrical har 
many instances of recessed contacts on the Amphenol power connector 
encountered, 
connectors utilizing the larger gages of wire (No. 4 and No. 0 AWC). This 
connector utilized a plastic retention device f o r  the contacts, and it was 
concluded that because of the bulk of the harnesses and the loads imparted to 
this retention disc, the design was marginal. 
e 
Most of these problems were found to  be associated with the 
Since these connectors a r e  used exclusively in power applications 
such a s  txhe power distribution system and as electrical interfaces to the 
stage batteries, the recessing of one of these connectors could cause a 
catastrophic" failure, 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
From a review of the problem by both the supplier and NR/SD it was 
concluded that the final corrective action should be a design change that 
would provide a connector with a metallic clip retention device. This pro- 
posal was accepted by NASA and a request for proposal was transmitted to 
the Saturn connector suppliers. As a result of .these proposals, the 
"Cannon" design was selected and the new connectors were implemented on 
the S-11's starting with S-II-11, 
Re c o m e n d a t  ion s for futur e c onne ct o r s : 
1. Minimize or  eliminate the use of extremely large-gage wires 
(4 and 0) on future programs. 
2, Use connectors with metallic retention devices for power applica- 
tions requiring large wires. 
Provide sufficient installation clearance 'BO that severe harness 
bend radii a r e  not required close to connectors. 
3.  
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During the June, 1966 Saturn Quarterly Re 
c onneet or diacr spancie s asr sociated with 
were discussed. Basically the 
nectors utilizing both No, 4 and No, 0 gage contacts, and it 
that these problems were the r 
as  the contact retention device 
these connectors by a molded s 
This system, when used for very large gage wires (4 and 0 )  
nessed together and subsequently subjected to very small bend radii, was 
found to be marginal. In order t o  eliminate the problem of recessed con- 
tacts, a supplemental contact retention device consisting of a nylon sleeve 
installed on the individual wires behind the contact crimp barrel  provided 
a means for positively capturing the contact between the retention disc and 
the connector rear  wire support. 
lem on all  Amphenol connectors utilieing No. 4 or No. 0 gage contactcs. Ae 
a final solution to  the problem a new design for connectors employing a 
metallic clip for contact retention was implemented, to be effective on all 
S- Iz' s commencing with S-11- 1 1. 
This device was used to correct the prob- 
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RECESSED INSERT OF CA ON PATCHBOARD CON 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EF T 
During aseembly operations on the Cannon patchboard 
(40 shell size, 81 pin) several  cases of insert recession wer 
investigation of these connectors already installed on stages revealed that 
the insert assemblies were slightly displaced, 
ring permitted the entire .insert assembly to recede, thereby reducing the 
contact engagement. Loss of contact engagement in critical applications - 
could cause a catastrophic failure. I(. 
Displacement of the snap 
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDATION 
As a result of the above problem, a design analysis was conducted by 
both the supplier (ITT Cannon) and NR. It was concluded that the snap ring 
used to  capture the insert  assembly was not of sufficient cross- sectional 
a rea  to  preclude the possibility.of its becoming displaced from its groove in 
the connector shell. ITT Cannon and North American agreed that the only 
satisfactory solution would be to  redesign the insert retaining ring to pro- 
vide a larger cross  section. 
I 
It was further recommended that on connector designs considered for 
new programs this possible failure mode be reviewed and, if found marginal, 
the new design should be employed. 
DISCUSSION 
During rework of the S-11-6 sequence controller, it was noted that 
two ITT Cannon patchboard connectorsa on the wire harness exhibited insert 
recession, This raised the question as  to the adequacy of the 
tibn device used by these connectors. Subsequent analysis su 
the design was marginal, 
essary inspection cri teria to  be used for verifying the condition of these 
connectors on other S-II stages, commencing with S-11-2. Visual inspections 
and measurements performed on the S-11-2 confirmed that the connectors in 
question on the stage were satisfactory for launch, 
ducted on the 5-11-3, however, it was determined that the measuring inspec- 
tion did not provide positive assurance that the questionable m a p  ring was 
Immediate action was taken to determine the nec- 
Frdm inspections con- 
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properly sea ted .  It was found that the most satisfactory 
was by X-ray, and this method was used on the S-II-3, S- 
to determine the position of the insert retaining rings. All those found dis- 
placed were removed and replaced with connectors of the new design, which 
were also used on al l  subsequent stages, 
I 
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CRYOGENIC CONNECTOR 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During the early phases of the S-II Program, several  problem8 related 
to cryogenic connectors were encountered; of these the most significant 
were : 
1. Silicone insert  material  developed cracks after being subjected to 
thermal cycling (tanking and static firing) 
Excess corrosion on plugs encapsulated in stage foam insulation 
-. 
2. 
3. Degradation of connector interfacial seals was observed after 
thermal cycling (cryoproof tank tests). 
The effect of a l l  three of these failures could result in loss of elec- 
t r ical  continuity, and system failure, causing loss of mission. 
' SOLUTION/ RECOrvLMENDATION 
The following a r e  the respective solutions for the above problems: 
1. 
2. 
The insert material  was changed from silicone to teflon. 
Anti-wicking plugs were installed on harnesses. 
3. Interfacial seals were debonded. 
DISCUSSION 
Engineering analysis revealed that the use. of silicone insert material  
in applications where temperatures ranged below - 320 F was not satisfactory. 
The design change to teflon, a s  indicated above, solved the problem. 
The problem of corrosion of the cryogenic connector plugs encapsu- 
lated in the stage foam insulation was isolated to a condition known a s  
"cryopumping. I '  
through the foam t o  an a rea  that i s  closer in temperature to ambient. 
thermal cycling permits moisture to flow along the wires into the r ea r  of the 
This occurs when wires pass f rom an extremely cold area 
This 
i 
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connectors and came6 corrosion. 
blocking the moisture path had to be developed; analysis reveal 
practical and efficient method of accomplishing this was to 
plastic plug on the wire harness under the foam to form a seal aro 
individual wire, After conductin ser ies  of engineering tests to 
design, the "anti-wicking" plugs r e  installed on the harness 
lern was resolved, 
To eliminate this condition a method 
stall a molded ' 
The problem of degradation of connector interfacial seals was isolated 
to the engine cutoff (ECO) connectors that a r e  used to shut the engines 
down a s  fuel depletion occurs. It was found that after conducting the cryo- 
proof tes ts  and static firing the interfacial seals that were bonded to the 
glass insert  of the ECO receptacle were severely degraded (badly cracked), 
and the seal fragments were found to  have flakes of glass from the insert 
adhering to them (spalling). 
revealed that the coefficient of expansion of the silicone interfacial seal  and 
the glass insert  were too far  apart  to tolerate bonding. A recommendation 
to eliminate the bonding operation was proposed and testing confirmed that 
this procedure would eliminate the problem of the damaged interfacial seals 
as  well a s  the spalling of the glass insert. 
Analysis of the problem with the supplier 
, 
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MI SMATED ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Use of two o r  more  identical electrical connectors in close pr 
increases the cross-connection margin of e r ror ,  
t 
A classic example of such an effect can be nated f rom an.early Saturn V 
launch when two engines of the S-11 second stage shut down when only one 
engine was commanded, 
two engines' prevalves were c ross  connected. 
A data review indicated that the connectors to the 
SOLUTION"/ECOMMEN.DATION 
The ideal solution f o r  preventing cross  connections is  to use electrical 
connectors of different sizes and clocking arrangements in common areas .  
However, this i s  not always feasible or practical, due to vendor component 
design, physical limitations, and cost considerations. 
Solutions include the following : 
l... Route harnesses to physically minimize the possibility of mak 
cross  connections. 
2. Color code receptacles and plugs to aid visually in the making of 
proper connections. 
3. Install full reference designators on each plug and on o r  near  each 
receptacle to aid in the verification of proper connections. 
Devise system-level testing to ensure the detection of cross  
connections. 
design. 
4. 
This requires adequate initial vehicle/GSE interface 
l3ISCUSSION 
Cross  connections result from human error and a r e  compounded by 
vague documentation. A prerequisite to clear,  concise documentation i s  a 
training course to acquaint the designer and the user  with the methoda 
available to prevent misconnections and to establish means for detecting the 
misconnection if precautionary measures fail. 
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A mockup is required to adequately determine the optimum harness 
routing, break-out points, and length. Ik 
installation of harnesses through photogra 
Reference designators a r e  the l'fingerprints'l of electrical 
connections. 
component, wire harness assembly, and c 
been assigned to a piece of equipment, it i 
referred to  by that designator, Plugs and 
matching designators. Legibility problem 
the S-I1 Program were overcome by incneasing 
to  1 / 4  inch and by ensuring that the designators were visible after cmnec- 
They provide a unique alphanumeric code to each 
tions were made, 
The advantages of match color coding plugs and receptacles are 
obvious - a plug-receptacle color mismatch indicates a c ross  connection. 
*. 
However, in spite of the aids, rnisconnections cah occur,  If the ideal 
It is con- 
solution cannot be used, it i s  prudent to "design in" methods of detecting 
c ross  connections, and to devise test requirements accordingly, 
sidered that incorporation of the above will minimize margin of e r r o r  for 
c r o s s connections . 
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THREADED COUPLING-RING CONNECTORS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Loose electrical connector coupling rings were detected after initial 
connector rnatings. 
mittent or  total loss of circuit functions, 
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDATION 
If this condition were undetected, it could lead to inter- 
' 
Inspection cri teria was developed for verifying engagement of cryogenic 
connectors, and for the application and inspection of torque stripes and 
tamper-proof seals on other threaded conne&ors. 
dures were also established for the cryogenic connectors. 
Specific mating proce- 
It i s  recommended that improved methods and procedures be developed 
Means a r e  required for positive for verifying proper Connector engagement. 
verification of tightness such a s  a secondary locking device o r  "short pins" 
which have continuity only when connectors a r e  properly tightened. 
DISCUSSION 
Extensive inspections were performed on stage electrical connectors 
to  verify proper tightness of the coupling rings. 
inspections, it became evident that indiscriminate, unauthorized disconnec- 
tions were being made without proper reconnection. 
lished through the use of tamper-proof seals t o  provide a simple means for 
verifying that connectors were given proper attention a t  time of last mating. 
The tamper-proof seal application included the inspector's identification and 
date of application, 
During the course of the 
Controls were estab- 
The cryogenic connectors were used inside the propellant tanks and 
consequently were not safety wired; therefore, proper coupling ring tight- 
ness was mandatory. The threads of the cryogenic connectors a r e  double 
lead ACME threads which inherently present mating problems. Detailed 
instructions were devised for the proper tightening of the ACME threads. 
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REMY PROBLEMS, MANUFACTURING AND SUPPLIER 
PROBLEM STATEMENT A.ND EFFECT 
The two signifi t manufacturing and supplier problems concerning 
relays involved (1) diodes and resis tors  and (2) weldable leads: 
1. 
2. 
The S-lf originally utilized relays for switching circuits which 
contained diodes and resis tors  positioned across  the relay coils 
for a r c  and transient suppression. The restricted space avail- 
able for the diodes and resis tors  in the relay resulted in manu- 
facturing problems pertaining to soldering, mounting of 
components, and additional wire routings. Also the diodes 
created a polarized coil and the diodes could fail in a shorted 
mode, thus creating circuit problems. 
Leads to  the Babeock relay for external weld connections proved 
not to be weldirble: there was too great a variation in pull strength 
and excessive splatter and expulsion after welding to 100 percent 
nickel wire. 
gold plated, 20 to  50 mils in diameter. 
(Airpax) fuses the alloy lead into the glass bead of the header at 
1800 F which drives contamination into the lead. 
chemical cleaning did not remove the contamination below the 
surface of the leads, This residual contamination invalidated 
the weld setup schedules during relay module manufacturing at 
NR. 
Leads were Carpenter alloy 426 copper-nickel, 
The header manufacturer 
A subsequent 
SOLUTION /RECOIvLMENDATION 
The respective solutions for the above problems are: 
1. Bifilar relay coil construction utilizing a shorted coil parallel 
wound with the relay coil accomplished the transient suppression 
and eliminated the diodes and interconnecting wiring. 
Stripping the leads by an Electro Surna stripping process to 
0. 001 inch and replating with gold produced a good weldable lead, 
2, 
, 
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DISCUSSION 
The Bifilar Relay and its Advantages 
Twenty-eight volts dc is applied to the relay coil. At To, 
i s  removed. The magnetic field around the magnet coil eo 
of producing a high, negative, inductive spike in the dirgct 
source, comparable to th of a standard coil, it is transferred to 
bifilar coil in a closed-lo circuit having resistance, inductance and 
capacitance; the power transferred from the rnagnet coil is dissipated in 
the bifilar winding. 
source is  suppressed to approximately -50 volts. 
-6  volts at  T3 0 (3. 0 msec after removal of coil voltage at  To). 
increase in release time may be expected because of the transformer action 
setting up another magnetic field around the bifilar coil. This tends to hold 
the armature in the energized position until the power is dissipated from the 
bifilar coil, rB 
The result is that the inductive spike seen by the, power 
This s,pike is reduced to ’ 
A slight 
The main advantages of the bifilar coil method of reducing suppression 
of inductive spikes (Figure 4 ) over the conventi’onal diode or resistor 
techniques a r e  a s  follows: 
1. It has the ability to operate more effectively at temperature 
extremes (especially at high temperature). 
2, It i s  not polarity sensitive. 
3 ,  Foreign materials a r e  eliminated. 
4, Outgassing of suppression components is eliminated, 
5. The nurnber of manufacturing operations is reduced. 
Weldable Leads 
The weld problem was discovered at  the NR/SD McAlester facility 
during lot welding tes ts  on relays received from the supplier, The weld pull 
tes ts  were below the minimum pull tests for Group (b) material  specified in 
NR/SD Specification MA0607-009. Relay lots which failed MAO607-009 were 
subjected to modified weld schedules with no 8uccess and then were rejected 
a s  not weldable, and finally submitted for rework at  the NR/SD laboratories 
in Downey, California: 
s 
J 
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RELAY SCHEMATIC 
WITH ARC SUPPRESSION 
DIODE AND RESISTOR 
281 
-281 
-8OOV 
PHYSICAL COIL 
SCHEMATIC 
BIFILAR 
NON-POLARIZED 
3 
COIL VOLTAGE REMOVED 
28V 
-6V AT 1.6 MSEC 
7
STANDARD 
1 
T 
' 0  
ure 4, Bifilar Coil Method 
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The inconsistency of the weld strength during weld g 
was identified a s  resulting from contamination of the leads 
The leads of the relay consist of a copper-cored Carpenter 
0. 032 inch in diameter. 
lead solder (60SN-40Pb) by the hot ,dip method. 
completely removed from the Carpenter 426 alloy prior to copper plating, 
inconsistent welds result, 
This wire is  copper-plated and then coated with tin 
When the oxides a r e  not 
These a r e  the factors affecting weldability: 
1. Oxide contamination driven into the Carpenter 426 basic metal, 
which was impossible to remove by the normal state-of-the-art 
cleaning, i, e . ,  chemical cleaning. 
Heavy copper undercoat in plating the leads. which varied from 
lot to lot. 
I .  
2. 
3, Variation of electro-tin plating thickness. Specification require- 
ment was a minimuib of 0. 0002 inch. 
0. 0002 to 0. 0008 inch. 
Grain enlargement of lead material. which results from the high 
oxidation fusing temperature (1800 F) when bonding the lead mate- 
r ia l  through the glass bead of the header. 
Plating varied from 
4. 
5 .  Carpenter 426 lcad material. 
weld a s  a r e  other lead materials: i. e . ,  it i s  not a s  easy to weld 
a s  99 percent nickel, Dumont, and Alloy 52. However, Carpenter 
426 lead material, when subjected to high temperature bonding 
inta the header glass bead, is the only consistently reliable lead 
material  which will meet the NASA High Reliability Relay Specifi- 
cation leakage and twist test  Gequirements. 
This material is not as  easy to 
that oxide Contamination (factor 1, above) was the primary 
ctors  2 and 3 were secondary and should be controlled, and 
4 and 5 could not be changed due to  requirements. 
t es t s  proved that if 1, 2, and 3 were eliminated o r  controlled, then consistent 
s could be made, i. e . ,  welds were made to conform to a coefficient of 
variation of less  than 0. 4 vs. 9. 6 in the problem relays, and tested above 
the minimurn pull tes t  requirements, 
Also, the laboratory 
In arriving at  a solution to  the problem the NR/SD laboratory, with 
the relay supplier's permission, directly contacted the header manufacturer. 
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The header manufacturer submitted wire samples both pro 
unprocessed, and also described the chemical cl 
research finally concluded that chemical cleanin 
not remove the imbedded contamination. It wale then dete 
electrolytic cleaning was ired, followed by electrolyti 
(3-a process). Then th  ds could be replated and pr 
The complete treatment devised by NR for reworking the weldirig leads 
included cleaning and polishing. The leads are chemically cleaned, then 
subjected to a reverse  electrolytic action to remove oxides and material to 
a depth of 0, 0005 inch (oxides a r e  driven 0. 0003 inch into lead material). 
Then the leads a r e  subjected to a Surna electrolytic polishing process. 
After the Suma process, the leads have a shiny bright appearance provided 
a l l  oxide8 a r e  removed, but a dull dark appearance if they a r e  not, After 
a successful Suma process, the leads a r e  gold plated over a nickel flash. 
This i s  a description of the cleaning process: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Weld the ends OX the relay leads to a nickel ribbon 0. 015 inch biy 
0. 032 inch and approximately 6 inches long to  facilitate electrical 
contact for electro-cleaning and plating. Mask the bodies of the 
relays with lead tape, and coat with micro mask (strippable paint 
type coating), 
Strip the solder coating and the copper plate under the solder by 
immersion in a 50-percent solution of nitric acid at  room temper- 
ature. The imm.ersion time is appr*oximately 30 seconds. 
Elactro-polish the lead wires for 45 seconds by the Swna process. 
Gold plate the lead wires of the relays per MIL-G-45204, Type 1, 
Class 3, to an approximate thickness of 50 micro-inches. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT A.ND EFFECT 
The contacts of a Babcock relay used for activating an RF  t 
failed to open on command during the S-11-13 checkout. 
showed that the transmitter had a high capactitive input characteristic 
(approximately 500 pf). The inrush current through the relay contacts 
varied between 60 and 120 amperes of spike current for approximately 
10  microseconds. 
Analysis and tests 
This results in fused contacts. 
SOLUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conditions which contribute to sticking contacts on 10-ampere relays 
when switching into capacitive loads include: 
1 .  
2 .  
3. 
4. 
'5. 
Inrush current above 50 amperes. 
High r ise  current, with sharp peaking at 50 microseconds. This 
inrush supplies the maximum current during the period that con- 
tacts a r e  breaking through the surface f i lm and be fore  maximum 
contact pressure is  developed. 
Amount of over travel. 
involves a slight friction movement of contacts when they meet. 
This varies from contact to contact and 
Contour of contact "make" area.  There i s  some convex curvature 
in the contact seating area (where contacts meet)  which varies 
f rom contact to contact, 
Contact bounce during contact make period. 
time that arcing and fusion can take place. 
This increases the 
, The conditions listed above explain why some contacts will stick and 
Tests indicate that con- others will not under the same capaatancs loads. 
tacts which have stuck a s  a result of capacitive switching can be, when com- 
manded, opened by vibration, jarring, or  repeated turning on and off of the 
relay. This was the only solution available for the 5-11 because of the tight 
schedule and the costs involved, 
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TWO electro-circuit modifications that can be helpful are: 
1. Adding inductive chokes in ser ies  with capacitive loads 
the effec5 of capacitive switching. 
Adding resistance in series with the capacitive load to  re 
inrush current to a safe level, 
2, 
DISGUSSION , 
i5_nalysis of Stage Operation at Time of Failure 
Stage checkout was being performed when the anomaly occurred. 
During these tests, transmitters BPI, BF1, and BF2 were turned on at  once, 
checked out, turned off, and then turned on individually. The switching 
anomaly occurred when BF2 transmitter was energised followed by BF1. 
The relay contact failed to  respond to a de-energizing signal, remaining in 
the energized position for approximately nineteen minutes. 
attempt to de-energize (open) the contact, was successful, 
was repeated during three subsequent tes ts  with the contact failing to respond 
for periods of from three to ten seconds. 
The third 
The anomaly 
The contacts of the suspected relay were examined and it was deter- 
mined that one set of contacts was very heavily pitted, showing evidence of 
having been immobilized by switching iRto a capacitive load, Similar relays 
with the same contact material  and arrangement were switched into high 
capacitance, 1000 to 2000 micro-farad loads, (Three transmitters represent 
approximately 1500 micro-farads, 500 micro-farads each. ) Some contacts 
started sticking after 10 cycles of Qperation. These contacts were compare8 
with the contact in question and found to be similar under microscopic anal- 
ysis. 
sticking) and resistive loads was made and compared with the subject con- 
tact, and with contacts of a relay which switched the BP1 transmitter without 
The visual evidence indicates that the subject contact had all  the 
appearance of having been in a sticking mode during capacitance switching. 
A ser ies  of tes ts  on contacts switched into capacitance loads (no 
. 
It was also determined that there was no evidence of any mechanical 
or foreign particles inside the relay having interfered with relay operation. 
t s  were conducted at NR, switching the three transmitters BF1, 
BF2, and BP1 in various modes, instrumented by checking current inrush 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
with an oscilloscope, utilizing a battery power source. The foll 
synopsis of these tests: 
One transmitter (BPI )  turned on - 62 amp 
peaked (rounded peak) in 50 microsecsnds 
200 microseconds. 
Added 10, 000 microfarad capacitor across  power 
repeated test 1. 
peaked in 10 microseconds (sharp peak), 
Current inrush: 80 ampe 
5, 
6 .  
seconds, but ‘oscillatory ringing between the first and second 
peak. 
Repeated test  2 turning one transmitter (BF1) on with BP1 still on, 
Current inrush: 100 amperes peak; current peak in 10 micro- 
seconds (sharp peak), second peak 150 microseconds, but 
oscillatory ringing between f i rs t  and second peak increased, 
Repeated test  2 turning BF2 on with BP1 and B F l  still on, 
rent inrush: 1 2 0  amperes peak; peaking and oscillatory ringing 
similar to that during tes t  3. 
Cur- 
Turned all  three transmitters on at once (BPI,  BFI and BF2). 
Current peaks in 3 successful series;  peaks building up to 
t 50 amps by 250 microseconds with approximately 80 microaeconds I 
between peaks. 
ing the relay contacts to each transmitter. 
Repeating the foregoing tes ts  with a 1 mill 
. with each transmitter significantly knocke 
rounded them off, and delayed the peaking for 200 microseconds. 
This delay would benefit the relay switching because it allows the 
contacts to firmly seat  before the peak transient inrush current is 
reached. 
This is caused by different switch times in clos- 
Test 3 above repeated the stage failure mode, Also, tes ts  on relays 
at  the supplier indicated that capacitive switching transients of 500 amperes 
could freeze the contacts when operated ten times with this type of load. 
The stage tes ts  indicate this happened the eighth time the relay wa8 switched. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AMD EFFECT 
During tests on the S-XI-1 prior to static .firing, a LOX 
failed to reseat within the specified pressure range. Thi 
caused by pressure oscillations (organ pipe effect) in the 
of the pressure - s ens ing system, valve portion 
v 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The oscillations were eliminated by adding a double-orificed plenum 
chamber to the valve pressure-sensing system external to the valve main 
hous ing . 
DISCUSSION 
The fir s t  vent valve malfunction occurred on the S-11- 1 when the valve 
did not reseat  by 39 psia due to valve oscillation. The malfunction recurred 
This suggested a chronic instability problem 
Preliminary tests were performed by 
Both valves proved unstable, 
I 
on the battleship tes t  vehicle. 
during the venting mode of operation. 
the supplier, Calmec, on two vent valves. 
but the vent valve responded quickly enough to track the frequency of 
pressure oscillations in the vent line. Uncoupling the vent valve from the 
line by adding an orifice plenum chamber to the valve-seasing line slowed 
the valve's response capability, 
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PROBLEM STATE l E N T ,  ID EFFECT 
Vent valves presently in use on the  S-I1 propellant tank 
pressure relief band (from valve opening to reseat)  of two to t 
reduction in the actuation pressure band of the  valve will per 
in the structural requirements of the tank and increase the margin between 
the vent valve cracking pressure and the maximum allowable differential 
pressure across the tank wall. 
SO LU T ION I' RE C OMM E N  DATION 
' 
A t ea t  program, utilizing the basic S-I1 LOX and LHz vent valves a'@ 
test beds to evaluate a 1-psi  preseure band design concept, was  developed 
and implemented. 
pressure relief band by modifying the vent valve pilot valve system. Ik is  
recommended that  this concept be utilized on future space vehicle programs 
to achieve the desirable effects described above. 
The program achieved the desired goal of a 1-psi 
DISCUSSION 
The pilot valve redesign consists of (1) rearrangement of detail parts 
within the existing pilot valve housing, (2 )  Belleville-diaphragm assembly 
redesign, and (3 )  incorporation af a bellows seal. 
and a diaphragm ring was made into a weldment with the Belleville interface 
on a r ing  of circular cross section to reduce operational friction loads. 
bellows seal was added to the poppet stem to eliminate leakage-induced 
er ror .  
valve housing space envelope. 
requirements of a 1.0-psi pressure-band vent valve. 
The Belleville spring 
A 
Rearrangement of the detail parts permitted use of the existin 
The resultant configuration meets the 
1-70  
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
SOLENOID VALVE DESIGN 
PROB'LEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The S-U- 14 LHZ vent-valve step-vent solenoid valve failed to actuate 
(could not shift from low mode to high mode) due to a shorted coil. 
result of performing an  insulation resiatance tes t  on other stage valves, 
more cpils were found to have unacceptably low insulation resistances. The 
anomaly cause was found to be twofold. The coil wire insulation, which 
was  of improper quality, degraded as a function of time. 
was not hermetically sealed. * This allowed moisture to enter,  providing a 
current leak path and causing corrosion. 
As a 
The coil enclosure 
so LU TION /REGOMMEN DATION 
The solenoid enclosure construction had to be revised to provide for  
a hermetically sealed enclosure. 
implemented to ascertain the proper curing of the wire insulation prior to 
use for coil winding. 
Inspection of the coil wire insulation was 
DISCUSSION 
A corrective action plan was instituted f o r  S-11- 10 and subsequent 
stages. 
All of the vent valve solenoid coils which contained questionable wire 
were replaced with redesigned coils. 
which has been tested by NR by lot. The new coils a r e  subjected to a 
complete drying procedure to insure that the coil is f ree  of moisture. 
coil enclosure is completely welded. 
seal is  finally verified by the Radiflo leak detection method which utilizes 
a radioactive t racer  gas (Krypton 85-Nitrogen). 
The redesigned coils contain wire 
The 
The integrity of the welded h'ermetic 
A specification and criterion document requirement was added to check 
coil resistance and insulation resistance on selected stage components prior 
to launch. 
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RETEST OF S-ll HARNESS ASSEMBLIES AFTER REWORK 
. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
About the t ime S-11-3 completed sys t em checkout at  Seal Beach, a 
l a rge  amount of wi re  ha rness  modification and rework was performed by 
manufacturing, 
to accomplish and somet imes  resul ted in unnecessary retest .  
Existing r e t e s t  methods required extensive t ime and effort 
W h i l e  s tages  were  in system-level  checkout, the disconnection of 
connectors to pe r fo rm continuity and insulation res i s tance  re tes t  
previously run 'system-level tes ts .  
The wisdom of performing continuity and insulation resis tance r e t e s t  is 
questionable. 
invalidated 
System-level r e t e s t  was then required.  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Negotiations with Manufacturing, Quality Assurance,  and NASA resulted 
in agreement  that cer ta in  types of ha rness  rework were  minor and did not 
requi re  continuity and insulation res i s tance  retest .  
on the definition of minor rework. 
Agreement was reached 
Rather than establ ish a firm requirement  for  continuity and insulation 
resis tance re tes t ,  the responsibility for  determining r e t e s t  requirement  was 
given to the cognizant s i te  tes t  engineering organization. 
DISCUSSION 
The rework performed on the S-I1 wire  ha rnesses  f r o m  S-11-3 on con- 
s is ted mainly of rerouting, addition and removal of c lamps,  and shortening 
ha rness  length. 
that af ter  rework r e t e s t  was required.  
variation in the complexity of the rework. 
single c lamp was removed and then installed solely for  the purpose of access  
to w i r e  ha rnesses  within the bundle. 
rework which probably should not r equ i r e  any kind of retest .  
ins tances ,  similar rework was performed but many clamps were  removed 
and reinstalled.  
continuity and insulation res i s tance  r e t e s t  would be necessary .  In o rde r  to 
specify a rea l i s t ic  and adequate r e t e s t  requirement,  i t  is necessary  to de t e r -  
mine how many clamps can be removed without adversely affecting the wire  
harness .  
The specification requirement  applicable at that time was 
The r equ i r epen t  did not allow for 
F o r  example, many t imes a 
This i s  obviously an example of minor 
In other 
Given a sufficiently l a rge  number of c lamp removals,  a 
Cons equen tly, di s cu s sion s were  held by Engineering, Manufacturing , i 
Quality Assurance and NASA to attempt to define minor rework not requiring 
continuity ancf insulation res i s tance  retest .  It was agreed that a rework 
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involving removal and reinstallation of three clamps or les 
minor rework and would not require retest. Also h 
could be accomplished without disconnecting eonnec 
minor rework, 
Disconnecting connectors to  perform continuity and ins 
resistance retest  is necessary to  prevent application of the 
(500 VDC) to bensitive stage componentk. 
any system-level checkout which may have previously bean 
system-level checkout must then be rerun. 
testing. 
rework to determine the optimum retest. Considerations such as accessi- 
bility of the wire harness to visual inspection, whether o r  not the harness 
is braided, and the function of the harness must be taken into account. 
Disconnection also in 
This can involv 
It is therefore desirable to examine all  aspects of a particular 
Since these considerations cannot be anticipated and cannot be gen- 
eralized, an Engineering Specification requirement was not feasible. 
The following requirement was incorporated into the Engineering 
Spe c if  ic at i on : 
Insulation Resistance and Continuity Retest Requirements for 
Rework Performed After Beginning Stage System Unit Acceptance 
Testing, 
These requirements shall be determined by site Test Operations 
and coordinated with site Quality Assurance and site NASA, o r  a s  
specified by S-Il Engineering on retest  E. 0. 's.  
This requirement gave the organization best able ta assess  all  factors 
associated with a given situation the latitude to determine retest 
requirements. 
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COAXIAL CABLE INSTALLATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Routing of RF coaxial cables on the S-II through areas  of high 
. personnel traffic resulted in cable damage and costly repair and replacement. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Temporary protective covers were installed to  prevent cable damage, 
The intent of the initial design was to maintain a separation between the 
coaxial cables and the electrical harnesses due to  electrical interference. 
However, in routing coaxial cables, other parameters such a s  accessibility, 
maintainability, mechanical interference, and human factors should be 
con I ide red. 
The majority of the electrical harnesses were routed between 
Stations Xb 930. 00 and Xb 955. 00 in the Forward Skirt Area. 
and antennas were located between Stations Xb 894, 00 and Xb 930. 00. 
requirement to maintain a separation between the electrical harnesses and 
coaxial cables wag imposed on the installation design to prevent electrical 
interference. The logical coaxial routing installation was to approach the 
containers and antennas from below to eliminate the cross-over. 
installation maintained the necessary clearance between the containers and 
the coaxial cables, but the cables a r e  located on the same level and adjacent 
to the work platform (walkway), making them subject to damage from foot 
Since 
some of the cables a r e  part  of the Range Safety System R F  Signal system, 
minor damage in some instances resulted in cable replacement. The loca- 
tion of cables also necessitated partial removal of forward skirt containers 
to  acdomplish cable replacement. 
The containers 
A 
The 
- traffic, Significant harness damage was incurred'due to  this routing. 
Close coordination between cable installation design persronnel and 
facilities personnel who design the work platforms .should be established 
early in the program. 
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COAXIAL CABLE HANDLING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A number of failures which resulted in measurement anomalies were 
An investigation was made to determine the problem 
experienced with the S-I1 coaxial cable assemblies used for piezoelectric 
transducer vibration, 
a reas  and to perform corrective action, 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
* 
The solution is to replace the existing connector on the coaxial cable 
assembly with a connector of a new design. 
be changed from brass  to stainless steel; the coaxial cable welded or  
soldered (high temperature) in place; all  joints enlarged and made more 
rugged; 'and a workable humidity seal against the transducer connector face 
must be devised. 
The connector material  should 
DISCUSSION 
No problem exists with the coaxial wire; however, the. connector and 
cable-to- connector interface has repeatedly failed. 
points in the connector-cable joint were apparent. 
that during assembly, the cable could be damaged. 
connector is ,  essentially, jammed and crimped in place. The general 
construction of the connector was rather flimsy and no provision was made 
for an "0" ring seal. Any seal made was due to the interface of the con- 
nector shell with the face of the accelerometer with a flat gasket mounted 
between. 
Several design deficiency 
The center pin in the 
There is  a possiblity 
The knurled portion of the connector was not torqued into place but 
was attached finger tight. 
inside of the threads. 
would have assured a reliable connection; however, because of the extreme 
difficulty in controlling the application of the Loctite (too much o r  too little), 
short  circuit and open circuit conditions resulted in some instances. 
Loctite also made i t  difficult to remove the connector from the accelerom- 
e te r ,  in case accelerometer replacement was required, and in some cases,  
this caused the cable termination to be destroyed, 
To secure it,  a drop of Loctite was placed on the 
If this procedure had been followed properly, it 
The 
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The new replacement connector resolved most of these problems. 
This connector is made of stainless steel, has a hermetic glass seal, and is 
heavier and more rugged than the old design. 
center conductor and an integral rrO" ring seal. 
such that it is much easier to assemble to the cable and is thus less  subject 
to damage during this procedure. 
Assembly includes a welded 
The connector design 4s 
1-76 
SD 71-256 . 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
i 
Design 10-04 
WIRING INSTALLATION IN CONGESTED AREAS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Wiring installations in congested a reas  on the S-II resulted in a high 
incidence of wire damage during installation, modifications, and inspections, 
SOLUTION/REC OMMENDATION 
The problem on the S-U: was partially resolved by rerouting certain 
wire harnesses in the congested areas ,  
For future programs, it is recommended that close attention be given 
to component and container locations to avoid such congestion, and that suf- 
ficient tolerances be included for growth factors, 
that a full-scale mockup be maintained to  provide visual awareness of 
potential interferences or congestion. I 
It is also recommended 
DISCUSSION 
As a result of joint NASA/NR shakedown inspections held on the f i rs t  
three S-I1 flight articles, a high n m b e r  of discrepancies were uncovered 
that required clarification of harness installations. 
wiring was hampered due to poor visibility and accessibility. 
guidelines were established to  aid in the installation and inspection of all 
S-11 wire harnesses. 
hspection for damage to 
A set of 
Concerted action csf NASA/NR teams resulted in reaffirmation, with 
changes, that the overall wiring concepts and practices implemented on the 
S-I1 Program met the high standards of design and workrnanehip required 
for the program, and that a l l  possible steps were taken to  provide a safe and 
high quality physical installation of stage wiring. 
Congested wiring installations can be avoided through 'careful planning 
of initial design concepts, 
design i s  implemented,is prohibitively costly and incurs delays that may 
prove critical. 
Full correction undertaken after an inadequate 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Design 10-05 
The problem was one of long harnesses,  short harnesses,  mislocated 
breakouts, and the variation in harness installations from stage to stage. 
Its effect was large amounts of rework. 
installed a s  intended and Engineering drawing changes were made to describe 
the as  -imstalled configuration, 
Modification kits could not be 
SOLUTION/RECOR/IMENDATION 
The solution was partially accomplished by the utilization of the 
electrical mechanical mockup (EMM) initially in the program, the incorpo- 
ration of station markers  on the vehicles as an interim procedure, and the 
utilization of the systems dimensional simulator (SDS) late in the program. 
U s e  of a full-scale flight-configuration operational mockup is recom- 
mended in the initial phase of the program with engineering design control. 
Point to point dimensions should be logged a s  depicted on road maps and 
utilized to preclude the human e r r o r  in repeated measurements. 
DISCUSSION 
The harnesses installed on the vehicle became involved in many modi- 
fication changes which affected the length, diameter and breakouts of the 
harneasses and their installation. 
vehicle did not reflect the drawing configuration o r  the requirements of the 
installation specification. 
In many cases the installations on the 
This situation existed until the Smash Program was initiated, The 
This 
purpose of the Smash Program was to clear all discrepancies discovered . 
by the inspection teams, in the most expeditious manner possible. 
meant revision of the engineering documentation to reflect the acceptable 
as -installed configuration. 
existing design drawings to effect the necessary rework and clear the 
discrepancies within engineering documentation. 
effort required the following revisions: addition o r  relocation of cable 
clamps and attaching hardware; addition and relocation and change of g 
grommets ; addition of hardware for mounting connectors (screws, washers, 
etc. ) ;  addition and relocation of support brackets; and the addition of 
protection from abrasion (add R T V ,  grommets, reverse  HiLoc fasteners, 
’ 
Design changes were written to revise the 
Implementation of this 
i 
e tc . ) .  
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The electrical mechanical mockup was constr 
of the program to ensure that proper installations c 
However, the EMM not reflect the flight configuration of the 
nor was it maintain o current configurations. 
The final installation (FI) diagram of each harne 
after the ins tallation was approved by Engineering 
These FI's were documented in the Operators Gen 
(OGID) No. 006-009 which was  used to instruct th 
in the proper sequence, procedures, and methods necessary to expeditiously 
install the harnesses in the S-I1 stage's aft skirt  area.  
Identification station markers  were added to the harness assemblies 
to identify specific locations for harness ins tallations within the S-I1 stage 
and to provide a more efficient means of operation during the manufacturing 
and inspection effort. 
A plan of action for activation of the S-11-T aft skir t  and thrust struc- 
ture as a systems dimensional simulator (SDS) was established. 
Control function was headed by an Engineering representative (Spacemaster), 
to control mockup activities and satisfy their respective requirements. 
This 
) Q & R A  representative, and Manufacturing representative (Simulator Master) 
, 
s 
1-79 
SD 71-256 
Dfvlsion 
rnerican Rockwell 
Design 11-01 
THRUST STRUCTURE LONGERON FAILURE AND REDESIGN 
P R O B U M  STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During testing of the 9-LT. thrust structure on the S-11-8 test vsh 
Seal Beach, the thrust longerons failed as the loading approached the level 
of 120 percent af limit load. 
structure to t h e  ultimate loading of 140 percent of limit load. 
dition was a hard-over gimbaling case which imposed high momente on t h e  
thrust longerons. 
upper end of both longerons at Engine 3 ,  initiated the general collapse of 
the thrust cone shell. 
The test objective was to qualify the thrust 
The test eon- 
Compressive failure of the unsupported inner cap, a t  the 
As a result of this failure, a redesign of the longerons, and subsequent 
tes t  verification, was necessary to show fulfillment of contractual 
requirements. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMEN DATION 
The original thrust longeron design used an allowable cap s t ress  based 
on the appropriate bending modulus of rupture curves. 
of the unsupported cap was not considered critical because of the short span 
and cross-sectional dirnensions of the longerons, This proved to be uncon- 
servative. 
rigorous analytical investigation of lateral stability. This investigation 
limited the allowable stress in the unsupported cap to the compression yield 
stress of the material. 
caps and deeper sections. 
approach . 
DESC USSION 
Lateral instability 
The redesign of the longerons was accomplished utilizing a 
The longerons were redesigned to include heavier 
Subsequent testing verified the analytical 
Four pairs of longerons provide the backup support t'o the outboard 
engine attach fittin 8 ,  accepting the concentrated engine thrust loads and 
distributing them into the conical shell structure. Beam end reactions a r e  
supplied to the longerons by ring frames at  Stations 167.5 and 112. The 
longeron assemblies also provide support for the hydraulic servoactuators 
that control engine pitch and yaw de$lections. The longerons are machined 
from 7079-T652 hand for ings. Stress-relieved temper and surface pro- 
tection (by shot peening, anodizing, priming, and epoxy-base painting) are 
employed to elirnhake the poerPibUity of stress corrosion in the heavy 
machined sections of these members. 
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On April 30, 1965, during testing of the thrust structure on the S-11-S 
vehicle, the longerons failed as  the loading approached 120 percent of limit 
load. The test case was Condition V B  (control engines at  full thrust and at  
maximum-gimbaled position, with actuator loads on and center engine out), 
and the tes t  objective was to achieve 140 percent of limit load. This condi- 
tion imposes high moments on t h e  thrust longerons. Compressive failure of 
the unsupported inner caps of both longerons at  Engine 3 initiated the general 
collapse of the thrust cone shell. Details of the t e s t i n g ,  and the failure, a re  
found in Reference 3 .  
The failure brought about an intensive review of the structural  analysis 
on the thrust longerons. 
of appropriate bending modulus of rupture curves in determining an allowable 
inner cap s t r e s s  (Referenee 5). 
Section 2 .70  of Reference 4, and is a valid method for  arriving at beam 
s t resses  above the elastic limit that can be withstood without failure. The 
shape and the  dimensions of the section subjectgd to the moment loading, as  
well a s  the s t ress-s t ra in  curve of the material, enter into the development 
of these plastic bending design curves, However, because of the short span 
of the longerons and the large cross-sectional a rea  of the beam, lateral 
stability of the unsupported cap was not considered a problem. More inten- 
sive and rigorous analytical investigation into this type of failure showed that 
the initial assumption was unconservative. Detailed lateral  stability analysis 
procedure is found in Section 2 . 6 8  of Reference 4, (with use of data f rom 
Reference 5 ) ,  providing a reasonably conservative analysis to predict t h i s  
type of beam failure. The primary instability mode of a beam attached to 
skin and loaded in compression at the free flange, may be considered as  a 
pure torsional mode with rotation occurring about the enforced center of 
twist existing at the skin attachment point. 
allowable s t r e s s  of the unsupported inner cap of the longerons resulted 
f rom this lateral  stability analysis. 
the new criteria.  
The design of these members was based on the use 
Bending in the plastic range is described in 
. 
A significant reduction in the 
The longerons were redesigned using 
Retesting of the thrust structure, with the new longerons, was started 
in August 1965; details of this tes t  can be found in Reference 3 .  
conpletion of Condition V B  (140 percent of limit load) was attained, but it 
was then determined that a second phase of this test  condition would b e  
required. 
addition of f u l l  thrust f rom the center engine. 
bolts at 128 percent of limit load, plus the subsequent destruction of the 
S-11-S Stage, prevented tes t  verification of the redesigned longerons. 
ever,  References l and 2 contain analyses of the tes t  data with extrap- 
olations to verify that the longerons would easily accommodate ultimate 
loading. Details of subsequent testing on the high force thrust structure 
Successful 
* 
The second phase would be similar to the first phase but with the 
Failure of the engine attach 
How- 
i 
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est No,  404), with results to the 1 0 percent  of li 
, are found kn Refere  6. Thilr, test verified th 
obtained on the -LI-S thereby idating the data extrapol 
certification. 
1. SID 67-32, Design Certif ication Review, SA5Ol/S-II-l, Structure  Sub- 
system Report,  r e i s sued  May, 1967. 
2, SD 68-125(B), Volume 5, Saturn 5-11-3 Stage Design Certification 
Review Report ,  26 F e b r u a r y  1968, rev ised  23 March  1968, rev ised  
17 June 1968. 
3. 
4. 
SUD 65-1682, Saturn S-I1 Major Structural  Tests ,  1 July 1966. 
S t ruc tures  Manual, Space Division, North Amer ican  Rockwell. 
5. Mat,erials P rope r t i e s  ManVal, Volume 1, Design Data, October 1969, 
. Space Division, North American Rockwell. 
S-lff-1 Stage Thrus t  Structure  Evaluation, August 21, 1968, prepared  for 
Structures  Division, P & V E  Laboratory,  MSFC, by the Structures  
Department of Brown Engineering. 
I 
6. 
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J-JOINT THERMAL STRESSES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
t -the junction of the common bulkhead, the LOX tank 
hydrogen tank sidewall - is a critical a rea  for thermally 
&i addition, there were original requiremepts that the 
These proved impractical 
induced s t resses .  
.tanks be capable of being filled independently. 
and imposed an unwarrantably severe condition on the vehicle. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMEN DATION 
The J-joint structure is pre-chilled prior to LH2 loading. 
requirements were also revised and GSE systems and procedures modified 
to reduce the differences in temperature at the J-joint and thus reduce 
thermal strain. 
The design 
It is recommended for future systems that the filling requirements be 
evaluated to make certain that there a r e  no requirements for "fast f i l l "  so  
that the entire vehicle system can be cooled (chilled) simultaneously. 
general, the flow of hydrogen gas for  pre-chill must  occur during LOX 
filling. Establishing these requirements early will expedite design and 
eliminate worrisome problems. 
In 
DISCUSSION 
The lower (LOX) tank i s  chi l ledf i rs t  and as  the joint cools, gaseous 
hydrogen is admitted through the fill-and-drain valve in the bottom of the 
forward (LH2) tank to  chill all sides of the J-joint simultaneously. The 
ground lines from the main storage tanks must also be cooled. By venting 
the cooling gas through the S-I1 tank, the tank is purged and chilled with 
no loss of time and using a minimum amount of gas. 
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DEFICIENT BRACKET DESIGN 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Problems encountered with brackets on the S-I1 occurred in 
3 categories: 
1: During the early manufacturing period of the S-11 it was found 
that many brackets were functionally inadequate or placed at 
unde s irable locations . 
2. Extensive use of welded joints was employed in the original design 
of many brackets with the material usually being 5061 aluminum 
alloy. Welding proved difficult, with flange warping and very fine 
shallow cracks in material  adjacent to the weld beads being the 
major problems. 
3. During the  early design period, the effect of transmitted vibration 
on the components being supported by the brackets was not 
considered. - 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
It was found that assignment of responsibility for the design of sub- 
stantially all brackets to one engineering group (Structures Design) rather 
than a distributed responsibility among various disciplines was required to 
assure uniform, good design and coordinated installation. 
DISCUSSION . 
During the early design period of the S-11 there was a rapid evolution 
of design involving changes in line routing fa r  the various systems. Lack pf 
coordination among the design groups involved resulted in sbme installations 
which utilized brackets which were less  than optimum. 
systems engineers unfamiliar with sheet metal fabrication, sometimes 
designed overly complex brackets or  brackets unsuitable to the purpose. 
Coordination and integration of design was  grea t ly  aided later in the program 
with the institution of a full-scale dimensional simulator of the th rus t  cone 
and aft skir t  area of the stage where the greatest concentration of line 
routing existed. 
numerous changes specifically involving bracket problems. 
Electrical or fluid 
During the active development phase of the S-11 there were 
Many other 
-1-84 
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
Design 11-03 
changes, although not specifically chargeable to bracket problems, involved 
significant bracket changes. 
In an attempt to  achieve the lightest design f o r  brackets, many 
were fabricated from sheet metal with welded-in gusset5 and webs. 
welding proved difficult. There was difficulty in maintaining the required 
size,  shape, and dimensional tolerances. 
the cylindrical stage mold-line some cracking along weld beads was 
experienced because of an improper match of the welded flange to the 
structure. 
A continuing fabrication problem was crazing of 6061 Aluminum alloy welded 
parts. 
in the material  adjacent to the weld beads. 
materially reduce the strength of a part ,  it was considered to be unacceptable 
for  spacecraft quality requirements and had to be polished out wherever 
detected. 
where integral guSsets a r e  required, which cannot be formed into a bracket 
f rom a single sheet, a more feasible method of fabrication would be to 
machine the par t  f rom bar-or billet o r  use 2 -  or  3-part  brackets. 
Where flanges had to mate with 
When the attaching fasteners were drawn tight, cracking resulted. 
C-arc welding resul ts  in the formation of very fine, shallow cracks 
Although this crazing would not 
rp 
This experience with welded brackets led to the conclusion that 
Many mechanical o r  electrical units mounted within the stage a re  
limited as to the intensity of vibration tha t  they can withstand. Usually 
these components a r e  qualified to specific limits of vibration, such as plus 
o r  minus 30 g's  for  given frequency ranges. When vibration from the , 
structure occurs at the resonant frequency of a Gracket, the vibration i s  
amplified in the bracket. 
might be amplified to more  than *lo0 g ' s  fo r  a component mounted on a 
bracket whose resonant frequency is being excited. At very high frequencies 
the amplitudes of vibration become infinitesimal and not destructive to 
physical elements ; the lower frequencies, with larger amplitudes, are more 
destructive. Generally, to avoid transmitting harmful vibration to sensitive 
elements, it  was found that sheet metal brackets were inadequate. 
supporting brackets had to have very high resonant frequencies. 
machined from bar stock with relatively thick walls and flanges and with 
integrally machined gussets were found to be required. * 
Thus a vibration of *15 g's in the basic s'tructure 
The 
Brackets 
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COMPLIANCE MODE FREQUENCY A N D  STAB1 LlTY 
FOR THE ENGINE ACTUATOR STRUCTURE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Early in S-I1 control system design (late October 1963), it was 
recognized the compliance mode frequency for the J - 2  engine actuator 
structure would have a significant influence on control system stability. Fo r  
this reason an active damping device was incorporated in the engine actua- 
tion system design specifications. 
on preliminary theoretical considerations, which pol'nted to the need for  
Recognition of this problem was based 
1. A sound theoretical set  of equations describing the engine 
actuator structural  system dynamics 
2. Reliable estimates of compliance and other physical characteristics 
for each of the- components 
t 3 .  Prototype and production testing and measurements of the system 
and its components to confirm the theoretical estimates and data 
A course of action was followed to supply these needs, since an unstable 
control system could not be tolerated. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
The course of action included theoretical studies, analog simulation of 
the system and its components, and extensive testing on prototype and pro- 
duction vehicles. These actions covered approximately 36 months terminat- 
ing when battleship test  results confirmed theoretical predictions. Test  and 
analyses activities were later extended to include general and special testing 
of production vehides  through S-II-12 at the Mississippi Test  Facility, MTF. 
Several theoretical approaches, or  models, were developed to study 
blem; One model consisted of a matrix of linear influence coeffi- 
cients describing 'the -thrust structure, engine, and actuator. 
cients were theoretically calculated, and a special static tes t  was made on a 
prototype thrust structure to verify portions of these calculations. This test  
provided good agreement between the theoretical influence coefficients and 
those resulting f rom the test. Test  verification of the influence coefficients 
describing the engine and actuator were obtained from the suppliers. 
These coeff i- 
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However, many problems were concerned with obtaining reliable and 
meaningful data fo r  these components. 
obtain linear analyses of the system compliance mode frequency. 
This model made it possible to 
Other theoretical models of the sys tem were considered that included 
nonlinear characteristics such as  engine gimbal friction and the dynamics 
of thc D P F  (dynamic pressure feedback) active damping device in the 
actuator. Studies of compliance mode frequency from these models were 
- principally performed by analog computer simulation. A mockup engine 
actuator structure was available for tie-in with the analog computer. 
important result  of using a simulation of the system was to provide an 
assessment of the theoretical range of variance of the compliance mode 
frequency. 
select tolerances of individual parameters.  
w e r e  made in this assessment. 
compliance mode frequency was found to include situations where the control 
system would not be stable. 
tes t  production stages during -static firing at MTF. 
pliance mode frequency could be monitored indirectly from frequency 
'response tests and from compliance measurements, Significant differences 
between theoretical and test results were considered as  indicating a signifi- 
cant variance in the compliance mode frequency. 
One 
In this study the Monte Carlo sampling technique was used to 
Over 100 analog computer runs 
The theoretical range of variance of the ~ 
For  this reason it was decided to continue to 
Variability of the com- 
Two kinds of tests were performed during static firing of production 
Measurements 
vehicles at MTF. In one tes t  the engines were gimbaled at  certain discrete 
frequencies to obtain frequency response characteristics. 
were made of the commands to the actuators, and of the actuator extenrilions 
in response to these commands. 
auto- and cross-correlation techniques that produced a mathematical trans- 
fe r  function of the engine actuation system. 
then compared with a theoretical transfer function to determine if significant 
differences existed. This test was conducted on the battleship, and &-II-1 
through S-II-12. However, good repeatability was observed in all cases 
where a common thrust structure design was used. 
expected and noted when a new thrust structure design was being tested. 
h the other test, motion picture cameras were focused on e 
mouited targets to record engine alignment changes in two planes 
was applied to an engine. 
stiffness of the  engine actuator structure systems this measurement could 
be used to asees8 system compliance. 
stages, and only on two engines for any one stage. The results compared 
These measureme s were analyzed by 
This transfer Eunction was 
Differences were 
Since the alignment change is proportional to the 
d on selected This test was conduc 
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acceptably with theoretical values. The test could be improved by i 
additional reference targets on the stage in the camera field of view 
also by photographing all four engines simultaneously. 
The solution as outlined above combines theoretical solutions with 
actual testing wherever possible. F r o m  the experience gaiiied in salving 
this problem, the following recommendations a re  made for  future efiorts 
involving gimbaled rocket engines used fo r  attitude control: 
1. Make adequate allowance in the work statement for  testing of 
components as  well as for  system testing 
2. Do not permit suppliers to perform component acceptance testing 
3. Add reference targets on the stage as  well as on the engines when 
photographing engine alignment changes due to thrust 
4. Photograph all four engines on each stage selected for photographic 
c om p lian c e me  as  u r em e nt s 
DISCUSSION 
Much of the effort described above was concerned with developing or  
learning new techniques. 
were not previously used to organize data for analog computer runs. 
photo-optical measuring system used to measure engine alignment changes 
in a live thrust environment was developed from scratch. 
c ross  -correlation analysis techniques were adapted from a Rocketdyne 
program, but the techniques for producing a transfer function f rom the 
correlation functions was developed entirely by Flight Dynamics and Control 
personnel. (This was accepted by NASA at T U  No. SID 92343. ) 
For  example, the Monte Carlo sampling techniques 
The 
The auto- and 
i 
1-88 
SD 71-256 
kwell 
STRI N GE R EN D-FIX I TY COE FFI Ci EN f 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
N R  and.NASA (MSFC) agreed that the method of analysis to be used 
for determining the c ru ica l  buckling load of the S-U. LHz tank wall under 
axial compressive loading would be that given in NASA Memo 2-12-593; 
(Reference 1). 
"end-fixity coefficient" be known in order to accurately determine the 
critical buckling load. 
four depending on the degree of end-fixity (pined end versus fixed end). 
However, this method of analysis requires tha t  a stringer 
The end-fixity coefficient may vary by a factor of 
The effect of not accurately determing this end-fixity coefficient would 
result in a non-optimum tank design. 
structure, it was required to determine the end-fixity coefficient by test. 
In order to design a minimum weight 
SOLUTION /RECOMME;P~DATION 
Three LH2 tank wall quarter panels were tested under axial com- 
The LH2 tank stringer end-fixity coefficient 
pressive loading at the University of California and the buckling load 
determined (Reference 2). 
was then computed f rom the  empirically determined buckling loads. 
Although a theoretical expression correlated excellently with small  
cylinder test data, it was found to be unconservative when applied to the 
S-I1 LH2 tank. 
formed to determine the end-fixity coefficient for structures which would 
require large extrapolations f rom available tes t  data. 
Therefore, it  is recommended that full-scale tests be per- 
DISCUSSION 
Methods of analysis for  determining orthotropic shell buckling loads 
One such method generally consist of column and shell curvature effects, 
selected for  analysis of the S-11, is given in Reference 1. 
equation is :  
The basic 
where the f i r s t  t e rm on the right-hand side of the equation represents the 
Euler load of a flat panel having the same cross  section as  the cylinder wall. 
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The second term on the right-hand s ide  of the equation represents th 
buckling load of a moderately long longitudinally stiffened cylinder ; 
a cylinder long enough so that the ends have a negligible effect on the 
load but short  enough to preclude the posgibility of f 
into an elliptical shape. F o r  t h e  S-11 configuration, 
the equation predominates. 
value of 1.  0 to 4. 0 depending on the degree of end-fixity. 
tening the cylinder 
e E d e r  portion 
The end-fixity coefficient, 6, may vary fr 
A theoretical expression to evaluate effective column end-fixity had 
However, a lack of con- 
been developed by Langhaar (Reference 3). 
expression and available test  data was excellent. 
fidence in the reliability of the shell buckling equations of Reference 1 as 
well as in the Langhaar expression for column end-fixity is indicated. The 
validity of applying test data obtained on model cylinders in the size range 
covered by the referenced tests to extremely large shell structures such as 
the S-11 tank is questionable. Also, conflict in existing test data and dis- 
agreement between various investigators in the field is apparent. 
therefore decided that tests on full-scale curved panels of the LHZ tank wall 
configuration were warranted. 
wall was derived f rom these tes ts  (Reference 4). 
fixity coefficient derived from the full-scale tests and the theoretical 
coefficient derived from the Langhaar expression found the Langhaar 
method to  be unconservative f o r  the S-I1 LH2 tank structure. 
Correlation between the  Langhaar 
It was 
The end-fixity coefficient for  the S-I1 tank 
Comparison of the end- 
REFERENCES 
1. 
2. 
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3. 
4. 
Peterson, J. P., and Dow, M. B. , I'Compression Tests on Circular 
Cylinders Stiffened Longitudinally by Closely Spaced 2 -Section 
Stringers, I '  NASA Memorandum 2-12-59L (November 1958). 
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Missiles and Space Division, SunnrJale, California (September 1964). 
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MATERlAL AND PROCESS SPECIFICATION APPROVAL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Mew and changed Material and Process  Specffications on the S-I1 
Program required MSFC /NASA contractual approval prior to release or 
implementation. 
ing delays and increased program costs. 
The lengthy approval cycle resulted in hardware process- 
SOLUTION ~RECOMMEN DATION 
Cettain non-critical specifications were removed from the "Approval 
Pr ior  to Release" l ist  to reduce t h e  quantity of specifications submitted in 
an effort to provide an expedient approval cycle. Additionally, special 
NR/NASA task groups were formed to provide expedited review and approval 
of the specifications. However, backlogs of Bpecification changes continued 
to develop, lengthening the approval cycles. 
was never established. 
An expedient approval cycle 
On future pro-grams, it is  recommended that requirements be negoti- 
ated with the customer but that specification release and implementation 
remain contractor responsibilities. 
DISCUSSION 
Most changes to specifications were in methods and techniques, How- 
ever,  customer approval was required f o r  all specification changes regard- 
less  of the technical content. 
one point in the program, required at least 90 days for approval regardless 
of the magnitude of the change. 
delays whenever an in-process change was required. Concerted efforts by 
contractor -customer personnel relieved critical a reas  of concern but! never 
fully resolved the problem. 
Specification backlogB developed which, at 
This resulted in hardware processing 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Maafunction of stage mechanical components during cbeckod, attrib 
to  particulate contamination, generated a concern for all stage and GSE fluid 
system components. * 
SOLUTION /RE COMMEM DATION 
Because of the'fabrieation status of the existing program (all vehicles 
complete) an interim solution was implemented. This solution was to blow 
down all stage mechanical systems which contained particulate contamina- 
tion sensitive components, where failure of these components would cause 
launch abort or mission failure. 
systems. 
These systems were identified as critical 
The recommended solution f o r  implementation on future vehicles 
(f ollow-on contract) was to protect all contamination sensitive components 
by filtering, etc. , and to  clean critical systems after assembly prior to 
component installation. 
It was further recommended that the particulate level utilized a8 the 
acceptance criterion be reduced. 
tive particulate level which results from the assembly of individually cleaned 
components. 
This in turn would reduce the cumula- 
DISCUSSION 
A ga5 blowdown (high velocity purge) was performed on critical stage 
systems to determine the existing particulate level and to clean the system. 
This procedure utilimd a stage-certified GSE helium supply attached to the 
inlet of t h e  system or part of a system being blown down. 
holder containing a five micron filter was attached to the outlet of the sys-  
tem. 
A Millipore filter 
Pressure gages reflected system inlet and outlet pressure. 
Flow was established by adjusting the system inlet pressure until the 
outlet pressure (filter inlet pressure) reached 300 psig, o r  the system inlet 
pressure reached operating pressure of the system, whichever was estab- 
lished first. Each purge cycle consisted of three minutes. The subject 
k 
J 
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systems were repeatedly bl 
N R  detailed cleaning specif 
components were removed 
prevent their damage. 
Reference 1. 
tion exceeding the'levels allowed by the detailed cleaning spa 
existed in most stage systems. 
occurrence was primarily contributable to generation du 
induction from the assembly environment. 
down w t U  they met t 
Further detail of this procedure is 
This blowdown analysis reflected that par t  
The type aE this particulate 
Testing performed as par t  of a contamination program conducted by 
N R  verified .that particulate contamination is generated during the assembly 
and disassembly of "B" nut joints of the type utilized on the S-IJ stage. 
data also reflected that the particulate generated followed a definite size 
distpibution and that the "Gas Blowdown" procedure was effective in removing 
this particulate. 
in Reference 2. 
mended for incorporation into cleaning specifications MA0110-018 and the 
Test 
Additional data obtained during this program may be found 
Also reflected in this report  is the particulate level recom- 
MSFC-SPEC- 164, 
A follow-on program is currently being proposed to continue develop- 
ment in the particulate contamination control field. 
primarily be concerned with establishing, through evaluation testing, an 
ultimate cleanliness level (practical cleaning plateau). 
establish a base line for the establishment of design and control cri teria,  
cleanliness requirements and cleaning procedure$ for future applications. 
Advanced methods of system cleaning will also be evaluated including the 
"Gas Blowdown" method and cryogenic fluid flushing. 
REFERENCES 
This program will 
This data will 
1. 
2. 
Contamination, SD 70-557-5, Saturn S-I1 Qhality Assurance Critical 
Process Control Manual (October 30, 1970). 
Contamination Program Final Report, SD 71-247 [April 15, 1971). 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Analyses and full scale  tests indicated that the  flow r 
honeycomb-insulation purge vent sys tem was too high and t 
p re s su res ,  causing insulation debonding, would resu l t  du r i  
boo s t phas e. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
is tance of the 
e 
The problem was solved by cutting a network of interconnecting mani-  
folds in  the insulation which great ly  reduced the p r e s s u r e  lag through the 
insulation. In addition, vent plugs were  added to  the upper and lower mani-  
folds; these were  closed during ground operations and opened at lift-off to  
provide additional vent a r e a  without introducing 10s ses associated with pipe 
flow. It is recommended that in-flight venting sys tem designs that u se  flow 
paths having undefined high frictional losses  should be avoided. Whenever 
! possible, t e s t s  should be performed to  ascer ta in  these type of losses .  
DISCUSSION 
The LHz tank 1.6-inch foam-filled honeycomb insulation was helium 
purged during prelaunch operations. 
venting to allow the purge gas to  escape during boost, since insufficient 
venting could cause the insulation to debond. 
used a mesh  of saw cuts in the insulation next to the tank to  t ranspor t  the 
purge gas to  the kani fo lds  a t  both ends of the sidewall. 
through l/Z-inch pipes leading to  the umbilical panels. 
was used for ground purge. 
provide adequate in-flight venting of the honeycomb purge: 
I t  was necessary  to  provide sufficient 
The original venting concept 
The  gas flowed 
The s a m e  system 
These  design changes were  implemented to  
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VENTING OF FORWARD SKIRT A N D  AFT INTERSTAGE COMPARTMENTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Analysis indicated the S-11 forward sk i r t  and aft inters tage compart-  
Undersized vent ment  vent holes were  undersized fo r  the Skylab mission. 
holes could r e su l t  in excessive compressive and b u r s t  loads on the com- 
par tment  walls during flight. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
By using external  aerodynamic flow field data in conjunction with an 
in-flight venting program,  the vent holes were  properly sized and located 
to satisfy the in-flight venting requirements  without compromising the ground 
purge requirements .  
In design of in-flight venting systems,  i t  i s  recommended that adequate 
provision be made  for  t ra jec tory  changes which may be required for future 
missions.  
DISCUSSION 
The  S-I1 forward and aft inters tage compartments a r e  purged during 
pre- launch operations. 
s ive s t ruc tura l  loads during boost, The problem was to provide adequate 
vent a r e a  during boost in o rde r  to  meet s t ruc tura l  requirements ,  without 
exceeding the maximum allowable a r e a  for  compartment purging. 
additional problem affecting the forward skirt '  compartment was caused by 
the external  aerody&amic flow field in this region. 
could exis t  on the f rus tum a t  the s a m e  time bursting loads were  acting on 
the forward skir t .  The  t ra jec tory  of the S-I1 for  Skylab is different f r o m  
the t ra jec tory  for  LOR miss ions  result ing in a different se t  of values used 
for external  aerodynamic flow data. 
inadequate to  accommodate both missions.  
Venting provisions must  be  made to  prevent exces-  
An 
Compressive loads 
Tolerance provisions for venting were  
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MOISTURE CONTROL WITHIN SYSTEM CO/'""' IC. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
M1"UNtN I3 
Initial S-11 design did not adequately consider 
accumulation. Excessive moisture has resulted in 
component failure, and corrosion. 
the problem of moisture 
slow component response, 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Subsequent to initial S-I1 design, it became necessary to make , 
engineering design changes to add purge provisions; perform additional 
purging, component cycling, pressure cycling, and vacuum drying; and 
redesign components. 
considered in initial design so that traps a r e  eliminated, purging provisions 
made, and procedures written so that all moisture is removed. 
It i s  recommended that moisture accumulation be 
DISCUSSION 
During the S-11 program, a number of component failures occurred 
which can be attributed to moisture or where moisture is  suspect. 
failures have been caused by either moisture freezing at cryogenic conditions 
or by corrosion. The failures and their immediate effect include: 
The 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
An LH2 prevalve failure during a static firing countdown. 
static firing was aborted and the valve replaced. 
The 
Vent valve position microswitches malfunctioning. 
effect. 
No immediate 
A slow opening of an engine main LOX valve during an S-I1 static 
firing. The static firing was cutoff during the s tar t  transient and 
the valve replaced. 
A leak through a torsional bellows, The line was replaced. 
A slow opening of a s tar t  tank vent and relief valve during CDDT. 
The valve was replaced. 
i 
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For  each of the failures it was necessary to initiate an Engineering 
to prevent recurrence of the problem. 
ion to the design changes made as  a result of S-II 
number of changes were made on S-I1 a s  a result of other prog 
problems . 
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MECHANICAL JOINTS SEAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
It was necessa ry  to  select ,  design, test, and qualify an  adequate 
mechanical sys tems tubular joint sealing system. The  tubular sys tems are 
of various size's and subjected to  seve re  serv ice  conditions and temperature  
extremes.  
An inadequate sealing system, one permitt ing leakage, would be  
extremely hazardous, result ing in f i r e  or  premature  depletion of fuels, 
oxidizer, o r  pressurizat ion media. 
SOL UTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A thorough industry search  was made to  se lec t  candidate seals for 
testing. Flange designs were  prepared,  fabricated,  tested,  and optimized. 
The t e s t  p rogram was successfully completed, resulting in the selection 
of the sea l  now manufactured by Megatech. 
It is recommended that the seal/flange system a s  qualified continue to  
be utilized: its capabilities are known, installation procedures and handling 
devices a r e  successful, and the supplier is  cooperative. 
DISCUSSION 
Three  significant problems were  encountered during the development 
phase of this program. 
1. Peeling of the teflon coating on cryogenic sea ls  
2. 
3. Warping of the flange 
Oxidation of the copper alloy coating on hot gas sea ls  
The Navan (Megatech) cryogenic seal was originally coated with taflon 
The problem was overcome by applying the 
tape and it was noted that after exposure t o  cryogenic tempera tures  the 
coating would spli t  and peel  off. 
teflon by the dispers ion process .  
SD 71-256 
When the hot gas seals, coated with c 
LNz  after exposure to hot gas (air)  it was n 
oxidation of the coating o 
to silver corrected the p 
The third problem involved the seal  and flange combinatfon. Thermal 
shock tests conducted on the combination (subjection of an ambient seal  and 
flange to LWz at  -423 F) resulted in permanent warpage of the flange and 
leakage of the seal. Analysis of the problem led to the conclusion that this 
was due to the flange material  (steel) low strain level, shrinkage at  cryogenic 
temperatures and decreasing thermal-conductivity. 
eliminated by prechilling the installation to -250 F prior to exposure to LHz. 
The problem was 
REFERENCES 
Final Report - Testing of Saturn S-I1 Cryogenic and Hot Gas Seals, 
SID 66-294 (April 20, 1966). 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Internal leakage and timing fai lures  of cryogenic valves occurred due 
to the dimensional instability of the lipseal. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
*c 
A process  mus t  be developed to  be u ied  during seal and valve manu- 
facturing to stabilize the sea l  and prevent distortion during the life of the 
valve. 
DISCUSSION 
The following sequence was developed to  relieve stress on the seal 
during machining and fabrication. 
The l ipseals a r e  machined to a rough ring configuration measuring 
10.850 inches (outer d iameter )  by 7. 750 inches (inner diameter)  by 3/16 inch 
thick. 
sections of aluminum foil between each ring. 
on the inner and outer diameters  to within 1/8 inch of the Kel-F to  remove3 
excess material .  A restraining bolt on the jig fixture is then finger tightened 
to  apply a slight compression load to the rings and prevent excessive warping 
during the s t r e s s  relieving process.  
desired tempera ture  (250 j: 15 F) and a thermocouple installed near  the 
center of the ring stack is monitored until the temperature  is reached. 
the temperature  has  been reached, a timer is  se t  for  24 hours. At the 
conclusion of the 24 hours the oven i s  turned off, the oven door remains 
closed, and the oven is allowed to  cool down to a maximum of 100 F before 
the specimens are removed. 
in the oven, it is extremely important that the oven door not be opened. 
can not be over-emphasized. 
These rings are stacked in  a jig fixture and placed in  a n  oven with 
The aluminum foil is t r immed 
The oven control is adjusted to the 
When , 
During the ent i re  period in which the Kel-F is  
This  
After the oven hag cooled to  100 F maximum, the rings a re  removed 
f rom the oven and machined to  drawing dimensions. 
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TOR RESERVOIR MANIFOLD ASSE 
RVOlR PISTON SEAL L E A K A G E  
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
T h e  r e se rvo i r  piston "O"-ring seal has  a tendency to sp i ra l  (twisting] 
nonuniform rolling action) during piston cycling. 
leakage requiring accumulator r e se rvo i r  manifold assembly (ARMA) 
replacement. 
The effect is excessive 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The '!O''-ring seal was replaced with a quad-ring sea l  specifically 
designed not to  spiral .  
for  dynamic application on la rge  pistons. 
Future  designs should not utilize standard "O"-rings 
DISCUSSION 
This  r e se rvo i r  i b  used in a hydraulic sys tem with MIL-H-5606A fluid, 
The  p r imary  cause of spirall ing is thought to resu l t  f r o m  the l a rge  d iameter  
(8 inches)  of the piston. Other factors  considered to compound the problem . 
a r e  the slow speed of s t roke (less than 1 inch p e r  10 seconds), low p r e s s u r e  
differential (60  to 110 AP) ,  small length of s t roke  (2 .4 inches nominal, 
4.2 inches total)  and the fact that lubrication is  not optimum (back s ide of 
piston is  vented). 
An engineering evaluation test was run to  determine spirall ing ten- 
dencies of the r e se rvo i r  piston "0"-ring seal ve r sus  a quad-ring seal. 
Several tests were  conducted,> including piston cycling with no lubrication on 
the r e se rvo i r  bore  where the "0"-ring spiral led during the first cycle and 
the quad-ring did not s p i r a l  after 5 cycles. 
(Reference 1 )  was that the quad-ring eeal exhibited no signs of rolling, 
twisting] o r  spiral l ing and that t he re  was no sign of leakage and no indication 
of sea l  deter iorat ion as a r e su l t  of that  series of tests. 
The conclusion of these t e s t s  
A design verification test was  later conducted with an ARMA reservoir 
to  determine the effectiveness of the quad-ring seal t o  resist spirall ing and 
leakage under dynamic and s ta t ic  conditions at var ious pressures and 
tempera tures ,  
through a series of simulated duty cycle tests, ground checkout tes t s ,  and 
accelerated aging and s torage  tests. 
These  tests (Reference 2 )  included 4,266 cycles accumulated 
Resul ts  were  satisfactory.  
1-101 
SD 71-256 
After design go-ahead, the A R U  quad-ring configuration was 
by the supplier.  
REFERENCES 
1. "Test  Report  Saturn S-I1 EAS ARMA Quad-Ring Test", LTR 3306-3401, 
L&T ( January  1970). 
2. "Tes t  Report  Saturn S-11 Design Verification Te&, ARMA Reservoi r  
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3QTR5630087Ml (June 26, 1970). 
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CRACKED 6-NUT SLEEVES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
MS20819 "B" nut s leeves  fabricated of 303 SE C r e s  ma te r i a l  exhibited 
numerous cracking fa i lures  induced by sulphur s t r ingers  within the raw 
mater ia l .  The  sulphur is  added to provide f r e e  machining character is t ics .  
rz 
The cracking of the s leeve causes  torque relaxation in the joint, which 
could resul t  in excessive sys tem leakage. 
SOLUT ION/REC OMMENDATION 
The s leeve m a t e r i a l  was changed to  304 CRES. It is recommended that 
type 304 CRES sleeves continue to  be  utilized. 
ma te r i a l  is acceptable and not susceptible to  cracking fai lures .  
Experience has  proven this 
DISCUSSION 
f 
A s e r i e s  of leakage t e s t s  were  conducted with purposely cracked -4C, 
- 6 6 ,  -8C, -1OC, -12C and -16C sleeves installed at minimum torque. The  
t e s t s  were  conducted a t  1500 psi while submerged in LN2 and at room 
t empera ture ,  
It was found that the leakage rates of the -4, -6, -8 and -10 s leeves 
did not exceed 0. 3 sc ims .  This amount of leakage was not considered s ig-  
nificant and is  non-detrimental  to  the reliabil i ty of the sys tems involved. 
The  -12 s leeve leakage was approximately 6 0  scims and -16 was in excess  
of 300 scims.  
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SERUOACTUATOR PHASE lAG 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
, 
The servoactuator supplier phase-lag acceptance test procedures and 
requirements were not compatible with the contractor's acceptance test, 
The effect was that servoactuators could pass the supplier's atceptance test 
and f a i l  the contractor's static firing acceptance test. 
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
1;1 
A study (Reference 1) indicates that i n  flight the vehicle reacted to a 
resultant phase lag which was closely approximated by average phase lag. 
Accordingly, the static firing acceptance test requirements were revised to 
specify that the average of the four pitch servoactuator phase lags and the 
average of the four yaw servoactuator phase lags shall be equal to o r  less 
than 34* with no individual servoactuator phase lags of more than 40°. 
original requirement was for all servoactuator phase lags to be less than 34O), 
(The 
Supplier test equipment requirements and supplier and vehicle accept- 
ance test requirements a re  prodded early i n  the program. 
mended that these early requirements be re-evaluated, as test data becomes 
available, i n  order to insure compatibility, 
It is  recom- 
DISCUSSION 
A static firing acceptance test criteria for the servoactuators was less 
than 34O phase lag between the input current and the servoactuators output 
position, when applying a sinusoidal input signal of 6 m a  P-P at a frequency 
of 1 Wz, The supplier's acceptance test requirement at this amplitude and 
.frequency was equal to o r  less than 33O. A problem existed because of dif-  
ferences i n  test configuration and method of determining resultlr. 
primary difference was in  load inertia with the supplier's load inertia (flight 
configuration) being only approximately 60 percent of the static firing con- 
figuration. 
i n  load structure stiffness, bearing friction, and the transfer function (sup- 
plier used load position while the static firing data used was servoactuator 
pigton position). 
increase of 7O over that recorded by the supplier on the same aervoactuators. 
Accordingly, servoactvator s could pass .the aupplier's phase lag acceptance 
test and fail the static firing acceptance test. 
occurred on the one servoactuator removed for  excessive tatic firing phase 
The 
Other differences thought to have a minor effect were differences 
Data evaluaaon indicated an average static firing phase l ag  
This condition actually 
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lag. When retested by the supplier, the phase lag was almost identical to 
during the initial supplier acceptance test (Reference 2). 
REFERENCES 
1. "Minutes of the Thirteenth S-II Stage VeMcle, Dyaamice and 
Control Working Group Meeting, I '  R-ASTR-BV-709-68, Agenda 
Item 7 (October 30, 1968). 
2. "Minutes of the Twelve 5-a[ Stage Vehicle, Dynamics and Control 
Working Group Meeting, I t  R - A E R O - P - 2 2 4 - 6 8 ,  Agenda Item 6 
(May 13, 1968). 
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RE PEA TAB I LlTY PROGRAM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A review of component failures (electrical and mechanical) after the 
components had been installed on the stage revealed that the failures occurred 
when the attempt wae made to repeat component functions which had recently 
been passed during a supplier's acceptance test program. 
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
A Product Repeatability Program was developed by NR/SD, NASA, and 
the supplier for  improvement of configuration management, planning, tooling 
and quality assurance functions, This program included the establishment of 
an in-house Re-acceptance Test Program, This re-acceptance test was per- 
formed on all Criticality I and LI components and some Criticality LLI 
components , 
In view of the number of components rejected during this program, it 
i s  recommended that a similar component tes t  program be developed and 
implemented wherever high reliability systems a r e  required. 
DISCUSSION 
The Product Repeatability Program consists of subjecting the compo- 
nent to an upgraded ( m o b  stringent) acceptance teat program by an independ- 
ent user  tes t  facility. In t h i a  program the testing was performed in  an NR/SD 
laboratory. 
component to be tested. Test  stands which were-equal to o r  better than the 
supplier's were designed and built. 
Detailed tes t  plans were developed and implemented for each 
Any malfunctioning component was returned to the supplier for correc- 
tive measures. 
to the supplier's acceptance test program and upon receipt at NR/SD was 
again subjected to the Product Repeatability test program, 
Upon completion of this action the component was subjected 
This test program resulted in a significant reduction of failures of 
components after ingltallation on the stage. 
1-106 
SI) 71-258 
S- 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Space Oivision 
North Amencan Rockwell 
Design 23-01 
I CRYOGENIC TRANSFER LINE 
AND EFFECT 
Early Saturn P r o g r a m  cryogenic t ransfer  line assembly designs were  
not effectively verified by development tes ts ,  because tes t  facil i t ies were not 
available to tes t  with operational fluid media and flow rates .  'Many labora- 
tor ies  lacked the experience necessary to fully understand the effects of 
cryogenic flows. Subsequently, line failures occurred on the Saturn S-II as 
a resul t  of vibration caused by high propellant flow rates .  
capable of simulating exact service flow conditions were  built. 
performed revealed that line assemblies behaved quite differently with minor 
changes i n  flow media o r  flow rates.  The flow-induced vibration phenomena 
was la ter  the subject of an extensive study by the NASA. 
Flow facilities 
Flow t e s t s  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The basic  qualification tes t  philosophy was changed to include opera- 
tional flow tes t  for high-flow line assemblies. 
all line assemblies  was initiated to determine the effects of flow induced 
vibration. 
flow testing to complete qualification requirements. 
A comprehensive analysis of 
From the analysis, -five components were singled out for additional 
Serious consideration a s  to the effects of flow induced vibration must  be  
included i n  the des.ign of future cryogenic t ransfer  lines, Flow tes t s  must be  
a par t  of the development t e s t  phase using the proper fluid media and instru-  
mentation to verify compliance to design requirements. 
DISCUSSION 
Tes t  facilities and tes t  techniques were  lacking to adequately verify the 
s t ructural  capabilities of ear ly  cryogenic t ransfer  line assembly design. Tes t  
facilities did not have the knowledge and were  not equipped to provide opera- . 
tional flow r a t e s  using liquid oxygen o r  liquid hydrogen a s  the flow media. 
The flow techniques employed were the substitution of water o r  i n  some cases  
liquid nitrogen at equivalent flow ra tes ,  o r  short  bu r s t s  with the actual media 
(gravity flow). 
provide the exacting information. 
' 
No matter  how well these systems performed, they failed to 
Fa i lures  during the  tanking operations of a 6-inch-diameter Boeing 
Saturn S-IC LOX f i l l  and drain line assembly bellows and an 8-inch-diameter 
North American Rockwell Saturn S-IT LOX f i l l  and drain line assembly 
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bellows provided the major impetus into flow characteri 
Boeing's study revealed that flow-induced vibration on t 
line assembly was significantly increased when the flo 
lons per minute, and structural failures would occur on unlined single o r  
multi-ply bellows at flow rates in-excess of 4000 gallons per minute, 
investigations, 
Note: The same conditions will exist at equivalent velocities for 
larger diameter line assemblies. 
The NR failed LOX f i l l  and drain line assembly qualification test pro- 
gram was reviewed to deterfiine cause of failure, 
became apparent that some minor differences in flow characteristics 
existed between water (used during the initial line qualification program) 
and LOX, which could be a problem when related to high-flow rates. To 
substantiate this analysis, a LOX flow system was developed capable of 
flowing LOX at operational flow rates and extended durations. 
F r o m  the review, it 
The failed bellows in  the NR line assembly was replaced with a multi- 
ply bellows with liner. 
assumed that a valve located near the failed bellows causes turbulent condi- 
tions, thus causing the failure. 
to an L N z  flow test  and then to a LOX flow test  at operational flow rates  and 
duration. 
flow test. 
assemblies such that multi-ply bellows with liners replaced all single ply 
bellows without liners. 
The remaining bellows were not changed since it was 
This redesigned line assembly was subjected j 
. 
The unlined compensator bellows failed one minute into the LOX 
This failure influenced the selection and design on many line 
The 5 - 2  engine AS1 fuel line flex hose failure initiated a comprehensive 
study program into the effects of the flow-induced vibration. All Saturn S-T.f 
flexible line sections were assessed for potential failure due to flow-induced 
fatigue. 
tion were subjected to flow tests following the techniques fostered by 
Dr.  C. R. Cerlach. 
Stage flexible lines and ducting, and established new guidelines for the flow 
te  s ting, 
Five of the ducts determined to be influenced by flow-induced vibra- 
This program verified the integrity of the Saturn S-11 , 
The approach to line assembly flow tests a r e  now well defined, providing 
a development tool f o r  actual simulation of system requirements. Flow test  
results have provided confidence that the transfer line assemblies, designed 
for various systems, will perform as required, 
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EFFECTS OF LOCAL GEOMETRIC IRREGULARITIES 
OM WELDED THIN-WALL LINES 
1 
PROBLEMVSTATEMENT AND EFFECT 
In Februa ry  1967 a fai lure  of the LOX tank internal  vent line occurred 
on the S-II-F/D during the longitudinal phase of the Dynamic T e s t  P r o g r a m  
being conducted on the Saturn V vehicle at MSFC. 
p re s su re  environments to which this line had been designed and analyzed and 
for  which other specimens had been successfully qualified were  considerably 
higher than the corresponding levels that preceded the failure. Subsequent 
metallurgical investigation determined that fa i lure  began a s  a high-cycle 
fatigue fracture i n  an area exhibiting incomplete weld penetration and l a rge  
degrees  of mater ia l  offset  (mismatch) and peaking (weld joint angularity). 
Re-examination of inspection radiographs obtained f r o m  the line supplier 
indicated discernable weld discrepancies i n  the fai lure  a r e a  that had not been 
repaired during l ine produetion. 
specifications revealed that, although weld offset  was limited to 35 percent of 
the adjacent material thickness, no limitation existed for  joint angularity o r  
peaking, Weld offsets grea te r  than 100 percent of the mater ia l  thickness and 
weld peaking of varying degrees  were  found to exist elsewhere gn the failed 
line and on other  l ines subsequently examined. Immediate concern developed 
regarding the s t ructural  integrity of this line and all other similarly- 
constructed thinwall welded l ine systems employed on the S-II flight stages, 
The flight dynamic and 
Fur the r  review of this supplier's weld 
SOLUTION/ R E  COMMENDATION 
A list was compiled of all l ine systems on  the S-II that, because of 
All weld radiographs were  
design o r  method of support, could prove susceptible to the deleterious 
effects of weld offset and peaking conditions. 
re-examined to in su re  the adequacy of line s t ructural  welds; discrepancies 
were  noted and the affected par t s  returned to the manufacturer for repair. 
Analysis resu l t s  were  combined with static and dynamic test resu l t s  to 
establish the effects of various geometric i r regular i t ies  on the fatigue 
strength of this type of welded l ine system. 
compared to the predicted cyclic load spectra  for each s t ruc tura l  weld on the 
l isted S-XI l ine sys tems to determine allowable limits for  weld offlset and 
peaking. 
not exceeded. 
cations to preclude future occurrence of the problem. 
The resu l t s  of these efforts were  
All applicable weld8 were  then inspected to insure  these limits were  
These limits were  incorporated in  the applicable weld specifi- 
,I 
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DISCUSSION 
The large number of potentlal weld peaking and offset configurations a s  
well a s  the variations in  circumferential length precluded any possibility of 
rigorous structural analysis. F o r  this reason, a more  general approach was 
employed using idealized geometries. Peaking and offset were assumed to be 
axisymrnetric and were analyzed independently. As developed for the afore- 
mentioned LOX tank vent line failure, the analysis techni ques and assumptions 
a r e  documented in  Reference 1. These same methods (described below) were 
employed in  the analysis of welded thin wall line assemblies on the S-a. 
c4 
Weld peaking was represented in a longitudinal cross-section of the 
line wall a s  two straight slopes emanating obliquely from either side of the 
weld bead and joining the basic contour a t  an angle. Fo r  a given amount of 
peaking (expressed as multiples of the material thickness), the magnitudes 
of the three angles thus formed a r e  functions of the longitudinal separationcs 
of the apexes. 
metrical peaking were evaluated by considering the local moment effects to 
be equivalent to those that-would result f rom the action of three uniformly 
distributed radial loads Va,  Vb, and V C  (Figure These were assumed 
to act  at  circumferences along the line i n  directions that would tend to pro; 
duce the particular peaking conditions studied. 
symmetrical and unsymmetrical peaking, the magnitudes of these radial 
loads were determined so a s  to  balance the line maximum longitudinal force 
P resulting from the combination of line axial load and gross line bending. 
This calculation assumed no bending stiffness existed in  the longitudinal dis- 
continuity element at the load locations. 
ing f rom each of the three uniform radial loads were next determined using 
methods described in  Reference 2. 
mine the maximum moment and i ts  location. Because of the rapid decay in  
moment away from the radial laad producing it,  the maximum was found 
always to  occur a t  the weld. 
The various conditions representing symmetrical and unsym- 
5 ) .  
F o r  several  conditions of 
Local longitudinal moments result- , 
These were added algebraically to deter - 
A more  general case was considered f o r  weld offsets. An inflection 
point was assumed to exist at the weld so as to result in  a moment a r m  equal 
to 60 percent of the total offset i n  the longitudinal element of the line 
(Figure 6). 
F o r  both weld peaking and offset, the s t ress  resulting f rom the local 
moment effects was represented as a s t r e s s  intensification multiplier for the 
gross line s t ress ,  These factors vary from a minimum value of unity for the 
case of no discontinuity to maximums in  the range of ten for peaking and off- 
set  values equalling 200 percent of the material thickness. 
plotted a s  functions of the eccentricity ratio (e / t )  for the various cases 
considered. 
They have been 
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To obtain a c b a l  measurements  of the stress inte  
segment of the  failed S-II-F/D l ine was subjected to a 
MSFC. 
w e r e  instrumented with s t r a i n  gages. 
culated, based on strains measu red  adj  
pared to the gross l ine stress obtained f r o m  longitudinal P 
between welds on  the duct su r f ace  to  de te rmine  the c o r r e s  
t ion fac tors .  
Six weld a r e a s  represent ing var ious conditions of of 
8se8 at the we 
to the welds 
Based on the foregoing analysis  and tests, the follovcring observations 
a r e  made: 
e 
1. The analytical approach is  conservative; calculated weld stress ' 
intensification f ac to r s  are higher i n  all cases than those result ing 
f r o m  measured  discontinuity $trains.  
2. F o r  a given eccentr ic i ty  ra t io ,  weld peaking i e  m o r e  seve re  than 
weld offset. 
3 .  F o r  a given peaking eccentricity ratio,  the stress intensification 
fac tor  i nc reases  as the slope of the peak inc reases ,  
P rac t i ca l  application of the calculated s t r e s s  intensification fac tors  
r equ i r e s  that  the cyclic load spec t ra  and material weld fatigue allowables b e  
known. By u s e  of Miner 's  theory of cumulative fatigue damage and fatigue 
curves at t empera tu re  (Reference 3),  allowable intensification fac tors  can  b e  
determined for a given load spectrum, (A trial and e r r o r  process  is often 
required for  complex loading spectra. ) F r o m  this,  weld peaking and offset 
maximum allowables can  be  determined so as not to exceed a cumulative 
damage increment  of unity, 
As applied to  l ines  on the S-II, a weld was classified as "critical" if  
the allowable offset o r  peaking calculated as descr ibed above was g rea t e r  
than 1. 0 t o r  0. 8 t, respectively,  
cr i t ical ,  I '  Conservative a r b i t r a r y  limits were  established as follows: 
All other welds w e r e  classified as "non- 
I 
1-112 
SD 71-256 
Space Division @A!!! North Amencan Rockwell 
I Design 23-02 
The p r i m a r y  objective was  to provide a basis for asses 
Although intended fo r  application flightworthiness of S-IE lines.  
hardware,  the techniques could b e  employed to establish design requirements  
for  maximum weld offsets and peaking, provided determination of the cyclic 
load spec t r a  is  possible. Since this is often not possible during pre 
design, a m o r e  realistic approach would b e  to  establish rigorous qu 
requirements  f o r  all such l ine welds and to employ the  foregoing analysis 
techniques as requi red  fo r  Mater ia l  Review Disposition. 
REFERENCES 
1. "Internal LOX Tank Vent Line Fatigue Investigation, " 
S-II/STR 67-5, Space Division, North Amer ican  Rockwell 
Corporation (June 19, 1367). 
2. Roark, R .  J., Formulas  for  S t r e s s  and Strain,  Fourth-Edition, 
McCraw-Hill Book Company (1965). 
3 .  Cryogenic Matepial Data Handbook, ML-TDR-64-280, Air F o r c e  
Mater ia l s  Laboratory,  Resea rch  and Technology Division, Ai r  
F o r c e  Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air F o r c e  Base,  Ohio. 
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FLOW-IN IBRATlON ANALYSIS 
PRUBLEM STATEMENT AND EFPEGT 
Under cer ta in  conditione, gaseous o r  liquid flow through a convoluted 
flexible element of a duct o r  holse {bellows section) may resu l t  i n  a fatigue 
fai lure  of the eleme'rrt which clan cause leakage o r  premature  shutdown of a 
critical fluid system. 
n 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
As a general  rule ,  l i ne r s  can be added to prhvent resonance of ducting 
bellows i f  media flow velocities exceed Mach 0 ,  3. 
acoustic resonance can occur under o the rMse  "safe" conditions, and l iners  
under some conditions may not b e  required at flow rates exceeding Mach 0 . 3 .  
It i s  recommended that a flow-induced vibration/acoustic resonant analysis 
be  made of all bellows sections of a fluid fsyrstem to determine i f  a resonance 
condition exists. Reference 1 includes a technique which has  been proven to 
give valid resu l t s  with this phenomena. 
However, flow-induced 
DI S G US SION 
While the 5-2 Engine A. S. I. l ine fai lure  on AS-502 i s  the best-known 
instance of flow-induced vibration (Reference 2) ,  two instances of flow-induced 
fatigue fai lure  have occurred i n  the S-U program, 
section of the S-II-1 LOX f i l l  and drain line. The solution was to add l iners  
and incorporate multi-ply bellows; analyses such as i n  Reference 1 were  not 
available at the time. 
The first was i n  a bellows 
The second fai lure  was that of a pre-pressurization sys tem flexible hose 
i n  S-11-9 that had been  identified in  a pr ior  t e s t  p rogram (Reference 2) subject 
to a flow-induced vibration condition, 
prompted a n  immediate invegtigation and test program (Reference 3) .  
found that purge media used during ground maintenance operations (CNZ) 
created a m o r e  severe  flow-induced vibration problem than the system's  
end-use gas (GHe) used during the pr ior  analysis. While the solution to this  
particular problem was relatively s imple (mandatory use  of a second source  
flex-hose which was not sulsceptible to flow-induced fatigue), this fai lure  
points up the conditions that mus t  be  evaluated i n  determining flow fatigue 
susceptibility. 
Discovery of the failed hose i n  S-II-9 
It wa8 
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Pneumatic control l ine fa i lures  were  experienced ear ly  i n  the p rogram 
due to fa i lure  of the weld joints as a r e su l t  of vibration. 
type could cause  miss ion  104s o r  abort ,  
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
A fai lure  of this  
Rocketdyne introduced new weld techniques (shot-peened double-weld) 
to preclude the possibility of l ine  separat ion during tes t .  
that  welding of pneumatic l ines  uti l ize this technique. 
It is recommended 
DISCUSSION 
During ear ly  c luster  testing of the 5-2  engines on the S-II Battleship, 
weld joint fa i lures  experienced on the engine pneumatic l ines were  found to 
be  due to vibration. Rocketdyne developed a shot-peened, double-weld joint 
which successfully withstood the cluster  environment. 
the weld redesign, a special  inspection of the applicable l ines  was performed 
pre-s ta t ic  f i r ing and post-static fir ing on S-II-1 through S-II-4. No d iscrep-  
ancies w e r e  found. 
I n  conjunction with 
The pneumatic control l ines  rewelded were: 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6 ,  
Oxidizer turbine bypass  valve opening control 
Oxidizer turbine bypass  valve closing control 
Main fuel valve opening control 
Main fuel valve closing control 
Main fuel valve sequence valve inlet  
Main fuel valve sequence valve outlet 
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VACUUM JACKETED LINES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The fuel and oxidizer propellant, fuel vent, and r e c i r c  
the S-II depend on the vacuum i n  the jacket annulus fo r  insul  
excessive heat  leak into the cryogenic liquiy propellants. Outgassing con- 
taminants i n  the annulus, cracked o r  corroded welds, rupture  d iscs  o r  
bellows, cracked o r  broken thermacouple gage pins, and faulty evacuation 
valves are all means  by which the vacuum insulation ha8 been lopt. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Initial vacuum los ses  w e r e  attributable to "freezing out" of the pr imary  
"0" ring seal which was fabricated of Viton A with a lower tempera ture  limit 
of -65 F. 
abrupt p r e s s u r e  rise i n  thb vacuum annulus. 
ume this p r e s s u r e  rise would vary f r o m  140 to  2040 microns. 
r i s e  was the resu l t  of leakage in  the pr imary  seal and the cap 's  secondary 
sea l  maintaining the new higher vacuum level. 
by changing the pr imary  seal "0" ring to one fabricated f r o m  Kel-F and 
redesigning the plug and disc  assembly to  a two-piece construction to accom- 
modate the new Kel-F ring, 
When s tage installed l ines  exceeded this limit the resu l t  was an 
Depending on the annulus val- 
This p r e s s u r e  
This  condition was resolved 
Initial rupture  d iscs  of the L H 2  recirculation sys tem were  of coated 
aluminum which corroded i n  the sal t -a i r  atmosphera to which the S-II is sub- 
jected. 
tion, corrected the problem. 
the propellant feed and vent sys tems l ines  was also CRES 321, through 
improper  processing severa l  d i scs  corroded. 
was changed to Inconel 600 and processing was s t r ic t ly  controlled. 
These d iscs  were  replaced by CRES 321 d i scs  which, with one excep- 
Although the mater ia l  of the  rupture  d i sc s  for  
The material in  these d i sc s  
P r e s s u r e  c a r r i e r  bellows which cracked due to improper  supplier 
forming processes  caused l o s s  of vacuum by leaking propellant into the 
annulus a rea .  
ing new forming methods and bellows re-roll ing techniques. 
This was corrected by working with the supplier i n  implement- 
Bent thermocouple pins contributed to loss of vacuum also. 
thermocouple gage pins are  s e t  i n  glass  and may b e  bent without l o s s  of 
vacuum, but when straightened so  they will accept the readout instrument 
cap, the g lass  c racks  and the  vacuum is lost. 
The 
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e evacuation valve plug 
silver plated to prevent 
dis  c as s emblie 8 have 
al-to -metal galling w 
cycled f r o m  operi to closed. Wi th  the changing of the ma 
seal "0 "  r ing f r o m  Viton to  Kel-F considerably m o r e  tor  
effect an acceptable seal.  
cold flow under the loading conditions, thus requiring periodic retorquing to 
maintain the seal.  These  conditions caused silver plate flaking f r o m  the 
plug with subsequent migrat ion of the  s i lver  to the sealing surface of the 
are scheduled for  the purpose of finding a m o r e  suitable lubricant and provid- 
ing thie change for  the remaining S-a 's .  
DISCUSSION 
In  addition, the Kel-F "0" r ing had a tendency to 
1 1  I t  0 ring, thus providing a leak  path fo r  l o s s  of vacuum. Engineering tests 
Vacuum- jacketed l ine maintenance technology was a non-existent skil l  
at all Nfi facil i t ies at the inception of the program; therefore ,  until sufficient 
technical ski l ls  w e r e  acquired by Seal Beach, MTF and KSC personnel, l ine 
annulus contamination was  a continuing problem. Eventually documentation 
was  wri t ten f o r  all faci l i t ies  -to control and regulate annulus entry. 
imposit ion of this  documentation and training of technicians brought the con- 
The 
% tamin'ation under control. 
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RETEST AFTER REMOVAL OF CHECKOUT DRAG-ON CABLES 
FROB LEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
S-U stage systems checkout was performed a t  Seal Beach MTF 
with drag-on (nonflight) cables installed to obtain the desired instrumenta- 
tion readouts. This necessitated retest, after re turn to flight configuration, 
to verify flight functions. 
inadequate to validate all disturbed flight functions. 
Early in  the S-I1 Program, reteeting was 
SOLUTION / RE COMMENDATION 
The syatems functions disturbed by cable disconnection and recon- 
- 
nection were analyzed, and tes ts  were defined to provide the required 
reverification. 
automatic checkout tes t  (final checkout) that i s  performed after the vehicle 
has been returned to flight -configuration. 
These tes ts  were incorporated into the simulated flight 
It is recommended f o r  new business that systems be designed to 
minimize use of nonflight hardware in  order to meet checkout requirements. 
DIS C U SSION 
If the reasons for tes ts  performed in the nonflight configuration are 
justified, define the functional disturbance caused by removing the non- 
flight hardware (drag-on cables, break-out boxes, pneumatic lines, etc. 1. 
Develop tes t  requirements and operations that will retest  these invalidated 
functions when the vehicle under checkout i s  i n  the flight configuration, 
Example: The engine valves position measurements a re  routed to continuous 
recorders  via drag-on cables during functional sequence tests. 
on cable configuration was required to obtain the engine valve position 
measurements for continuous monitoring, due to the critical timing 
requirements of valve positioning, to be verified during the engine sequence 
tests. A procedure was provided i n  the simulated flight automatic checkout 
tes t  to verify all engine valve measurements when the stage harnesses 
were reconnected in  the flight configuration. 
were performed to re test  all  engine functions that were disturbed by this 
cable configuration change. 
This drag- 
Individual engine sequences 
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CRACKED SOLDER CONNECTION A N O M L I E S  IN 
S-l I I N STRUME NTATl ON EQU I PMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Numerous instrumentation equipment failures caused by cracked 
solder connections have been experienced on the S-I1 Program during the 
various phases of S-IIvehicle test, Much time and effort have been expended 
in recycling, failure analysis, and effecting corrective action on each failure 
occurrence, 
SOLUTION/ REC OMh4ENDATION 
All affected equipment is being.recycled to the supplier for 
re-inspection of each solder joint and reworked a s  required. 
has incorporated an improved production process for rework of solder 
joints. New motherboards were fabricated by an improved production 
process for refurbishing the flow-tach chassis to be used on S-11's -6 
through - 15, 
The supplier 
It is recommended that where reflow of solder is  required, such a s  
bifurcated terminal soldering, a 47-watt soldering iron and liquid f lux  be 
used. 
has been completed, 
All conformal coating should be deferred until the soldering process 
It is also recommended that Final Report No. 8402A, "Development 
of Highly Reliable Soldered joints for Printed Circuit Boards" (August 1968), 
by Westinghouse Defense and Space Center should be considered when pro- 
duction processes a r e  prepared for future programs. 
DISCUSSION 
Due to  variation in design of each failed unit of instrumentation 
equipment, failure analysis and corrective action of cracked solder con- 
nections have varied, 
joint failure was entrapped conformal coating and/or contaminants stressing 
the joint during thermal excursions and/or soldering. The major objective 
in establishing corrective action was to strengthen solder joints so  they can 
withstand s t resses  caused by thermal excursions when equipment is in use 
o r  during uncontrolled storage, Because of design variations and schedule 
In general, the major loading mechanism in solder 
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Design 25-01 
and cost impact, the established corrective actions t S- u: 
program relative to cracked solder anomalies can be into two 
categories: 
Category A 
Percent of 
Stressed Joints per Unit 
PCMIDDAS 
TDM 
M S M  
RDSM 
R F  Power Assy. 
ME470-0083 2 uniks 
ME456-0027 None* 
ME456-003 1 None* 
ME45 6 - 003 3 None* 
V7-750140 None 
3570 of total joints 
2570 of total joints 
3070 of total joints 
20% of total joints 
1070 of total joints 
Category B 
Equipment in the category have experienced high failure ra tes  but 
cannot be visually inspected for stressed solder joints due to non-transparent 
protective coatings such a s  silicone rubber. Flow- tach signal conditioner 
chassis, V7-750145, was the only equipment that was in this category, Cor- 
rective action for equipment in this category was found to  be costly due t o  
packaging design. 
solder joints were used with little success. Therefore, investigation was 
concentrated in the production process. 
Various nondestructive detection methods for cracked 
'::Unverified failures experienced with this equipment m a y  have been due to 
. stressed solder joints, 
/ 
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It was determined that several discrepancies existed during fabrication. 
These discrepancies were: 
1. 
2. 
. 3. 
4. 
5. 
Improper swaging tools for bifurcated terminals were used. 
Cleanliness of production process area was not enforced. 
Assembly specification allowed conformal coating entrapment in 
the solder joints. 
Inspection personnel were not properly trained for inspecting 
solder joints. 
Soldering specification did not provide sufficient details in solder - 
ing bifurcated terminals where a reflow of solder could take 
place, thereby causing weakened solder joints to occur. Solder 
joints were strengthened by use of higher iron-tip wattage and 
use of liquid f lux  during reflow of solder. 
w 
Thorough review of above discrepancies indicated that the quality of 
The following L solder joints in the flow-tach chassis was extremely poor, 
failure history of the flow-tach chassis during various phases 02 S-11 vehicle 
t e st subs tantiat ed the above conclusion. 
Facility 
Seal Beach 
Seal Beach 
MTF 
MTF 
MTF 
MTF 
MTF 
Vehicle No. 
SI 11- 8 
S-fI-8 (spare) 
s-11-4 
5-11-5 
S-II-6 
s-II-7 
S- 11- 9 
Checkout 
Checkout ( r et e s t ) 
Post Static Firing 
Static F i r ing  
Static Firing 
Static Firing 
Static F i r ing  
Failure 
Cracked solder 
Cracked solder 
Cracked solder 
Cracked solder 
Cracked solder 
Cracked sqlder 
Cracked solder 
Because of this high failure rate, a l l  flow-tach chassis from S-11-6 
through S-n- 15 were recycled to  the NR/McAlester facility for fabrication 
of new motherboards which incorporated an improved production process. 
This corrected all  the above-listed discrepancies. Since corrective action 
was taken, no further failures have occurred, 
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CAPACITANCE PROPELLANT-GAGIN G HA~DWARE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT ANID EFFECT 
A number of hardware problems have been encountered with 
capacitance propellant-gaging equipment on the S-11 and other programs, 
These a r e  the major problems: 
1, Coaxial wiring and connectors 
2. Electromechanical potentiometers 
3. Electronic component reliability 
These problems have degraded countdown and flight reliability, threatened 
launch delays, and caused heavy expenditures of time and money for 
corrective actions. 
SOLUTION/ RE COMMENDATION 
Stringent quality control and workmanship procedures were instituted 
to minimize sensitivity of coaxial wiring and connectors to environmental 
factors (cryogenic temperatures and moisture). 
components (capacitors, potentiometers, transistors,  diodes) was neces- 
sary to achieve acceptable reliability of the propellant utilization (PU) 
computer electronics assembly. Improvements i n  welding and lubrication 
of electromechanical potentiometer windings were necessary to correct 
breakage and noise problems with this component. 
Upgrading of numerous 
It is recommended that the use of capacitance type propellant-gaging 
equipment be avoided unless a strong reguifement exists for a continuous 
(analog) measurement of propellant quantity. This is because of the 
extremely low signal-to-noise ratio inherent i n  capacitance gaging systems 
and the resultant sensitivity to wiring defects and stray capacitance. 
DISCUSSION 
The S-I1 Propellant Loading and P U  System is  an adaptation of the 
capacitance system designed for the S-IVB. 
not built to the same high reliability and traceability standards normally 
iknposed on S-I1 hardware. 
over a 7-year period. 
As such, the electronics were 
As a r e ~ u l t ,  numerous failures of components 
1 such a s  capacitors, semi-conductore, and potentiometers have occurred 
These problems were corrected a s  they occurred by 
. 
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* 
particular parts 
1 new .component 
on i s  believed to 
olved, but as of the AS 
lems conkinue to app 
high reliability pro 
upgrading of the P U  computer, including replacement of 
mechanical rebalancing bridges with solid-state devices. 
To avoid the expense of this change, an open-loop 
d on S-11-9 and subsequent stages which bypasse 
entirely. 
control a pneumatically actuated 2-position MRCV (mixture ratio control 
valve) on each engine. 
ground loading and inflight instrumentation. 
Open-loop cornmands from the guidance system a r e  now used to 
The capacftance gaging system is  now used only for 
Discrete level sensors a r e  used for redline monitoring of propellant 
level during steady-state repleniehment. 
Failures of the coaxial wiring and connectors between the probes and 
P U  computer presented a more difficult problem, due to the low signal-to- 
noise ratio and inherent seneitivity of capacitance systems to minor 
influences. 
of the connectors often caused shifts i n  the syatem readout, especially 
duri.ng rainy weather and cryogenic loading. 
the system tunnel was reduced and stringent quality control procedures were 
instituted to reduce these problems, but the element of human e r ro r  cannot 
be completely eliminated. 
systems since it is not feasible to provide redundancy in  the full-length 
capacitance probes and associated hardware. 
This meant that slight damage to the wiring o r  flaws in  assembly 
The number of connectors in  
This is a serious drawback of capacitance 
. 
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QPTiMIZATiON OF PROPELLANT UTILIZATION FUEL BIASING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Previous methods of selecting fuel bias sought to minimize the 
3-sigma S-I1 P U  (propellant utilization) residuals, 
S-V payload capability since the mean S-I1 residual (rather than the 
dispersion about the mean) has the greatest effect on 3-sigma S-V 
performance. 
This did not maxlmiza 
SOLUTION/RECOMM.ENDATION 
A Monte Carlo statistical simulation program was devised to optimize 
fuel bias with respect to 3-sigma S-V performance (rather than 3-sigma 
S-II residual weight). 
payload capability i s  important. 
This approach should be used in  all caseswhere 
DISCUSSION 
To maximize 3-sigma S-V performance, it i s  necessary to adjust the 
S-I1 fuel bias so as  to rninimize*the mean S-I1 residual weight rather than 
the +3 sigma S-11 residual weight. This is  so because, when statistically 
combining the various factors which affect S-V performance, the mean 
S-I1 residual weight must be combined arithmetically with all other mean 
factors affecting S-V performance, such as mean dry weight and mean 
thrust; whereas the random variance o r  residual weight (about the mean) 
must be combined in  a root sum square manner with all the other random 
variances affecting S-V performance, such as  dry weight tolerances and 
thrust tolerances. This drastically dilutes the effect of the S-I1 residual 
variance on 3-sigma S-V performance. 
the minimum residual variance do not ,occur at the same value of fuel bias. 
The minimum mean residual and 
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UNCERTAINTY OF BUBBLE VOLUME IN BOILIN 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The volume of bubbles in a tank of boiling cryogenic propellant can 
vary from near-zero to approximately 3 percent of the liquid volume, depend- 
ing on tank size, shape, liquid convection, and thermal insulation. The 
uncertainty in bubble volume assumed for the S-I1 tanks was *O. 4 percent 
which substantially degraded the accuracy of gaging and loading propellants, 
SOLUTION / REC OMMENDATION 
Stillwells were installed in the S-I1 tanks to isolate the propellant level 
monitoring point sensors from the effects of bubbles and indicate the effec- 
tive liquid level (that which would exist in the tank if no bubbles were present). 
Point sensors were also installed outside the stillwell to  measure the actual 
tank level including bubbles. 
outside of the stillwell indicated the volume of bubbles in the liquid. 
technique was used in correcting indications from sensors subjected to 
bubbles. 
The difference in measured level inside and 
This 
Sensors used for gaging boiling propellants should be protected from 
the effects of bubbles by means of stillwells and bubble deflectors, except as 
noted below, 
DISCUSSION 
The effectiveness of stillwell compensation for bubbles is 100 percent 
in a tank of constant cross-section a rea  (assuming a uniform radial distribu- 
tion of bubbles). 
area, the compensation is less  than perfect but still on the order of 80 to 
90 percent, which reduces the bubble content e r ro r  to negligible amounts, 
For S-11- 11 and following S-II's, however, loading is controlled to the over- 
f i l l  sensors which a r e  located outside of the stillwells. The advantage of 
external point sensors is that they indicate over a broader ran a of tank level 
since they a r e  exposed to  the wave action caused by normal boiling, (The 
percent of time that a sensor flashee, wet indicates the average eurface level 
i f  the wave height is known.) When loading to external sensors, it i s  impor- 
tant to  know the absolute value of bbbble content. 
mined by means of closely spaced point .sensors which indicate the difference 
in liquid level inside and outside of the stillwall. 
For the S-11 tanks, which have a varying cross-sectional 
This can best be deter- 
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LM2 REClRCULATlON PUMP BEARING' 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
LH2 pump Barden bearings with phenolic-micarta retai 
to inadvertent pneunatic turbining (pressure differential across  purn 
o r  excessive electrically powered dry spinning operations during ch 
Pump failure affects engine preconditioning and ability to s ta r t  engines, 
SO LUTION/RE COJklMENDATION 
The Barden bearings with phenolic-rnicztrta retainerrs were replaced 
with MCRC (Marlin-Rockwell Corp. ) bearings with teflon impregnated 
fiberglass (Rulon) retainers, 
operating procedures that could produce a differential pressure across  the 
pump were reviewed and caution notes such as the following, added: 
All applicable specifications and detailed 
. 
Caution - Never open pump discharge valves until pressure has 
been equalized across  the rec i rc  pumps. 
After experiencing the individual failure and prior to making the 
bearing change, all  electrical dry-spinning operations were deleted. After 
incorporating the new bearings, electrical dry spins, up to 10 seconds in  
duration for  a total of not more than 24 cycles, were allowed to facilitate 
electri ea1 checkout. 
DISCUSSION 
Bearing failures occurred on pumps installed on the S-II Battleship 
and four S-I1 stages (S-II-T to S-11-3). 
minute of dry spinning to 25 hours of cryogenic operations. 
failure analysis showed that all bearing failures were similar i n  that a con- 
siderable amount of friction was in  evidence between the bearing's ro ta thg  
parts. Thus, it was concluded that the pumps had been subjected to 
excessive turbining and/or dry  spinning and operat3ons, 
Time of failure ranged from one 
Resulte of 
The improved lubricity of the Rulon material  has increased the 
allowable electrically powered 
durations with up to 24 cycles, 
pneumatic turbining over speed 
dry-spinning operations to 10-second 
and eliminated bearing damage caused by 
and dry spinning. 
. 
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NOISE ON 28-VOLT IGNITION BUS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
When the spark exciters of the ignition systems in the J-2 engines 
were operating, noise and transients in excess of the maximum allowable 
levels appeared on the 28-volt ignition bus, 
The ignition interference was coupled into data lines to obliterate 
some data and t o  render suspect much data that was not obliterated. 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
The ignition interference resulted in a contract change allowing NR to 
ignore all  PCM data during operation of the ignition system, 
Current J-2 engine ignition systems can be vastly improved by the 
addition of power-ling filters which attenuate the ignition noise as much as 
50 to 60 decibels. A 
separate bus, isolated from other busses by twisting and shielding and by 
distance should be used, 
A filter should be installed in the monitor line also. 
New designs should be integral units comprising the exciter, high 
voltage cable, and spark plug. 
chamber. 
current fluctuations; this will minimize induction of voltages into adjacent 
lines. 
DISCUSSION 
This unit should be mounted on the thrust 
The power input lines should be current regulated to minimize 
The noise and transients were generated by (1) the operation of the 
The operation of the spark exciter contributed the higher fre- 
spark exciter, and (2) discharge of the storage capacitor through the spark 
plug gap. 
quency (600 to 800 Wz), lower-level pulses. 
through the spark plug contributed the lower frequency (500 to 80 Hz), 
higher-level pulses, 
tained frequencies a s  high a s  several mHz. While the EMI specification does 
not limit noise in the frequency range below 150 Wz, it is  necessary to limit 
noise in this frequency range for proper operation of adjacent equipment. 
The diracharge of the capacitor 
Both types of pulses had fast r i se  times and thus con- 
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Because the ignition systems on the J - 2  
ment furnished equipment (GFE)  package, NR 
and approved to allow this higher interference level on the 28-volt bus.  
a test was performed in the Laboratories and 
laboratory to determine whether a design change was f 
L-C filter configuration was developed. This 
interference on the ignition bus a s  much a s  50 to 60 decibels. 
requested that the 5 - 2  engine manufacturer install this filter in the ignition 
system power lines. However, the J - 2  engine manufacturer had already 
received a contract change approval allowing noncompliance with the specifica- 
tion. 
interfacing with the J - 2  engine system. 
contract change to allow the deviation from normal data monitoring. 
of the contract change was granted by MSFC. 
solution in that data were lost fo r  approximately 4 . 7 5  seconds, it appeared to 
. physically alter the equipment. Instead, a specifi 
Later,  
N R / S D  
It was not feasible fo r  N R / S D  to install f i l ters in each of the many lines 
Consequently, NR/SD applied for  a 
Approval 
While this was not the best 
I be the most feasible solution. 
When new ignition systems a r e  designed, they should be of the integral 
type of unit recently developed by the Rocketdyne Division of NR, under con- 
t ract  to the NASA Lewis Laboratories, This type has extremely low radia- 
tion levels because the spark exciter and spark plug a r e  an integral unit, 
mounted on the thrust chamber, with no high voltage cable, In addition, the 
power lines a r e  filtered with a constant-current regulator which allows only 
milliampere fluctuations in power current rather than ampere fluctuations 
such as those in the J-2 engine ignition system. 
tion Iirnits the induced voltages in adjacent lines to  very small values. 
. 
This minute current fluctua- 
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RECIRCULATION INVERTER ELECTRICAL NOISE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Excessive electrical noise level due to the operation of the LH2 
recirculation inverter was experienced on the EDS measurement system; 
thereby causing an out-of-tolerance condition on the S-11. 
was determined to be poor filtering of inverter noise. 
The major cause 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A pi input filter with a choke in the return line was added between the 
bus and each inverter.. 
(between 50 and 70 mv). 
Avionics system which utilizes power conversion equipment with quasi 
square-wave switching in order to meet EM1 requirements. 
This reduced the noise to an acceptable level 
It i s  recommended that filtering be used for any 
DISCUSSION 
Without any filter, the system noise levels varied from 100 to 200 mv. 
Several -filter configurations were considered and tests conducted to select 
the most effective filter for the S-II system. 
All noise wave forms showed a damped oscillatory transient with a 
repetition rate of 2400 Hz and a ringing frequency of 50 to  100 KHz. 
The 2400-Hz repetition rate of the inverter was derived by multiplying 
the fundamental frequency of 400 Hz by 2 because the amplifier is push pull, 
and then multiplying by three for the amplifier's three phases. 
The final filter configuration is shown in Figure 7 , The most 
effective filter would have used 1000 pf capacitors, but the, delivery schedule 
for these capacitors was not feasible, so 660 pf capacitors were selected, 
The filters were supplied by Engineered Magnetics and were first installed 
on the S-II-2. 
specification r equir ernent s. 
Subsequent tests showed that the filters meet all procurement 
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FLIGHT MEASUR ENTS FOR ANALYSIS OF LOW 
OSCi LLATIONS (POGO) 
PROBLEM STATE T AND EFFECT 
The vibration and pres  sure  measurement requirements originally 
established fo r  the S-11 did not provide the capability for analysis of phase 
and amplitude on low frequency data. 
of the center engine beam were apparent during the S-11 boost phase. 
Indications of low frequency vibration 
M 
SOLUTION/ REC OMIMENDAT ION 
Three low-fr equency vibration measurements were implemented using 
piezoelectric transducers mounted at two locations on the center engine beam 
and at one location on the LOX tank sump. 
measurements were implemented, two measuring LOX pump inlet pressures  
on Engine 1 and Engine 5, bnd one measuring the LOX tank s u m p  pressure. 
Existing LOX pump inlet and discharge pressure measurements were 
re-channelized from time- shared to continuous channels. 
Three close-coupled pressure 
, 
DISCUSSION 
Beginning with S-11-6, a ser ies  of instrumentation changes were made 
that resulted in the data required to complete phase and amplitude analysis 
of the low-frequency vibration phenomenon on the S-U: Three new low fre- 
quency measurements were implemented and transmitted over the FM / F M  
data ;link a s  continuous channels. After the S-U-6 launch, the frequencies 
of interest became better identified and low-pass filters were added to  the 
stage s ignal  conditioning for these low frequency vibrations on S-XI-7 and 
following S-IPS, 
along with the rechannelization of three existing pres  sure measurements 
f rom 120 samples per second to  continuous channels. 
changes were made to provide information regarding the source of the driv- 
ing mechanism of the low frequency oscillations, 
During the S-II boost of the AS-508 launch, an early cutoff of the S-11 
Three close-coupled pressure measurements were added 
These measurement 
center engine occurred due to a loss of chamber pressure that resulted from 
excesllsive low frequency vibrations of the prkmary structure. Analysis per- 
fQrrned for S-11-7 and subsequent S-11's using the new measurement data 
proved an extremely valuable design aid in the corrective actidn program, 
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resulting in the installation of the accumulator on the center engine f 
for later vehicles. 
mentation of a backup acceleration ewitch (G-switch) that would provide 
center engine cutoff in the event of excessive beam vibration. 
This data also provided design information for imple- 
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vehicles which caused dif€i 
from various pressure and vibration transducers, 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATIO$~ 
When true frequency, amplitude, and phase information is desired 
I 
f rom a liquid pressure meamrement, it is essential that the measuring 
device be flush-mounted as close to  the measurement medium as possible. 
The use of long-line coupling from the medium to a remotely mounted 
mea sur  ement device introduces considerable distortion. 
DISCUSSION 
As a result of the POGd problems 'associated with some of the Saturn 
vehicle flights, a question a rose  as to the fidelity of long-lisle pressure 
transducer installations. 
frequency loss in a long line with gases but the effect of bi-phase cryogenic 
liquid in a long line were unkn 
transducers of the same type. 
11 inches high was fabricated. 
were made t6 hold two flush- 
Each p l w n b d  unit w a s  differ 
tube. On top of the tank two 
sures. 
1 to 17 cps was introduced. 
liquid mea sur  ement s f ollawed 
fidelity to the long-line me  
liquid down the long lines 
meaning. As the lines g ion increased. The amount of 
distortion was dependent 
a step function pr  
suffered loss in a 
Considerable information wa8 available on the 
test setup was dts.viss 
e tank eight inches in 
five plumbed units. 
same diameter of 
d to  measure gas 
The tank was filled with LN2, and a gas pulse a t  a varying rate of 
er very well; however, there was no 
s. 
rtion that the data had no 
The sudden surging of the 
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It became apparent that an additional 
s s a r y  in order  t o  provide meaningful inf 
inlet line, P r io r  to this  time, an unsu ade 
the information f rom a long line (42 
succ es 9. 
An investigation disclosed a location on the LOX feed lines that would 
. accept a 1/4-inch fitting. This location was on the same plane as the plumbed 
long line t ransducer  but was located 90" off center, Basic requirements were  
that the t ransducer  must be light in weight, small in size, be capable of 
being mounted f rom an existing 1/4-inch boss, and must be available off the 
shelf for immediate delivery. Contact was made with severa l  potential sup- 
pliers  and one was selected. 
CEC, of a n  unbonded design and was very lightweight. 
units were available off the shelf at the supp1ier's.facility. 
were  slightly modified by CEC to comply with NR requirements, and delivery 
and qualification was completed within 2 months. 
first implemented on Saturn S-11-6 and extremely valuable data was obtained 
f rom this measurement during the POGO problem on Saturn S-11-8, which 
allowed correlation in frequency and phase of other p re s su re  and vibration 
The unit decided upon was manufactured by 
Supplies of these 
These par t s  
The measurement was 
\ measurements.  
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ELECTRICAL COMPONENT REDUNDA 
PROBLEM AND EFFECT 
a1 component failures restilted in co 
reliability of electrical: circuits might not meet program requirements. 
SQ LUT ION / REG OMMENDATION - 
Provide selective redundant electrical components wherever possible, 
DISCUSSION 
* 
When the Saturn S-11 program progressed from the design to the 
manufacturing phase problems arose with electrical equipment which had 
met program qualification .requirements. 
ment requirements could still be demonstrated it became evident that a 
significant reliability increase would result from selective redundancy in 
electrical components. 
Even though reliability apportion- 
The concept of redundancy was thoroughly covered during the Saturn 
S-II 13hase I and Phase II Design Reviews held by MSFC as well a s  the 
various in-house design reviews that were held by Space Division Quality 
Assurance. 
and the various design review boards were satisfied that the Saturn S-11 
program was in compliance with design requirements. 
During these operations all single failure modes were identified 
The present design criteria for the S-II program represents an 
increase in reliance upon redundancy, and all new design considers redun- 
dant components, but across-the-board redundancy is not practical due to 
cost and weight considerations. Also, redundancy should never be used to 
justify use of unreliable components. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
During initial qualification tests of the S-LI batteries, 
Design 32-06 
BATTERY CELL TABS 
AND EFFECT 
the voltage and 
capacity performance was adversely affected by the breaking of plate tabs 
between the cell plates and terminals, 
performance was such a s  to require a redesign, 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
This occurred during vibtation. The 
Redesign was accomplished by adding integral, expanded metal grid 
tabs in place of the wire tabs used in the original design and by using hold- 
down potting in the corners and bottom of the cells to  f i x  the plates to the 
cell wall, This allows less  motion between the plates and terminals and 
reduces the tendency for tab breakage, 
used in the future where high vibrational environments a r e  expected. The 
tab is less susceptible to breakage and makes a stronger cell pack design. 
It is recommended that foil tabs be 
DISCUSSION 
The battery used on the S-LI program i s  a manually activated, primary, 
silver zinc battery. 
negative plates of sponge zinc, 
cellophane. The electrolyte i s  potassium hydroxide. The ESB battery was 
originally designed with conventional wires attached to the plates and te r -  
minals. When qualification tests severed the 
wires, ESB attempted to solve the problem by compressing the cell pack so 
that the plates could not move up and down, thus work-hardening the wires 
leading to the terminal and breaking them. On subsequent tes ts  wires con- 
tinued to sever, 
The positive plates a r e  made of silver peroxide and the 
The separators a r e  made of Viscone and 
Each plate used three wires. 
A contract was subsequently negotiated with Eagle Picher to produce 
the S-II battery in support of S - a - 1 .  
design was twofold, 
expanded metal screen design. 
silver solder to  the terminal. 
that resisted flexing when the plates attempted to move, 
base potting material was added on the bottom of each cell and along the 
sides of the expanded metal tabs, which.tied the plates, separators, and 
cell walls together, allowing the batteries to  pass all specification require- 
ments in qualification tests. 
The advantage of the Eagle Picher 
One, the tab design used an integral tab and plate 
The metal screen was attached directly by 
This led to a stronger mechanical connection 
Second, an epoxy 
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GSE OPEMTING AND T R ~ U B L E S H ~ ~ l i ~ G  PROCE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During the activation period for Seal Beach and MTF, GSE operational 
problems were encountered. 
inadequate documentation, 
SOLUTION / REG OMMENDAT ION 
It was difficult t o  isolate problems due to 
Requirements documents, overall system schematics, and individual 
rack schematics must be developed a s  part of the initial phase of a program. 
DISC USSION 
The Saturn S-XI Program ground support equipment for checkout and 
static firing the vehicle for acceptance was designed on an end item basis 
using interface control documents (ICD's). 
be utilized effectively if properly implemented on a systems requirements 
and control basis. 
s e quentia ll-y : 
This type of design control can 
This control must be implemented logically and 
1. Based upon vehicle checkout and operational requirements, develop 
an overall GSE operational requirement specification which defines 
the GSE rack level operational requirements. 
2. Produce and continually maintain an end-to-end GSE schematic 
which contains, a minim- all interface-to-interface wiring 
including the vehicle interface, This schematic must show all  
test  pohta, patching, s ignal  nomenclature, and will preferably 
contain internal GSE T ~ C &  circuitry; however, this schematic 
will not control the configuration of the internal rack circuits, 
This schematic must be complete and accurate prior to activation 
of the test site, 
schematic and will control the wiring configuration, 
changes'will be incorporated into the wire list by engineering 
order with the change irnrnediately reflected on the schematic, 
An inter-rack wiring list must accompany the 
All wiring 
SD 71-256 
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, Design 38-01 
3. Produce and continually maintain rack schematics and wire lists. 
These documents must contain all test points, patching, and sig- 
nal nomenclature, 
The above documentation i s  required to successfully activate and 
operational site for acceptance or development testing; 
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INSULATION IN WELDING AREAS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The insulation mater ia l  utilized in the weld area stations of the S-XI 
Bulkhead Fabricat ion Building (BFB), S - 02, was exposed and was installed 
without a sur face  covering o r  ex ter ior  bond. As a r e su l t  of traffic and 
t r a v e r s e  of the overhead crane ,  and building expansion and contraction, this 
unbonded ma te r i a l  flaked and settled into welding a reas .  This mater ia l  was 
assumed to  contribute to weld contamination. 
SOL UTION/RECOMMENDATION 
In a continuing effort to-minimize any source of contamination in the 
welding operation, vinyl sheet  coverings were  installed direct ly  to  the  
sur face  of the insulation. This  bonding of vinyl to  the insulation, with 
adhesives,  provided an ad'equate in te r im means of containing the flaking 
mater ia l .  Continual maintenance was required to  maintain the vinyl on the 
through the a i s les  and doors.  
i insulation due to  continual traffic,  t r a v e r s e  of the crane,  and wind cu r ren t s  
It is  the recommendation of North American Rockwell that insulation 
panels utilized in new facil i t ies,  where c r i t i ca l  welding operations will be 
conducted, be installed with ei ther  a polyurethane sp ray  finish o r  covered 
with a factory-installed vinyl cover that is adequately bonded to  insure  
minimum maintenance costs,  and a l so  insure  debr i s  containment. 
Incorporation of a factory surfaced, bonded, nonflaking insulation or  
vinyl-bonded ma te r i a l  should be  included in the initial Faci l i t ies  c r i t e r i a ,  
for  building installation at the ear l ies t  date  of design o r  modification to 
negate future contamination problems. 
DISCUSSION 
The BFB, S-02, was of g i rder  and t r u s s ,  sheet metal-faced con- 
struction. 
the inter ior  walls were  lined, between the g i rders ,  with a composition 
f iberglass  insulation. 
bond and, a s  a resul t  of heavy traffic f rom shop flat t rucks,  overhead c rane  
t r ave l  and other related vibrations, the mater ia l  began to  flake and fall. 
falling flakes and dust  sett led on materials to  be welded, tool f ixtures,  and 
the general  a r e a  causing a probable weld contamination problem. 
To provide a degree  of personnel  comfort  and noise abatement, 
The insulation face  was not finished with sea l e r  o r  
The 
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Correct ive action was initiated by Faci l i t ies  t o  contain the fa 
flaking debris.  This action consisted of applying vinyl sheeting ove 
face of the insulation, from g e r  to  g i rder ,  with adhesives.  This 
was not a panacea but did pro e a control me sur e. Continued traff 
erations,  and wind n ss i ta ted contin ed Surveillance of 
n the contaminating dust. 
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RADIOGRAPHIC 1NSPECTION OF FUSION WELDM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Radiographic inspection techniques (x - r ay )  employed in  
s tage bulkhead weld operations were  accomplished independen 
ing provisions incorporated in  the four,  major ,  bulkhead weld 
tooling provisions made  for x- ray ,  while satisfying quality requirements,  
had numerous potential a r e a s  for improvement in both operating time and 
materials. 
Radiographic inspection of the bulkhead meridian welds are made in a 
series of 16 individual radiographs, each 12 inche-s in length, along the 16 feet 
of weld. 
subsequently, individual handling in processing, interpretation, filing, sorting, 
re t r ieval ,  etc. 
This method requi res  an individual set-up for  each exposure and, 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Simplification of x - r a y  inspection can be accomplished by elimination 
of the 1-foot radiographs. 
acce le ra te  all s teps  in handling and processing. 
The utilization of ful l  weld-length film s t r ips  will 
DISCUSSION 
The Boeing Company, in conjunction with NASA Huntsville, has  
developed an automated, radiographic inspection sys tem for S- 1C stage 
operations. 
quality and can be expected t o  reduce the S-I1 method by 15 set-up operations 
per bulkhead meridian wkld. 
This sys tem has proven successful in providing the required 
The Boeing sys tem is built around an  automated f i lm-transport  
casset te ,  which permi ts  the use  of full weld-length film str ips .  
contains, internally,  shielded film advance and take-up spools, permitting 
stop and go film exposures of 12 inches in length. 
employ the casse t te  on a tape-controlled skate mechanism which propels 
the casse t te  on a fixed t r ack  along the weldment in 12-inch increments,  T h e  
cassette, p rog res ses  f r o m  point to  point, stopping for’ the x - r ay  exposure. 
After exposure %nd during the movement of the casse t te  t o  the next point, the  
film s t r ip  within the casse t te  i s  advanced t o  an unexposed section. 
action is repeated the number of times necessary  t o  expose the  entire weld. 
This unit 
Operating techniqxtetii 
This 
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Upon completion of the full weld travel, the total filni s t r ip  is  proc 
essed, interpreted, and stored. Film retrieval and flaw locating is  acc 
erated by u s e  of specially designed strip-film readers.  Flaw location; is 
enhanced by use of a specific steel tape measure which i s  attached to the 
par t  being x-rayed, adjacent to the weld, 
clearly discernible i n  the processed film and reveal the exact location 
discrepancies 
The tape measure indication 
X-ray film data, such a s  part  number, film number, date, etc.,  a r e  
included on all radiographs. 
"Addressograph plate" to emboss information on a lead plate, which is also 
attached to the part  and thus incorporated into the exposed film. 
This is accomplished by using a standard 
I It is.recommended that this Boeing system be incorporated in all 
future tooling design programs for any products requiring "in tool'! radio- 
graphic inspection. 
, 
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WELD QUALITY REQUIREMENTS 
PROBLEM STA$.EMENT AM3 EFFECT 
Faci l i t ies  04- 
At the time of Saturn S-I1 contract  award, the definition of what II 
constituted required weld quality was  subject to var ious interpretations and 
subsequent disagreement .  
but permiss ib le  defects,  which w e r e  allowable in a sat isfactory weld, were  
always points of contention. 
What constituted a good weld was agreed upon, 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The  problem of "acceptable" weld quality was not resolved. Pe r sona l  
differences of opinion as to  what constituted an acceptable, o r  a re jectable  
defect along with the reco-rnmendation for  a "fix" for  each  point of contention 
resul ted in many meetings,  investigations, and even Mater ia l  Review actions. 
A recommended solution follows: by joint action of concerned industry 
I (material suppliers,  fabr icators ,  NASA, the Armed Forces ,  and manufac- 
t u r e r s  of welding equipment and inspection sys t ems)  develop and publish an 
i l lustrated description of weld pa rame te r s ,  showing acceptable and 
unacceptable conditions. This  jointly developed and approved manual would 
then become an authoritative re ference  baseline. This  activity would be  
conducted independently for  any contract  o r  project  and could requi re  con- 
s iderable  effort  on the p a r t  of the participants.  T h e  joint committee would 
a l so  compile necessa ry  re ference  data, f rom cu r ren t  and previous programs.  
The re  would be  no specific completion date,  and the document would be  
reviewed periodically to  in su re  inclusion of the necessa ry  revis ians  accrued 
f r o m  experience and technological progress .  
DISCUSSION 
Controversy over what degree  and type of weld defects were  acceptable 
Part was due to the lack 
a r o s e  ear ly  in the S-II program. 
ence of personnel  delegated with the responsibility. 
of existing information on specific ma te r i a l s  and their  application. 
Part of this was due to the l imited experi-  
The  problem was compounded by the lack of his tor ical  data  on ma te r i a l  
usage for  sys tems such as the S-II. 
acceptable re ference  and the task  of interpretation fell  upon the Mater ia l  
Engineers and Quality Control personnel. 
T h e r e  was no baseline or  authority of 
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On occasion repa i r  was undertaken on questionabIe ts .  This ty 
l e s s  d e s i r a  of r epa i r  often resul ted in creat ing other defects o r  condi 
than the original offending fault. 
panel replacemqnt was resor ted  to a s  a way of insuring agreement.  
(e. g . ,  cutting an  en t i re  cy l inder -bar re l  off an assembly,  replacing a panel  
and then rejoining. ) This  s o r t  oi problem was a l so  responsible for  extensive 
non-destructive testing to  insure  the capability of an assembly (bulkhead 
hydrostat  and pneumostatic testing of ent i re  tanks) because the contractor 
and customer had to  ver i fy  what had already been inspected by dye penetrant 
and X-ray. 
In a few instances expensive repa i r  and 
Nobody des i r e s  a bad weld, everyone ag rees  on what a c lear  one i s .  
The a r e a  of borderl ine controversies  resu l t  in costly resolutions. 
proposed "Defect Document" could reduce the a r e a  of disagreement ,  
expedite production, tes t ,  and programs,  and ultimately resu l t  in reduced 
production cost. 
The 
2- 6 
SD 71-256 
Faci l i t ies  04-03 
REPEATABLE, CERTlF IABLE WELDING EQUIPMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E CT 
The integration of an acceptable assembly procesa w 
e a r l y  in the S-I1 program. This  was  compounded by the in 
maintenance technicians in the diagnosis of machine faults 
correct ion of these problems. 
isolation and 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 4 
The technicians responsible for the performance of the equipment 
acquired familiarization and knowledge through continued exposure to  the 
welding process .  This  was helpful but inadequate to  meet  the requirements  
of schedule and achieve des i red  weld quality. To acce lera te  the learning 
process ,  contracts were  developed between NR and the two pr ime suppliers 
of welding packages - Sciaky Bros . ,  Inc. and the Air  Reduction Company 
(AIRCO) - for on-the-job training (OJT), and assis tance in  personnel 
education, maintenance techniques, and qualification of equipment. Any new 
program should emphasize initial technician capability upgrading by intensive 
on-the-job and classroom training and should be conducted by the manufac- 
t u r e r  of the original equipment. 
I 
DISCUSSION 
The S-I1 contains over 2, 200 feet of exacting quality weldments. 
heads fo r  the hydrogen and LOX vesse ls  required long, tapered welds and 
step welds. To accomplish such weld joints, programmable controls were  
incorporated into the sys tem by blending the power supply cur ren t  require-  
ments with the tool and piece par t  requirements.  
gas envelope to  preclude weld contamination; the necessary  equipment func - 
tions to  move the torch  along the weld a t  a controlled rate of speed; and 
maintaining of the proper  weld tempera ture  through an elaborate a r c  voltage 
comparison system which regulated the tungsten t ip  to work piece distance. 
Bulk- 
Also required was an iner t  
Synchronizing all these requirements  into a functional operation (tool, 
power supply, piece part ,  and p rogrammer )  was c r i t i ca l  and was accom- 
plished on representat ive material which simulated the actual pqrt. This 
test material was then removed for laboratory evaluation and testing to 
a s s u r e  weld quality and to establish equipment parameters ,  
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The possibil i t ies for  malfurictions during such a c r i t i c3  
recognized even at the t ime of conceptual equipment design. 
time- and process-proven components was emphasized t o  pr 
difficulty. However, the sys tem was so comprehensive that 
occur and the diagnosis of a fault, its isolation and correct ion,  in many 
instances]  was a tedious andstime-consuming task. 
Maintenance personnel were  qualified a s  e lectr ical  /electronic tech- 
nicians and most  of them had previous weld machine maintenance experience. 
The  S-I1 weld process  and equipment] however, was considerably m o r e  
elaborate  than any previous weld equipment assignments at the Space Division. 
Assis tance was required and was yequested f rom the p r ime  suppliers of the 
welding machines. Sciaky B r o s . ,  Inc. provided an instructor  for  on-the-job , 
control sys tems and weld equipment and la te r  provided weld process  and 
equipment instruction to run a c l a s s  on s i te  for  weld equipment technicians. 
The  ass i s tance  and training acquired f rom outside contracted support 
accelerated NR personnel training. 
. training of technicians in the maintenance and functioning of penetration 
J 
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IN-TANK ENTRY AND UTILITY DISTRlBUTlON 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
In-tqnk entry was required prior to the pneumostat test to finalize 
certain hardware installations and to perform closeout welding. 
also required, following the pneumostat test, to perform dye-penetrant 
inspection of the stage and to make repairs,  as  required. 
a s  electrical units with J-boxes and extension cords, intercom units, and 
phone lines were required by the craftsman inside the tank for the perform- 
ance of installation and inspection. 
of continual chafing, the electrical cord insulations were damaged at the plu$ 
ends and at  the equipment casing ends. 
tact with the stage created a r c  burns to the product, which created Material 
Review action, rework, and lost production time. 
Entry wa8 
Equipment such 
Through cons.tant use, and as  a result 
The exposed wire coming into con- 
SOLUTION/RECOMMEND-ATION 
To overcome the inherent dangers of arcing, damage to the stage and 
injury to employees, new procedures were implemented. These new pro- 
cedures included the encapsulation of all  electrically operated units in the 
stage; the elimination of J-boxes; the installation of electrical systems on 
the access ladder: and the installation of a Rucker sentry alarm system. 
addition, the S-11 Tank Entry Safety Standard procedure was issued. 
In 
Aerospace contractors encountering similar confined entry require- 
ments, where utilities a r e  mandatory within the tank, should provide - 
encapsulated receptacles for all  power requirements such as: electrical, 
intercom, and phone lines, prior to the f i rs t  requirements for tank entry. 
DISCUSSION 
# 
Entry into the S-I1 stage was a procedure followed fo r  in-tank installa- 
The interior of the stage had to tions and for post-pneumostatic inspection. 
be provided with lighting and power from external sources to provide a means 
from which to operate power tools, welding equipment, and black lights for 
inspection purposes. The power sources were long extension cords equipped 
with J-boxes which became worn and frayed from constant use, handling, 
and twisting. In the performance of installation or  inspection, some of these 
frayed cords grounded out to the eta e interior causing a r c  burns. Also a 
minor incident involving an employee was encountered wherein the employee 
was shocked but not hurt, 
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To minimize  the dangers  cited above, co r rec t ive  action w 
by Sys tems Safety, Fac i l i t i es  and Manufacturing, These  action 
entry tank platform was modified to  include the following: 
elimination of the extension boxes, intercom, and phone 1 1 
1 .  Floodlights w e r e  installed on top ,of the ladder  with l ights 
so that  they could be  plugged into a s epa ra t e  c i rcu i t  f r o m  t 
of the e l ec t r i ca l  requirements .  
2.  A plug jack was  added for the intercom sys t em a t  the  bottom of 
the ladder  and a t  the top. 
Six a i r  outlets w e r e  added at the  bottom of the ladder  for  plant 
a i r .  
Six e l ec t r i ca l  out le ts  w e r e  provided for lights and e lec t r ica l  power 
equipment. 
9 
3, 
4. 
5 ,  All outlets w e r e  t ied to a Rucker  sen t ry  a l a r m  system. 
6. A bat te ry  powered emergency l igh t  was provided to allow safe  
exit in the event of power fai lure .  
In addition to  these  modifications, all extension and power co rds  used 
inside the tank w e r e  encapsulated and a l l  tools were  continuity checked. 
Twist-lock design connectors w e r e  mandatory.  These  new applications 
co r rec t ed  all p r i o r  problems except the black light used in the dye-penetrant  
inspection. 
unit was wrapped in asbes tos  sheeting to  provide the insulation required.  
Due to  s i ze  and shape of the light and the heat  generated,  t h i s  
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MULTICONDUCTOR PIN ALIGNMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
. Numerous multi-conductor cables were  used during T e s t  & Operations 
checkout of the Saturn S-11. 
the check-out consoles,  was equipped with a la rge  e lec t r ica l  plug containing 
connector pins set in potting compound. 
separat ion t e s t s  many pins were  bent o r  broken due to tension on the cables 
and misalignment a t  the connecting points. 
required extensive rework, incurred added program costs ,  and caused 
Each of these cables, routed f rom the Stage to  
During alignment setups and 
These  damaged or broken pins 
. delays in  stage checkout schedules,  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Following a detailed study of the problem, Industrial  Engineering issued 
a contract  funded Job Order  for  design rework of the Umbilical Station in 
Building S-15, the Vert ical  Checkout Facility. 
addition of an access  ladder to the east s ide of the cable disconnect platform; 
re-rout ing of a l l  cabling andpower  l ines;  installation of a cable c a r r i e r  rack  
to align to  the umbilical c a r r i e r  rack;  and rework of the umbilical c a r r i e r  
r ack  to  provide a m o r e  positive alignment. 
conductor cables increased  the bend radius  of the cables making the connec- 
tion to the umbilical  c a r r i e r  ea s i e r  and minimizing the probability of bending 
o r  breaking pin connectors. 
requiring manual  hook-up include human factors  evaluation during the design 
phase,  Inclusion of this aspect  during design will provide eas i e r  cable 
handling and routing, reduce the exposure of connector pins to damage, and 
minimize rework and design costs.  
The  rework consisted of the 
The re-rout ing of the mult i -  
It i s  recommended that s imi l a r  installations 
DISCUSSION I 
Following Final  Assembly, the Saturn S-11's were  moved to the Vert ical  
Checkout Building where each stage underwent sys tem checkout and tes t ,  The  
s tage was connected to a fixed umbilical tower interconnected with the check- 
out consoles. 
with l a rge  potted fixed pin connectors.  
t o  the umbilical was difficult due to the l imited cable flexibility and l imited 
radius in the cable. 
broken during sa t -up  and separation. 
The  var ious sys t ems  included multiconductor cables equipped 
The  alignment of these connectors 
As a resu l t  of these problems,  pins were  bent and 
T o  alleviate the condition a design 
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Job Order  to analyze and rework this eystern was issued. 
for  this re lease  stated: 
The justific 
erne difficulty when connecti 
aft umbilical stands to  the u 
cat  eablss at  
nterface plat 
many connectors have been damaged. 
extremely costly and contributed to many hours of 
downtime. Redesign 01 unibilical stands to  pro 
accessibility at the cab1 nnect points will great1 
condition. I '  
This  situation has been 
ea As a resul t  of a detailed study, modifications to modify umbilical 
r e t r ac t  methanisms t o  allow higher ca r r i e r  plate installation were approved. 
The modifications eliminated the previous problem and gave greater  flexibility 
to  the connection and separation of the cables to the umbilical c a r r i e r  rack. 
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R I N S E  REQUIR M E N T S  F O R  S A T U R N  S-ll S 
LEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Cleaning requirements for the Saturn S-IC[ stipulated that the interior 
of the stage be cleaned with heated demineralized water (I20 degrees) and 
detergent. The wash cycle was followed by a rinse flush of the total interior. 
The rinse cycle was accomplished with water of an ambient temperature 
which retarded drying time and resulted in a: detergent residue clinging to the 
interior skin and baffles. To remove the residue, the affected a reas  of the 
stage were hand - wiped. 5.1 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
It is recommended that future cleaning installations for large vehicles, 
requiring interior rinsing following a detergent wash, incorporate heaters 
to heat the required rinse’water to a temperature compatible to the wash 
cycle requirements. 
amount of residue clinging to the interior surfaces. 
Heated water will accelerate the drying and reduce the 
Although this system of heated water for rinsing was not- incorporated 
in the Saturn S-U: program, it was evaluated and its costs were studied after 
the demineralized system was in operation. Installation of a heating system 
for large volumes of rinse water should be incorporated into the basic 
Facilities requirements and included in the construction specifications. 
DISCUSSION 
Specifications for cleaning the interior of the Saturn S-II stages stipu- 
This was accomplished by preheating the 300, 000 to 500, 000 
lated a detergent, demineralized water cleaning at  a temperature of 120 F 
at  the nozzle, 
gallons of water in the tank-farm holding tank to approximately 180 F. 
detergent-water mix was, in turn, pumped through the cleaning boom to 
provide a detergent wash a t  250 gpm and 200 psi. Following the cleaning 
cycle the stage interior was spot sprayed with rinse water of an ambient 
temperature (approximately 5 5  to 60 F, depending on the climate) to reduce 
the shock to the metal. 
attained, a full and final r inse was conducted to  remove residue and scums. 
This rinse, with water at  an ambient temperature, slowed the interior drying 
and did not remove all water apotds or t races  of detergent. 
was removed from side wall and baffle a reas  by hand wiping. 
ThiB 
When the mean temperatures on the skins were 
The final residue 
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Based upon the experience gained in the Saturn program, it is the 
recommendation of North American Rockwell that any contractor f 
a similar problem of cleaning large interior surfaces should incor 
ated rinse water into the process specifications. 
ould become a baeic part of any Facilities criteria 
T 
date to  minimize installation costs. 
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DOOR CONTROL DURING WELD OPERATIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
High bay doors in the Bulkhead Building, S-02, were installed without 
Additionally, dust and dirt,  
locking devices, During welding operations, i f  these doors were opened, 
a weld a r c  flame-out interrupted the welding. 
transported by wind through the doorways, created a weld contamination 
problem. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
All major exterior doors, leading into areas  where critical welding 
operations a r e  performed, should be equipped with electrical t'lock-out'' 
devices and indicator signs noting tlWeld-In-Process". 
The inclusion of the'above controls should be incorporated during the 
design phase of the facilities installation. 
DISCUSSION 
Welding operations for the bulkheads of the Saturn S-I1 were conducted 
in an a rea  of Building S-02 adjacent to high bay, electrically operated doors, 
When these high bay doors were inadvertently opened during welding, the 
wind currents caused the inert  gases to drift from the weld line or  to flame- 
out. The wind also caused dust and particulate matter to settle on the 
product leading to contamination of the welds. To avoid flameouts and 
contaminations, signs of "DO Not Open During Weld Operation" were installed 
and the doors secured. In addition, a system of warning lights were installed 
in Building 5-02. These lights were energized when welding operations were 
in progress, thus alerting all personnel in the a rea  that the doors were not to 
be opened without permission from those in charge of the welding operations. 
Further, canvas drop curtains were installed in all weld station access 
areas.  The inclusion of required controls during the design phase of the 
building will do much to minimize cost and increase product reliability. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The first construction specification for  the NASA Site, Seal Beach, 
This  type of installation left significant unimproved 
dictated asphalt covering to be installed on areas of parking lots, road beds, *” 
and outside storage.  
a r e a s  between buildings and roadways that created a durstjdirt problem. 
Swirling dust and d i r t  flowed through open doorways, se rv ice  doors  and 
breeyeways creating a housekeeping and contamination problem in a r e a s  of 
welding, bonding, etching/cleaning, and processing. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
To  overcome the problems created by the dust and d i r t  swirling and 
settling in and around buildings and on deliverable hardware,  the s i te  was 
surfaced with asphalt covering. 
all s i te  locations, improved housekeeping, and reduced contamination of 
in - pr  oc e s s ha rdwar e. 
The action negated dust pockets adjacent to 
For  s imilar  activations it is recommended that the total, exposed, 
ground surface be black-topped o r  have ground cover installed concurrent 
with completion of the s i te  as a planned par t  of the site facilities cr i ter ia .  
DISCUSSION 
The construction specification for s i te  activati9n called for asphalt 
coverings of road beds, parking lots, and outside s torage areas. Wi th  high- 
velocity winds funneling between buildings, dust and d i r t  were  picked up and 
moved along, between, and into buildings f rom the  unimproved pockets of 
exposed ground. Dust settled in breezeways, doorways, and on in-process  
hardware causing both a housekeeping and a product contamination problem. 
Fine dust settling on product hardware in welding jigs, and on weld heads 
and pa r t s  had t o  be continually cleaned before welding to forestal l  weld 
failures.  
protection f rom settling dust. 
required extra  handling to  guard against abrasive dust  and d i r t  on c r i t i ca l  
edges and finished surfaces.  
P a r t s  a l ready cleaned and etched required extra  handling and 
Parts entering and leaving processing a r e a s  
- Dust and d i r t  created additional maintenance problems in a i r  conditioned 
a r e a s  by clogging filters and entering into ducts, causing extensive mainte- 
nance expenditures of time and material. 
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Costs can be reduced if the site is adequately surfaced with bla 
and/or ground cover a8 a control measure concurrent with site activ 
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CONSTRUCTlON 1EAD TIME, NEW FACILITIES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Joint occupancy by North American Rockwell and construction con- 
t r a c t o r s  in c r i t i ca l  a r e a s  of new buildings was necessary  to  meet building 
completion da tes  and to  s t a r t  production of subassemblies  for  the Saturn S-11 
program. Joint occupancy imposed duplication of cost  to  provide temporary  
accommodations such a s  utilities, res t rooms,  and s torage  a reas .  Subsequent 
demdlition and/or  removal of temporary  accommodations fur ther  increased 
s t a r t -up  costs .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
North American Rockwell could not resolve the joint occupancy problem 
The requirements ,  a s  stipulated by the 
because the contract  for the Saturn S-I1 P r o g r a m  had already been awarded 
and new construction was 'necessary.  
Mas ter  P r o g r a m  Schedule, required detail  fabrication and subassembly a t  a 
I ve ry  ear ly  date,  
It i s  recommended that, in future l a rge  aerospace  o r  a i r f r ame  con- 
t r ac t s ,  the product be Cefined at the ea r l i e s t  possible date and that the 
manufacturing methods be identified to  allow adequate lead t ime for  major  
construction. A period of 12 to  18 months is normally required to  design, 
bid, and construct these types of facil i t ies.  
If either NASA's "Phased P ro jec t  Planning Guidelines" (PPP) or  the 
Air F o r c e ' s  I'Systems P r o g r a m  Management' '  a r e  not imposed, i t  would 
enhance the cont rac tor ' s  visibility i f  he implemented a s imi la r  program of 
his own design. 
DISCUSSION I 
The acquisition and construction of facil i t ies has  always been a major  
problem facing a i r f r a m e  and aerospace  contractors .  Following the capture 
of a contract ,  l i t t le i f  any time was allowed for  the design, bidding and 
construction of the new facil i t ies required to  support production and testing. 
Joint occupancy with the builder always means  increased costs  and 
duplication of requirements .  
New concepts in bidding and awarding contracts  have now been 
implemented and, if properly organized and scheduled, adequate lead time 
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will be incorporated. 
contractor's version of a similar planning procedure is  recommended for all 
new facilities acquisitions that require long lead times to construct. 
planning will allow for a Beneficial Occupancy data commensurate with 
program requirements. 
Adoption of NASA's Phased Project Planning o r  a 
Such 
REFERENCES 
Figure 8, f rom NASA Handbook 7121.2. 
il 
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TEMPERATURE/ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL FACl LlTY PLANNl NG 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Initial facilities requirements for the environmental and temperature 
controlled a reas  required for the manufacture and tes t  of S-I1 stages were 
based on existing state-of-the-art methods. 
equipment procurement were initiated a s  a result of the then current planning 
to permit facility implementation with adequate lead time to comply with 
pr-ogram schedules. Subsequent weather variations, engineering design 
verification, and validation testing, plus other technological advances, 
imposed substantial ch8nges in ternperature/environmental control require- 
ments. 
after the program was underway. 
precluded incorporation of the ultimate required capacity and flexibility in 
the Seal Beach temperature/environmental control systems during the 
facility design and construction phases. 
Building construction and 
Identification of total requirements was accomplished incrementally 
This latent development-growth period 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The experiences incurred in the S-I1 Program, as  specifically related 
to the above described problem, reveal the need for total facilities program 
planning, including personnel comfort. It further identifies that a phased 
approach to the planning, approval and conduct of major research and 
development activities must be conducted to effect facility flexibility, 
capacities and economics. 
In 1968, the NASA Organization and Management Offices adopted a 
policy of Phased Project Planning (PPP). 
issued in August 1968, contains the guidelines for implementation of this 
approach. 
systems in four distinct phases: 
NASA Headquarters Bulletin 7121.2, 
In summary, PPP will conduct the development oi space hardware 
A - Preliminary analysis 
B - Definition 
C - Design 
- D - Development/operations 
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Resources  planning, when conducted on the PPP bas 
progress ive  build-up of know1 1 aspects  of the prop 
Thus, the  implementation can aken with the  confi 
f r o m  a fuller understanding o am objectives and 
DISCUSSION 
Original Vertical  Assembly and Hydrotest  Building _ I  Requirements - 
Requirements and usage originally established fo r  the Vertical  
Assembly and Hydrotest  Building a r e  defined in Table  6.  
Original Chiller System and Air Conditioning System 
The or iginal  sys t em was designed fo r  a summer ambient condition of 
85 F (dry  bulb) and 69 F (wet bulb), Chilling capacity was provided by a 
163-ton main  Chiller N6. 1 and a redundant standby 39.4-ton Chiller No. 2 
for  the computer room. 
System h a d  equaci e s 
The chiller and a i r  conditioning sys tem has  been modified and supple- 
mented. 
proper  environment for S-II Stage manufacturing activities. 
fac tors  contribute to  this condition. 
However, it s t i l l  does not have sufficient capacity to  provide the 
Two main 
1. Ambient conditions experienced to  date exceed those conditions 
anticipated by the original design. 
conditions are 95 F (dry bulb) and 74 E: (wet bulb). This factor 
alone prevented the originally installed sys tem f rom providing 
proper  environment for  even the original station reqbirements.  
Actual summer  ambient 
2. Manufacturing sequence changes, 
I 
a. Station IV has  been changed f r o m  sys tem checkout to  
insulation bonding and sys tem installation, requiring a 
station work area control of 65 to 80 F and 70-percent 
maximum relat ive humidity. Remedy was provided by 
adding a third chil ler with a 5 8 . 5  -ton capacity and by 
installing cooling coils in Station IV air handlers  on Levels 1 
through 5. 
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A r e a  
Station I 
Station I1 
Station LII 
Station I V  
Station V 
Station VI  
Clean room 
(Class  D 
clean area) 
Computer room 
(Class  D 
clean area) 
Office a r e a  
Station V 
control room 
U s e  
C i r  cumfer entia1 
welding 
Insulation bonding 
Systems installation 
Systems checkout 
Hydr ote s t and 
cleaning , in - tank 
installation 
Bulkhead hydro s tat  
Component cleaning 
System checkout 
Manufacturing 
supervision 
Stabilized tempera ture  only (no 
c oolin g r equi red ) 
In-tank - 
4 
140 F (*lo)  for curing 
insulation bonding 
Work area - 65 to 80 F 
Stabilized temperature  only (no 
cooling requirement) 
Stabilized temperature  only (no 
cooling requirement) 
In-tank - 
180 F (*15) for drying 
73 F (* 5)  for installation 
180 F (*15) for  drying 
72 F ( * 5 )  50-percent maximum 
relative humidity 
70 F (*5) 50-percent maximum 
relative humidity 
I 
70 F (*lo) 50-percent maximum 
relative humidity 
Hyd r os t at t e s t 
c on t r o l  
70 F (*lo) 50-percent maximum 
relative humidity 
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Station 11 and IV operations were  changed f r o m  providing heat 
for  insulation bond curing to the inclusion of in-tank instal la-  
tions requiring an in-tank low-humidity air conditioning 
sys t em to prevent tank wall cor ros ion  and permi t  human 
survival. 
externally-applied heat blankets. ) 
A remedy to  the situation was attempted by redirecting the 
Station 11 in-tank a i r  handler t o  Stations I1 and IV and by using 
the standby 39.4-ton chil ler to  supply chilled water .  
the a i r  handler was designed for  heating and has never been 
able to  provide sufficient cool and d r y  a i r  for simultaneous 
Station I and IV in-tank installations. 
b. 
(Insulation bond curing is now accomplished with 
However, 
c. Environment in the 3 - 2  engine shop was too w a r m  during the 
summer  months for comfort. This  situation was remedied 
by the installation of chil ler coils in the existing air handler 
using chilled water  f rom the main chil ler.  
d. Station work a r e a s  of Station V m u s t  be environmentally 
controlled for  the application of foam insulation to  stage 
closeout a reas .  
The f i r s t  al l-foam insulated S-I1 stage w a s  recently closed 
out with sp ray  foam insulation in a Station V environment of 
75 F (55) and 50-percent maximum relat ive humidity. This  
was provided by temporary  ducting and a 65-ton mobile t ruck 
air conditioning sys tem with reheat  capability. 
insulation closeout was accomplished under favorable winter - 
time ambient a i r  conditions. Closeouts on subsequent s tages  
under summar  ambient a i r  conditions required additional a i r  
c ondi ti onin g equipment. 
This  f i r s t  
Summary  
The  effects of the ambient tempera tures  and manufacturing require-  
ments  lead to  the following conclusions. 
1. Total  chil led-water requirements  to  support  the cur ren t  station 
exceed the available capacity by 269 tons 
2 .  Chilled-water supply and re turn  l ines a r e  not la rge  enough to  
handle the required additional chil led-water capacity 
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3. Presen t  air handler cooling coils a r e  not la rge  enough to handle 
the required chilled water 
Some air handlers do not have sufficient cfm capacity. 4. 
T o  resolve the above cr i t i ca l  situation, Appendix "A" t o  the 
NAS8-14016(F) contract  was prepared and submitted t o  NASA. 
submittal 'recommended the installation of a central  chil ler plant, chilled- 
water distribution system, and new o r  modified air conditioning 
equipment. 
This 
Remedial action taken to improve tempera ture  conditions on the upper 
floors of the VAB/VCO included the provisioning of side wall vents and roof 
exhaust. This  action provided improvement but does not afford a permanent 
fix t o  the excessive temperature  variations experienced during peak heat 
wave conditions. 
REFERENCES 
NHB 7121.2 Phased Project  Planning 
IP 68-1422 (S-8-J )  Appendix "A" NAS8-14016(F), April 19, 1968, 
Central  Environmental Control System, Vertical  Assembly and Hydro- 
test Building, Seal Beach, California. 
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PAINT A N D  CHEMICAL STORAGE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Site activation and design c r i t e r i a  planning for  the Saturn S-I1 stages 
did not incorporate a separa te  building to house sizable quantities of paints, 
chemicals, solvents, and acids. The intent of the contractor was to  utilize 
an existing s t ruc ture  designed and used for  this type of s torage at  the main 
plant in Downey and two separa te  rooms designed for  chernical/paint 
s torage adjacent to the multipurpose Paint  and Package Building, S-04, at 
Seal Beach. 
The growth of Saturn program, and production changes in processing 
techniques increased the demand for  ma te r i a l s  of the  types noted above. 
This, in turn,  created logistical  and mater ia l s  handling problems. To be 
assured  of adequate ma te r i a l s  on demand, departments ordered and received 
la rge  quantities, storing thkm within and around the Manufacturing a reas .  
i SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Major production requirements  should be analyzed and c r i t e r i a  
prepared for  the safe s torage of paints and chemicals in a suitable s t ructure .  
The inclusion of such a facil i ty a t  the t ime of s i te  planning will negate unsafe 
conditions being created a s  production requirements increase  and as 
production and processing techniques a r e  modified or  changed. 
DISC USSION 
Ear ly  production planning requirements  showed a minimum quantity 
of paint and chemicals support. 
bulkhead gore  sections were  delivered a s  required and mixed in the tanks; 
the remaining limited chemical and s torage requirements were accommo- 
dated in a small s t ruc ture  adjacent to  but separated f rom Building 5-04. 
Chemicals used in the processing of 
As production accelerated,  increasing quantities of chemicals,  paint, 
T o  alleviate these unsafe conditions, the contractor fenced in a 
acids,  and solvents were  requisitioned and stored adjacent to  production 
facilities. 
section of outside yard area, away f r o m  the production facilities, for 
chemical and paint storage.  The area was equipped with a safety shower, 
eye wash, sump, control berm,  and grounding rods. All excess  quantities 
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of paint, chemicals, acids, and solvents not immedia required for pro- 
ion and stored in proper cans and cabinets were ved from the 
etion a rea  to this new location. 
This new loc ion provided limited safety and reduced the 
hazardous conditio but it was not a completely adequate solutio 
provide for the complete and adequate storage of paint an 
contractor submitted an Application ~ O T  .Industrial Fa2ilities. 
submittal detailed a specific building for paint and chemical storage as  
follows : 
hemical s, the 
This 
"Construct a one-story building, 40 feet by 150 feet, of clear 
span prefabricated-type structure with ribbed metal sides and 
roof. This structure to have lighting, special retention curbs, 
sump, 2-hour fir.e rated walls for  the flammable liquid dis- 
pensing and gas bottle storage area,  and a 10-foot concrete 
apron on the front side of the building for  loading and unloading. I '  
?a 
The submittal was received and evaluated by the NASA, however, for 
various reasons, outside storage of chemicals was continued by the 
contractor. 
REFERENCES 
Appendix "A", Industrial Facilities, Saturn S-I1 Program, NAS 8-  14016(F); 
SD 67-1135, December 8, 1967, Item 1102. 
, 
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FLOOR COVERING FOR STAGE PROTEC 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The raisablefloor decks in the Vertical  Checkout (VCO) building were 
installed with open-faced meta l  grating. 
par t s  (such as washers,  nuts, bolts, r ivets,  and tools) to  drop between floor 
openings, creating potential damage to  stage insulation and a hazard to  
employees. u. 
The open grating allowed small 
SOLUTION/REC OMMENDATION 
. To alleviate the cited situation above, plywood covers were  installed 
over all open grating. This installation, in turn,  caused other problems 
that a r e  covered in the discussion which follows; however, the pr imary  aim 
of product and personnel protection was achieved. 
An alternate recommendation would be that all raisable floors in new 
facilities construction be installed with solid - type, skid -pr  oof, lightweight, 
aluminum decking. 
to accommodate this additional dead-load weight and ventilation problem. 
The basic building c r i te r ia  and design should be planned 
DISCUSSION 
The VCO was originally planned to be utilized for  Systems Installation 
The and Checkout with no provisions for rework o r  work-around situations. 
open grated floors were designed to serve  two purposes: reduce s t ructural  
costs and to provide ventilation. 
On August 16, 1967, a design change was released to rework and 
change cer ta in  portions of the stage insulation. 
for this effort because al l  other ver t ical  stations were  occupied in accordance 
with the Manufacturing Sequence Plan. The rew0r.k to be accomplished 
required that pa r t  of the  insulation on the stage be opened and exposed. 
potential damage f rom dropped nuts, bolts, washers,  and smal l  hand tools 
falling through the open grating became a problem. T o  forestal l  damage to  
the product and to  protect personnel, plywood was cut, shaped and secured 
to  the deck plates. 
was accomplished by means of an Expense Job Order. 
The VCO had to  be utilized 
The 
This was an emergency "fix" to  cor rec t  the problem and 
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This corrective action created a secondary problem that must  
The installation of the plywood diverted the orderly up-draft of air thr  
the building, as established in  the original design. The new upward 
was diverted to the open spacing between the stage and the floor cau 
high-velocity funneling effect. Further ,  the wood floors had to  be r 
continually because of damage sustained from equipment moves, 
The  installation of solid, skid-proof, lightweight, aluminum deck 
plates, coupled with adequate ducts and reg is te rs  at the outboard a r e a s  of 
the floor levels would negate having to make temporary flooring installations, 
eliminate ventilation problems, and make the facility m o r e  general purpose. 
, 
2-29 
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
Faci l i t ies  12-08 
BRIDGE CRANE ACCESS CATWALKS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The  bridge c rane  installations in  all stations (I through VI) of the 
Vert ical  Assembly Building (VAB) w e r e  completed without catwalks. 
catwalks it became necessary ,  in the event of power fai lure ,  fo r  the c rane  
operator  to  evacuate the cab by means  of a dropped rope and Sky-Genie, which 
he  s l ides  down, o r  to  walk the rails back into the building. 
con4Ttuted a hazardous situation for  the employee. 
Without 
* 
Both of these 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The hazardous situations noted above were  cor rec ted  by the installation 
of: 
1. 150-foot catwalk with handrails between Stations I1 and IV 
I 2. 
3. 
150-foot catwalk with handrails between Stations I and III 
190-foot catwalk with handrails at Station V 
4. 190-foot catwalk with handrails at Station V I  
This installation was accomplished with NASA funds in response to  the 
contractor 's  application to  NASA for  Industrial  Faci l i t ies ,  Saturn S-I1 
P rogram,  SID 64-1034, dated June 1, 1964. 
It is recommended that bridge c rane  installations of this span and 
height include catwalks in the initial design c r i te r ia .  
recommended that applicable State Safety Codes be researched  and imple-  
mented a t  the time of construction. The  time of implementation should be 
concurrent  with the basic  installation of the bridge c ranes  to  reduce total  
.cost  and to  make  the catwalk installation cu r ren t  with the building design 
for  the doors ,  ladders ,  and platforms required to  conform to the applicable 
safety codes. 
It i s  fur ther  
It irs a lso  recommended that for  future installations the Williamson- 
Steiger  Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596) be  
investigated and applicable sections be included in design and construction 
c r i te r ia .  
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DISCUSSION 
The Vertical Assembly and Hydrostatic Test  Building was desi  
with four independent bridge crane systems to service six 
tes t  stations. These bridge cranes had capacities of 10 to 
III, 20 tons, Stations I1 and fV; 50 tons, Station VI; and 70 
and were located approximately 100 feet above ground lev 
were not equipped with catwalks that could be utilized by the operator in the 
.event of loss of motive power or  by maintenance personnel to make I 
inspection and required repairs.  This lack of safe ingrese/egress to the 
bridge crane was noted to be in. violation of the California General Industry 
Safety Orders, which describe catwalks in Article 5, Section 3262, which 
states: rl. 
"Every permanent inaccessible elevated location, where there is 
machinery, equipment, or  material  which is customarily operated 
o r  frequently repaired, serviced, adjusted, or otherwise handled, 
shall be provided with a safe platform or maintenance runway 
which shall be made accessible by means of either fixed ladders 
o r  permanent ramps o r  stairways. I t  
The catwalk requirements were further detailed in Article 62, 
Section 3926, which states: 
"Access to the cage, cab, or machinery house shall be afforded 
by conveniently placed stationary ladder, s ta i rs ,  o r  platforms. ' I  
The bridge cranes experienced heavy utilization based on the Saturn 
S-I1 Manufacturing Sequence, Plan and on station utilization. Any lock-up 
or malfunction over the transfer table pit, f o r  an extended period of time, 
could have tied up all operations in Stations I through IV. The cranes in 
Stations V and VI handled major assemblies and the completed stage outside 
the building. These handling operations were accomplished night or  day 
during low-velocity or  zero-velocity winds. 
these cranes became inoperative during the outside t raverse  operations, 
immediate access to the area of the malfunction was required. 
installation of catwalks provided this access to the rail,  bridge, and cab 
facilitating repairs and recovery. Without immediate access and repair, 
any change in wind velocity, while the stage or assembly was suspended, 
could have resulted in heavy damage or total loss of these units. 
If the cab controls on one of 
The 
2-31 
SD 71-256 
B Division 
Amemn Rockweil 
REFERENCES 
Application to NASA for Industrial Facilities, Appendix "A", SXD 64- 1034, 
Item 608, June 1, 1964. . 
A&E Design Criteria for Crane Access Catwalks - Vertie 
Hydrotest Facility, January 15, 1965. 
Construction Specification for  Crane Catwalks, Vertical Aasembly 
Hydrotest Facility, Seal Beach Facility. 
m. 
, 
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DUST CONTROL, PHENOLIC MILLING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT'  
Contour milling of bulkhead honeycomb materials prior to the final 
of the aluminum bulkhead facing sheet within the same enclosed area  created 
blem detrimental to final bonding of the honeycomb to the facing 
e dust created problems in adhesive bonding operations, in 
personnel environment and in maintenance of clean facilities. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
e0 
An existing building exhaust system was modified and reworked to 
This increased exhaust removed the dust generated by cutting, and 
provide increased face velocity exhaust to the t r im  tool used in the contour 
milling. 
reduced personnel hazards and improved adhesive bonding operations. 
In similar situations, it is  recommended that cut and t r im tools be 
I equipped with an exhaust system sized with adequate face velocity for the 
product being milled and tied into a central evacuation dust collector. 
Further,  i t  i s  recommended that in the design for a new installation 
where cut and t r im,  bond, layup and cure a re  to be accomplished, separate 
rooms be utilized. 
the movement of the tool and/or part  and should be serviced from a common 
exhaust system with a high face velocity. 
These separate rooms should be sized to accommodate 
This problem should be considered during preparation of the facilities 
design criteria.  
DISCUSSION 
Phenolic honeycomb materials utilized in the bulkhead manufacturing 
process were pre-faced by the vendor fo r  immediate installation. 
facturing plans called for the use of a technique known as  "Putty Pads" 
for the installation required minimum trim after layup. This proved to be 
inadequate due to the diameter and height of the bulkhead and the contours 
required. New techniques were devised wherein the honeycomb was faced 
and bonded to the base material, a vacuum drawn on the material  and 
approximately 1700 measurements were made of the honeycomb in this 
condition. These measurements were then programmed and fed into a 
Manu- 
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computer. The computer results were then analyzed by Ma 
Development Laboratory pareonnel who, in turn, established all  of the 
that required milling. 
To accomplish the removal and col 
trim cutting, the trim tool wa,s equipped n exhaust tu 
portable vacuum cleaner. 
exhaust, system proved to be inadequate use dust .settled on 
which, in turn, created problems in the sive bonding proce 
powdered dust was very difficult to remove. 
Due to the high volume of dust from cutting, this 
This method was improved by connecting the tooling exhaust tube into 
a central build5ng exhaust system in order to provide a higher face velocity 
at  the cutting head. 
insuring a better bond, improved housekeeping, and contributing to safer 
environmental conditions for employees. 
This increased capacity reduced dust in the product 
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MO DUIAR OFFICE INSTALLATIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
During peak growth periods on large programs, office rearrangements 
and relocation a r e  continually required to accommodate the increasing 
departmental headcounts. These rearrangements and relocations require 
constant a rea  planning, facilities modification, and resource investments, 
SOL UTION/REGOMMENDATION 
Establish a mathematical model for housing personnel based upon 
established company standards for offices and office furnishings. This 
standardized a rea  should incorporate adequate office areas  for levels of 
supervision/management, "bull-pens" for support personnel, file areas,  
and fixed utility installations to minimize rearrangement costs. 
DISCUSSION 
Common practice is  to plan and implement rearrangements /relocations 
on an as-required basis. 
planning, the construction of offices to meet requirements for  functional 
organizations, and rearrangements of a reas  to accommodate increasing 
head count levels. This is  particularly true during those peak growth 
periods of program buildup which contribute to higher overhead costs. 
As a result, each relocation requires new area  
The establishment of a modular office layout plan for variable office 
requirements was instituted by North American Rockwell and proved to 
contribute subs tantially to lower relocation / r  ear  r ang ement costs . 
as implemented provided for: 
The plan 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Perimeter  management offices, complexes, and confer enc e 
rooms 
Low office profiles for first level supervision and secretaries 
adjacent to working groups 
Standardized office layouts with utility ra i l  separation between 
desks 
Standardized aisle patterns 
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6 .  
7. 
8. 
9. 
In-place electrical and telephone outlets 
Minor rearrangement impacts 
Provided for  "box moves" of personnel 
Minimized lost move time 
Lower costs to maintain 
10. Uniformity of similar areas  throughout the facility 
Planning for such modular installations should be instituted at  the 
earliest  possible date in the program buildup. 
, 
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PROTECTION OF FEMALE EMPLOYEES AT NIGHT 
IN GENERAL PARKING AREAS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Female employees entering o r  leaving the plant a t  night have been 
accosted in the "general" parking a r e a s  adjacent to  the plant, 
incidents were  broadcast  by word of mouth, a l l  female employees refused to  
work a t  night without adequate protection in the general  parking a reas .  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
When these 
T o  prevent fur ther  occurrences,  all female employees scheduled t o  
work a t  night were  as signed reserved  parking spaces  immediately adjacent 
to  the guard 's  shack at the well-lighted main gate. 
of this nature  occurred.  
No fur ther  incidents 
It i s  recommended that the parking a r e a  closest  to the lobby o r  main 
This  is a pract ical  solution to  the problem since 80% of 
gate be  lighted to 50  foot-candles and made available to  all female employees 
fo r  night parking. 
these r e se rved  spaces  (normally occupied by management personnel  during 
the day shift)  a r e  unoccupied at night. 
When planning for  the construction of a new si te  o r  at  the beginning of 
a new p rogram on an  existing site this problem should be considered as a 
p a r t  of the facil i t ies c r i t e r i a  package. 
DISCUSSION 
During the month of July 1968, about midnight, a female employee was 
attacked by a man  in the general  parking a rea ,  approximately 300 feet f rom 
the main  gate on the NASA Seal  Beach site.  Fortunately, two ma le  employees 
heard he r  s c r e a m  and came  to h e r  ass is tance.  Again, during the month of 
January 1971, at 1:30 AM, another female employee was molested by a male 
exhibitionist in the general  parking a r e a  eas t  of Building 80 on the NR Seal 
Beach site. Soon af te r  each incident occurred the offender was apprehended 
by the Seal  Beach police. Nevertheless,  to  ave r t  any future incidents, all 
female employees who plan to  enter  or  leave the site a t  night have been 
requested to p a r k  i n  the r e se rved  parking space close to  the lobby o r  ma in  
gate. 
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HELIUM MANIFOLD SYSTEM FOR LEAK CHECKS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During the ea r ly  s tages  of Saturn S-I1 production, helium leak-chec 
of weld joints on the tank were  performed using K-bottles, containing 
helium, to p re s su r i ze  the S-I1 subassemblies  and completed stages. These  
bottles were  located on the floor adjacent to the assembl ies  and used one 
a t  a t ime a s  the gas was depleted, 
becpxse of recur r ing  connecting and disconnecting of t h e  bottles when t e s t s  
were  underway, a s  well a s  the residuals  of gas remaining in each bottle. 
Contr'olled helium flow into the tanks was highly c r i t i ca l  and, if not maintained, 
resulted in the loss  of effective t e s t  resu l t s  because of the doubtful accuracy 
manual handling provided . 
SOLUTION /REC OMMENDATION 
This resulted in a high-helium loss  factor  
T o  provide helium in sufficient quantities a t  the proper  p re s su res ,  a 
helium manifold sys tem was installed. This  installation included a bank of 
bottles manifolded together, outside the Vert ical  Assembly Building (VAB), 
with related controls,  gauges, indicators,  and piping distributed f rom the 
bottle manifold into the t e s t  control room. 
source  f rom which helium leak-checks could be conducted with efficiency, 
reliability, and grea te r  speed. 
The  installation provided a helium 
It is  recommended that testing requirement  f o r  leak-check of welds 
in cr i t ical  subassemblies  be identified a s  a f i r s t  pr ior i ty  in the manufacturing 
t e s t  plan, Based upon requirement  of the t e s t  plan, the design c r i t e r i a  f o r  
building i n  stallation would then incorporate  such requirements .  
DISC USSION 
In accordance with the Manufacturing Plan for  the Saturn S-I1 stage,  
This  plan required leak-checking of all tank 
it was stipulated that helium be used to  per form leak-checks on the S-I1 
assembly and subassembly. 
welds by first pressur iz ing  the unit with helium, and then, scanning with a 
helium leak detector  fo r  determination of the helium flow ra t e s  through the 
weld joints. 
Ea r ly  leak-checking was performed on the station floor,  adjacent to 
the a r t ic le  under tes t ,  by K-bottles filled with helium. 
involved the distribution of helium bottles throughout the VAB. 
This  manual sys tem 
T e s t  r e su l t s  
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were doubtful due to the high helium. loss encounte 
connect and disconnect from bottle to bottle, This 
created a housekeeping problem in a reas  densely p 
and equipment. Further, the system created a c 
of supply and return of bottles, and presented pr  
hazards due to constant handling. 
To overcome the shortcomings of the manual system, the Contractor 
proposed and received approval to install a helium bank with the neceswary 
gauges, related controls, indicators, and plumbing. The system 
of a bank of 3144 storage bottle;, with manifold, set on a concrete 
ground level, and routed through the building to the control room 
fifth floor, 
gas delivered at 300 scfrn at  800 psig for 45 minutes. 
provided a continuous source of helium at  the required pressure f o r  
stipulated times required to perform the leak tests. 
This storage capacity was sufficient to provide a supply of helium. 
The installatio 
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RATIOS FOR PARKING LOTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The original c r i t e r i a  for  site parking stipulated a s tandard accepted 
A&E ra t io  of 1. 5 employees pe r  car .  
respec t  to total  employees, and c a r s  that  had to be parked during peak 
shifts. 
This  ra t io  proved to be  invalid in 
SOL YTION /R ECOMMENDATION 
A study of available parking stations and the number of c a r s  used by 
employees dictated that a ra t io  of 1. 1 was necessary  to  provide adequate 
parking during high shift periods.  
In-depth studies should be taken at the time of the prel iminary site 
planning to  in su re  adequate parking facilities. 
location in relation to  public transportation; frequency of public t ranspor ta -  
tion to  support  employees at shift changes; and forecas t  of employment by 
shifts and the planned available parking s ta l ls .  
This study should include site 
~ 
DISCUSSION 
The parking lot utilization a r e a  planned was based upon a standard 
A&E factor  of 1 . 5  employees per  car .  
tion, limited c a r  pooling, and the divergent a r e a s  from which people drove 
to  work, it l a t e r  proved that a m o r e  acceptable ra t io  would be provision of 
9 parking stalls fo r  every 10  employees. 
Due to the lack of public t ransporta-  
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PNEUMOSTATIC TEST SAFEGU 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Two of the original requirements in the Saturn program were 
hydrostatic and pneumatic testing, 
ments were included in site planning with hydrostatic testing being accom- 
plished at Station V and pneumatic testing at Station VZL 
Provisions to incorporate these require- 
In early 1967 the Manufacturing Working Plan 67-A was reyised t o  
At the same time the pneumatic pressures  were increased from 
delete hydrostatic testing of the structural assembly on S-11- 
stages, 
20 to 62 psi. 
the tank and weldments. 
new site for testing. 
sures  that would endanger other site-buildings and the surrounding businws 
and residential areas.  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The new requirement was to certify the structural integrity of 
The increased pressure requirements dictated a 
This was predicated On the explosion and burst pres-  
Negotiations between NR, NASA, and the United States Navy resulted in 
an agreement to utilize an isolated a rea  within the confines of neighboring 
Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach. All pneurnostatic testing wa8 conducted 
at this site for the remaining Saturn S-11 stages. 
Other contractors encountering similar problems for high pressure 
testing face one of two options: 
1. Location of facilities in an isolated area with adequate perimeter 
boundaries to  prevent damage liability. 
2. Construction of an explosion-proof structure and control room 
designed to protect surrounding structures and environs. 
These options must be analyzed and a determination made ara early a s  
possible during program definition. 
DISCUSSION 
The test  plan initially implemented to  verify the Structural integrity of 
S-II structural assembly and major stage components utilized hydrostatic 
testing, Leak testing of weldments was accomplished with the helium leak - 
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detection method by internal pressurizat  
These testing techniques were 
e Seal Beach work stations sp 
ty implementation. While the 
the intended purpose, methods and t e c h  
over a l l  act ivit i e s . 
The tes t  method investigation responsibility was assigned to a special 
joint MSFC/NR task team and resulted.in the issuance of a Memorandum of 
Agreement. 
to  reduce assembly t ime and provide schedule improvement. 
The recommended action provided for changes in S-I1 testing 
Events that followed this recommendation were consummated in the 
normal change board activities, terminating with a contract change order. 
Facility planning did not commence until commitment on the revised testing 
techniques had been made. 
Initial facilitization of a pneumostatic test  site was accomplished on a 
temporary basis a t  the adjacent Naval Ammunition Depot in order to accom- 
modate the 5-11-4 schedule requirements, 
established at the present location on the Navy site. 
This activity was ultimately 
i 
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HEA W-DUTY CRANE SHOES 
AND EFFECT 
The electrical trolley ducts, which provide power for the bridge crane 
in the Bulkhead Fabrication Building, were installed without heavy-duty con- 
tact shoes. Constant use of the cranes created excessive wear on the shoes. 
Additional wear'was created by crane cross-over gates employed in the 
interlocking bridge crane system employed in Building S-02. 
heavy-duty contact shoes resulted in frequent breakdowns and related delayrrr. 
SOLUTION /REG OMMEN DATION 
e- 
The lack of 
Several alternate solutions were investigated by the contractor in an 
effort to correct the deficiencies noted above. The solution most readily 
implemented was to double the number of rollers used in  conjunction with 
the shoe. 
with two pair of rollers, one in front and one in the rear ,  
wear on the rail,  two rollers were added, one in front and one in the rear .  
The new installation on 3-inch centers thus reduced the flex load on the 
spring - loaded bay on et c ont act shoe, 
The original factory designed and installed shoes were mounted 
To maintain a 
I straightforward thrust at the cab crossover point and to reduce frictional 
Another alternate evaluated was to double the length of the'contact shoe 
so that electrical contact was constant over the length of the enlarged shoe 
in contact with the power rail even at the cab crossovers. 
It is recommended that all  crane utilization be critically analyzed and 
that the contact shoes be sized to twice the required capacity to  reduce wear 
and down time. 
for overhead crane acquisition. 
This cri teria should be a basic portidn of the specification 
DISCUSSION 
The power shoes, ducts, and rails  provided with the bridge crane in 
the Bulkhead Fabrication Building were standard off-the- shelf components, 
In a normal installation with no breaks in the rails, these components would 
prove adequate and very effective. 
the high level of use of the bridge crane system, the contact shoes were 
inadequate. 
the rail  alignment. 
rail misalignment, 
However, due to the crossover gates and 
The problem does not concern the contact shoe only, but also 
Constant preventive maintenance is required to minimize 
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The solution as implemented by North American Roe 
several approaches that matarial-handling engineers should 
acquiring and maintaining heavily used bridge crane syste 
crossover systems. 
w 
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CONTINGENCY 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
PLANNING-MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 
AND EFFECT 
With the rapid growth of the S-II production program it became 
that additional high bay building a r e a  was necessary  for  s torage of in -  
hardware  and to accommodate new stations for changes in manufacturing 
p rocesses .  
t ransportat ion problems. 
Off -s i te  manufacturing and warehousing presented logistical  and 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDAT ION 
NR submitted an Application to NASA for Industrial  Faci l i t ies  Saturn 
S-I1 P r o g r a m ,  SID 63-449, dated 15 May 1963, for  a 30, 000-square-foot 
warehouse,  The justification for this 'additional building included all aspects  
of the problem based upon the handling and s torage of 207  p a r t s  p e r  month. 
Th i s  analysis included the s i ze  pe r  p a r t  (50 to 860 square  feet);  configuration 
and weight which precluded pa r t s  stacking; and an estimated cost  of $200, 000 
for ma te r i a l  and labor,  including inspection, to provide surveil lance of pa r t s  
s tored outside the facility. 
Authorization for  construction of the warehouse was received in 
May 1964 and construction completed in August 1965. This  additional 
building provided the necessa ry  flexibility to r ea r r ange  work stations and to  
accommodate changes in the manufacturing processes .  
To  preclude this problem on a similar future ma jo r  program,  on-si te  
warehousing for  l a rge  components and contingency provisions for technological 
advances in manufacturing should be considered a s  an ear ly  program requi re -  
ment  with justification and approval receiving a high pr ior i ty  in the Faci l i ty/  
Manufacturing Plan. 
8 DISC US-SION 
Original manufacturing planning of the S-I1 Stage assembly was based 
on an optimized s e r i e s  of sequential operations. 
not requi re  "off-line" s torage of ma jo r  subassemblies  in process .  
was a l so  based on the then-current  s ta te  of the a r t  of manufacturing processes .  
Th i s  philosophy influenced t h e  facility planning c r i t e r i a  and, ultimately, 
construction of the NASA Seal Beach site. 
This  operating p remise  did 
Planning 
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Part of the stated proble 
for  major  subasse 
ration. The materi 
aluminum, is highly susceptib mid salt  air 
for  short  periods of time. 
The problem manifested itself as these subassemblies began to  
accumulat i  in 1963 and all production stations were  taken up with work in 
process ,  At the same time, it became impract ical  to s tore  these units in 
off- s i te  warehouses because of the transportation difficulties and the additional 
handling operations involved. 
permits, res t r ic ted hours of operation, and the relocation and rearrangement  
of public utilities to allow the loade to  pas s  without damage. Off-site s torage 
required additional handling operations and protective devices, both costly 
iil t ime and money. 
Transportation problems involved wide load 
Further ,  outside s torage presented corrosion problems because of the 
humid salt air. This,  in turn,  required additional Q&RA surveillance and 
reporting. 
hardware damage was heightened in an unguarded environment. 
Additional pa r t s  protection was envisioned and susceptibility to  
Welding problems incurred were fur ther  compounded by the require-  
ment f o r  par t s  in prgcess  storage.  In some instances, these problems, plus 
the lack of rework stations, caused schedule problems by preventing timely 
access  to weld stations. Resolution of the flow process  problems and station 
constraints was achieved with the implementation of additional stations. 
REFERENCES 
Appendix A SID 63-449 (May 15, 1963). 
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CATHQDI C PROTECT1 ON 
Utility piping’(b1ack iron, steel, and aluminum) was installed on the 
NASA site in accordance with normal construction standards. 
installation it was noted that electrolytic action was destroying some of these 
installations . 
Shortly after 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDAT ION 
e 
North American Rockwell submitted an Application to  NASA for 
Industrial Facilities, Saturn S-II Program, Appendix A, fP 1379, dated 
July 1, 1965, Item 908, requesting funds to  provide cathodic protection for 
the underground piping systems, This submittal covered the first of two 
phases f o r  corrective protection. The project was not funded, 
At the time of site preparation, a soil survey should be made to  
determine the possible electrolytic effect of the soil on metals such a s  black 
iron and aluminum. The results of this survey should be incorporated into 
the A&E Design Criteria for -all underground piping installations which will 
service the facility. Early identification of soil conditions and specifica- 
tions for piping protection and the implementation of protection systems will 
negate the more costly remedial installations, a t  a later date, Further, it 
is recommended that polypropolene piping be utilized where high electrolytic 
action is evident in the soil, 
DISCUSSION 
Standard black iron, steel, and aluminum piping were utilized in under- 
ground utility installations at the NASA site at Seal Beach, These in8talla- 
tions were covered with protective wrapping which did not, in al l  instances, 
provide adequate protection f rom the hostile soi l  conditions in the Seal Beach 
area,  
in line leaks and the need for piping repair, 
# 
Electrolytic action with the soil caused piping damage which resulted 
The earliest significant occurrence of underground piping leaks was 
early in 1965. 
and hydrostating operations in the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB), leaks 
occurred in these piping systems, The underground system was abandoned 
and the piping was run overhead from the water conditioning plant to  the VAB. 
During checkout of the fill and drain systems for the cleaning 
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The decision to go overhead was made to avoid the adverse schedule impact 
which a leak in this system would have created during pr  
The most recent failure of underground piping occurred la 
AprU L971, 
causing loss of a i r  service to  the station, 
locate the corroded pipe required the removal of 14'00 square feet of 
asphaltic concrete and the exposure of 66 feet of a i r  line piping because the 
site could not be determined by a visual inspection of the surface. 
replacement of the corroded section of pipe, a protective coating was 
applied to the 66 feet of exposed line and th'e trench was refilled. 
An a i r  line that served the sewage lift station er 
The excavation to uncover and 
. 
After 
When the first problem occurred, NR had a socl survey conducted by 
a qualified A&E firm, Bechtel Corporation, Power and Industrial Division, 
Vernon, California, Their report classified the soil a s  "severely corrosiye 
to corrosive. I '  
REFERENCES 
Appendix A, IP 1379, dated 1 July 1965, Item#908. 
1 
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FUNDING CYCLE FOR REQUIRED FACI LlTY MODIFICATIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Normal procedures for the acquisition of Facilities funds for 
modifications, alterations, o r  repairs, required the preparation of the 
Application for Industrial Facilities submittal to NASA, and a waiting period 
of from 6 to 8 months fo r  approval, 
failure, this procedure for obtaining new or modified facilities, in such . 
situations, was unrealistic with rebpect to maintaining production schedules. 
In emergency situations such as  a power 
SOLUTION /REG OMMENDATION 
To expedite the approval of minor modifications, alterations or 
repairs, the basic contract, NAS8-14016(F), dated May 12, 1965, was 
modified by Supplemental Agreement No, 1.1, dated September 27, 1.966, 
This modification provided for local approval of specific projects, providing 
the costs did not exceed $10, 000. 
funds were documented by a Task Order, prepared in Appendix A format 
with its own numbering sequence. 
Submittal of requests to expend facilities 
It is recommended that future basic contracts for large aerospace or 
airframe contracts contain similar provisions, such as  the Task Order, to 
allow for flexibility in the administration of contract funds to meet emergency 
or unforecasted requirements. It is further recommended that these terms 
and conditions be implemented at  the time of the basic contract negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
The approval of Facilities funds, for  projects proposed by the 
Contractor, is a process which takes about one year from preparation to 
approval and implementation. Normally, there is little flexibility to cover 
emergency situations that may arise, 
a degree of flexibility, the Saturn S-II/North American Rockwell Task Order 
system was implemented. Following meetings and discussions, the contract 
was modified to allow local approval for  emergency projects not to exceed 
To overcome this void and to provide 
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$10, 000, 
Supplemental Agreement were speeifi 
The original ground rules for defining it 
I r l .  No single item or  task e ceeding $10, 0 
2. Item’s of work, o r  tasks, estimated to exceed $10, 
Relate subdivided to meet the $10, 000 limitation. 
classified a s  a single project and, if th 
$10, 000, a normal Appendix A submittal must be made. 
The submittal of the Task Order followed the format of an Appendix A, 
but in a simplified form, 
sequence to negate confusion with an Appendix, 
The Task Order was numbered in a different 
Subsequent agreements with NASA modified the original intent of 
“emergency items only, ’’ and allowed for the submittal of any udorecasted 
item providing they followed the original ground rules, 
REFERENCES 
Supplemental Agreement, Modification No. 11 , to Contract 
I 
NAS8-34016(F), dated August 24, 1967. 
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BUILDING LOCATIONS FOR STAGE MOVES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The modified Manufacturing Plan for Saturn S-LI created the need for 
a separate building for Test and Operations. 
tion of the Vertical Checkout Building (VCO). 
not contemplate such a requirement and, as a result, additional land was 
acquired upon which the VCO was constructed. 
150-feet south and 500-feet east of the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) 
(see Figure 9 ), 
This resulted in the construe- 
The original site planning did 
The new facility was sited 
. 
The distance? between these two buildings imposed additional stage 
handling operations including a vertical-to-horizontal rotation of the stage 
’by attachment of slings and handling fixtures, horizontal transportation on 
the transporter, and subsequent horizontal-to-vertical erection at  the VCO. 
This was a t ime consuming ‘and crit ical  operation taking many manhours to 
- c omplet e. 
SOLUTION / R EC OMMEND AT ION 
North American Rockwell used the described system for the full 
duration of the Saturn S-I1 program. 
revised a s  required to incorporate the latest and safest methods of handling, 
transporting, and erection although the site itself did not permit cost effec- 
tive improvement, It is recommended, however, that if other aerospace or  
a i r f rame contractors a r e  faced with similar types of handling, plan 
should consider placement of assembly and test  buildings opposite each 
other. 
connecting railroad-type tracks upon which the stage could be moved without 
resorting to the additional operations previously described, 
planning should be undertaken before site development, if possible. 
Material Handling Procedures were 
Transfers between buildings could then be accomplished on inter- 
This tfpe of 
DIS~USSION 
The original site planning for Saturn S-I1 utilized one building, 5-03, 
with four stations, for the manufacture and test of a l l  stages. 
were for manufacturing assembly, systems installation, engine installation, 
etc. and one station was for combined systems tes t  and checkout. 
evolution of program changes and the manufacturing flow process brought 
about the requirement for one additional assembly station and one additiond 
Three stations 
The 
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checkout station. A decision wa ached whereby the NASA 
new facility, the Vertical Check uilding S-15, which would c 
identical combined systems checkout stations, thus devoting tln 
aeaembly operations only, This decision, turn, required the 
of an additional building site consisting d e acres  of land a 
ing S-I1 Assembly Site. 
The offset location of these buildings required additi 
handling procedures for moving the stage f rom building to building. 
these procedures the stage was removkd from the assembly tool and stage 
dolly in a vertical position, rotated to  a horizontal position, and placed on 
the transporter for transfer to the Vertical Checvkout Building, Placement 
of the stage in the VCO was accomplished in the reverse  order, These 
multiple tasks required a minimum of 18 personnel to affix the handling 
cones, lifting rings, tag lines, and tools, and to transport the stage into the 
VCO, Wind velocities were an additional factor. 
The Material Handling Procedures used to support and implement these 
moves a r e  submitted a s  reference material. 
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REVIEW BOARD FOR FACILITIES 1NSTALLATlON 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The Faci l i t ies  department is char tered with the p r ime  responsibility t o  
forecast ,  justify and provide new facilities, facility modifications, and 
rehabilitation of facilities, 
coordinated with the affected production operations and related functions 
through a coordination letter of notification which requested comments, 
approval o r  disapproval of the design, the modifications, and t ime schedules 
established. In addition to  the le t ter ,  construction/installation t imes were  
coordinated with Manufacturing Scheduling t o  utilize the available "window 
times" in the production schedule, which would allow facilities work t o  be 
accomplished on a noninterference basis,  
The implementation of approved projects was 
This le t ter  did not always provide the desired resu l t s  for a number of 
reasons and resulted in delays encountered in re-design, re-scheduling and 
' delays in construction. 
s OLUTION IREC OMMENDATION 
To improve the scheduling and implementation of a l l  major facilities 
projects,  a Facil i t ies Control Board (FCB) was established under the cogni- 
zance of the Facil i t ies & Industrial Engineering Manager with the direct  
approval of the Saturn S-I1 P r o g r a m  Manager. 
manent members  and al ternates  f r o m  the organization representing: 
The FCB consisted of per -  
Facil i t ies & Industrial Engineering 
Manufacturing 
Quality & Reliability Assurance 
Test  & Logistics 
System Safety 
Engineering 
This control board established, published, and had approved by 
Management, a char te r  of responsibilities which said in part: 
"The function of the board will be to  review and evaluate a l l  pro- 
posed facil i t ies work activity in order  t o  categorize the cri t icali ty 
and to establish the inspection and/or  surveillance levels required." 
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Based upon the timely results achieved by North Americ 
Seal Beach Facility in the creation of such a unit, it 
oard, or  equ 
ities and car ugh the total produ 
ion results were realized in construct 
n to having al l  functional a r eas  aware of an 
ation and improvements. 
DISCUSSION 
During production operations it is  necessary to implement certain 
facility changes o r  modifications, 
changes o r  modifications requires coordination between various functional 
organizations for approval, and of Manufacturing to work in or around the 
product, Typical projects included such items as: capital type rehabilitation 
projects for  overhead handling devices; rehabilitation of processing tanks 
and feed lines; or  the installation of new facilities, These types of construc- 
tion projects require surveillance and "buy-off'' by a responsible cognizant 
organization. The decision a s  to the category of surveillance and determina- 
tion of the responsible organization for surveillance assignment was estab- 
lished by the FCB. The criticality categories were established a s  f o ~ ~ o w e :  
The implementation of these design* 
j 
Category A Extremely Critical, requires full surveillance 
Category B Critical, requires full surveillance except for items 
specifically designated a s  exempt 
Category C Semicritical, requires surveillance only on items 
designated a s  critical 
Category D I__ Safe, requires only normal surveillance 
The creation of the FCB minimized pr ior  problems and instituted an 
orderly dispostion of assignments. 
a charter granted to the Board, 
Instruction SS11 -F14, dated January 1970, Performing Facilities Control 
Board Operations, and distributed to all functional departments. 
Guidance for the FCB was included within 
A guideline was isgued a s  Implementing 
Meetings were scheduled on a weekly basis, a t  which time the Board 
established the criticality for current and pending Facilities projects. 
met on an as-needed basis. 
After 
g firmly established and operating procedures formalized, the Board 
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REFERENCES 
Implementing Instruction SSl1 F- 14, Performing Facilities Control 
Board Operations, dated January 1970, 
i 
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COLOR CODE MARKING FOR PlPING SYSTEMS A N D  CO 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFF 
Internal contractor surveillance by a safety audit dilp 
color coding of fixed piping systems for gases, fluids and 
incomplete. 
tainers the contractor could encounter a problem of shutd 
emergency or malfunction because of his lack of ability t 
shutdown point quickly. 
to  confine the hazard o r  damage into a small  area, 
Without a complete color coding of all  hazardous 
The ability to shut down quickly i s  highly deskrable 
SOLUTION /RECOMME24BATION 
Corrective action was taken by the contractor to complete the color 
coding of piping carrying fluids and gases, in accordance with MIL-STD-1247. 
The primary corrective effort was concentrated in cri t ical  a r eas  such a s  the 
fluid distribution systems. 
* 
Additionally, the contractor ensured that all future installations would . 
be per MIL-STD-lOIA, Color Code for Pipeline and for Compressed-Cas 
Cylinders, It is  recommended that a l l  aerospace contractors investigate and 
use the applicable MIL standard at  the time of facilities installations to min- 
imize cos ts  and reduce the potentially hazardous environment of unmarked 
lines and containers. 
DISCUSSION 
During the facilitization and construction periods, some critical a reas  
of color coding were overlooked, 
these a reas  were identified and corr'ective action taken, At about this same 
time, Marshall Space Flight Center issued Apollo Program Directive 
No. 38-A stipulating that all  contractor-operated NASA facilities comply 
with the color coding/marking of piping systems by government or  other 
equivalent standards, 
MIL STD's 1247A and 101A. 
During a contractor-directed safety tour, 
NR used Corporate Standard RM 8010-001 and 
The intent of A P D  38-A states: 
"'This Program Directive establishes the requirement for  piping 
system identification and encompasses a standard MSF code for 
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identification of materials conveyed in piping systems. 
of this code will promote greater safety and will decreas 
risk of e r ror ,  confusion, or  inaction in times of emerge 
providing a uniform color code and written identifieati 
personnel of the hazards associated with the materials 
To' comply with Memo I-I/IB-E-525-68, December 3, 1968, Subject: 
Color Coding/Marking of Piping Systems at  Contractor-operated NASA 
Facilities, and the MSFC letter that transmitted APD 38A, N R  submitted a 
Budgetary and Planning Estimate per MSFC-STD- 146, September 16, 1968. 
This estimate excluded the identification of ground support equipment, All  
facilities installations completed after the receipt of A P D  38A were installed 
to an applicable standard, 
R EF ERENC ES 
Corporate h4RO Standard RM 4710-001 R W  3, March 1965. 
MIL STD- 1247A, August 17, 1964. 
MSFC STD-146, September 16, 1968. 
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This in-tank use of fluorescent lamps presented a problem in that t 
fluorescent tubes contained mercary, and the presence of mercury wa8 
violation of N R  Specification MA06 10- 001, Revision D, dated February 
1968, which states: 
"With the exception of mercury vapor ultraviolet lamps, any 1 
equipment which contains Mercury or uses Mercury in its opera- 
tion, shall not be used in or  attached to  the LOX or LH2 tanks at 
any time. " 
SOLUTION /R EC OMMENDATION 
To overcome the possible mercury contamination problem from a 
broken fluroescent tube, and to provide adequate illumination, incandescent 
floodlights were added to the 8EH-5101 entry tank platform to provide the 
primary light source. Particular a reas  of the tank, requiring additional 
lighting for cleaning and ingpection, were provided with encapsulate 
fluorescent fixtures and the tube was covered with a clear, high-i 
plastic facing. 
also utilized. 
Battery-powered lights of 6- and 1 2-volt capacity were 
Studies and evaluations were also made to utilize fiber optics, light 
tubes and other light sources, none of which proved to be of adequate foot- 
candle power to  support the needs for product inspection and cleaning, 
1st i d  recommended that incandescent lighting be utilized in all  areas,  
where possible, in the internal inspection and Clean' 
tanks to negate the possibility of mercury contaminat 
rocess of alumin 
The incorporation of internal lighting needs should be a consideration 
of the basic design for ladder o r  platform entry into the tank or product. 
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ior to  the next assembly op 
d two problems: (1 
e presented a problem of a posrJible "arc 
aluminum a r e  not compatible, and exposure to  mer  
molecular structure of the aluminum tank. 
To provide illumination of the desired foot-candles required for n* 
inspection and cleaning, incandescent floodlights were added to the entry tank 
platform. 
the tank were encapsulated over the wire, the frame and the end plates, and 
were provided with high-impact plastic tube covers. 
lights were inspected, cleaned and bagged after every use, and stored in the 
tool cr ib  to insure proper cleanliness and control, 
Fluorescent light units that were required in specific a reas  of 
These encapsulated 
REF ERENC ES 
NR Specification MAO601-001, Rev, D, dated February 1, 1968, 
Methods of Cleaning and Cleanliness Requirements for Saturn S-I1 Fuel or  
Oxidizer Tanks. 
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COMPATIBILITY OF GSE COMPONENTS 
AND. EFFECT 
LOX/GOX compatible ma te r i a l s  a r e  normally considered man  
for  u se  in aerospace  vehicle LOX/GOX systems.  However, for the assoc i -  
ated GSE sys t ems  many compromises  in mater ia l  selection a r e  made  
because of considerations such as high p r e s s u r e  requirements ,  economics, 
and availability. A s  a resu l t  of such fac tors ,  s eve ra l  S-I1 GSE sys tems con- 
tained ma te r i a l s  which were  noncompatible with LOX/GOX. Some of these 
were  considered to  represent  safety hazards  because of the possibility of 
cbmbustion i f  these  mater ia l s  came into contact with LOX or GOX in the 
presence  of a sufficiently high eneygy source.  
SOL UT ION/REC OMMENDATION 
Ground rules  were  established to  govern the utilization and selection 
of ma te r i a l s  contained in GSE circui ts  which serv ice  LOX/GOX systems.  
All sys tems which did not comply’with these c r i t e r i a  were  modified as 
necessary.  
It i s  recommended that firm and comprehensive ground ru les  be estab-  
lished for ma te r i a l  compatibility p r io r  to designing any system. 
DISCUSSION 
MSFC -SPEC- 106B establishes the basic  compatibility requirements  
for  the selection, testing, and control of ma te r i a l s  to be used in S-11 sys tems 
subjected to  LQX/COX. 
mater ia l s  and components will  be exposed to LOX/GOX. Obvious a r e a s  such 
a s  GSE sys tems servicing LOX/GOX as the p r imary  fluid medium for vehicle 
fi l l ,  pressurizat ion,  and tank venting a r e  readily defined. L e s s  obvious 
a r e a s  include GSE sys tems normally processing iner t  fluids which may, 
through operational sequences,  be made  susceptible to a backflow of LOX/ 
GOX f rom stage sys tems a s  a resu l t  of stage component allowable leakage. 
Assessments  m u s t  be made for  components not in the d i rec t  fluid flow path, 
o r  located a t  the end of static,  dead-ended lines. 
the d i rec t  fluid flow path, lubricants,  and sealants  such a s  plating should 
also be considered for  compatibility. 
The  basic  problerh exists in determining which 
Static sea ls  located outside 
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As a bas i s  f o r  making the above determinations,  the following ground 
ru les  were  established to  govern the  use of materials in GSE circui ts  which 
serv ice  LOX/GOX sys tems o r  components. 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
Combustible m a t e r i a l  in GSE components can be exposed to  
LOX/GOX by ei ther  a par t ic le  of the material breaking off and 
migrating to  the downstream LOX/GOX sys tem being se rv i  
o r  by LOX/GOX f r o m  a downstream sys tem backflowing into a 
GSE sys tem normally containing an ine r t  gas. 
The  25-micron absolute f i l t e rs  utilized in LVGSE o r  the S-I1 will 
prevent migration of par t ic les  l a r g e r  than this s ize  to  the LOX/ 
COX sys tems downstream of the filters. 
25 microns,  even if  detonated, will not produce sufficienb energy 
to  be of concern. (A fa i lure  of the filter which allows a l a rge r  
par t ic le  to migra te  downstream was considered a second-order 
fa i lure  since a previous component failure would be required to  
introduce the par t ic le  into the system, ) 
Par t i c l e s  less than 
Components requiring one o r  m o r e  fai lures  before becoming 
exposed to  LOX/GOX, and those which by the nature of the sys tem 
design o r  sys tem operating modes could not become exposed to 
LOX/GOX were  not given fur ther  consideration. 
Only NR/SD LVGSE equipment used with the S-I1 a t  KSC was 
considered. 
mus t  be verified as LOX/GOX compatible by the customer o r  
contractor.  ) 
Since data indicates t he re  has  never  been a LOX/GOX leak into the 
S-I1 common bulkhead, and the confidence level fo r  this sys tem 
was high enough to  have eliminated the need for a leak detection 
capability in the GSE, a GOX leak into the GSE f rom this c i rcui t  
was  not considered. 
(Fluid distribution and facility l ines and components 
Lubricants utilized in components ups t ream of the last sys tem filter 
a re  not considered to  be a potential compatibility problem unless 
i t  is possible to  backflow LOX/GOX to these  components. 
If components are  located at the end of a long s ta t ic  line that has  
contained an  ine r t  gas  before  the opposite end of the line is exposed 
to low p r e s s u r e  COX, the sys tem should be evaluated for  COX 
diffusion. If it i s  determined that the required diffusion t ime is 
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much g rea t e r  than the t ime that the system was exposed to COX 
and the Components do  not contain an energy source,  then GOX 
compatibility fo r  the components is not a requirement.  
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Some of the weld defects that occurred in the production of fhe  
Saturn S-I1 Stage6 were attributed to  oxidized or  dirty ke ld  wire,  
SOLUTION /REC OMMEND AT ION 
To protect 'weld wire  f r o m  contamination and oxidation, North 
American Rockwell purchased sealed, humidity controlled cabinets. Utili- 
zation of these cabinets for  storage of the wire  sustained the validity and 
chemical purity of the wire,  
It is recommended that humidity controlled cabinets of this type be 
provided for  production Operations pr ior  to the acquisition of the weld wire, 
This ear ly  acquisition will minimize any exposure of weld wire  to  oxidation 
and contamination. 
DISCUSSION 
Early production requirements did not specify environmental control 
for  the protection of weld wire  used in the production of Saturn S-II compo- 
nents, The wire  was, therefore,  stored in open line supply racks and 
standard cabinets. The wire  was not totally protected f rom dust, dirt ,  
changing temperatures  and salt a i r ,  prevalent in an a r e a  adjacent t o  an 
ocean. 
contributing to  some weld defects ear ly  in the Program. 
This condition of storage resulted in a suspicion that the wire was 
To prevent continued contamination and oxidation, the contractor 
acquired special  cabinets for the storage of spools of weld wires  and welding 
rods. 
g lass  door fronts and included a 75 watt heater  with thermostat  control and 
an automatic dehumidifier. These units provided a positive environmental 
condition for the storage of welding wire  and rods used in cr i t ical  production 
operations of the Saturn S-II. 
REF ER ENC ES 
These cabinets were of metal  a l l  welded f r ame  construction with 
i 
KEDCO, Inc. ,  Dust-Tight Spool Storage Cabinet Drawings and 
Spec if ic a t ion s . 
-2-64 
SD 71 -256 
Space Division @A! North Arnericd7n Roc.kwc.ll 
POWER SUPPLY OVER-VOLTAGE FA1 LUltC 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
An o v e r - v o l t a g e  s p i k e  w a s  appl ied t o  t h e  S-11-12 du r ing  checkout  a t  
' Seal Beach ,  Stat ion IX, due  to a m o m e n t a r y  p r i m a r y  AC power  f a i l u r e  which 
caused  the  output of t he  28 vdc Ine t -Sprague  fac i l i ty  r e c t i f i e r ,  supplying 
i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  bus  p o w e r ,  to  r i s e  to 56 v d c  and d a m a p e  s t a g e  e l e c t r i c a l  
components .  T h e  sp ike  ex i s t ed  fo r  approx ima te ly  75 n i i l l i seconds ,  a t  which 
time the  r e c t i f i e r  i n t e r n a l  o v e r - v o l t a g e  p ro tec t ion  circi:it shiit down  the  unit. 
SOLUTION/RECOMh4ENI~AT'.ION 
Speci f ica t ions  fo r  fac i l i ty  equipment  which i n t e r f a c e s  d i r e c t l y  with 
veh ic l e  h a r d w a r e  shotild he  thoroughly  rev iewed f o r  c o m p l e t e n e s s  and 
a c c u r a c y  by v e h i c l e  p r o g r a m  engineer ing .  
(power  s u p p l i e s ) ,  the  overLvol tage  p ro tec t ion  c i r c u i t r y  m u s t  p rov ide  abso lu te  
p ro tec t ion  to  t h e  load r e g a r d l e s s  of inpiit po\ver f luc tua t ions ,  i n t e rna l  corn- 
ponent  f a i l u r e s ,  and t r a n s i e n t s  diie t o  load switching.  
In the  p a r t i c u l a r  c-ase of r e c t i f i e r s  
T h e r e f o r e ,  the  p r o c u r e m e n t  specif icat ion m u s t  be  expl ic i t  i n  d e s c r i b i n g  
the  o v e r - v o l t a g e  p ro tec t ion  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and the  de ta i led  t e s t  spec i f ica t ion  
m u s t  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  capabi l i ty  of t h e  unit  to m e e t  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
DISCUSSION 
On D e c e m b e r  1, 1969, an  o v e r - v o l t a g e  sp ike  was  appl ied to the  S-11-12 
du r ing  checkout  a t  S e a l  Beach ,  Stat ion IX. T h i s  anomaly  w a s  the  r e s u l t  of a 
r a r e  m o m e n t a r y  p r i m a r y  a c  power  f a i l u r e  caused  by  a c a r  hi t t ing a Southern  
Ca l i fo rn ia  Ed i son  Company p o w e r  l i ne  pole. B e c a u s e  of the  des ign  of the  
f ac i l i t y  28 v d c  r e c t i f i e r  ( Ine t -Sprague  Model  SCR - 36-250)  which w a s  supplying 
power ' to  the  S-11-12 i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  bus ,  t h e  output vo l tage  rose t o  56 vdc 
upon l o s s  of pr imary power .  T h i s  sp ike  ex i s t ed  f o r  approx ima te ly  75 m i l l i -  
s e c o n d s  (a t  which t i m e  the  r e c t i f i e r  i n t e r n a l  over -vol tape  p ro tec t ion  c i r c u i t  
shu t  down the  uni t )  and r e s u l t e d  in  d a m a g e  to a n u m b e r  of s t a g e  e l e c t r i c a l  
components  including the  power  sl ipplies in  a r e m o t e  analog submul t ip l exe r  
and  a r e m o t e  d ig i t a l  submul t ip l exe r .  
T h e  Ine t -Sprague  r e c t i f i e r  rises a fu l l -wave ,  t h r e e - p h a s e ,  r e c t i f i e r  
and f i l t e r  c a p a c i t o r  on the  output of a s tep-down t r a n s f o r m e r .  
vo l tage  ( 6 0  v d c )  is appl ied  t o  a combina t ion  of S C R ' s  which d o  the  regula t ing .  
T h e s e  S C R ' s  a re  o p e r a t e d  in  a cont ro l led  duty  cvc le  osc i l la t ing  mode .  
T h i s  r a w  
AS 
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the a c  power began to  fail,  the on time of 
control  c i rcui t  sensed a d e c r e  
until the SCR's were  fully turned on. 
but s ince it is difficult to  contr 
them, the rec t i f ie r  output volt ent to  approximately 
fa i lure  mode). 
to shut down the rect i f ier  but this  r 
to the drop-out time of the power contactor. 
The  
At this s a m e  time, 
As a resu l t  of this problem, the Inet-Sprague rec t i f ie rs  were  removed 
f rom serv ice  where they were  being used to  supply stage power and replaced 
by Cal-Power rec t i f ie rs  which do not exhibit the above fai lure  mode, 
addition, the stage switch selector  was  replaced a s  a precautionary measure .  
In 
4 
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und Suppor t  Equipment  (GSE) and  S y s t e n t s  h l e a s u r i n g  Dev ices  (SMD3 
a r e  b a s i c  p r o g r a m  reqn i  r c n l e n t s  which have  s i x a b l ~  c o s t  i n ipac t s  iipon fac i l i ty  
f loo r  s p a c e ,  e n v i r  onn 1 e n  t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and ut i  l i t  y req (ti 1' en2ent s ~ 
SOLUTION/R ECOMllIE NDATION 
Dur ing  t h e  l i fe  of the Sat i i rn  I1 p r o g r a m ,  so lu t ions  t o  min in l i ze  th 
f ac i l i t y  c o s t s  r e l a t e d  to  s y s t e n i s  i n s t a l l a t ion?  (GSi?/bhlT)) w e r e  inves t iga ted  
and ana lyzed  f o r  fut i i re  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
It is r e c o m m e n d e d  tha t  d e s i g n s  f o r  new p r o g r a m  GSE and ShlD conso le s  
and  s u p p o r t  r e q u i r e n i e n t s  b e  ana lyzed  t o  u t i l i ze  the  v e r y  l a t e s t  or  newes t  t e c h -  
nology, such  a s  sol id  stat'e c i r c u i t r y ,  t r a n s i s t n r s ,  a n d  njiniattllrization t o  
m i n i m i z e  f ac i l i t y  c o s t s .  
P r o j e c t  P l ann ing  ( R e f e r e n c e  1) should b e  included a s  c a r l y  a s  pnss ib l c  in  t h e  
p r o g r a n i  p l ans  to minit-r-iize the  f a c i l i t i e s  s u p p o r t  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
DISCUSSION 
T h e s e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  and i t t i l ization of P h a s e d  
In g e n e r a l ,  f a c i l i t i e s  planning is  based  upon the  p roduc t  s i ze ,  t he  
n u m b e r  of nianiifactiii-ing u.nrk s t a t ions ,  t h e  support o p e r a t i o n s ,  and the  t e s t  
and checkout  r e q u i r e n > e n t s .  T h i s  planning is  b a s e d  on c u r r e n t  p roduc t  visi- 
b i l i ty ,  quant i ty ,  and pyodiict des ign .  Rased  tipon these same g e n e r a l  c r i t e r i a ,  
SMD and GSE a r e  des igned  and f ab r i ca t ed  to  s u p p o r t  and check  out  t he  
p r odu c t . 
I 
F a c i l i t y  requi rcn2cnt  t o  s u p p o r t  SMD and GSE ins t a l l a t ions  g e n e r a l l y  
c o n s i s t s  of r a i s e d  p lenum floors upon which  the  equipnlent  is p laced  and 
unde rnea th  n-hich cabl ing  and duct ing a r e  routed  t o  the  equipment .  T h i s  
unde rnea th  a r e a  often s e r v e s  a l s o  as cool ing c h a m b e r s  f o r  the  equipment  
i t e m s .  
foot.  
s y s t e m s  i n  a n  eqtiiprrient unit ,  o r  by des igning  t h e  eqll ipixent with solid s t a t e  
c i r c u i t r y  to r e d u c e  uni t  s ize ,  and t o  obvia te  the  u s e  of vacuum tiibes, which 
g e n e r a t e  m u c h  hea t  and r e q u i r e  ex tens ive  cooling equipment .  
e f fec t  would be t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s i z e  and c o s t  of f a c i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  house  t h e  
equipment .  
T h i s  type  of ins ta l la t ion  c u r r e n t l y  c o s t s  approx ima te ly  $75 p e r  s q u a r e  
T h e s e  c o s t s  would b e  m i n i m i z e d  th rough  se l f -conta ined  fan  and ven t  
T h e  to t a l  
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Tota l  integration of a l l  the  la tes t  technological changes can be attained 
only through a detailed int  
approach to  the integrat io  
ce  of all functional organizations.  
all the la tes t  technological changes and fa 
A posi t  
i r e m e n t s  to  support  th i s  type of p rogram can be attained through 
ed P r o g r a m  Management P r o c e s s "  NR Publication 2547 €3-13, d 
September  1970. 
Reference  2, which depicts  the broad management approach to  p rogram plans. 
REFERENCES 
The  adoption of this  planning is fur ther  identified in 
1. Phased  P r o j e c t  Planning - NASA Handbook NHB 7121.2, dated 
(August 1 968 ). 
Space Station P r o g r a m  Definition (Phase  B )  SD 69-200-2. 2. 
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TASK A N D  RESP IFICATIOW FOR 
PROBLEM'STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During s i t e  activation a t  the Mississ ippi  T e s t  Faci l i ty  (MTF), ser ioue 
problems w e r e  encountered because of the lack of a basel ine operations plan 
and contractor  in te r face  c r i t e r i a .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Personne l  familiar with activation tasks  w e r e  sen t  to M T F  to develop 
a site activation planning document. 
define the need for  and scope of activation plans. 
Original p rog ram requi rement& should 
DISCUSSION 
Logist ics  support  document personnel  went t o  M T F  and developed a 
I s i t e  activation planning document th'rough the use  of raw data,  PERT char t s ,  
personal  contacts,  and a bas ic  understanding of the s i t e  activation tasks ,  
Th i s  document defined, in text  and matrix form,  all tasks  with p r i m e  and 
secondary responsibi l i t ies  for  all cont rac tors  and functional organizations. 
The  document was approved and used by  NASA in managing the activation 
tasks .  
REFERENCES 
MTF Site Activation Plan,  July 1965. 
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SIGNAL FLOW DIAGRAMS FOR STAGE A N D  GSE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
* The lack of stage signal flow d iagrams and specific provisions to  
update GSE signal flow d iagrams caused delays in troubleghooting and 
analysis.  
. SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
GSE signal flow diagrams,  which w e r e  prepared  by Logistics,  T e s t  
Operations activity in t racing out stage problem circui ts ,  and extensive 
training of technicians eventually solved the problem. 
should include the requirement  f o r  originating and updating signal flow 
diagrams.  
DISCUSSION 
Fu tu re  p rograms  
i 
During the integration and functional testing of the Seal Beach automatic 
checkout equipment and other related GSE, T e s t  Operations personnel drew 
signal schematics  t o  supplement the Logistics -originated signal flow 
d iagrams which were  not specifically covered contractuall? and were  not 
adequately funded for  updating. To avoid future duplication, all documents 
were  monitored and retained. 
During the checkout of the first S-II stage,  an identical problem 
existed. 
for  drawing changes, as  applicable. This  supplemental documentation a l s o  
was monitored and retained for future use.  
Test Operations t r aced  problem circui ts  and submitted requests  
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Hardware requirements  existed which were  c m m  Q multiple vehicle 
effectivities. The hardware was installed on the vehicl  a r ious  points, 
including preparat ion for  launch, Events such a s  shipment, transportation, 
and testing were  supported by these hardware installations. After completion 
of the event being supported, the hardware was to be removed and discarded 
pe r  drawing requirements .  This  created a potential waste of highly expensive 
mater ia l .  
SOLUTION/REC~MMENDATION 
Hardware requirements  having multiple vehicle effectivity were  
analyzed. 
of hardware packages required to  support  p rogram milestones,  
w e r e  revised ' to  specify the number of hardware packages required with 
accompanying notes specifying retention. 
were  responsible for the original i s sue  of the hardware packages, a review 
of the hardware returned af ter  removal, the rework o r  replacement of 
damaged hardware,  and packaging for the next requirement.  
The  program schedules were  evaluated to determive the number 
Drawings 
The  logistics functions at the  s i tes  
DISCUSSION 
To ensu re  that the S-I1 stage was qualified fo r  flight, i t  was necessary  
to  control the required flight configuration by engineering drawing. 
support  the launch, it was necessa ry  to install  nonflight looee equipment and 
test hardware  in support  of various preceding events. 
to  b e  controlled to ensure  subsequent removal. 
Engineering utilized a loose equipment drawing (V7-000025) with individual 
loose equipment drawing callouts, plus other drawing requirements  (5'7) which 
w e r e  used specifically for  t e s t  installations. These  controls were  adequate; 
however, the assignment of effectivity and utilization of the multiple release 
sys tem resulted in multiple (common) like packages of support hardware 
until cor rec t ive  action was implemented. 
T o  
This  installation had 
To accomplish this control, .I 
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T h e r e  was a lack of common reference that could be  utilized by 
functional groups to  identify pa r t  numbers ,  common nomenclature, cleaning 
codes, and traceabili ty requirements .  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
*z 
Logistics originated and implemented an i l lustrated pa r t s  book ( I P B )  
which defined and configured a l l  significant S -11 stage maintenance items. 
DISC WSSION 
Because of the lack of an easy  re ference  hardware identification docu- 
ment, ex t reme difficulty was encountered by personnel at the sites and home 
plant supporting functions during conference phone cal ls ,  meetings, problem 
, analysis,  and troubleshooting. Use of drawings fo r  this  effort is extremely 
curnbersome and open to  interpretation. The  creation and subsequent u se  of 
the IPB supported this effort by a highly effective ready re ference  to  figure 
and index number,  and c ross - r e fe rence  data a t  the sys tems o r  p a r t  level. 
R E F E R E N C E S  
NASA support  documents: MSFC-MAN-051-1 through -5. 
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LIMITED LIFE HARDWARE CONTROLS 
Logistics 01-05 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Original limited life hardware  requirements  (age sensit ive,  shelf life, 
time serv ice ,  and t ime cycle) were  not sufficiently detailed nor  were  they 
established ea r ly  enough in the program to adequately control production and 
s p a r e  hardware.  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
r Limited life hardware  procedures  were  generated and imposed a s  
required to  remedy problems throughout the program. 
of l imited life hardware should be instituted a s  pa r t  of the original engineer- 
ing c r i t e r i a  a t  p rog ram inception, even though the original program life span 
m a y  fall within defined specification limitations. 
DIS CUSS ION 
Engineering control 
$ I 
Limited life controls,  much the s a m e  a s  good preventive maintenance 
procedures ,  can complement the design reliabil i ty of components and sys -  
tems. The  circumstances encountered o.n,the Saturn P rogram,  due to the 
lack of limited life controls,  could have created false  s ta t is t ics  on spa res  
utilization. La te  definition of requirements  did establish control for  that 
hardware in o r  awaiting production; however, delivered hardware which 
malfunctioned at the component level was supported f rom spa res  on an 
attr i t ion basis.  
limited life requirements  should not have been supported f rom a s p a r e s  
inventory which was stocked to  support t rue  failures.  
have been the potential overstocking of spa res  i t ems  due to the use of wrong 
s ta t is t ics  . 
Those  malfunctions which should have been controlled by 
The  end resul t  could 
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COMMONA LITY I N F U N C T  I ONA L TEST REQU I REME Nf S 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  AND EFFECT 
A high r a t e  of rejection of purchased s p a r e s  was experienced due to  
incompatibilities between suppl ier ' s  acceptance t e s t  p rocedures  (ATP)  and * 
in - hous e fun c ti onal te s t requirements  . 
SOL UT ION /RECOMMENDATION 
Design Engineering reviewed test specification data and made  com- 
patibility correct ions between functional t e s t  requirements  and supplier 
A T P ' s  to  meet  actual design performance c r i te r ia .  
ments  were  a l so  established for  the t e s t  equipment. 
Compatibility requi re -  
DISCUSSION 
- Many items of hardware ( s p a r e s )  accepted a t  the vendor 's  facility by 
NR representat ives  were  functionally re tested in-house and subsequently 
re jected and returned to  the vendor as defective. A review of the rejections 
showed c r i t e r i a  incompatibilities between the vendor's A T P ' s  and equipment 
and the in-house test specifications and equipment. This  problem and its 
solution a l so  shows a need exis ts  for  compatibility in qualifications of 
personnel  witnessing t e s t s  a t  a vendor facility and those performing the 
in-  house retests .  
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CONTRACTUALLY SPEC1 FlED DOCUMENTAT1 ON 
PROBLEMSTATEMENTANDEFFECT 
Affected o r  using organizations will not always recognize contract  
specified documentation for u se  by personnel at  the working level. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
All logistics,  vendor, and engineering manuals and operational data 
should be listed on an end i t em/sys t em control data drawing. 
DISCUSSION 
Many contractually specified documents, such as operational and 
Maintenance Manuals, a r e  not themselves recognized by using organizations. 
Functions such a s  Quality Assurance,  Tes t ,  and Site organizations will not 
always recognize documents which a r e  not officially re leased  by Engineering. 
In this event, these functions generally rewr i te  t h e  information into organiza- 
tion or  s i te  work documents, procedures ,  o r  direct ives  for  u s e  by the  
respect ive function. 
generation of e r r o r g ,  o r  u se  of outdated information. 
This  redundant effort c r ea t e s  a potential cost  impact,  
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MANUFACTURING/SIfE REPAIR OR REWORK TECHN 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Engineering defined and specified productioq techniques 
apply to  future manufacturinglsite r epa i r  o r  rework requi rem 
include acceptable technologies fo r  utilization by s i te  personnel. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
All original drawings and specifications should specify production and 
field acceptable r epa i r  o r  rework methods a t  the first release.  
DISGUSSION 
.i. , 
Original drawing requirements  were  totally centered around production 
requirements  re la t ive to techniques for  accomplishing special  efforts. As 
an example, si lk screening is an acceptable production method for  original 
repa i r  o r  rework i t ems  while the hardware is  jn the production a r e a  and 
unassembled. However, this same technique is painstaking and time consum- 
ing for utilization by site personnel where the process  i tself  and the d i s -  
assembly requirements  a r e  not conducive to  supporting tight schedules. 
end result of the la t te r  condition was not to  incorporate  required changes. 
, 
The 
Logistics Engineering developed a d r y  transfer p rocess  for imple-  
mentation of si lk screening requirements  by site personnel. 
was negotiated with Engineering and implemented incrementally by drawing 
change for authority. 
This  p rocess  
Repair  or  rework technologies suitable for  s i te  implementation are not 
included on the drawings a t  the first r e l ease  because potential impact  to  
hardware  configurations, cost ,  and schedules could occur.  
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MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS ON COMPONENT PART NUMBERS 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  AND E F F E C T  
Established mandatory  requi rements  which did not affect 
function did not always r e su l t  i n  component re-identification. 
form,  f i t ,  o r  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION . 
In negotiated instances,  Engineering changed the component pa r t  number 
All mandatory requirements  
on drawings;  however, the general  tendency was to  identify the component by 
a deca l  o r  tag that  could be eas i ly  lost .  
(contractual o r  otherwise)  imposed on hardware  af ter  init ial  de l iver ies  have 
been made  should r equ i r e  Engineering to  r eco rd  the requi rement  on t h e  
respect ive component drawing and re-identify the component by pa r t  number 
change. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
On s e v e r a l  occasions on the Saturn P r o g r a m ,  mandatory requi rements  
Some requi rements  affected 
f o r  both contractual  and engineering c r i t e r i a  were  imposed on Component 
hardware  a f te r  init ial  de l iver ies  had been made. 
pa r t i a l  inventories with a l imited effectivity while others  affected the full 
component inventory with full effectivity. An example of such an imposed 
requi rement  was the product repeatabil i ty p rogram ( P R P ) .  T h e  object of 
this  requi rement  was to  fully r e t e s t  hardware  in the inventory to  a s s u r e  a 
no-fai lure  mode due to  handling and s torage  over a period of t ime. 
this re tes t ,  a tag or  deca l  was attached to  the component. 
a specific effectivity was assigned to  the component. 
identification was  lost, a repea t  of the P R P  requi rements  would be mandatory.  
The  loss  (;f a tag /deca l  c r ea t ed  a potential impact t o  cos t  and schedules. 
T o  r eco rd  
At the s a m e  t ime,  
If this tag /deca l  
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CONTROL OF PATCH BOARD CONFIGURATIONS 
AND CORD LENGTHS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Hardware changes installed on an incremental  bas i s  created difficulties 
in defining, much l e s s  controlling, patch board configurations and patch cord 
lengths. 
SOLUTION / R EC OMMENDATION 
I t  is  suggested that acqvisition of ex t ra  patch boards for configuring a t  
the home plant on a rotational basis  with patch boards f rom the s i tes  would 
minimize the difficulties associated with providing patch boards and patch 
cords  for hardware changes. 
DISCUSSION 
j The installation of severa l  changes incrementally and in no par t icular  
sequence made  it impossible to  define patch cord lengths. 
need to  stock l a rge r  quantities of patch cords  of var ious lengths. 
random installation of changes did not .lend itself toward neatness and minor  
changes for  troubleshooting were  quite difficult to accomplish. 
This  resulted in a 
Fur ther ,  
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EMENT OF STAGE-ORIENTED GSE 
I 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  AND EFFECT 
Stage-oriented GSE (equipment ass igned to  and t ravel ing with a stage)  
was not consistently available in a t imely manner  to  support  stage d e l h e r i e s  
f r o m  Seal  Beach because  of poor recycle  schedule techniques and extensive 
refurbishment  turnaround effor ts  . 
6. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The p rogram manage r  reassigned the responsibil i ty f o r  managem’ent of 
s tage-  oriented GSE which included maintenance, end i tem assignment,  
scheduling of the repairlrnodification/refurbishment effort ,  and cost  controls 
to  the Logis t ics  organization. 
In fu ture  p rograms ,  .any equipment having an interface with and t r a n s -  
f e r r e d  between s e v e r a l  functions should be  immediately assigned to a single 
function f o r  full responsibil i ty and control of maintenance requirements ,  
or iginal  and recyc le  scheduling, end i tem assignment ,  and repa i r  / 
refurbishment .  
DISCUSSION 
Logist ics  developed a sys tem fo r  managing the s tage-or iented GSE 
which included a de l ivery  sequence for  re turning GSE, a m a r i n e  t ranspor ta -  
tion schedule for  the s tage  t ransportat ion ship (AKD) and barges ,  and GSE 
allocation data used to  update the allocation of s tage-or iented GSE documenta- 
tion. 
oriented GSE which provided management with visibil i ty and a means  to  
evaluate schedule changes and GSE allocations. 
Display cha r t s  a l so  w e r e  made  t o  depict  the total position of s tage-  
The field s i t e s  pe r fo rmed  only min ima l  preventive maintenance to the 
In an effort t o  minimize  this problem type of GSE under the i r  jurisdiction. 
and lessen  the refurbishment  t ime,  due to  the lack of maintenance pes  the 
S-11 Prevent ive  Maintenance Manual (SD 67-77),  a plan was established 
whereby the sites were  given advance notification of end i tem preventive 
tenance requi rements .  This  notification established a da te  by which 
aintenance was to be per formed with a need for  a feedback verifying the 
t a s k  completion. 
f ied the  location of a l l  s tage-or iented GSE and the i r  scheduled maintenance 
periods.  
A p r o g r a m  s ta tus  r epor t  was issued monthly which identi- 
‘ Visual cha r t s  were  prepared  and updated which displayed the s ta tus  
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of preventive maintenance tasks pending and compleMd for utilization by 
management and the customer as’ insurance of compliance with maintenance 
requirements . 
A system also was implemented for controlling and minimizing repair /  
modification/refurbishment costs. A single department was established a s  
the 
the 
the 
the 
rework department for  all stage-oriented GSE, 
recycle of each end item was established and the next organization needing 
end item identified realistic need dates to identify to NASA the dates for 
return of GSE via marine transportation. 
An average time span for 
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CHANGE PACKAGE DEFJNlTION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
P r o g r a m  Change Control did not have sufficient visibility of engineering 
change package r e l eases  to  identify when total  r e l ease  had been achieved. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDAT ION 
The modification kit drawing sys tem was implemented on the  Saturn 
P rogram.  
DISC USSION 
Engineering documentation is re leased incrementally by functions within 
Engineering. 
made  with the final r e l ease  held temporar i ly  pending coordination with another 
design function in Engineering. 
In some instances,  it i s  possible for  a par t ia l  re lease  to  be 
In the ea r l i e r  phases  of the prograni,  the la t te r  situation could have 
resulted in par t ia l  change installation and equipment incompatibilities. 
Although engineering schedules were  monitored, i t  was possible to confuse 
a par t ia l  r e l ease  for the total  re lease.  
was  implemented. 
each end item affected. 
100 percent  r e l ease  date. Once this  drawing was released, additional 
enginee ring r e l eases  created new dash- number ed kits,  which established 
new 100 percent  r e l ease  dates  and revisions to the design change 
documentation. 
The  modification kit drawing system 
A V 7  o r  G7-88XXXX drawing number was assigned to 
This  drawing was scheduled and monitored a s  the 
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NSTALLATION CONTROLS 
E F F E C T  
It was possible to  instal l  m o r e  than one modification ahead of,schednle, 
result ing in potential hardware  functional incompatibilities, 
SOLUTIQN/RECOMMENDATION 
The  Modification Kit Summary Drawing (MKSD) was implemented. 
This  drawing l isted all t h e  modification kits applicable on a single end item 
and the configuration change point (CCP) being supported, Specific drawings 
were  l isted in the modification instruction, including revision letters and the 
attached engineering orders .  A data  package of applicable drawings was put 
together a t  the time of the i r  release and included in the modification kit. 
DISCUSSION * 
Because of the multiple re lease  system, scheduled implementation of 
Mississippi T e s t  Faci l i ty  (MTF)  modifications at Seal Beach and multiple 
events scheduled a t  MTF, it was possible to  install  many changes over s eve ra l  
change points. 
c r ib s  ca r r i ed  the la tes t  drawing which could, a s  an example, include post-' 
s ta t ic  fir ing changes. Because of tight schedules, the technician would not 
wait fo r  the modification kit, but ra ther ,  d raw hardware f rom stock to  sup- 
por t  the la tes t  drawing requirement.  After installation of this hardware at 
Seal Beach, potential vehicle incompatibilities were  c rea ted  at final Seal 
Beach checkout o r  a t  M T F  during tests p r i o r  to  s ta t ic  fir ing,  As an added 
fea ture  to  the solution of th i s  problem, the modification kit drawing l isted the 
modification instruction (MI) a s  a l ine item, which made it mandatory fo r  
the MI to be included in the kit. Fu r the r ,  the  drawings included in the kit 
data package were  color-coded to  sh,ow hardware to  be  removed as well a s  
hardware to  be  installed. 
This  defect in the sys tem was possible because the blueprint 
REFERENCES 
SID 64-1577, "Detail Guide for  Prepara t ion  of Saturn S-I1 Modification 
Instructions. ' I  
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BULK HARDWARE CONTROLS 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  AND EFFECT 
Bulk h a r d w a r e  c o s t s  c a n  become e x c e s s i v e  when th’e h a r d w a r e  is 
i s s u e d  i n  bulk quant i t ies  r a t h e r  than m e a s u r e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
SOL UTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Set  up  a s ingle  c o n t r o l / i s s u e  s o u r c e  f o r  a l l  bulk h a r d w a r e  r e q u i r e -  
m e n t s  support ing planned modifications.  Cut, count, or m e a s u r e  t h e  
quantity r e q u i r e d  f o r  the c o n c u r r e n t  i s s u e  with the  modification kit .  
DISC USSlON 
Bulk i t e m s  such  a s  safety w i r e ,  paint, chemica ls ,  and glue cannot be 
economical ly  inefitded in-modification k i t s  at the home plant because  m a n y  
items a r e  lo t -cont ro l led  o r  have shelf life limits. Unless  k i t s  can b e  
uti l ized immedia te ly ,  which is  not reasonable  when product  ion quantit ies 
a r e  involved, bulk items with t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  would b e  cost ly  t o  
handle.  T h e  c o s t  is  a s s o c i a t e d  with throwaway and recordkeeping.  
A s i m p l e  solution is t o  set up  a s ingle  site i ssue  point f o r  a l l  bulk 
hardLvare t o  b e  i s s u e d  concurren t ly  with the modification kit  when it i s  
scheduled f o r  instal la t ion.  
mor ta l i ty  quant i t ies .  
T h e  amount t o  b e  i s s u e d  would include reasonable  
A sec t ion  of the modification instruct ion includes a l is t ing of h a r d w a r e  
T h i s  l is t ing could b e  used r e q u i r e m e n t s  not  included in the modification kit. 
a s  the bill of m a t e r i a l  t o  m a k e  up the bulk h a r d w a r e  i s s u e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
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CONTROL OF DRAWING COMPLETENESS A N D  SCHEDULES 
UPON ORIGINAL DRAWING RELEASE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Because  of over  scheduling tendencies,  incomplete documentation of the 
design p a r a m e t e r s  existed at the time of or iginal  drawing r e l ease .  
. SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
"A limit of five attaching engineering o r d e r s  p e r  drawing was established. 
. A schedule change board  function was  established and a 100 percent  des ign/  
r ev iew/ re l ease  participation by Logis t ics  Engineering was recognized as a 
r equir  ement  . 
DISCUSSION 
During the  ini t ia l  phases  of a p rogram,  t h e r e  is a tendency fo r  func- 
j t ional groups to overschedule  (pad) re la ted responsibi l i t ies .  T h e  accumulated 
effect  of this  p rac t i ce  is to  impose unreal is t ic  demands on the design engi- 
n e e r s  to  meet- release schedules ,  resul t ing in  incomplete designs a t  the  time 
of original  drawing release. T o  offset this  problem, the 'designer a t tempts  
to complete  his design incrementa l ly  by individual EO. This  c r e a t e s  the 
unwieldy situation of many  EO'S (in some  c a s e s  over  100)  being attached to a 
single drawing. 
On the Sa turn  P r o g r a m  this  problem was overcome by imposing a five 
EO l imit  per drawing. Th i s  requi red  the drawing vellum to  be rev ised  by EO 
to support  minor  changes and clarifications as originally intended r a t h e r  than 
have the EO s y s t e m  support  drawing changes of great  magnitude, 
F u r t h e r ,  p r o g r a m  recognition of the m e r i t s ,  decis ions,  and authority 
of its schedule change board gave r ea l i sm to  required scheduling 
responsibi l i t ies  . 
Logist ics  Engineer ing par t ic ipated in  design reviews and final reviews 
p r i o r  to drawing release, and the re fo re  could identify r e l e a s e  p r io r i t i e s  to  
lower drawing levels  fo r  the design groups.  
de l ivery  of end items, modification ki ts ,  and s p a r e  hardware.  
This  enhanced the on-t ime 
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DEFINITION OF TEST SITE'S FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In many instances,  
AND EFFECT 
capabilities existing a t  a site were  .duplicated by 
associate  cont rac tors  and were  not planned for utilization. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Future  contracts  should include provisions for  a comprehensive and 
These  provisions should include a "definition of concise maintenance plan. 
s i te ,  contractor ,  and vendor capabilities. 
DISCUSSION 
During the development and activation phases of the var ious Saturn 
test s i te  facil i t ies,  the permanent o r  planned t e s t  s i te  functional capabilities 
available to  assoc ia te  contractors  were  not adequately defined. 
tion of these capabilities would include such i tems  a s  s i te  r epa i r  capabilities, 
levels of repa i r ,  cleaning/clean room facil i t ies,  cryogenic/vacuum line 
checkout capabilities, nondestruct inspection, and calibration facilities. 
Because of the lack of this information, redundant capabilities a r e  created a t  
the contractor  home plant o r  vendor facilities. In addition, delays a r e  
encountered due to  t ime lost  in unnecessary shipment to and f rom the site. 
An adequate maintenance concept o r  plan, i f  recognized and properly coordi-  
nated with the appropriate  levels of contractor and customer management, 
would preclude this situation. 
baseline for  planning design, support, training, personnel,  and equipment 
requirements  
The defini- 
1 
A plan of this type would provide a bet ter  
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During the decl ine and s t re tchout  phase of the program,  conbiderable 
difficulty was experienced i n  sustaining adequate repair capabili ty a t  sub- 
cont rac tor  and suppl ier  faci l i t ies  for reparable  hardware .  
SOLUTIONIRECOMMENDATION 
A plan was  developed to  review and se lec t  in-house functions. as  a l t e r -  
nate  sources  t o  support  r epa i r  of supplier i t ems .  On future  p rograms ,  
consideration should be  given to  including a cen t r a l  overhaul  and r epa i r  
facil i ty a s  a p rogram requirement .  
DISCU sSION 
In some  instances,  the loss of supplier certif ication and r epa i r  capabil-  
i ty occurred  because of company liquidation, m e r g e r ,  cessat ion of product 
line, or  loss  of key personnel ,  In other instances,  exorbitant cos t s  wauld 
have been required for  suppl iers  t o  maintain ski l ls ,  capabili t ies,  and equip- 
ment  on standby t o  support  potential repa i rab le  activity. As  a resul t ,  in- 
house functions concerned with failed/defective hardware  participated in  the 
selection of supplier i t ems  to  be repa i red  by in-house organizations.  Steps 
w e r e  taken to  ensu re  tha t  this  r epa i r  activity would not infringe on sub- 
contractor  o r  vendor p ropr i e t a ry  and warran ty  agreements .  
* 
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PART NUMBER CONTROL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Part numbers were  not controlled to the lowest drawing level of hard-  
ware  in  the controlled inventory. 
S O L U T I ~ N / R E C  OMMENDATION 
Each p a r t  number control problem was solved individually by negotia- 
tion of the re leased  engineering documentation o r  by manually tracking the 
par t  under question. Future programs should consider establishment of a 
par t  number controls sys tem which would define and execute part  number 
changes during definition and scheduling phases of the hardware change. 
DISCUSSION 
The Saturn P rogram had a n  adequate part  number control sys tem to  
support the manufacturing of the hardware through launch provided there  was 
no need for  a s p a r e s  inventory. 
extensive s p a r e s  inventory. 
drawing levels lower than covered by the system: 
affecting the lower par t  numbers had to be individually negotiated for  engin- 
eer ing documentation coverage. When this was not possible, a manual 
sys tem was used to ensu re  proper  update of hardware in the spa res  inventory. 
The manual  sys tem was controlled by a spa res  analyst ,  who kept the com- 
posite his tory of events on s c r a p  paper,  It is evident that other official 
records  were  kept, such as DD250 s, DD1149 s and Purchase Orde r s ;  how- 
eve r ,  without a par t  number change, the verification of a change installation 
a f t e r  s e v e r a l  months was a tedious and extensive operation. 
However, the Saturn S-I1 Program had a n  
Hardware was stocked by par t  number to  
As a resul t ,  modifications 
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UNIFORMITY OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEOURES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The lack of a fast-react ing procedural  change sys tem 
interpretat ion for  Quality Assurance procedures  could poten 
flow of hardware.  
SOLUTZON/RECOMMENDATION 
All known change requirements  which could possibly affect hardware 
*c 
flow were  given the personal  attention of d i rec t  coordination among the 
Central  Quality Assurance  function and the responsible interfacing functions. 
Future  p rograms  should consider establishment of a cent ra l  control 
agency which would devote full attention to coordinating, interpreting, 
administrating, and resolving procedural  conflicts on a t imely bas is  and in 
concert  with contractor requirements  , 
DISCUSSION 
There  were  instances when the flow of hardware  was held up due to  
misinterpretation, slow change processes ,  o r  conflicts in the Quality 
Assurance procedure system. In some cases ,  division procedures  are 
Supplemented by p rogram procedures  and fur ther  supplemented by a desk  
o r  working level instruction f rom the Quality Assurance function, 
of vocabulary in each separa te  procedure could c rea t e  conflicts. 
A choice 
The resolution of procedural  change problems on a single piece of ha rd -  
ware  could be accomplished in a t imely manner;  however, due to the lag in 
making procedura l  changes, subsequent identical problems crea ted  another 
hardware under - support  condition. Fur ther ,  some procedural  changes were  
made  without coordination with a l l  affected funckonB which  created additional 
problems,  Having a cent ra l  function singly responsible for  the release,  
control, and coordination of a l l  levels of p rocedures  would eliminate mis- 
interpretation, speed the flow of changes, and avoid conflicts between 
proc edur e s . 
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LOGISTICS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (LIM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The  computer p rogram f o r  LIMS did not  provide sufficient flexibility 
in record  o r  s ta tus  repor t s  to allow visibility of hardware  in the repair/ 
refurbishment process .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
1L" 
A simple mechanized (EDP) card system, operated independently of the 
computerized LIMS, was developed. This  card  sys tem had the capability 
of providing the required level of s ta tus  on reparable  hardware.  
Future  programs,  utilizing computerized inventory management sys  - 
t ems ,  should provide for  flexibility in the data field and include on-line 
and/or  off-line r epor t  capabilities in the computer program to satisfy 
various phases  of hardware support. 
D IS C U SS IO N 
The  S-11 LIMS computer program could not be economically revised to  
s ta tus  hardware  in the repa i r l re furb ishment  cycle. 
sys tem was to s ta tus  the hardware in the inventory; in this regard,  the system 
proved adequate. 
p rocess ,  it became obvious that manual statusing was much m o r e  costly th 
a mechanized sys tem;  therefore ,  a simple mechanized card system was 
developed. 
method, 
include these  requirements  in the original LIMS program. 
The  original intent of the 
When a l a rge  volume of the hardware  was in a recycle  
This c a r d  sys tem effectively replaced the costly manual statusing 
The  most  cost  effective approach however would have been to  
* 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The SMK codes which identify the reparable  and recoverabi  
of hardware,  a s  reflected in maintenance analysis documentation, 
updated in a t imely manner .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
A manual and mechanized system was established to  supplement the 
existing system. 
reparable  and recoverable  hardware.  
This  sys tem accelerated the dispositioning p rocess  of 
Future  programs should consider a cost  effective, fully mechanized, 
maintenance analysis which would include the most  cu r ren t  requirements  
based on actual program experience or  redefined capabilities. 
DISCUSSION 
1 
The sys tem for updating of the SMR codes in the maintenance analysis 
documentation was not responsive. As a result ,  dispositioning of failed 
defective hardware  returned f r o m  test sites was delayed. 
and immediate action to remedy the situation, p rog ram miss ion  schedule 
could have been impacted. T h e  rnanual/rnechanized sys tem used to  solve 
this  problem was not the mast cost  effective method, due to the exceesive 
paperwork and coordination involved; however, it was not feasible to provide 
a fully mechanized sys tem a t  the t ime a solution was required,  
Without specific 
c 
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HAND TOOLING CONTROLS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
Technicians were  asgigned o r  acquired m o r e  than one set of tools 
without justification. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A s  a pilot exe rc i se  a t  the Mississ ippi  T e s t  Facil i ty ( M T F ) ,  an inventory 
was performed on al l  tool boxes and work a reas .  ,A l l  excess  tools were  
confiscated and manual i s sue / r e i s sue  controls were  updated. 
Future  p rograms  should consider u se  of a data processing system with 
a deck of ca rds  by name and s e r i a l  number for  each technician. Updated 
printouts could be maintained a t  a l l  tool c r ib s  to verify assigned tools, to  
avoid unnecessary duplication of tools, o r  to  identify individual requirements  
i f  m o r e  than one se t  of tools is actually required. 
records  would be maintained by Quality Control, 
Scheduled audits of these 
DISCUSSION 
Due to  tight schedules,  spur of the moment ass ignments  to var ious 
locations a t  a site, outlying tool c r i b  i s sue  points, and a slow reacting 
expensive manual  record  control system, tools were  issued to  technicians 
by type and in quantities they requested ra ther  than by controlled authoriza- 
tion. 
and certif ied types of hand tools. 
The  r e su l t  was a hypothetical lack of sufficient quantities of common 
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TECH N 0 LO GY C 00 R Dl NAT ION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Logistics 15 - 13  
Advanced technologies a r e  not properly coordinated between 
organizations. 
Organizations expanding their  responsibil i t ies to include established 
technologies should be required to  substantiate coordination with knowledge- 
able organizations. 
To  a s s u r e  adequate coordination of a specific technology by an 
organization expanding its responsibil i t ies,  a member  of management, such 
as ,  the Chairman of the Change Control Board, should review a l l  coordinat2on 
effort for compatibility and completeness.  
, DISCUSSION 
Rocketdyne w a s  advanced in the technology of LOX cleanliness in 1964. 
The  Space Division sent a team to Canoga P a r k  to negotiate cleanliness 
requirements  with Rocketdyne personnel. Specific differences in requi re -  
ments  were  made c lear  to  the Space Division team, as related to  flight and 
facility hardware;  however, the team m e m b e r s  were  s t r ic t ly  flight hardware 
oriented, which resulted only in the adaptation of flight hardware requi re -  
ments  a t  the Space Division. 
Subsequent to these negotiations, the Space Division took control of the 
Battleship facility a t  Santa Susana and s ta r ted  activation a t  two other t e s t  
s i tes .  
a potential impact  to vendor, construction, tes t  and activation schedules. 
The lack of a lower level facility LOX cleanliness requirement  caused 
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PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
T h e  lack of a defined preventive maintenance plan for  GSE and a single 
discipline to  control i t s  implementation. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The  S-I1 P rogram,  Manager appointed a single discipline (Logis t ics)  
E a r l y  implementation of this plan could have 
to  p r e p a r e  a preventive maintenance plan (SD 67-677) which defined all 
maintenance requi rements .  
provided the technical and adminis t ra t ive reqbi r  ements  and controls  neces  - 
s a r y  to reduce equipment deter iorat ion and cor rec t ive  maintenance actions. 
Genera te  a preventive maintenance plan for  GSE ea r ly  in the program.  
Establ ish a GSE maintenance team staffed by personnel  f r o m  the home plant 
who would periodically p e r f o r m  s i t e  equipment maintenance and r epor t  on a l l  
i cor  r ec  t ive action requirements .  
DISCUSSION 
GSE was not being proper ly  maintained a t  any of the t e s t  s i tes .  The  
iiiajor problem was the lack of a n  adequate maintenance p rogram which 
in c lud ed funding , planning, f 011 ow up, and doc um e n  t a t  i o n r eq ui  r em ent s . 
Although this problem was generally resolved by direct ion of the P r o g r a m  
Manager, ma jo r  implementation deficiencies s t i l l  existed.  Seal  Beach, as a 
t e s t  s i te ,  with i t s  c lose  proximity to  the home plant, did comply 100 percent  
Lvith p rogram direction. The  Mississ ippi  t e s t  s i te ,  on the other  hand, 
complied with all requi rements  except established documentation and - reporting media. Finally,  the KSC tes t  s i t e  complied to i t s  own c r i t e r i a .  , 
REFERENCES 
Saturn S-I1 P r o g r a m  Prevent ive Maintenance Plan,  SD 67-677. 
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INSULATION PURGE TEST SCHEMATIC DRAWINGS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Because of continual changes to  S-I1 insulation and related circui ts ,  
it became increasingly difficult t o  define insulation purge test requirements  
and techniques, 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDAT ION 
Insulation purge sys t em schematic d iagrams reflecting the operating 
manuals t o  be used were  prepared.  
whereby all insulation changes could be noted, and manuals could be changed 
accardingly, 
p rocedures  a r e  init iahy prepared,  
continually updated a s  t e s t  requi rements  change. 
These  schematics formed a bas i s  
This  solution should be implemented when manufacturing tes t  
Thereaf ter ,  the  procedures  should be 
DISCUSSION 
The Special Tes t  Equipment (STE) Engineering group is responsible 
T h e r e  were  seve ra l  applicable assembly  drawings and t e s t  specifica- 
fo r  preparing the insulation purge test procedures  to  be used by Manufactur- 
ing, 
t ions involved in determining t e s t  requirements  and techniques. 
As a n  aid to  visualize the scope of the purge t e s t  and the effect of 
changes to  the specifications and drawings, the STE Engineering group p re -  
pared  insulation purge sys tem schematic diagrams.  This effort reduced the 
time required to  make changes to  the manufacturing test procedures.  
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DEVELOPMENT A N D  USE OF A STANDARD COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE PROCESS SPEC1 FICATION 
t 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Nonflight i tems and equipment were  being fabricated to  unne 
stringent requirements of flight specifications. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDAT ION 
A standard commercial  pract ice  process  specification was established 
which would be applicable to  nonflight i t ems  fabricated by processes  requir-  
ing minimum controls and inspection. . 
saved by use  of this specification in procurement of noncritical equipment. 
Considerable t ime and cost can be 
* .  
DISCUSSION 
Specification MA01 13-002 applies to  a l l  equipment not classified a s  
Criticality Category I or  11. This  specification outlines the general  require- 
ments  for  mounting electronic components and hardware on te rmina l  boards, 
etched or  printed circuit  boards, and console panels. 
requirements,  the specification refers other stringent specifications. How- 
ever,  these requirements are not mandatory on cer ta in  equipment, and pro- 
visions a r e  never made to  relax the requirements on nondeliverable equipment 
required by the contractor in the performance of a development o r  production 
contract for checkout and servicing of the product during the manufacturing 
process.  
Category I o r  II, it was assumed that the MAO113-002 specification was 
applicable; thus many i tems of satisfactory and available eqriprnent were 
eliminated and special  procurement was required. 
In addition to  these 
Since this in-process test equipment did not fall within Criticality 
REFERENCES , 
1. Standard Commercial  Pract ice  Specification (STOI 1 3 N B O O O 1 )  
2. Installation of Aerospace Ground Equipment Wiring (MA01 13-002) 
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E LECTROMECHANICA L FLU I D SCHEMATICS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The DratGing Requirements Manual (DRM) recommended the complete 
separation of fluid and electr ical  schematics, 
adequate f o r  system fabrication, proved cumbersome and difficult to  use in 
trouble shooting problems during system ope ration. 
This philosophy, although 
SOLUTION/ RECQMMENDATION 
Certain of the electromechanical systems fluid schematics were 
modified to  include electr ical  energizing components associated with the 
mechanical components. 
mechanical fluid schematics which could be readily used to  troubleshoot 
systems problems. Additionally, these schematics were of significant. 
value in training tes t  personnel in the operation of the systems and related 
equipment , 
This improvement resulted in combined electro- 
DISCUSSION 
In compliance with DRM recommendations, the fluid and electr ical  
schematics for an electromechanical system were prepared separately with 
major  consideration given to  use during the fabrication cycle, It was found 
during checkout and operation of these systems that the schematics were 
somewhat difficult to  use for troubleshooting problems, It was necessary 
to  consult both schematics when attempting to  isolate a problem which 
proved t o  be not only impractical, but a lso cumbersome. The addition of 
e lectr ical  ref e r enc e information for  applicable mechanical components on 
the fluid schematics facilitated troubleshooting of system problems and 
aided in the training of tes t  personnel. 
P 
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RECAPITULATION OF UNACGOMPLISHED S-11 STAGE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Manufacturing had the responsibility of informing Tes 
unaccomplished work before turnover of the stage. These 
to determine constraints on test requirements and t,o allow 
work during the tes t  phase. Consolidation of these data r e  
ing of numerous Fabrication and Inspection Record (FAIR.) 
throughout a six-story complex. 
To gather and consolidate the necesisary data, personnel were assigned 
T o  maintain to the task commencing approximately 30-days before turnover. 
the quality standard required many manhours were needed to perform the 
task, 
SOLU'TION/RECQMMENDATION 
Manufacturing Planning introduced a low-cost data processing system 
which produced daily tabulation runs depicting all  unaccomplished effort, 
System capability included sorting techniques to reflect that effort attributed 
to a supervisor, test  constraints, specific design changes, etc, 
DISCUSSION 
Manufacturing started a system of accumulating al l  applicable documents 
immediately before turnover, 
while negotiation with Test Operations took place, 
in a mass of data to search in a short period of time to establish stage status 
for turnover to Test Operations. 
Each document w a s  temporarily out of use 
This procedure resulted 
The new open-item status reporting system included an initial input of 
planned work sequences extracted from manufacturing orders  before issu- 
ance, and unaccomplished effort obtained from transfer documents written 
by a reas  not controlled by the system. Assigned personnel transferred the 
necessary data to Data Processing Transmittals. 
fo r  system control which consisted of applicable codes for shop supervisor, 
tes ts  affected, completion dates, etc, Manufacturing Planning personnel 
were assigned to  screen shop a reas  on a daily basis for the addition or 
deletion of work effort; thus an up-to-date listing was maintained. 
Additional data were added 
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Before turnover to Test Operations, a final tabulation w 
depicting the total remaining effor 
Program Schedule required 
effort on another unit before turn 
gained by using the new system allbwed for Concurrent a 
items applicable to the new unit without restrictian to tu 
- 
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PLANNING RESIDENT ORDERS (PRO'S) 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Numerous fabrication and assembly procesees used on t 
program required in-depth specification interpretation so  tha 
and positive control could be maintained during manufacturing operat 
This need caused a constant search of specifications and installation draw- 
ings, thereby creating schedule and cost problems, 
* 
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDAT ION 
A procedure was developed whereby Manufacturing Planning Resident 
Orders (PRO'S) were prepared and.issued which described the sequential 
fabrication and assembly proceeses, techniques, and methodology f o r  
accomplishing selected major manufacturing tasks ( see  Figure 10). These 
documents provided Manufacturing personnel with specific bench-level 
instructions and assured positive controls for specification and engineering 
document interpretation, 
DISCUSSION 
Because of the complexity of the operations (i. e., spray foam insula- 
tion, structural welding, engine installation, major structural component 
assembly, etc. ) and the necessity for ensured product repeatability, it w a s  
essential that detailed instructions be provided to describe the operations. 
Inclusion of detailed instructions in the Manufacturing Order documents was 
undesirable because of the excessive time and cost involved for preparation 
and control. 
significantly in providing instructions to Manufacturing personnel. 
Development and use of the Planning Resident Orders contributed 
, 
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Figure 10. Typical Planning Resident Orde r  Sequence (Sheet 1 of 3) 
RESTRICTIONS: 
Use of this procedure  i s  l imited to Seal 
Beach welding operations on +he Saturn I1 
LOX and LH2 tank fabrication. 
NOTES: 
a. During pre-weld cleaning and a l l  
subsequent operat ions,  until comple- 
tion of the weld, a l l  personnel  inside 
the weld station shal l  wear  clean white 
nylon, cotton o r  paper  smocks o r  
covera l l s  and ha i r  covers .  (Sta. 1 - A  
and al l  VAB weld stations). 
b. Clean,  l in t - f ree ,  white nylon gloves 
must  be worn by all personnel  pe r -  
forming pre-weld cleaning operations 
and subsequent operations p r io r  to 
weld (handling pre-cleaned tools, 
equipment and /o r  p a r t s ) .  Gloves a r e  
to be  used f o r  the i r  intended purpose 
only and a r e  not to be used in lieu of 
cheesecloth,  etc. 
c. All  tools required for  pre-weld MA01 07-01 6 
MA061 0-00  1 cleaning must  be  "tool" cleaned p r i o r  
to this operation. 
d. The following procedure  must  be 
per formed in the sequence outlined 
and in conjunction with special  
cleaning requi rements  specified in 
applicable weld schedule. 
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F i g u r e  10. Typical  Planning Resident  O r d e r  Sequence (Sheet 2 of 3 )  
>per.  
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ope rat ion Be s c ription 
e.  In event  of conflict  between th is  p r o -  
c e d u r e  and appl icable  weld schedule ,  
the appl icable  weld schedule  sha l l  take 
precedence .  
Remove a l l  contaminants  f r o m  s u r f a c e  of 
m a t e r i a l  using c lean  cheesec lo th  moistened 
with ace tone  (do not "wet" s u r f a c e  with 
acetone ). 
Remove all vis ible  t r a c e s  of chem-f i lm 
coating (o r  o ther  coat ing)  f r o m  s u r f a c e s  
ad jacent  to the joint  (2" ni inimum).  
NOTE: Do not r e - c l e a n  weld joint  o r  
s u r f a c e  adjacent  to weld joint  
tvith solvents  a f t e r  the above 
operat ion.  If such cleaning i s  
ne c e s s a r y , the  en  ti r e  p r o c c clu re 
m u s t  be repea ted  in the a r e a  
which w a s  solvent wiped. 
The  cleaning operat ion is bas ica l ly  a 
d r aw - f i l e ope r a t  i on. 
ground r u l e s  m u s t  b e  observed  during 
d r a w  filing opera t ions :  
The  following 
3. 1 The file m u s t  b e  "tool" cleaned with 
acetone p r i o r  to beginning the draw 
f i le  operat ion.  
3 . 2  All chips  must be p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
removed f r o m  the d r a w  file gul le ts  
with a small s t a i n l e s s  s t e e l  w i r e  
brush .  
rool,  Gauge, Spec 
F i x t u r e ,  V i s  Aid 
A i r  Motor 
Rear-? 'ex Wheel 
Vixen F i l e  
S ta in less  Steel 
Wire Brush  
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Figure 10. Typical Planning 
3per .  
No. 
4. 
Resident Order  Sequen 
Ope ration De s c r i p  tion 
3 .  2 .  1 The wire  b rush  must  be "tool" 
clean. If i t  becomes con- 
taminated i t  must  be cleaned 
in acetone before re-use.  
I 
3 .  2.2 The wire  brush  must  not be 
handled by the br i s t les  o r  placed 
on a d i r ty  surface.  
3. 2. 3 In a "draw' '  file operation] the 
file must  contact metal  in the 
cutting direction only. If the 
file is dragged back a c r o s s  the 
metal  in preparat ion for the next 
cutting s t roke,  i t  could cause 
contamination en t r apmen t 
3 .  2.4 Do not blow chips o r  dust f rom 
the metal  surface with the 
breath,  It will contaminate the 
metal .  
Take par t ic le  count. The count of a given 
weld a r e a  must  not exceed 3500 par t ic les ,  
5 microns- in  s ize  and l a r g e r ,  per  cubic 
foot of air when measured approximately 
5 feet f r o m  the weld joint and joint p r ior  to 
initiation of final cleaning operations. 
NOTE: Pa r t i c l e  count shal l  not be taken 
during contaminant generating 
operations such as machine cutting 
and fit-up trimming. Clean-up 
subsequent to fit-up trimming and 
cutting operations must  be comple- 
ted in sufficient t ime (at leas t  one 
hour )  p r i o r  to pre-weld cleaning to 
permi t  par t ic le  counting operation 
to be performed. Do not attempt 
to take 
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CORREMTION OF NOMENCLATURE AND IDENJIFYJN M0 
PRQB TEMENT A CT 
Many stage components were.seferr ree  or more 
names and id ifying numbers. This situat 
problem among the various groups when referring to  the same stage 
component. 
SOL’JTION /RECOMMENDATION 
r” 
The various identifying names and numbers were correlated into a 
single well-indexed booklet. 
DISCUBSION 
Use  of multiple names-and identifying numbers created a contirnunica- 
tior, problem between Engineering, Inspection, Manufacturing, and other 
groups, An example is  shown below: 
Par t  Number: V’7-480328 
Stage Reference Designation Number: F5A-F5E, F6A-F6E, F10 
Prodwt  Repeatability Program Number: Item 1 
Nomenclature: Recirculation valve, return valve, bypass valve 
pump valve 
ooklet correlates these various identifications, In addition, the 
ntity per stage is specified, and comments on their usage and history 
a r e  recorded. 
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ADAPTER CABLE CROSS REFERENCE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Duplicate cables with different part  numbers were baing fabricated for 
signal breakout boxes and tes t  equipment. 
e 
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDATION 
An adapter cable cross-reference list was developed listing the 
interfacing connectors in alpha-nume>ric order for quick reference to exist- 
ing cable adapters, This type of listing should be established during initial 
design and updated continually. 
DISCUSSION 
One of the phases i-n which manufacturing costs increase substantially 
is  in the design time and quantity of interconnecting adapter cables required 
and fabricated by the contractor for use during the manufacturing process, 
During the Saturn S-I1 program, special test  equipment adapter cables were 
designed and fabricated; and in order to reduce this cost, an adapter cable 
cross-reference list (see Table 7 ) was developed in which every adapter 
cable drawing number was listed and cross-referenced to an alpha-numeric 
listing of all  connectors which appear at  either interfacing end of the 
adapter, This list facilitated analysis and checkout of equipment and mini- 
mized fabrication of duplicate adapter cables. 
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PROOF AND LEAK TEST TRAINING MANUAL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Training and coordination of effort relating t o  three-  shift coverage fo r  
S-I1 stage proof and leak t e s t  operations were  difficult because of the com- 
plexity of S-I1 sys tems and the  "piecemeal" type of testing required.  
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
A booklet was prepared  showing stage systems,  subsystems, compo- 
nents, e lec t r ica l  t ie- ins ,  and associated data re la ted to proof and leak test 
operations,  
which operating manual was to  be used fo r  each stage subsystem/system, 
These  data were  presented so a s  to  c lear ly  show t e s t  personnel  
DISCUSSION 
The complexity of the numerous stage systems,  and subsystems 
thereof, encountered during proof and leak testing created difficulties 
relating to  training engineers  and technicians to  facil i tate three-shif t  
coverage of testing operations. In addition, since testing was accomplished 
in "piecemeal" fashion to  support manufacturing installation schedules, 
t h e r e  were  necessar i ly  many operating manuals required to  facilitate inspec- 
tion acceptance of par t ia l  sys tems,  The problem, therefore ,  was one of 
correlat ing and organizing applicable information into a readily usable fo rm 
fo r  engineers not completely famil iar  with the S-I1 and related testing 
activit ies,  
REFERENCES 
STE Engineering Proof and Leak Tes t  Booklet 
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CONTROL DIMENSIONAL TOOL LOCAT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
ON A N D  MOVEMENTS 
Individual manufacturing departments were require 
location and movement of the tools used. 
employed, which frequently resulted in lost or  misplaced t o  
A variety of minor systems were 
s a  urIorJ/ R ECOMMENDA TI ON 
Manufacturing developed the Transaction Record and Accountability 
*r Control System (TRACS), which consisted of on-line equipment capable of 
accepting and processing data with respect to the location, fabrication 
status, type, effectivity, disposition, etc. , of al l  dimensional tools. The 
system was further kxpanded to include those data pertinent to contract 
closeout preservation, condition codes, storage location, periodic inspec- 
tion requirements, discardirig, etc, These codes were applied to a l l  types 
of tools and equipment, both on and off site. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the 1967 triennial inventory instigated the investigation 
for improved control of'tooling items. 
condition status of a tool, required manual screening of various departments 
records. Departments were not consistent in format and accuracy of record 
keeping which contributed to lost tooling. TRACS was developed to provide 
a single up-to-date source of tooling inforrnation. This inforrnation, some 
of which was not previously available, included the capability to determine 
tool costs, hours expended, and common factors, such a s  location, part 
number, and general order. 
To determihe the availability and 
A feature subsequently added was the capability to process storage 
data. 
possible follow-on usage. Retention codes for  location preservation require* 
rnents, inspections, etc., were applied to each tool. Also included is a 
listing of those changes to tools which would be incorporated in the event of 
follow-on use. This feature has proven itself during many of the customer- 
requested studies for  cost data and follow-on proposals. 
The Saturn program requirements included the storage of tools for 
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SPRAY FOAM INSULATION MACHINING AND FINISHING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Spray foam insulation on the S-LI bulkheads required special tooling and 
facility support for  machining and finishing the insulation to  required 
thickness. 
SOLUTION/RECOhlMENDATION 
The following were  designed and built: 
1. A special  air-conditioning supply and return duct t o  provide 
temperature  and humidity control in the bulkhead fabrication 
building. 
2, An arched half-round Bccess platform t o  follow the spraying and 
machining tool. 
3. A machining dust exhaust system to pick up and remove the spray 
foam dust during machining operations. The system retained the 
dust in a hopper for disposal. 
Also, installed were required a i r ,  vacuum, and electr ical  facilities a t  the 
need points in the fabrication building. 
DISCUSSION 
Spraying and maching of polyurethane foam insulation presents  the 
problem of fume and dust removal, access  t o  the a reas ,  support facilities, 
and collection of the dust for disposal. 
factorily performed the functions required. 
met. 
The system described he re  sat is-  
Specification requirements were 
* 
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SPRAY FOAM MACHINING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A diamond impregnated machine cutter inadvertently contacted the 
LH2 bulkhead during a spray-on foam frirnming operation. 
damage required foam removal, metal bulkhead repair  and reapplication of 
spray foam, 
The resulting 
SOLUTION /.RECOMMENDATION 
This problem was solved a t  Seal Beach by developing phenolic foam 
cutters and an electr3nic sensing’device to  be used together with the foam 
t r im  machine. It is suggested that before machining foam on a metal base, 
these innovations should be incorporated in the t r im  machine. 
DISCUSSION 
The incident of damage to the bulkhead was caused by operator e r ror .  
This incident resulted in 
The operator failed t o  recognize the hard spots on the bulkhead that are 
used a s  reference marks for machining the foam. 
the change of cutter composition (phenolic instead of impregnated nickel) and 
provisions for an electronic sensing device to give the operator better 
visibility during the machining operation. 
REFERENCES 
SK-017287, Spray Foam Phenolic Cutter 
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BLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
N g  p ~ 6 i t i v e  means of identifying the true offsetjpeaking condition of a 
weld joint existed. Unnecessary Material Review action resulted. 
SOLU QN / REC OMMENDATION Tr 
To aid in precisely establishing the condition that existed and the 
degree of its severity, Manufacturing Engineering developed an electTo- 
mechanical t racer  known a s  a profilometer. 
It is recommended that the training of personnel in the use of this 
tool be in the initial production phase of a program. 
DISCUSSION 
In circumferential welding of large 33-foot-diameter cylinders on 
Saturn S-I1 program, offset and peaking were constantly under question by 
Quality Control, Offset is the result of joint mismatch, and peaking is the 
result of excess longitudinal and transverse weld shrinkage. An excess of 
both conditions impacts joint efficiency, 
To aid in precisely establishing the condition that existed and the 
degree of severity, the area in question was traced with an electromechanical 
t racer  and the data were transmitted to  a strip chart recorder. The points 
plotted were then drawn by using conventional curve development techniques. 
The results showed the exact profile of the suspect area and its differential 
from the part mold line, 
view and compared to the tolerance allowables, dictated by specification. 
Out-of-tolerance findings were then submitted to Material Review for 
disposition, 
Direct measurements were taken of the exploded 
REFERENCES 
T-7204193, Electromechanical Tracer  
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The 3-area of the S-II forward common bulkhead requires  we 
f rom both inboard and outboard sides. 
penetration, suckback, o r  blow holes. 
Improper ch will cause lack 
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDATION 
lo* 
On Saturn S-II this problem was solved by developing copper inter-  
locking backup bars,  precisely machined to  maintain 1 00-perce 
with parent metal. Stringent process  controls were also imposed. 
The t ime to  impose these solutions on a program with unique welds 
similar to the S-I1 J-weld m u l d  be in the ear ly  tool designlfabrication 
stages. 
DISCUSSION 
The concept could be tool-proofed during weld certification. 
The forward facing sheet of the common bulkhead on the Saturn S-II 
vehicle contained an a r e a  known as the J-section. Many problems were 
encountered in pr0ducing.a quality weld in this zrea,  in that the backup 
tooling was not of the proper configuration to  allow for a constant, repeat- 
able weld on each machine pass. 
history of lack of penetration, suckback, and blow holes. Extensive rework 
and loss of schedule position resulted. 
On the initial test vehicles, there  was a 
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PATIBI LITY 
DISSIMILAR ALUMINUM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
D1 
The J-section of the forward common bulkhead (2219 aluminum alloy) 
was welded t o  the bulkhead gores  (2014 aluminum alloy) by using 
num filler alloy. 
welding, c racks  would appear in the ends of the weld. Before any subsequent 
meridian welding could be performed, these cracked a r e a s  had to be repaired 
(welded) to  a s s u r e  that the c racks  did not propagate. 
After the gore panels were  t r immed for bulkhead meridian 
SOLUTION / REG OMMENDATION 
During repa i r  efforts, it was Doted that rewelding the defective a r e a  
with 231 9 filler alloy caused additional crack propagation.. 
was necessary to  use 4043 fiIler alloy to eliminate this  problem. 
Therefore, it 
As a resul t  of these findings, in-depth analysis was conducted to  
determine the compatibility of the 2319 fi l ler  alloy t o  the combination 2014 
and 2219 aluminum alloys. Tes t  welds were made in numerous quantities 
until the defects could be reproduced a t  will. These tes t s  proved that the 
dilution of the 23 19  f i l ler  alloy in the welded joint of 201 4 and 221 9 aluminum 
alloy base metals  produced a crack-sensitive condition, and the slightest 
notch effect propagated cracks.  Conversely, when 4043 filler alloy was 
used in welding these base metals,  the dilution provided a sufficient ductility 
to  eliminate the cracking problem. 
tensile strangth, but it was well within the process  specjfication allowables, 
A slight degradation was noted in the 
, 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Manufacturing 04-04 
WELD 
Modifications and part  substitutions made to equipment without print 
updating resulted in identical weld ma chines having different configurations, 
This method of weld machine maintenance made it necessary to maintain 
separate weld schedules for each machine. 
SOLUT ION / RECOMMENDATION 
A configuration control program was established by Plant Services 
and Manufacturing Engineering, whereby all  welding machines were com- 
pletely updated and all  electronic configurations were duplicated and 
recorded on the schematic diagrams. The machines were then locked and 
sealed to assure  the control of the established configuration. 
locks were opened only in the presence of the responsible Manufacturing 
engineer and a Plant Services technician. 
bility and repeatability of the equipment and allowed weld schedules to be 
interchangeable. 
The seals and 
This control improved the relia- I 
It is  recommended that controls similar to those described here be 
implemented from the s tar t  of any new program using welding machines, 
DISCUSSION 
Approximately 22 fully automatic direct- current, gas tungsten a r c  
welding machines were used on the Saturn S-XI program. 
tion by the metrology laboratory was a standard method of an established 
preventive maintenance program, Also, just before every production weld, 
a complete calibration check was made by Plant Services electronic techni- 
cians. , During this check, i f a  particular parameter was off, the technician 
would correct the e r r o r  by changing, adding, or  removing the necessary 
components. These changes were never red-lined on the schematics; con- 
sequently, after several such changes, each machine became a special case 
requiring specific weld schedules which were not interchangeable. 
Quarterly calibra- 
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IMPROVED STUD WELDING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The welding of studs on the forward LH2 and aft LOX bulkheads was a 
constant source of rework. 
straddle a meridian weld. 
meridian weld, the surface to which the studs attach is not normal  to  the 
centerline of the studs. This surface‘variation resul ts  in degraded weld 
values because of poor alignment of the stud to  the bulkhead surface and 
c rea t e s  variations in the stud-to-bulkhead pre-weld gap, 
The studs a r e  grouped in  sets of t h ree  and 
Because of the weld peaking encountered in the 
The effect of these variations is studs that will not meet  the specifica- 
tion requirement of 45 inch-pounds of torque. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A new welded-stud locating tool (Figure 11) was fabricated that could be 
secured t o  t h e  bulkhead by vacuum cups. 
pat tern and the surface f rom which the spotfacing and gap adjustment a r e  
performed, 
This tool established the stud 
A special  micro-s top  spotfacing unit (Figure 12) was made. This unit 
was indexed for  location by the locating tool previously mentioned, 
device is used to machine a minimum depth spotfaced surface normal  t o  the 
desired stud centerline. 
This 
The stud welding gun (Figure 13) was modified by replacing the fixed 
tripod support with an adjustable gap control support (Figures 14 and 1 5 ) .  
This support unit along with its accompanying gap adjustment adapter pro- 
vides the capability to measu re  the depth f rom the locating tool to  the bulk- 
head sur face  and to adjust the pre-weld gap accordingly. - 
These refinements were  not certified in t ime t o  be used in production 
on the S-I1 but should be considered for  other applications, 
DISCUSSION 
The welded-stud locating tool with i ts  vacuum cup support provides a 
stable surface f r o m  which the bulkhead surface is spotfaced. 
provides a clean surface normal  to  the stud centerline which provides the 
proper  relationship a t  the weld interface during the weld cycle, 
This spotfacing 
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e adjustable gap control support simplified considerably the task  of 
e gap before each stud weld. The previous method set the stud 
surface,  but the bulkhead surface is not flat because of weld 
peaking and variations in the gap setting resulted.  
B e  changes was an incr  se in stud torque values to  the 
REFERENCES 
Tool Designs T-7205002 and T-7205005 
C '  BORE 1 
Figure 11. Welded-Stud Locating Tool 
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Figure 13. Stud Welding Gun 
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F i g u r e  13. Adjus tab le  Gap  Suppor t ing  Tool 
I 
BARREL 
w I NDOW /’ S T U D  S E T T I N G  GAP 
Figurt .  1 5 .  Adjus tab le  G a p  Control  Suppor t  
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ELECTRODE CONFI GURATlON CONTROL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Precis ion fusion welding dictates that  a l l  pa rame te r s  be s t r ic t ly  
controlled to  a s s u r e  repeatable weld quality. 
specification details  these  controls with the exception of electrode 
configuration. 
The manufacturing process  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The tungsten electrode shapes,  used in the DCSP/GTA welding 
p rocess  on the Saturn S-I1 program, were  determined during the weld cer t i -  
fication effort, All s izes ,  shapes and finishes which were  proven for  
specific weld operations were  established a s  s tandard and recorded on tool 
design drawings. 
The following s teps  were  s ta r ted  in September 1968 to control this  
I valuable welding parameter :  
1 
1. F o r  tungsten electrodes,  configuration and identification shal l  be 
specified on SK-017352 provided by the Tool Descgn Department. 
2. The welding schedule. F o r m  971-D, shal l  specify the tungsten 
electrode to. be used. 
b e r s  with a configuration sketch on the face of the 971-D weld 
s c h e dule, 
The electrodes will be identified by num- 
3. Stock electrodes shal l  be procured by the using department.  
Procurement  will  be in accordance with standard practice.  
4, Vinyl envelopes and labels used for  electrode s torage and 
identification, a s  shown on SK- 01 7352 (refer t o  - 109 and - 1 lo) ,  
may  be obtained by Internal Let ter  request,  by the using depart-  
ments ,  f rom Central  Manufacturing. Detail numbers  will  be 
added t o  the labels by the using departments.  
5. Electrode machining to  the required configuration may be accom- 
plished by Internal Let ter  request  t o  the Quality Assurance 
Laboratory machining group. 
by an SK- 107352 drawing, 
The request  shal l  be accompanied 
Quantities will be specified for each 
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configuration required.  Sufficient vinyl envelopes. labels,  and 
e lec t rodes  sha l l  be supplied by the using departments .  
The Quality Assurance  machining group shal l  request  inspection 
of the completed electrodes.  
date  and inspect ion-stamp the label (SK- 107352-1 10). The label  
and electrodes sha l l  be inser ted  in the vinyl envelope (SK-017352- 
109) and stapled closed in accordance with the SK-017352 drawing. 
The Inspection Department sha l l  
The inspected and packaged electrodes sha l l  be re turned  t o  the 
using depar tments  for  s torage  and dispensing in accordance with 
s tandard pract ice .  
The Inspection Department will verify the packaged electrode 
identification in accordance with the 971 - D  weld schedule and 
witness  its installation in the weld torch.  
U s e d  e lectrodes will be accumulated by the using depar tments  and 
may be salvaged by' re-machining according t o  the outlined s teps .  
i DISCUSSION 
Precise cdntrcjl of the electrode shape and f inish was proven to  be a 
valGable requirement  f o r  guaranteeing repeatable a r c  plasma consistency 
that provides the established a r c  force  necessary  for  proper  penetration. 
REFERENCES 
SK-017352, Saturn Wclding Electrodes 
, 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
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The 104 feet  of per iphery  of eve ry  c i rcumferent ia l  weld made  on the 
Saturn S-I1 vehicles requi red  the use  of two welding machines  diametr ical ly  
opposed, 
Improper  location o r  a t tachment  meant  the difference in maintaining a con- 
s is tent  voltage drop  a c r o s s  the work piece, which subsequently affected the  
e Y tabli  shed weld pa rame te r  s. 
The location of the grounds and signal t r a c e  leads was  cr i t ical .  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
To a s s u r e  constant control  of both welding machines  and reduce the ' 
possibil i ty that  one machine ' s  malfunction would not influence o r  affect the 
other ,  a weld ground sp ider  was designed and developed. The ground spider .  
fabr icated of e lectrolyt ic  copper,  was attached to  the tank wal ls  at 1 2  equally 
spaced attach points. The  welding machine ground cables  and signal t r a c e  
I l eads  were  then bolted t o  a common bus which t ied all 1 2  s t r a p s  together.  
DISCUSSION 
The uniform distribution of the ground sys t em provided a s su rance  of 
consistent c i rcui t  control and reduced the possibility of weld defects occur -  
r ing because of malfunctioning welding equipment o r  affected welding 
p a r a m e t e r s ,  
REFERENCES 
K-376465. Detail Drawing of Ground Spider 
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INTERNAL WELD DEFECTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Internal weld defects caused by sur face  oxides. oils ,  and moi s tu re  
requi red  welds t o  be repaired.  
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
The following actions were  instituted on the Saturn S-I1 p r o g r a m  t o  aid 
in resolving the in te rna l  weld defects problem: 
1, Procedures  in  pre-weld joint preparat ion w e r e  meticulously con- 
t rol led;  i. e. , scraping and draw-filing in one direct ion only, 
b a r e  hands never  t o  touch the par t ,  and no a i r  hoses to  be used 
fo r  cleaning the pa r t  surfaces .  
White nylon gloves and garments  were  used instead of cotton to  2. 
) reduce lint factor .  
3. Liberal  vacuum cleaning of the a r e a  and pa r t  sur faces  was a 
continual operation during pre-weld clean and during welding. 
4, Weld stations *were environmentally controlled - t empera ture ,  
humidity, and dust count. 
5, Reactor  grade heliuni was used for  the torch  shielding gas  to 
a s  s u r e  high purity. 
6. A s  an  additional precaution, the r eac to r  grade  helium was sub- 
jected to  a chromatograph analysis.  
pa red  to  Quality Assurance  Acceptance Standards for  maximum 
allowable constituents. 
T h e  r e su l t s  were  then com- 
7. Before any weld, either certif ication o r  production, was  s ta r ted ,  
a hygrometer  was attached t o  the torch and a mois ture  check was 
made  to  verify that no  leaks  existed in any gas  l ines (maximum 
allowable mois ture  content was se t  a t  25 ppm), 
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8, After final cleaning was completed under bright lights, a black 
light inspection was performed on a l l  su r f aces  the weld joint 
t o  revea l  t r a c e s  of oxide film, lint, o r  dust  wh could not be 
detected under bright lights. All suspect a r e a s  were  recleaned 
and vacuum- cleaned, 
DISCUSSION 
These controls and improvements were  progress ive  efforts which 
s ta r ted  with the f i r s t  S-I1 flight stage (S-11-I) and were  completed in 1966 
during the fabrication of Saturn S-11-6. 
tinuous quality improvement t o  a level of perfection where the final (S-II- 15) 
vehicle required only 1 / 2  inch of weld r epa i r  in approximately 25, 000 inches 
of we Id ing , 
Results of the effort showed a con- 
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OFFSET CONTROL - CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT +AND EFFECT 
The Saturn S-I1 consis ts  of stacked bulkhead and ring assemblies .  In 
These welds were  made in the horizontal attitude by 
o rde r  to  complete the assembly, eight 33-foot-diameter c i rcumferent ia l  
welds were  required.  
using the free-fal l  welding technique. 
eight-segment, internal,  c i rcumferent ia l  sizing r iiig. Since the tank sections 
werc  'not built as  concentric enti t ies but ra ther  t o  matched circumferent ia l  
s izes ,  it was necessa ry  for  the internal sizing r ing  t o  force  the segments to  
concentricity, 
ring to  overcome local offset, it was necessary  to install "bottle jacks" a t  
a l l  points where excessive offset occurred. 
the pa r t  and the pressur ized  sizing ring, 
The only tooling involved was an 
Because of the limitation of the solid segments of the sizing 
These jacks were  placed between 
Limited success  in offset control was notable. but the process  was 
very t ime consuming, 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
In o rde r  to overcome the offset problem and reduce costly fabrication 
t ime, the internal sizing ring w a s  redesigned to  provide individual, 
increment adjustments over the ent i re  top and bottom periphery of the sizing 
tool., Preadjustments  were  made over the ent i re  surface a r e a  before any 
welding was done, and progress ive  adjustments followed, a s  required,  during 
the tank welding operation, 
in tank welding t ime by approximately 60 percent and a considerable 
improvement in offset control. 
1 -inch 
This  newly designed tool provided a reduction 
The f i r s t  S-11 to  employ the use of this  tool was S-11-7, Future pro-  
g r a m s  should take into consideration circumferentia 1 welding offset problems 
in initial tool design, 
REFERENCES 
Planning Resident Order  (PRO) TOS-556-0005, Circumferential  Weld 
Backup Tooling. 
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UMBRELLA PLATFORM TOOL 
P R O B L E M  S T A T E M E N T  AND E F F E C T  
N o  w o r k  p l a t f o r m s  w e r e  available to p e r f o r m  in - t ank  r e w o r k  - removal 
and  r e p l a c e m e n t  of t h e  f o r w a r d  LH2 bulkhead. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
T h e  l a c k  of su i t ab le  p l a t f o r m s  f o r  in - tank  r e w o r k  w a s  solved at 
Seal B e a c h  by developing  an  u m b r e l l a - t y p e ,  co l l aps ib l e  p l a t f o r m  that could 
b e  i n s e r t e d  in to  t h e  LH2 t ank  t h ~ o u g h  a 36- inch  opening i n  the  f o r w a r d  bulk-  
head  and suspended  in  t h e  tank .  
DISCUSSION 
On two S a t u r n  S-I1 s t a p e s ,  i t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e m o v e  t h e  f o r w a r d  
LH2 bulkhead f r o m  Cyl inde r  6 b e c a u s e  the  junc tu re  weld offset  and  p e a r i n g  
w e r e  out of spec i f ica t ion .  
w a s  a complex  ope ra t ion ,  compounded by t h e  f ac t  t ha t  t h e r e  w a s  no way, a t  
t h a t  t i m e ,  t o  pos i t ion  too l s  and  p e r s o n n e l  i n s ide  the  t ank  a t  t he  Cy l inde r  6 
and bulkhead leve l .  
joining of Cy l inde r  2 t o  Cy l inde r  3 would b e  the  c loseou t  weld,  with plat- 
forms to s u p p o r t  t ha t  s ta t ion .  
and the  d e s i r e d  w o r k  a r e a  w a s  b r idged  with the  u m b r e l l a  too l  ( s e e  
F i g u r e  16). 
J u s t  the  a c t  of r emov ing  a 33 - foo t -d i ame te r  d o m e  
T h e  sequence  of s tacking  t h e  veh ic l e  d ic ta ted  tha t  
T h e  20-foot  span  be tween the  c loseout  weld 
R E F E R E N C E S  
1. U m b r e l l a - T y p e  P l a t f o r m  Drawings ,  T-7204145 J - 1  through J-11 
2 .  Opera t ion  Sequence ,  SK-017243 
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THICKNESS MEASUREMENT OF SPRAY FOAM 1 NSULATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Thickness of the Saturn S-11 insulation was being measured  by 
penetrating the foam with hypodermic needles and other  thin-line instruments  
and measur ing  the depth of penetration. 
to  be repa i red  and were  difficult to  f i l l  u4th foam, 
Holes lef t  by such ins t ruments  had 
SOLUTION/ R EC OM M EN’DAT ION 
The problem was resolved by developing a hand-held R F  proximity 
measu remen t  tool. 
insulation when backed by a meta l l ic  plate. 
detailed tool descr ipt ion)  
The self-contained device is capable of measuring foam 
(Refer  to the Attachment A for  
DISCUSSION 
i The hand-held R F  proximity measurement  tool has  tn o measurement  
ranges:  
range, 
the low range and 20. 062 inch on the high r.ange can be expected. 
can be expected to operate  continuously for  2 4  hours  a f t e r  the bat ter ies  have 
been fully recharged.  
0. t o  1 .2  inches in  the l o ~ v  range and 1. 3 to 3. 0 inches in thc high 
After a sho r t  famil iar izat ion period, accu rac i e s  of *O. 031 inch on 
The tool 
? 
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ATTACHMENT A 
HAND-HELD R F  PROXIMITY MEASUREMENT TOOL 
INTRODUCTION 
T h i c k n e s s  m e a s u r e n i e n t s  w e r e  be ing  m a d e  on t h e  S a t u r n  S-I1 foam 
insula t ion  with hypodermic  need le s  and o the r  th in- l ine  i n s t r u m e n t s  which a r e  
d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e  insu la t ion  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  m a t e r i a l .  
i n s t r u m e n t s  had t o  b e  r e p a i r e d  and  w e r e  diff icul t  t o  f i l l  w.ith foam. 
E x p c r i e n c e  gained with t h e  addi t ion of r e c e n t  e f for t  expended on a n  R F  
p r o x i m i t y  a l a r m  s e n s o r  ind ica ted  tha t  a n  R F  e l e c t r o n i c  m e a s u r e m e n t  d e v i c e  
could b e  f a b r i c a t e d  us ing  s i m i l a r  c i r c u i t s  to  n i e a s u r e  the  foam th i ckness  
without  d e g r a d i n g  the  insu la t ion  m a t e r i a l .  
Holes  le f t  by  such  
DEVELOPMENT PRESENTATION 
Objec t ive  
T h e  objec t ive  of t h i s  deve lopmen t  p r o g r a m  was  t o  des ign  and c o n s t r u c t  
a rugged  hand-he ld  m e t a l - d e t e c t i n g  device .  
contained and capab le  of m e a s u r i n g  f o a m  insu la t ion  t h i c k n e s s e s  when backed  
by a m e t a l l i c  p la te .  
The d e v i c e  was  to  b e  s e l f -  
Des ign  C r i t e r f a  
While t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  should a lways  b e  handled with c a r e ,  cons t ruc t ion  
T h e  d e v i c e  was  t o  b e  se l f - con ta ined ,  ope ra t ed  
of the  unit  was t o  b e  rugged  enough to wi ths tand  acc iden ta l  m i s t r e a t m e n t  
with a m i n i m u m  of r e p a i r .  
wi th  r e c h a r g e a b l e  b a t t e r i e s ,  capab le  of m e a s u r i n g  0. 750-inch th i ckness  
within a t o l e r a n c e  of *O. 062, and w a s  t o  ma in ta in  ca l ib ra t ion  o v e r  long 
p e r i o d s  of t i m e .  
D e  s i gn C on s i d e  rat ion 
T h e  newly  developed  p rox imi ty  a l a r m  s e n s o r  had s e v e r a l  qua l i t i e s  t ha t  
w e r e  d e s i r a b l e  f o r  a hand-he ld  m e a s u r i n g  dev ice .  I t  contained a n  advanced  
u s e  of c i r c u i t r y  for e l e c t r o n i c  m e a s u r e m e n t  of d i s t ance ,  t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t s  
w e r e  ma in ta ined  a c c u r a t e l y  f o r  long p e r i o d s  of t i m e  with few ca l ib ra t ion  
p r o b l e m s ,  and the  eqiiiprnent showed exce l l en t  s t ab i l i t y  and repea tab i l i ty .  
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It was determined that the basic  principle of the a l a r m  senso r  would be 
used to  obtain these  quali t ies.  (Reference  Letter Report  No.  P A P  68-0016). 
However, other aspec ts  like ba t te ry  operation and packaging would p resen t  
different  problems during development of the hand-held proximity m e a s u r e -  
ment  device. 
Sys tern Description 
A 455 Kc c rys t a l  osci l la tor  was used to  feed seve ra l  s tages  of 
amplification with the gain of one controlled by the impedance change in  a 
tank circui t .  
t he  DC output read on a m e t e r .  
is  changed by the proximity of meta l  to the "sense" tank c i rcu i t  and 
r ep resen t s  a DC voltage which can be read on a m e t e r .  
then be cal ibrated on the m e t e r  to r ep resen t  the dis tance between the me ta l  
sur face  and the forward contacting face of the instrument .  
The  AC output was fed into a conventional bridge circui t  and 
F o r  measurement  purpose,  the impedance 
This  voltage can 
Nickel cadmium bat te r ies  w e r e  selected for  the power sou rce  over 
conventional ba t t e r i e s  for  t h e i r  constant voltage output over  a longer period 
of t ime  and a r e  good for  a n i n f i n i t e  number of recharging cycles.  
development of the sys t em progressed ,  a voltage regulator  was added to  
ensu re  a-constant  voltage to the circui t  essent ia l  for  stabil i ty and repeatability, 
and a second range was added to make the unit m o r e  ve r sa t i l e  ( s e e  F igure  A-1). 
As 
I 
The prototype gun-shaped case  was fabricated f rom high-impact plastic 
and phenolic m a t e r i a l s  with the m e t e r  mounted a t  the back for  easy  reading. 
If quantit ies warran ted ,  however, the c a s e s  should be of molded construction 
fo r  cost  saving and appearance purposes .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The completed hand-held R F  proximity measu remen t  tool has  
measu remen t  ranges: - 0  to 1. 2 inches in the low range and 1. 3 t o  3.0 inches 
in the high range. The accuracy  i s  somewhat dependent upon the ability of 
the ape ra to r  to  position the gun properly:  however, af ter  a shor t  period of 
famil iar izat ion,  accu rac i e s  of *0. 031 inch on thk low range and * O .  062 inch 
on the high range can be  expected. The tool has  been operated continually 
during t e s t  fo r  4-hour  per iods with no deter iorat ion of the above accurac ies .  
The  tool can be expected to opera te  continuously for  2 4  hours  af ter  the 
ba t te r ies  have been fully recharged.  
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SENSE ANTENNA 
SENSE AMPLIFIER 
RANGE SELECT 
NICKEL CADMIUM 
BATTER I E S CALIBRATED I IN INCHES I 
Figure  A- I .  Hand-Held R F  Proximity Measurement  Tool 
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AFT LOX BULKHEAD PEAKING 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
T h e  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  configurat ion of t he  weld l ands  on the g o r e  
s e c t i o n s  of the  aft LOX bulkhead w a s  of a d o u b l e - r e v e r s e  t a p e r .  M a t e r i a l  
t h i c k n e s s e s  v a r i e d  in  r a n g e s  f r o m  0. 250, 0. 375,  0. 550 ,  and 0. 625 inch. 
T h e  h e a v i e s t  gauges  w e r e  at  t he  apex  and at the  equa to r .  Welding of t h e s e  
g o r e  pane l s  from the  outboard  s i d e  caused  peaking condi t ions  to  o c c u r  in  the  
heavy  areas  which exceeded  spec i f ica t ion  a l lowables .  Subsequent ly ,  t h e s e  
peaking  condi t ions  induced  of fse t  p r o b l e m s  when m a t c h i n g  bulkheads  f o r  t h e  
g i r t h  weld of t he  LOY tank and when a t tempt ing  the  f i tup of t he  l l l - i n c h -  
d i a m e t e r  d o l l a r  r i ng  in to  the  welded bulkhead.  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
T h e  f i r s t  so lu t ion  to . this  p r o b l e m  w a s  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of welding 
p a r a m e t e r s  which provided  a 75 - p e r c e n t  pene t r a t ion  f r o m  the  inboa rd  s ide .  
T h i s  s y s t e m  a ided  in  r educ ing  the  peaking,  but  w a s  time consuming  b e c a u s e  
the  welded a r e a  had to be r epos i t i oned  f r o m  under  the  b e a m  of t h e  too l  to a n  
area w h e r e  a n  i n t e r n a l  t r a c k  was ins ta l led .  
r i s k  f a c t o r  of p o s s i b l e  d a m a g e  t o  the  weld due  t o  equipinent  mal func t ion  OT 
c r a t e r  c r a c k s  c a u s e d  by  i m p r o p e r  weld ini t ia t ion.  
T h i s  me thod  a l s o  induced a h igh-  
In o r d e r  to r e m o v e  the  d a m a g e  r i s k  and i m p r o v e  schedu le  posi t ion,  
a second s y s t e m  w a s  developed .  
capabi l i ty  bui l t  in to  t h e  hold-down b a r s  of the  tool ,  
T h i s  method w a s  a m e c h a n i c a l  p r e - p e a k i n g  
Spec i f ica l ly ,  t h e  p r e - p e a k i n g  s y s t e m  employed  a s e r i e s  of ad jus t ing  
s c r e w s  the entire length  of bo th  s i d e s  of t h e  m e r i d i a n  and at a loca t ion  w h e r e  
they  p roduced  a c a n t i l e v e r  ac t ion  when the  hold-down p r e s s u r e  w a s  appl ied 
f r o m  t h e  inboa rd  s i d e  of t he  p a r t .  
bu t t  condi t ion to a "V" condi t ion with the  opening on t h e  t o r c h  s ide .  
t he  weld bead  g e o m e t r y  n o r m a l l y  inc ludes  a s h r i n k  d i f f e ren t i a l  be tween the  
pene t r a t ion  s i d e  and the  d rop- th rough  s i d e ,  the  p r e - p e a k e d  g roove  reduced  
t h e  conf igura t ion  t o  a n e a r  p a r a l l e l - s i d e d  nugget.  T h e  r e s u l t s  null if ied all 
peaking f r o m  t h e  weld ope ra t ion ,  and  the  p a r t  r e m a i n e d  in contour .  
T h i s  bending m o m e n t  changed the  s q u a r e  * 
Since  
T h i s  s y s t e m  w a s  f i rs t  u s e d  on the  S-11-4 bulkhead,  and a l l  subsequen t  
bu lkheads  welded  w e r e  accep tab le  without  t he  n e c e s s i t y  of r e w o r k .  
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New p r o g r a m s  should t a k e  in to  cons ide ra t ion  the  peaking problems 
i n h e r e n t  in  welding and m a k e  a l lowances  in  a l l  tool des igns .  
REFERENCES 
T-7201800, A s s e m b l y  W e l d  J i g  
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WELD STATtON UTILITY POSITIONER 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Vacuum p o s i t i o n e r s  and hydrau l i c  j a c k s  w e r e  used  t o  hold t h e  S-I1 
Cy l inde r  6 and  the  f o r w a r d  bulkhead in  posi t ion and r e t a i n  conf igura t ion  mold  
l i n e s  d u r i n g  the  weld ope ra t ion  in the  weld s ta t ion.  
v a c u u m  and high and low hydrau l i c  p r e s s u r e  was  needed  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e s e  
too l s  * 
A cont inuous supply of 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A unique ut i l i ty  s u p p o r t  f i x tu re  w a s  des igned  and bui l t  which could 
cont inuously supply  v a c u u m  and high and low hydrau l i c  p r e s s u r e  t o  t h e  
tool ing f ix tu re s .  T h i s  f i x t u r e  cons i s t ed  of a can t i l eve red  swing a rm which 
r o t a t e s  about  a f ixed c e n t r a l  a x i s .  T h e  vacuum and hydrau l i c  p r e s s u r e  a r e  
suppl ied th rough  a slip r ing  a s s e m b l y  at  t he  a x i s  and c a r r i e d  t o  the  ends  of 
t h e  a rms  t o  the  tool ing f i x t u r e s  through h o s e  a s s e m b l i e s  with quick 
d i s c o n n e c t s  a t  t he  too ls ,  T h e  f ix tu re  w a s  comple t ed  and put in to  ope ra t ion  
i n  June  1967. 
DISCUSSION 
T h e  welding ope ra t ion  t o  join the  f o r w a r d  bulkhead t o  S-I1 Cyl inder  6 
was  accompl i shed  in  Weld Stat ion 1A a t  S e a l  Beach .  T h e  tool ing tha t  
s u p p o r t s  t he  cy l inde r  and bulkhead w a s  des igned  t o  r o t a t e  t he  p roduc t  
th rough a f ixed weld head.  
b y  i n t e r n a l  v a c u u m  p o s i t i o n e r s ,  and hydraul ic  j a c k s  w e r e  used  t o  obtain 
conf igura t ion  m o l d  l i nes .  
p rov ide  a cont inuous vacuum and hydrau l i c  supply t o  t h e  vacuum and hydraul ic  
tool ing f i x t u r e s  a s  t hey  ro t a t ed  with the  bulkhead and cy l inde r  th rough the  
weld head .  
t ion w e r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  p rov ide  a ro ta t ing  f ix tu re  t o  m e e t  the  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
Thi: f i x t u r e  w a s  f a b r i c a t e d  and put in to  ope ra t ion  in J u n e  1067. 
F i g u r e  17. ) 
T h e  cy l inde r  and bulkhead w e r e  held in  pos i t ion  
It b e c a m e  a p p a r e n t  t ha t  a f i x tu re  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
A concep t  f o r  a f i x t u r e  w a s  in i t ia ted ,  and a d e s i g n  and s p e c i f i c a -  
(See 
R E F E R E N C E S  
J o b  O r d e r  561-67016-120,  F&I Utili ty P o s i t i o n e r  1A 0852 
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F igure  17. S u p p o r t  Assembly  P:?sitioner 
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EDLIAR WELDING S-ll AFT LOX BULKHEAD 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
B e c a u s e  of the th ickness  of material (0.625 inch),  the welding of the 
d o l l a r  sect ion (aft apex  of the LOX tank)  b e c a m e  one of the  m a j o r  weld 
p r o b l e m s  on t h e  p r o g r a m .  
necess i ta ted  p r o c e d u r e s  not  n o r m a l l y  used in other  tungsten i n e r t  gas  welding 
p r o c e  s s e s . 
Control  of offset  and peaking in t h e  weld.  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
T h e  p r o b l e m  of welding the dol la r  sect ion of the LOX tank w a s  solved 
at Sea l  Beach  by set t ing up s t r ingent  p r o c e s s  cont ro ls  and specifying that  
t h e  dol la r  sect ion would b e  welded f r o m  t h e  f o r w a r d  and aft s ides .  
method produced an inter locking weld nugget. 
c l a m p  w a s  used for posit ioning and controll ing offset. 
DISCUSSION 
T h i s  
T h e  NASA (Hawthorne) s t r a p  
1 
In the  ini t ia l  e f f o r t  t o  p e r f o r m  the dol la r  weld,  tooling w a s  provided 
with backup chi l l  b a r s .  
p a r a m e t e r s  f o r  a quali ty weld. 
backup tooling. 
and the  o ther  e x t r e m e  of overhea t  o r  blow holes  i n  another .  
T h i s  method was  never  s u c c e s s f u l  in producing 
Difficulty was  encountered in center ing  the 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e r e  was  a lack of penetrat ion in one a r e a ,  
R E F E R E N C E S  
1. Planning Res ident  O r d e r  (PRO) MW565-008, Standard Welding 
Operat ing P r o c e d u r e  - Aft LOX Bulkhead 
2. 971D Weld Schedule 00503 
3. Job  Instruct ion Manual T - 7200077 
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WELD -BEAD TRIM TOOL AND OPTICAL VIEWER 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Mil l ing and viewing t h e  weld bead  a t  t h e  junct ion of the  S-I1 domed  
c o m m o n  bulkhead and Outs ide  Cy l inde r  1 ( r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  the  J - g r o o v e )  is  
e x t r e m e l y  diff icul t ,  and the  mi l l i ng  m u s t  b e  done by hand. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
T h e  solut ion t o  t h i s  p r o b l e m  w a s  t o  deve lop  a tool  t ha t  coufd be  p laced  
in the  l imi t ed  s p a c e  be tween the  bulkhead and cy l inder  which would m i l l  and 
v iew the  weld bead a s  it t r a v e l s  a round  the  p e r i p h e r y  of the  J - g r o o v e .  
DISCUSSION 
T h e  spec i f ica t ion  govern ing  welding d i c t a t e s  t ha t  \velds wi l l  b e  c r a c k -  
f r e e .  At t i m e s  a weld \ \ i l l  deve lop  minu te  s u r f a c e  c r a c k s  which m u s t  b e  
r emoved .  T h e  r en iova l  of t h e s e  s u r f a c e  d e f e c t s  in t h e  confined J - g r o o v e  
a r e a  of the  S-I1 w a s  v e r y  diff icul t  and t ime-cons t iming .  
had to  pos i t ion  t h e m s e l v e s  in v e r y  awkward  and unsafe  pos i t ions  t o  a l low- 
hand fi l ing of t h e  a r e a .  
l igh ts  w e r e  used .  
The m e c h a n i c s  
In o r d e r  t o  i n s p e c t  the  a r e a ,  n i i r r o r s  and f l a s h -  
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SPRAY FOAMING PANELS 1-INCH-THICK BY 4 FEET BY 6 FEET 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT A i W  E F F E C T  
In t h e  e a r l y  phase  of t he  S-I1 p r o g r a m ,  no a c c e p t a b l e  method was 
available t o  s p r a y  a cons i s t en t  t h i ckness  of f o a m  on insu la t ion  panels .  
SOL U T  I O N  / R E Cob1 MEND AT ION 
A m o t o r - d r i v e n  conveyor  w a s  deve loped  which m o v e s  a boxed panel  
t r a y  at v a r i o u s  s p e e d s  under  a n  a-scillating panel  of s p r a y  f o a m  appl ica t ion  
guns .  T h i s  me thod  w a s  used  t o  s p r a y  r e p a i r  pane l s  of foam insu la t ion  for 
S-I1 s t a g e s .  
T h i s  me thod  of s p r a y i n g  polyure thane  foam pane l s  could have  m a n y  
o t h e r  c o m m e r c i a l  and i n d u s t r i a l  appl ica t ions  and should b e  c o n s i d e r e d  in  
t h e  in i t i a l  planning of the - insu la t ion  s y s t e m .  
DISCUSSION 
Cons i s t en t  fa rming  of s p r a y  foam insu la t ion  pane l s  r e q u i r e d  a method 
of moving  the  f r a m e  d u r i n g  o s c i l l a t o r  sp ray ing  f r o m  two o r  m o r e  s p r a y  
guns ;  t he  m o t o r  d r i v e n  conveyor  w a s  des igned  and h a s  worked  v e r y  we l l  f o r  
l a r g e  insu la t ion  pane l s .  
s p r a y  f o a m  u s e s .  
T h i s  method of appl ica t ion  could b e  appl ied t o  m a n y  
R E F E R E N C E S  
1. h f / P H E  Des ign  Drawing  f o r  8EH-0918 Conveyor ,  Drawing  SK-1007 
( 2 9  M a r c h  1q68)  
2. P r o c e s s  Spec i f ica t ion  MA0606 - 050 for P o l y u r e t h a n e  F o a m  Applica-  
t ion and M a t e r i a l s  
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INFLATED SKIN POSITIONING FOR CONTROLLED CORE MACHINING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Producing a common bulkhead consisting of two aluminum domes 
(facing shee t s )  bonded to  a varying thickness  honeycomb co re  presented a 
difficult p roblem because of sur face  var ia t ions produced during fabrication 
and res idua l  s t r e s s e s  caused by welding. 
the contours m u s t  have matched within 0. 010 inch. 
22d var ia t ions in both forward and aft facing sheets ,  considerable  hand 
fitting and uncertainty of tolerance w e r e  experienced. 
To  achieve a successful  bond joint, 
Because of the flexibility 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The  s tandard techniqueused i n  industry to  match  su r faces  of the 
honeycomb c o r e  to  the aluminum bulkheads was hand sanding. 
tecklnique was sa t i s fac tory  for  sma l l e r  vehicles,  i t  was not considered 
acceptable f o r  a bulkhead the s ize  of S-11. 
I approximately 1400 squa re  feet ,  of t h ree  different contours (ell iptical ,  
torodial ,  and conical) .  A sys t em to  produce an acceptable method was 
established and became known a s  the inflation technique. 
to  inflate, a t  low p r e s s u r e s ,  the forward and aft skin a s sembl i e s  of the 
bulkhead into smoothly fa i red  contours.  
individually t raced  by dial  indicators  a t  7920 points during the t racing 
operations.  F r o m  the t r a c e  information, computer  readouts supplied the 
data  for  machining the co re  for  a p rec i se  match to  both surfaces .  A skate  
machining technique was developed to  machine the honeycomb co re  as 
defined by the computer  data.  The skins  were  then bonded to  the  c o r e  in  a 
preload condition. The  bulkhead a s sembly  so fabricated was f r e e  of s lack 
and non-working membrane  zones usually associated with non-preloaded 
s t ruc tu res  . 
While this 
The  a r e a  involved on S-I1 was 
This  sys t em was 
The  aluminum domes were  
On futnre  p rograms ,  such techniques should be considered i n  the ear ly  
design phases  i n  the init ial  study so  that engineering coverage can be p ro -  
viaed p r i o r  t o  production. 
DISCUSSION 
The common bulkhead i s  composed of a tapered honeycomb c o r e  
sandwiched betlvveen, and bonded to, two aluminum facing sheets .  The  
facing shee ts  a r e  made  up of 12 sect ions called go re  panels and a center  
cap known a s  the dol lar  panel. The fabrication of these  aluminum detai ls  
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involves s t r e t ch  o r  explosive forming,  chemical  milling, machining, and 
fusion welding, the operation that joins them into an assembly.  
c r i t i ca l  aspec t  in the manufacture  of this  assembly  is to  obtain the required 
f i t  of the c o r e  t o  the facing sheet  sur faces ,  because,  to obtain a successful  
bond joint, the c o r e  contour m u s t  match  the bulkhead within ten thousandths 
of an inch, the maximum gap which the adhesive can br idge and still maintain 
s t ruc tu ra l  integrity.  
1400 squa re  feet, o r  the s i ze  of an ave rage  house, and the sur faces  are  
composed of t h ree  different contours,  the problem was ex t remely  complex. 
The  problem was  fur ther  complicated by the fact  that  fabrication of the 
aluminum facing shee ts  resulted in some  localized dis tor t ion caused by 
uneven res idua l  s t r e s s e s .  
The m o s t  
Since the honeycomb co re  sur face  is approximately 
The p rocess  previously used in the industry to  fi t  the honeycomb c o r e  
and facing shee ts  involved hand sanding the co re  to  match  contour templates .  
Th i s  p rocess  was not considered sa t i s fac tory  so  that Engineering and 
Manufacturing joined f o r c e s  and developed the inflation technique. Briefly,  
th i s  technique employs e i ther  air  p r e s s u r e  o r  vacuum to inflate the a s s e m -  
b l ies  into smoothly faired contours .  
facing shee t  and the outer  sur face  of the aft facing sheet  a r e  accura te ly  
measu red  a t  approximately 15, 0 0 0  points, and deviations f rom t r u e  contour 
a r e  recorded.  
develop c o r e  cutting tables ,  
c losely controlled.  
The  inner su r face  of the forward 
With the aid of a computer,  this  information i s  used to  
Thus,  the c o r e  thickness and profile a r e  
The f i r s t  s tep  in the p rocess  i s  to  inflate the aft facing sheet  with a i r  
p r e s s u r e  to  1 /2  psi .  This  p r e s s u r e  causes  the facing sheet  to  expand like 
a balloon into a smooth contour. 
designed ti, hold the facing sheet  and to  s e a l  the undersurfaces  so  that th i s  
inflation can be  accomplished and maintained. By using the rainbow beam 
and work platforms,  43 dial  indicators  a r e  employed to m e a s u r e  the bulkhead 
contour at each 2 -degree  increment  of bulkhead circumference.  
method r e su l t s  in  a measurement  of 7740 points for  the aft facing sheet .  
These  measu remen t s  a r e  made  and documented by certif ied mechanics ,  and 
ver i f ied by Quality Control. Engineering converts  these  measurements  to  
c o r e  cutting tables  for  use  by Manufacturing in establishing the honeycomb 
c o r e  machining pa rame te r s .  
The  tool for  th i s  purpose i s  especially 
This 
Before adhesive i s  applied the c o r e  blocks a r e  fi t  checked to  the 
facing shee t  contour by using a layer  of polyvinylchloride ( P V C )  both to  
s imulate  the adhesive thickness  and to  provide an impress ion  check. 
this  operation ver i f ies  that  the co re  matches  the facing sheet  within 
0.010 inch, the bonding operation can commence. 
When 
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A cormpartmentized vacuum bell i s  placed over  the forward facing 
shee t  and secured  in  place,  
compartment;  l a t e r ,  vacuum i s  applied to t h e  upper Compartment. The 
s lack  in the facing shee t  skin is  eliminated a s  the skin a r e a  is moved into 
its no rma l  contour,  
measu remen t s  can be made.  
A vacuum is applied t o  the lower vacuurn bel l  
When the facing sheet  is drawn 'smooth, p rec i se  contour 
The  forward  facing shee t  contour t rac ing  is taken in a manner  s i m i l a r  
This t rac ing  r equ i r e s  756Q'measurements  
t o  that  utilized for  the aft  facing sheet, except that  the contour measu red  is 
on the inside of the facing sheet.  
to  b e  recorded by Manufacturing and verified by Quality Control. 
The aft facing shee t  with co re  panels bonded in place i s  fixed to the 
machining tool; the in te rna l  su r f ace  i s  p re s su r i zed  to 1 / 2  psi;  and co re  
m a t e r i a l  i s  removed in  ten thousandths of an  inch increments  around the 
c o r e  panel ' s  per iphery.  
contour matches the forward facing shee t  contour. The a i rborne  minute 
dus t  par t ic les  caused by milling the nylon fabric  c o r e  make  it mandatory 
fo r  employees in  the machining a r e a  to wear  r e sp i r a to r s .  
operat ion is s ta r ted ,  equipment is inspected to a s s u r e  that each  component 
is secure ly  attached and is i n  working o r d e r .  The 43 adjustments for con- 
troll ing cutting contour a r e  s e t  to da ta  computed by Engineering f r o m  the 
aft and forward facirlg sheet  t rac ings ,  and a t e s t  cut is mil led a c r o s s  the 
honeycomb core  panel. Cutting machine head is re-adjusted for  the next 
0. 010-inch cut af ter  each  360 degree  mill ing sweep. 
This operation continues until  the  co re  panel  
Before this 
The  forward facing sheet  is t r ans fe r r ed  to  the location of the aft facing 
sheet  and c o r e  panel with an overhead bridge c rane  and a vacuum bell. 
forward facing sheet  i s  lowered onto the co re ,  making cer ta in  that the p r e -  
s e t  facing sheet  indexing t a rge t s  align and that the assembly  is level. 
hundred th i r ty  special  turnbuckle-type load cel ls  a r e  installed hand-tight. 
The  assembly  i s  slowly drawn over the co re  panel l ike a beanie cap  by 
incremental ly  tightening the load cells.  
load ce l l  is indicating 1000 pounds. 
s tored.  
The  
One 
This  procedure  continues until each 
Then the vacuum bel l  is removed and 
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BULKHEAD CIRCUMFERENCE CONTROL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
The  33-foot-diameter  welded bulkhead assembl ies  used on S-I1 m u s t  
be fabricated to  a specific equator ia l  c i rcumferent ia l  dimension within a 
to le rance  of * O .  078 inch (which i s  theoret ical ly  * O .  025 inch on the d iameter ) ,  
Because  of the apparent  var ia t ions encountered in  t r imming and weld 
shr inkage of the 12 mer id ian  welds,  the tolerance was quite hard  to maintain.  
The  effect of exceeding the * O .  078-inch tolerance i s  an increased  mismatch  
with the Circumference of the mating bulkhead o r  cylinder.  This  mismatch  
compounds the task  of effecting a proper  weld joint alignment, which r equ i r e s  
that  t h e  s m a l l e r  a s sembly  be s t re tched to match the l a rge r .  
SOLU TION ECOMMENDATION . 
In  o r d e r  t o  minimize- the var ia t ion of the bulkhead circumference,  an 
as  sembly sequence was instituted that required inc r e m  ental c i rcumference  
measurement .  These  measu remen t s  were  accomplished with a Pi tape 
and were  taken af te r  every  second mer id ian  weld was completed, s tar t ing 
af ter  weld six. This  procedure  allows for  any required cor rec t ions  to  be 
performed dar ing  the subsequent two gore t r i m  operations.  
tion of this procedure should be  undertaken on f i r s t - a r t i c l e  fabrication. 
The  implementa- 
DISCUSSION 
The use  of th i s  procedure  has  resul ted in bulkheads of quite consistent 
One future  advantage of this  m o r e  p rec i se  c i r cum-  c i rcumferent ia l  quality, 
fe ren t ia l  control  is that any new c i rcumferent ia l  backup b a r s  (an apply-type 
weld joint alignment f ix ture)  can be designed much lighter because much l e s s  
fo rce  i s  required to  effect proper  weld joint alignment.- 
REFERENCES 
Saturn S-I1 Product ion Operation Techniques,  Production Welding, 
Volume I, Bulkhead Welding, SD 70-559-1, pages 20-28 ,  92-103.  
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COMMON BULKHEAD HONEYCOMB MERIDIAN MACHINING CUTTER 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
T h e  mach in ing  of the  c o m m o n  bulkhead honeycomb c o r e ,  a phenol ic  
i m p r e g n a t e d  nylon m a t e r i a l ,  p r e s e n t e d  the  p r o b l e m  of producing  a f in i shed  
s u r f a c e  cu t  c l ean ly  and  without edge  f r a y  while  us ing  v e r y  l i t t l e  cut t ing 
con tac t  p r e s s u r e  d u e  t o  the  f r a g i l i t y  of t h e  material. 
T h e  change  in  the  an t i -p ro f i l e  ( the  p r o f i l e  p e r p e n d i c u l a r  t o  the  
m e r i d i a n  and n o r m a l  t o  mold  l ine  at a given point)  c u r v a t u r e  f r o m  t h e  c e n t e r  
of t h e  bulkhead down to  t h e  bulkhead equa to r  r e p r e s e n t s  approx ima te ly  a 
2 : l  ratio (401 to 198 inch  r a d i u s ) ,  T h i s  change  in  c u r v a t u r e  p r e s e n t e d  a 
p r o b l e m  theore t i ca l ly  with r e g a r d  t o  whe the r  m o r e  than  one c u t t e r  f a c e  
p r o f i l e  m u s t  b e  used  t o  m a c h i n e  the  e n t i r e  c o r e  s u r f a c e .  
c u t t e r  p ro f i l e  w e r e  r e q u i r e d ,  t h i s  would n e c e s s i t a t e  c u t t e r  changes  f o r  
mach in ing  d i f f e ren t  e l eva t ions  of t h e  c o r e  which would f u r t h e r  compl i ca t e  
t h e  opera t ion .  
If m o r e  than  one 
T h e  mach in ing  of t he  c o r e  a l s o  p r e s e n t e d  ano the r  p r o b l e m ,  tha t  of 
mach in ing  t h e  \vide, h a r d  bond l ines  p r e s e n t  be tween individual  c o r e  sec t ions .  
T h e  d e s i g n  of t he  honeycomb c o r e  c u t t e r  r e p r e s e n t e d  s e v e r a l  variables, 
e. g . ,  d i a m e t e r ,  f a c e  width,  f a c e  concavi ty ,  revolu t ions  per minu te  and 
cut t ing m e d i u m .  T h e  d i a m e t e r  w a s  d e t e r m i n e d  by what  s e e m e d  t o  b e  a 
r e a s o n a b l e  p r o x i m i t y  of the  ska te -moun ted  c u t t e r  d r i v e  m o t o r  shaf t  c e n t e r  
l ine  t o  c o r e .  
8:inch d i a m e t e r .  
T h i s  d i m e n s i o n  w a s  4 inches ,  which obviously r e s u l t s  i n  a n  
B e c a u s e  of t he  known a b r a s i v e n e s s  of phenol ic-nylon honeycomb Core,  
a d i amond-coa ted  c u t t e r  \vas  t r i e d .  
c u t t e r s  would w o r k  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  if the  cut t ing surface speed  exceeded  
6000. sui-face feet per minu te .  
T e s t i n g  p roved  tha t  d i amond-coa ted  
T h e  concavi ty  of t he  c u t t e r  f a c e  w a s  m a d e  t o  the  la rger  a fo remen t ioned  
r a d i u s .  
0.0015 inch  when cu t t ing  in  the  198- inch  r a d i u s  area b a s e d  on a 2 - inch  cu t  
width i n c r e m e n t .  
width i n c r e m e n t s  w e r e  kep t  at 2 i nches  o r  less. 
T h i s  ca l cu la t ed  out a s  c r e a t i n g  a t h e o r e t i c a l  e r r o r  of l e s s  than  
T h e  f a c e  of the  c u t t e r  w a s  m a d e  3 i nches  wide  but cu t -  
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The  implementat ion of th i s  machining approach is  most advisable  
during tooling conception phase.  
DISCUSSION 
The  design of th i s  cu t te r  has  proven to be quite successful .  
diamond coating longevity and the finish produced have been excellent,  
cost  for  this  cu t te r  could be considered reasonable  when the  cos t  of other  
types of spec ia l  f o r m  cu t t e r s  and the probable difference in longevity a r e  
considered. 
Both the 
The  
R E F E R E N C E S  
Tool  Design T-7200415, Sheet G-10, Detail  1001 
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HIGH ENERGY FORMING OF BULKHEAD GORE SECTIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Because of the i r  e x t r e m e  s ize ,  approximately 10 x 22 feet ,  the bulkhead 
gore  thin sect ions could not b e  fo rmed  by conventional means  within a 
reasonable  dis tance of the Los  Angeles a r e a ,  Likewise, the fully machined 
bulkhead go re  waffle sect ions (which have a diagonally oriented, egg-crated 
standing rib stiffener pat tern on what is, af ter  forming, the concave surface.! 
cpuld not b e  formed proper ly  by standard techniques. 
SOLUTION /RE.COMh<ENDATION 
In o r d e r  to  m e e t  this  forming requirement ,  a high energy forming 
facil i ty was established a t  E l  Toro,  California. 
filled forming pits up to  25 feet  in d iameter  by 15 feet  deep and a c r a n e  
capacity of 80  tons. Likewise, a s e r i e s  of hig'h energy form dies  were  
fabricated to  accommodate  the var ious bulkhead sections . 
This  facility included wa te r -  
I 
Briefly s ta ted,  high energy forming  is the use  of explosives for  forming 
ductile me ta l s  to  a d ie  sur face .  
formed onto a female d ie  and drawing a vacuum between the p a r t  and die. 
The  explosive charge  is then installed a predetermined dis tance above the 
workpiece. Then the die,  workpiece, and charge a r e  submerged in a pit of 
water .  The explosive charge  i s  detonated, and the result ing shock-wave 
fo rces  the workpiece into the d ie  cavity producing a formed part .  
This  was done by clamping the sheet t o  be  
The decision of whether o r  not t o  use  high energy forming o r  m o r e  
conventional methods should b e  made  a t  the pse-design s tage so that the p a r t  
design might be more compatible with the selected forming technique, 
DISCUSSION 
The  use  of high energy forming has  resul ted in a prac t ica l  method of 
This  type of forming has  many advantages over  conventional 
c forming ove r s i ze  and unique p a r t s  such as the bulkhead gore  thin and waffle 
sections.  
methods,  e. g. , reduced springback, unlimited forming p res su re ,  near ly  
any thickness and/or  s i z e  of p a r t  can be formed, only a female die  is 
required,  c lose  to le rances  can be  obtained on any s i z e  par t ,  and otherwise 
difficult  o r  impossible  shapes can be formed readily.  
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REFERENCES 
1. NR Document NA-64- 170, Explosive Forming.  
2. NR Document NA-69-531, High Energy  Forming,  Sa turn  11, 
Technica l  Manual, Section C - Bulkhead C o r e  Pane l  Forming.  
3, NR Document NA-69-531 ,  High Energy  Forming  - E l  Toro,  
Sa turn  11, Technica l  Manual, Section E3 - Waff l e s .  
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LH2 CY LlNDER ROTATING FIXTURE FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Because of manufacturing schedule requi rements ,  it was necessa ry  to  
es tabl ish a new c i rcumferent ia l  weld station. At  the t ime ,  opposed a r c ,  
opposed nugget TIC welding and pulsed a r c  MIG welding w e r e  being con- 
s idered  for  c i rcumferent ia l  welding. 
designed with these  types of welding in mind. 
It was des i r ed  that this new station be  
Each of these  types of welding r equ i r e s  welding f rom both s ides  of a 
At the t ime,  the 9nly capability to  weld external ly  was by using an panel. 
apply-type vacuum cup supported weld skate  t rack.  
presented an additional problem in that two torches  a r e  used simultaneously 
and m u s t  r ema in  d i rec t ly  opposed to  each other.  If this  were  done by using 
internal  and ex terna l  skate  t racks ,  t he re  would a l so  be  a problem of slaving 
one skate  to  the other  to  maintain the d i r ec t  opposition of the torches.  
The  opposed a r c  welding 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The  basic  solution to this  problem was to  rotate  the cyl inders  and 
mount the weld torches  on s ta t ionary pedestals.  
plished by fabricating a precis ion turntable dr iven by a dual-dr ive position 
Sciakydyne dr ive  with precis ion speed regulation controlled through the 
weld pack. 
This  effort was accom- 
DISCUSSION 
The precis ion turntable  simplified the internal  and external  weld torch  
positioning requi rement  and eliminated the need for  vacuum cup supported 
skate  t racks .  
versa t i l i ty  and reduced the probability of accidentally damaging any hardware  
because of the reduction of apply-type tooling involved. 
Th i s  solution resul ted i n  a weld station with increased  
The concept of rotating the pa r t  resul ted in a convenient and efficient 
operation even though i t  w a s  decided that s t ra ight  TIG welding would bes t  s e r v e  
this s ta t ion 's  purpose.  
REFERENCES 
Tool Design T-7204224, Circumferent ia l  Welding Turntable  
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SiNGLE LAYOUT FOR DOUBLE-SIDED PRINTED CiRCUlT BOARD 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Separa te  ar t  work was  required fo r  f ront  view and r e a r  view for a 
double-sided printed c i rcu i t  board.  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
An S-I1 or iginal  art  work was prepared  by applying all t'ape and pads 
on one view - r e d  t r anspa ren t  tape to  depict  f a r  s ide c i rcu i t ry ,  blue t r a n s -  
parent  tape for  n e a r  s ide circui t ry ,  and black tape for pads and circuit;y 
appearing on both s ides .  
absolute r ea r - to - f ron t  reg is t ra t ion  was accomplished and a light table was 
not required to  align o r  check regis t ra t ion of te rmina l  pad holes.  
positive and negative manufacturing tool (actual  s i ze )  was obtained d i rec t ly  
f r o m  the pr inted 'c i rcui t  original by using a photographing system. Th i s  
sys tem uses  a c a m e r a  loaded with or th-chronmt ic  f i lm,  a f i l t e r  over the 
method should be incorporated during init ial  design. 
By applying all tape and pads on a single view, 
The 
; lens  ( red  o r  blue f i l t e r ) ,  and blacklighting to  achieve des i red  resu l t s .  This  
DISCUSSION 
In a double-sided printed circui t  board,  i t  was required that a four 
times s i z e  printed c i rcu i t  or iginal  ( a r t  work) be prepared  for  the front view 
and a second sepa ra t e  or iginal  be prepared  fo r  the r e a r  view. A coordinate 
gr id  and a light table  w e r e  used to a s s u r e  c lose  to le rance  ( r e a r - t o - f r o n t  
reg is t ra t ion  t e rmina l  hole pads).  
follows : 
Shortcomings to  this  method were  as 
1. Absolute reg is t ra t ion  from r e a r  to front on t e rmina l  holes cannot 
be accomplished. 
2 .  Design and drafting t ime  i s  increased .  
3 .  A light table and s t r ingent  checking a re  required to  a s s u r e  good 
regis t ra t ion.  
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SUBSYSTEM H A R D W A R E  I N S T A L L A T I O N  I N T E R F E R E N C E  
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
P e r s o n n e l  working  in  t h e  a r e a  of the  af t  s k i r t  and t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  of 
. t h e  S-I1 w e r e  cons tan t ly  i n t e r r u p t e d  d u e  to the  h a r n e s s  changes  and tubing 
rout ing  f i t  checks  in t h i s  conges t ed  a r e a .  
f i gu ra t ion  t o  a n  ex is t ing  s y s t e m ,  an  i n t e r f e r e n c e  p r o b l e m  re sn l t ed .  T h e s e  
p r o b l e m s  c r e a t e d  d e s i g n  p r o b l e m s  and schedu le  d e l a y s  d u e  t o  mul t ip l e  
r:work and f i t  check  ope ra t ions .  
S o m e t i m e s ,  b e c a u s e  of r e c o n -  
SOLUTION/ R ECOMMl7NDATION 
T h e  s y s t e m s  d i m e n s i o n a l  s i m u l a t o r  (SDS) ,was  developed.  T h e  SDS, 
a f u l l - s c a l e  r ep l i ca  of the  veh ic l e  af t  s k i r t  and t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ,  i s  u sed  f o r  
deve lopmen t  p u r p o s e s ,  e a r l y '  p r o b l e m  ident i f icat ion,  des ign  ana lys i s ,  and 
evaluat ion of h a r n e s s ,  tub'ing, and m e c h a n i c a l  rout ing and mount ing  i n t e r  - 
f a c e s  without intcarit.rcn(-e on s t age  fabr ica t ion .  
deve lopment  a s p e c t  ,>f the s i m u l a t o r ,  the  intangible  benef i t s  ( i .  e . ,  t r a in ing ,  
s p e c i a l  s t u d i e s ,  expe r imen ta t ion ,  p r o p o s a l s ,  e tc .  ) d e r i v e d  f r o m  the  p r o g r a m  
a r e  n u m e r o u s .  
As ide  f r o m  t h e  p r i m a r y  
DISCUSSION 
T h e  af t  s k i r t  and t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  a r e a ,  which i s  t he  m o s t  conges ted  of 
a l l  a r e a s  o n  t he  s p a c e  vel i ic le ,  conta ins  about  7 0  p e r c e n t  of a l l  m e c h a n i c a l  
and e l e c t r i c a l  s y s t e n i s .  T h i s  a r e a  is sub jec t  t o  complex  rout ing  of tubing 
and  h a r n e s s e s  and posi t ioning of componen t s .  In t h e  pas t ,  t he  p r o b l e m  of 
phys i ca l  i n t e r f e r e n c e  has c a u s e d  r ev i s ion  t o  des ign  changes  a f t e r  f o r m a l  
r e l e a s e  of docunientat ion.  To  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  poss ib i l i ty  of i n t e r f e r e n c e  i s  
p a r a m o u n t  i f  c o s t  e f f ec t iveness  i s  t o  b e  r ea l i zed  in  modi f ica t ion  of an  
ex is t ing  s y s t e m ,  o r  imp lemen ta t ion  of a new s y s t e m .  
' o c c u r r e d  du r ing  the  coiirse of the  p r o g r a m ,  p e r s o n n e l  ins ta l l ing  t h e s e  
s y s t e m s  w e r e  i n t e r r u p t e d  b y  f i t  conf l ic t s  o r  ve r i f i ca t ion  checks  and m a n u -  
fa c t 11 1- in  g r e s 11 I t  ed . 
B e c a u s e  t h e s e  changes  
T h e  SDS p r o g r a m  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  imp lemen ted ,  and me thods  of con-  
f igu ra t ion  con t ro l  w e r e  ins t i tu ted .  T o  a s s u r e  the  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  des ign ,  P r o -  
g r a m  Des ign  Engineer ing ,  Manufac tur ing ,  and Qual i ty  Con t ro l  jo in t ly  r e v i e w  
the  change  as  it h a s  b e e n  m a d e  on the  SDS, b e f o r e  f o r m a l  r e l e a s e  of 
engine  e r i n g doc  um en t a t i on. Al l  s p e c  i f  i c at ion s r e g  a rd in g b r a c k e t  r y d e  s ign 
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spacings mus t  be m e t  a s  well a s  the general  routing and placement of 
components to  satisfy t h e  interfaces of the system and ensure  that the 
installation in question does not c r ea t e  a possible interference with another 
system. 
a r e  a s  optimum as possible, formal  documentation for  production can be 
processed  f rom the design group and in te r fe rence- f ree  installation can be 
accomplished. 
Once an agreement  is made  that a l l  avenues of design and quality 
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STANDARDIZATION OF WIRE HARNESS INSTALLATION CRITERIA - 
STATION AND STRINGER MARKERS 
PROBLEM STATEhIENT AND EFFECT 
V a r i o u s  types  of ident i f icat ion m a r k e r s  had been  ins ta l led  on 
s t r i n g e r s  and s t a t ions  t o  f ac i l i t a t e  ins ta l la t ions .  Lack of s tandar&ized  p r o -  
c e d u r e s  r e s u l t e d  in  i n c o r r e c t  posi t ioning and ins ta l la t ion  of w i r e  h a r n e s s e s .  
S/3LUTION/RECOMh4 FlNDATION 
A s t a t i o g  m a r k e r  me thod  w a s  developed  and implemen ted  on S-I1 
t o  p r e c l u d e  u n n e c e s s a r y  p r o b l e m s  d u r i n g  ins ta l la t ion .  
loca t ion  m a r k e r s  a r e  a t t ached  t o  w i r e  h a r n e s s e s  du r ing  fabr ica t ion .  Dur ing  
in s t a l l a t ion  of t r u n k  w i r e  h a r n e s s e s ;  the  h a r n e s s  i s  a l igned with the  locat ion 
depic ted  on the  s t a t ion  o r  s t r i n g e r  m a r k e r ,  t h e r e b y  c o r r e c t  w i r e  h a r n e s s  
posi t ioning i s  a s s u r e d .  . 
Stat ion and s t r i n g e r  
1 DISCUSSION 
V a r i o u s  types  of ident i f icat ion techniques  w e r e  dev i sed  by  Manufac tur ing  
p e r s o n n e l  t o  m a r k  s t r i n g e r s  and s ta t ion  p l anes  (e .  g . ,  m a s k i n g  t ape ,  dyna-  
t ape ,  co lo red  p a p e r ,  and penci l  m a r k s )  t o  identify spec i f ic  location's in  the  
S-11. h l i s loca ted  or i n c o r r e c t  m a r k i n g s  r e su l t ed  i n  i n c o r r e c t  ins ta l la t ions ,  
s h o r t  w i r e  h a r n e s s e s ,  and m i s r o u t e d  w i r e  h a r n e s s e s .  N u m e r o u s  such  
d i s c r e p a n c i e s  n e c e s s i t a t e d  implemen ta t ion  of an  e f f ic ien t  and r e l i a b l e  s y s  - 
tem to  e n s u r e  c o r r e c t  posi t ioning of w i r e  h a r n e s s e s .  
Dur ing  deve lopmen t  ac t iv i t i e s  on the  s y s t e m s  d imens iona l  s i m u l a t o r ,  
Stat ion m a r k e r  l oca -  p r o p e r  in s t a l l a t ion  of e a c h  w i r e  h a r n e s s  is ver i f ied .  
t i ons  a r e  f o r w a r d e d  t o  Wir ing  Analys is  p e r s o n n e l  f o r  inc lus ion  in a s s e m b l y  
i n s t r u c t i o n  documen t s .  Dimens ioned  loca t ions  of n i a r k e r s  a r e  spec i f ied  in  
t h e  h a r n e s s  a s s e m b l y  p r o c e d u r e ,  and the  m a r k e r s  ( T y - w r a p  t y p e )  a r e  , 
i n s t a l l ed  on the  w i r e  h a r n e s s  by  u t i l i z ing  a n  o p e r a t o r ' s  g e n e r a l  i n s t ruc t ion  
document .  
f i na l  ins ta l la t ion  document .  Alignment  of t he  p rev ious ly  ins ta l led  m a r k e r s  
on w i r e  h a r n e s s e s  t o  loca t ions  spec i f ied  in  the  s t a g e  f ina l  ins ta l la t ion  p r o -  
c e d u r e  a s s u r e s  tha t  h a r n e s s e s  a r e  in s t a l l ed  c o r r e c t l y .  
S ta t ion  and s t r i n g e r  loca t ions  a r e  a l s o  depic ted  in  the  s t a g e  
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CLAMPING OF PHENOLIC HONEYCOMB CORE FOR PERIPHERAL MACHINING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The  clamping of compound contoured phenolic impregnated nylon 
honeycomb c o r e  presented a problem because  of the honeycomb's ex t reme 
fragil i ty and the infinite number of s i zes .  Mechanical means  of clamping 
w e r e  undesirable due to  the fragil i ty of the honeycomb and the expense of 
accommodating the number of s i zes  involved. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A tool was built with a perforated sur face  duplicating the des i red  m a l e  
compound contour. The underside of this sur face  was encldsed, creat ing 
a plenum connector to  a l a rge  s q u i r r e l  cage blower. This  blower c rea t e s  
a high-volume, very-low-quality,  negative p r e s s u r e  in the plenum chamber.  
When a section of honeycomb co re  i s  positioned on the tool 's  perforated 
sur face  and a shee t  of plast ic  i s  placed over the exposed surface of honey- 
c o r e  is provided by the negative p r e s s u r e  to allow for  accura te  t r imming.  
! comb core ,  except for  the edge to  be  t r immed ,  sufficient clamping of the 
DISCUSSION 
This  approach allows for  an infinite number of c o r e  s izes ,  which fall  
within the tool ' s  dimensional capacity, to be t r immed.  
of clamping fo rce  and use  of a s imple sheet of plastic r a the r  than special  
clamping components for  each s ize  and shape of c o r e  have proven to be 
quite effective. 
The  even distribution 
This  par t icu lar  application uses  a skate  beam swung above the c o r e  
m a t e r i a l  t o  achieve one direct ion of t r i m .  
ska te  beam, effecting the second direction of t r im .  
A t r i m  skate  moves along the 
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N ON -COPPE R -C LA D PR I N T E  D CI RCU IT BOAR DS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Copper-clad glass  epoxy o r  copper-clad phenolic ma te r i a l  used for 
fabrication of printed c i rcu i t  boards requi res  ex t reme c a r e  and inspection 
operations in the p rocess  of removing the excessive copper to’ form the 
required c i rcu i t  image.  Delamination usually r e su l t s  i f  th is  ex t ra  c a r e  i s  
not exercised.  
SOL U T  ION / R E  COMMENDATION 
In o r d e r  to  acce le ra t e  design and fabrication of printed circui t  boards 
and a l so  reduce cost  and the rejection ra te ,  the existing stock of epoxy g lass  
The  punching, 
blanking, and dr i l l ing operations were  performed without the problem of 
weakening the laminate  bond. 
using a si lk screenable  conductive s i lver  epoxy compound. 
- board o r  phenolic m a t e r i a l  (without copper clad) was utilized. 
The required c i rcu i t ry  was  then applied by 
DISCUSSION 
The copper-clad glass  epoxy o r  copper-clad phenolic ma te r i a l  used in 
the fabrication of printed c i rcu i t  boards  always requi res  ex t ra  operations in 
removing the excessive copper to  fo rm the required circui t  image. 
of the ma in  problems encountered when using copper-clad ma te r i a l s  a r e  a s  
Some 
follows: 
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
5. 
Copper-clad stock m u s t  be  inspected when received f rom the 
vendor o r  laminate  s u r f a c e  pinholes, which will cause  lack of ink 
adherence when s i lkscreening i s  performed.  
Copper-clad laminate  will va ry  in color. 
Laminate  bond is usually weakened by punching, dril l ing,  o r  
piercing, causing portions of pads to  lift. 
During punching, dril l ing,  o r  piercing i f  the  oils used a r e  not 
proper ly  removed, t he re  will be a lack of ink adherence when 
s i lkscreening i s  performed.  
Discoloration o r  permanent  staining somet imes  occurs .  
organic r e s i s t  used for  etching operations mus t  be  removed,  
The  
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TRIMMING OF EXCESS FOAM INSULATION FROM FOAM-FILLED 
HONEYCOMB CORE SHEETS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The manufacture of foam-filled honeycomb c o r e  sheets presented a 
This  buildup removal  required an excessive amount of hand labor to 
problem of removing the excess  foam buildup which resulted during fabrica-  
tion. 
. whittle off. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A standard 14-inch woodworking band saw was modified by removing 
the table and increasing the throat opening to  34 inches and then rigging into 
a throat-down attitude above a conveyor table. 
the saw was designed to provide counterbalanced ver t ica l  adjustment, By 
adjusting the saw to the dedired height and running the foam-filled honey- 
comb through t h e  saw by using the conveyor table, the excess  foam was 
removed with one saw cut. 
The s t ruc ture  that supports 
This approach of modifying a band saw was dictated by an immediate 
specific need, In the future i t  i s  recommended that a commercially avail-  
able horizontal band saw be used. A commercial  band s a w  would resul t  i n  
a m o r e  sophisticated and efficient unit. 
DISCUSSION 
A dust collection sys tem was installed to preclude any safety hazard 
f rom the foam dust produced during band saw cutting operations, 
stop buttons were  a l so  installed on both s ides  of the conveyor table for  
improved accessibil i ty in an emergency, 
Saw motor  
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ALUMINUM ALLOY CORROSION 
C o r r o s i o n  of 2014 aluminum alloy components on the S-I1 w a s  a 
continuing p r o b l e m  dur ing  fabricat ion and assembly .  
o r  sc rapping  of h a r d w a r e  as  wel l  as a consequent impact  on cos t  and schedule.  
It resu l ted  in r e p a i r  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
A new c o r r o s i o n  cont ro l  specification was r e l e a s e d  f o r  components 
m a d e  f r o m  aluminum al loys.  Additionally, Manufacturing O r d e r  Planning 
documentation w a s  init iated that  included improved  operat ional  and ver i f ica-  
tion sequences ,  as defined by the p r o c e s s  specification. 
DISCUSSION 
T h e  p r o b l e m  of c o r r o s i o n  h a s  been  recognized s ince  1963. Investigation 
of the problem s t a r t e d  in D e c e m b e r  1966 and continued through M a r c h  1967. 
T h e  r e s u l t s  of the  investigation a r e  documented in  SID 67-533. 
REFERENCES 
1. C o r r o s i o n  Investigation of Aluminum Components of the 
Sa turn  S-I1 Stage,  SID 67-533 
2. P r o c e s s  Specification MA0609-007 
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SIMPLIFIED CONNECTOR KEYING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Flight a r t i c l e  connector requirements  a r e  such that connectors in the 
s a m e  vicinity requi red  a different key a r rangement  to prevent mismating of 
interconnecting ha rnesses .  
that  i t  was c a r r i e d  over to in-process  special  t es t  equipment (STE). 
This  requi rement  was s o  great ly  emphasized 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
A connector was developed that can be  re-keyed without disassembly 
f r o m  STE adapter  cable.  It i s  recommended that del iverable  equipment 
continue to  be designed such that any interfaces  within the s a m e  vicinity 
should have different keying ar rangements ,  but that  STE interconnecting 
adapter  cables  be  designed utilizing this clockable connector (F igure  18), 
which allows the use of the s a m e  adapter  cable to  interface with a l l  the 
different keying ar rangements .  
DISCUSSION 
One of the phases  in  which manufacturing cos ts  i nc rease  substantially 
The  
is  in the design t ime fo r ,  and quantity of, interconnecting adapter  cables 
required and fabricated for  u se  in checking out del iverable  equipment. 
numerous designs and quantity of cable adapters  required a r e  the resul t  of 
S-11 Engineering complying with good design prac t ices .  
A universal  type of special  t e s t  equipment i s  usually designed to  check 
out the different types of del iverable  equipment. 
cables a r e  then designed to  hook up with these different pieces  of del iverable  
equipment, which may o r  m a y  not be installed in the s a m e  vicinity; thus 
a different key a r rangement  i s  required to prevent mismating. Because of 
this  requirement ,  a different STE cable adapter  i s  designed and fabricated 
fo r  each different interface.  
Interconnecting adapter  
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CONNECTOR PIN BENDING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Damage to connector pins during mating caused shor t -c i rcu i t  and 
s y s t e m  malfunctions.  
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
On fu ture  p rograms ,  a n  improved type of connector should be used 
such as amphenol 270 s e r i e s  shown i n  F i g u r e  19. 
en 
DISCUSSION 
Because  of the  s i z e  and complexity of the S-II, the mult iple  haqness  
concept was used to interconnect  a l l  the  different subsystems.  
h a r n e s s  concept consis ted of 16 cryogenic,  25 in te rs tage ,  235 aft sk i r t ,  
59 forward  sk i r t ,  and 83 tunnel t runk  h a r n e s s e s  i n  addition to 11 7 container 
J -box and miscel laneous black-box ha rnesses .  During the p rocesses  of 
bench checking, install ing,  and testing, the  ha rness  connector pins a r e  
somet imes  bent, shorting out o r  causing sys t em malfunctions. In o r d e r  to 
prevent  t hese  hazardous  conditions o n  fu ture  p rograms  , i t  is recommended 
that  a n  improved type of connector such as amphenol 270 series be 
incorporated into h a r n e s s  designs.  
sockets  r e c e s s e d  i n  r e spec t  to the plug and receptac le  shell ,  eliminating 
the  possibility of the pins o r  sockets coming i n  contact with any pa r t  of 
the connector when a plug i s  inadvertently cocked while mating. The pin 
contact i s  shrouded by the i n s e r t  instead of the socket contact being shrouded 
by the  in se r t .  The exposed socket contact is approximately four  times m o r e  
r e s i s t an t  to  bending than the pin because  of its larger  d iameter .  
This  mult iple  
This  type of connector has  pins and 
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PLUG WELL 
Figure 19. Wiring Connector 
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RF COAXIAL CONNECTOR JAM NUT TORQUE RELAXATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The  coaxial cable shield braid,  when secured to the coaxial connector 
by compression,  "cold flows" with the result ing degradation of the j a m  nut 
torque values. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
To determine the necessary correct ive action, sample cables w e r e  
subjected to a s e r i e s  of tes t s .  
result ing f rom these t e s t s  a r e  a s  follows: 
The changes to manufacturing processes  a 
1. Coaxial connector j a m  nuts will be  torqued to the specified values 
and re-torqued after 24 hours.  
2.  Whenever a j a m  nut i s  suspected of being loose o r  i f  the torque 
s t r i p  has  been disturbed, the j a m  nut will be considered properly 
torqued when the j a m  nut cannot be  moved by hand. 
3. When the j a m  nut i s  considered to be loose, the jam nut will.be 
tightened by hand only. 
Another approach is  to bond the coaxial cable to the coaxial connector. 
The process  for performing this task i s  a s  follows: 
1. Tighten the j a m  nut to a specified torque value. 
2. P e r f o r m  electr ical  integrity checks. 
3.  Remove the j a m  nut, making s u r e  a l l  components r ema in  i n  their  
proper  position. 
4. Apply adhesive to the area of the connector where the j a m  nut is 
nor m a  lly ins tall ed . 
5. Replace the jam nut and tighten to the  specified values. 
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DISCUSSION 
Several  discrepancies  re la ted to R F  coaxial connectors were  noted on 
various S-II stages. 
value and, i n  a few cases ,  complete loosening of the connector j a m  nut. 
t ime elapsed between cable fabrication and observance of the discrepancy was 
f r o m  one day to many months. 
The problem was relaxation of the fabricated torque 
The 
To determine the necessary cor rec t ive  action, a n  evaluation was made 
of the assembly procedures  and subsequent use  of a l l  S-I1 stage R F  coaxial 
connectors. Concufrent with this  investigation, 14 sample cable assembl ies  
were  fabricated and subjected to a s e r i e s  of tes t s .  
All the mechanical tes t s ,  torquing, re-torquing, and measurement  of 
j a m  nut rotations clear ly  show that R F  coaxial connectors a r e  subject to 
torque relaxation. In  no case,  however, did the torque dec rease  to a value 
which permitted the j am nut to be turned by hand. 
compression within the connector ra ther  that  rotation of the j a m  nut. After 
each re-torquing, the amoutzt of torque relaxation and subsequent j a m  nut 
rotation decreased.  
consistently. 
a compression gasket; a l l  o thers  used a type of gasket that i s  cut i n  two 
during connector fabrication. 
The relaxation was due to 
One connector did exhibit maximum torque relaxation 
8 This connector was the only one in the t e s t  samples  that used 
The e lec t r ica l  charac te r i s t ics  ( V S W R )  a r e  essentially unaffected by 
repeated torquing, and a megger test performed on each cable se t  with al l  
cables connected i n  s e r i e s  showed the res i s tance  to be far in  excess  of the 
specification minimum. A vibration tes t ,  performed on two cable a s sem-  
b l ies  at  levels grea te r  than expected during flight, also confirmed the 
electr ical  and mechanical integrity of the assemblies .  Although the j a m  nuts 
were  loosened to a finger-tight condition before  the  s t a r t  of vibration testing, 
neither cable malfunctions nor j a m  nut rotations were  observed. 
Based upon the resu l t s  of the var ious tes t s  descr ibed here ,  i t  was 
concluded that the existing torque problem was not due to improper  assembly 
or  usage but ra ther  to an improper  assumption that cable assembly level 
torque values should apply at any t ime af ter  stage installation. 
forgoing t e s t s  indicate that the post-installation torque requirements  can be 
reduced without compromising the mechanical and electr ical  integrity of the 
cable assemblies .  This conclusion is substantiated by the vibration t e s t  and 
also by an evaluation of the various stage installations. 
ve ry  short  and connected to two rigidly mounted components o r ,  in  the case  
of long cables,  a r e  clamped a t  sufficient intervals  to prevent movement. 
All the 
The cables a r e  either 
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ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR, ASSEMBLY OF END BELL AND BUSHING 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
When "0"  and l a r g e r  gauge wi re  i s  used i n  the connector, the fo rce  
requi red  to compress  the in se r t  and engage the gland nut th reads  i s  g rea te r  
than the fo rce  an  assembler  can physically exert. 
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
Q 
The problem was resolved by the development of a small  hand-operated 
p r e s s  suitable for  u se  on the assembly line and in the field. 
DI SCU S SI0 N 
Elec t r ica l  connectors of the circular  MS type employing inser table  and 
removable contacts re ly  o n  compression of the resi l ient  r e a r  grommet to 
provide environmental sealing at the point of wire  entry.  
by drawing a conical-shaped nylon f e r ru l e  over the inser t .  When "0" and 
l a r g e r  gauge wi re  i s  used, compression of the in se r t  and engagement of the 
gland nut 
assembler .  
nector and to a s s u r e  pin alignment. 
This is  accomplished 
threads  r equ i r e  a force  beyond the capability of the average 
Thus,  a hand-operated p res s  was developed to close the con- 
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, LEVERAGE COLUMN 
F i g u r e  20 .  A s t r o  Insertion Tool 
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CONNECTOR, CLEANING AGENTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Inspection of e lectr ical  connectors revealed that there  might be 
possible deleterious effects o r  damage to e lectr ical  connector hardware 
through the use  of some common cleaning agents that were  called out in  
S-I1 process  specifications. 
Assurance to question the quality of the product. 
The effect of this problem caused Quality 
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
Laboratory t e s t s  were  performed to determine what cleaning agents 
were  causing the problem. 
agents. 
On the bas i s  of the test resul ts ,  engineering 
. process  specifications were  changed, eliminating the suspect cleaning 
DISCUSSION 
The full impact of connector degradation by cleaning agents was 
difficult to determine; hence, the laboratory t e s t s  were performed. Other 
problems created by cleaning agents were  reported when the silicone rubber 
swelling res t r ic ted  the assembly of the connector. 
prevalent with large-gauge wires ,  4 gauge through 1 / 0  gauge. F r e o n  T F  
caused the grea tes t  damage; therefore ,  it was eliminated f rom connector 
specifications, 
This problem was m o r e  
It was brought to the attention of the Saturn S-I1 Engineering Depart-  
ment  that there  might be possible deleterious effects and/or  damage to 
e lectr ical  connector hardware  through the use  of some common cleaning 
agents. An investigation was conducted by Space Division personnel on 
cleaning solvents that a r e  in  fa i r ly  common use  and called out i n  cer ta in  
North American Rockwell specifications (pr imary  and sub t i e r )  for cleaning 
operations of e lectr ical  connectors. 
The following cleaning agents were  investigated: F reon  T F ,  MEK 
(methyl-ethyl-ketone), p r imary  alcohols (methanol and ethanol) and secondary 
propyl-alcohol. Connector mater ia l s  included the connector shells with 
Alodine 1200s and Ir idi te  8 finishes,  silicone rubber ,  teflon (FEP and TFE) ,  
sealing plugs, gold-plated contacts, and the adhesive bond of the i n s e r t  to the 
shell. 
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Results of the tests indicate that F r e o n  T F  solvent causes  seve re  
swelling and degradation to the silicone rubber  compound of connector 
assembl ies  and its use  i n  cleaning connectors with silicone rubber should 
b e di  s continued. 
MEK had no ser ious  affect when used in  sparing amounts, e. g., a cloth 
saturated and used for wiping. 
excessive u s e  of MEK can damage the adhesives used i n  connector assembly. 
Caution should be exercised,  however, as 
Any of the three  alcohols investigated a r e  suitable and recommended 
fo r  cleaning all the var ious connector composites i temized above. 
th ree ,  isopropanol is  recommended because i t  has  a higher f lash point than 
either ethanol o r  methanol. In  addition, methanol vapors a r e  potentially 
harmful to per  so nnel. 
Of the 
If F r e o n  T F  solvent is used for  cleaning e lec t r ica l  connectors, the . 
effect o n  the sealing ma te r i a l s  should be investigated. 
sideration should be  given to the possible out-gassing of F r e o n  during 
potting o r  foaming operations i n  the vicinity of e lectr ical  connectors. 
In  addition, con- 
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CONNECTOR LOCATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During rework  o r  test cycles ,  locating a par t icu lar  connector was a 
t ime-consuming situation. The  r e a s o n  was  that s o m e  w i r e  h a r n e s s e s  
consis ted of many connectors  routed through s t ruc tu re  a r e a s ,  thereby 
necessi ta t ing a n  extensive s e a r c h  of drawings to de t e rmine  locations.  
S/T>LUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
A s y s t e m  was  devised to  pictor ia l ly  define the exac t  location and 
routing of each  wi re  h a r n e s s ,  including the  s t r inge r  and s ta t ion of each 
connector.  
DISCUS SION 
The  i n c r e a s e  in  the  change activity by engineering o r d e r s  made  
locating connectors  a v e r y  impor tan t  i t em.  
contributed to the problem of locating a connector quickly. 
t ion dramrings consis ted of 15 o r  m o r e  shee ts .  
r e l eased  f inal  instal la t ion documents  f o r  each cr i t i ca l  a r e a ;  i. e . ,  a f t - sk i r t ,  
forlvard sk i r t ,  e tc .  T h e s e  documents  w e r e  used ve ry  extensively by 
Manufacturing, T e s t  Operat ions,  and Quality Assurance  and during 
continuity and insulation r e s i s t a n c e  testing. 
The  s i ze  of the  S-I1 a l so  
Some ins ta l la -  
Manufacturing Engineer ing 
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ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR, REAR SEAL AND GROMMET DAMAGE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The wiring sea ls  of e lectr ical  connectors with inser table  and remov- 
able crimp contacts and resi l ient  r e a r  grommets  a r e  susceptible to 
damage during fabrication of wire  harnesses ,  etc. 
to suspect the reliability of the connector even though the damage i s  
superficial. 
This  damage is cause 
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
On the Saturn S-I1 P rogram,  this  problem was not recognized until the 
design was fixed and hardware  was being produced. 
t ime was to continue to use  the existing design and hardware. 
study of the problem was limited to investigation of damage and i t s  relation- 
ship to the reliability of the connector, the methods employed for  installing 
the contacts into the connector, the tools used in the installation of the 
contacts into the connector, and the personnel skil ls  training requirements.  
The solution proved to be  a combination of acceptance c r i te r ia ,  methods 
training, and tool modification. 
Thus, the solution a t  that  
Subsequent 
. To preclude this problem f rom recurr ing,  connectors with resi l ient  
r e a r  grommets  should be candidates fo r  exclusion from the design. This 
approach, although desirable ,  i s  not always practical. Thus, i f  a connector 
of this type i s  to be used, a selection process  with the emphasis on testing 
should be employed; a lso,  consideration should be  given to the lubrication of 
ins  e r tion tooling. 
DISCUSSION 
The S-I1 uses  approximately 300 electr ical  connectors. 
connector selected for  the task was of the MS circular  type meeting the 
r equi r eme nt s of specifications MIL - C - 5 015D and/or  MIL - C - 2648 2. 
of the nickel-plated copper wi re  employed and i t s  res i s tance  to joining by 
the solder technique and the number of changes anticipated, the connector 
design also incorporated inser table  and removable crirnp-type contacts. 
The pr imary  
B e caus e 
At the onset  of the program, i t  was recognized that the connector 
selected represented a d ras t i c  departure  f rom the fixed-contact solder -type 
connector employed on previous programs.  Therefore ,  extensive training 
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and quality programs were  instituted, The training program included 
indoctrination and certif ication for  each employee as signed connector 
assembly tasks  and required periodic recertification. 
The quality program identified damaged r e a r  grommets  on connectors 
as a major  contributor to the rejection of wiring assemblies .  
the training program was augmented with a section emphasizing procedures  
for the inser t ion and removal  of connector contacts. Specifically, the 
employee was shown the proper technique and the consequences of not 
following the prescr ibed method: 
acceptable working condition; they shall  be inspected by Quality Control 
before and af ter  completion of each connector; to avoid internal damage to 
the connector, do not t\vi.it o r  t i l t  the  inser t ion tool, etc.  Training was not 
the complete answer fo r  the  quality program continGed to identify damaged 
r e a r  grommets  a s  a major  problem. 
As  a resul t ,  
That is, insertion tools shall be  in 
. 
Engineering reviewed and analyzed the type of damage that was occur r -  
This  study included an environmental t e s t  of damaged connectors, and ing. 
the resu l t s  were  compared with supplier-established cr i te r ia .  
of this review, visual standards were  recommended and were adopted by 
Quality Control. 
As a resu l t  
Manufacturing Engineering together with the responsible Design 
Engineering organization investigated the methods and tooling used to assemble 
the connector. 
responsible for to rn  grommets .  
modified to allow lubrication of the tool with fluorinated grease.  
The study concluded that inser t ion tool drag was partly 
The process  specifications were  then 
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HIGH VELOCITY GASES IN FLEX HOSE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
During venting of the S-I1 propellant tanks, high velocity discharge of 
the gas through a flex hose created high frequency vibrations that could 
have resul ted i n  a rupture.  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
* An additional (redundant) vent valve of a smaller  s i ze  was installed 
to vent the tanks at a slower r a t e  to reduce the discharge velocity to 
acceptable levels.  
p re s su res  dropped'to a point where a high velocity discharge would not 
resul t .  
The l a r g e r  vent valve was  opened l a t e r  when the tank 
DISCUSSION 
The discharge of high velocity gas  occurred i n  the pneumostat system, 
' The stage LOX tank was pressur ized  to 76. 7 psia and the LHz tank was 
pressur ized  to  49. 7 psia. 
f lex hoses. 
Both tanks were  vented through 6-inch diameter  
Empir ical  data shows that the maximum vent r a t e  occurred  in the 
Neglecting the effects of temperature ,  the vent 
LHz tank when the  p r e s s u r e  dropped f r o m  44. 7 psia to 39.  7 psia in  a 
period of 1. 2 minutes. 
rate was computed to b e  179 cubic fee t  per second. 
through a 4-inch diameter  hose would resu l t  i n  a discharge velocity of 
900 fps. This i s  equivalent to Mach 0. 8 3 .  
valve reduced the velocity to about Mach 0. 3. 
This volume exhausted 
The use  of the smaller vent 
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VACUUM RELIEF VALVE FOR OPERATION UNDER A LIQUID PRESSURE 
PROBLEbI STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
An i n t e r n a l  nega t ive  p r e s s u r e  g r e a t e r  than  -0.  1 p s i g  w a s  c r e a t e d  
d u r i n g  hydros t a t i c  t e s t s  r e su l t i ng  in  the  c o l l a p s e  of a f o r w a r d  LI-Iz bulkhead 
on the  S-I1 (S-11-31, 
SOLUTION/RE;COMhlENDATION 
Modif icat ions Lvere imp lemen ted  t o  adap t  the  n o r m a l  type  vacuum rel ief  
~ 
valve  s o  t ha t  i t  would o p e r a t e  aga ins t  the  w a t e r  head condi t ions invoked 
du r ing  the  h y d r o t e s t s .  
DISCUSSION 
Due t o  t h e  l ack  of a n  'opening a t  t he  top  of the  LH2 bulkhead,  a n o r m a l  
vacuum re l ie f  va lve  could not  b e  employed  t o  p r e v e n t  nega t ive  i n t e r n a l  
p r e s s u r e s .  S e e  F i g u r e  21  for  hydros t a t i c  t e s t  s e tup .  
T h e  bulkheads  and o the r  large component  p a r t s  of t he  S-I1 tank s t r u c -  
t u r e  a r e  of e x t r e m e l y  th in-wal led  cons t ruc t ion .  
a s s e m b l i e s  r e s e m b l e s  t o  some e x t e n t  t ha t  of a bal loon fi l led with w a t e r ,  
in tha t  they  "grow" unde r  p r e s s u r e .  
T h e  r eac t ion  of t h e s e  
T h e  bulkheads  a r e  hydro te s t ed  in  an  uninsii lated o r  un re in fo rced  condi-  
t ion and a r c  e s p e c i a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  co l l apse  due  t o  nega t ive  i n t e r n a l  
p r e s s u r e s .  Vacuum re l i e f  va lve  l eakage  o c c u r s  d u r i n g  f i l l ing ope ra t ions  due  
t o  bulkhead def lec t ion ,  c r e a t e d  b y  the  i n c r e a s i n g  w a t e r  l eve l  head  e x e r t e d  
a g a i n s t  t he  s i d e s  of the  bulkhead.  T h e  p r e s e t  vacuum re l i e f  va lves ,  b e c a u s e  
of t he  e x t r e m e l y  low a l lowable  nega t ive  p r e s  s u r e  s e t t i n g s ,  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  
qui te  s e n s i t i v e  and wi l l  l eak  d u e  t o  the  above-ment ioned  downward def lec t ion  
of t h e  bulkhead.  
va lve  is  open d u r i n g  the  fi l l ing opera t ion ,  t h e  vacuum re l i e f  va lves  a r e  not  
p l aced  in s e r v i c e  unt i l  a f t e r  c l o s u r e  of t he  vent  va lve  and the  appl ica t ion  of 
a pos i t i ve  i n t e r n a l  p r e s s u r e  on the  a s s e m b l y .  
va lve  is shown i n  F i g u r e  22; a typ ica l  ins ta l la t ion  of such  a va lve  is shown in  
F i g u r e  23.  
A s  a r e s u l t  of t h i s  l eakage  condition, and s i n c e  the  vent  
A s t a n d a r d  vacuum re l ie f  
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F i g u r e  2 2 .  Standard Vacuum Relief Valve 
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RELIEF VALVE 
GASKET 
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:UUM 
F i g u r e  2 3 .  Typical Installation of Standard Vacuum Relief Valve 
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A g r e a t e r  marg in  between valve sett ing and bulkhead fa i lure  p r e s s u r e  
( i f  accura te ly  known) has  not been found to be  pract ical .  
requi rements  to  withstand the hydrostat ic  pressures  involved and to  s e n s e  
the  minute  values  of allowable negative p r e s s u r e s  has  reacfied the s t a t e  of 
t he  art  in the  existing vacuum relief valve: 
develop a modified vacuum relief valve. 
The  combination of 
i t  therefore  became necessa ry  to  
This  modified vacuum. relief valve (F igu re  24)  installed in  a typical 
application (F igu re  25)  is  descr ibed  as follows: 
Leve r  7 i s  r a i sed  to  allow inner  valve 2 to r e s t  on knife edge sea t  4. 
The vacuum r.elief line i s  filled with liquid, l eve r  7 i s  lowered to  
contact rod 8, and weights 10  and 11 a r e  added t o  compensate  f o r  the 
liquid head. 
i 
Vacuum valve is cal ibrated to  the  p rope r  opening p r e s s u r e  by the 
adjustment  of weights 10 and 11. 
all valves  in the closed position, the vacuum relief valves will operate  
in the following manner .  
With the vksse l  full of liquid and 
In the event of liquid leakage f rom the ves se l  o r  ves se l  rupture ,  the 
liquid su r face  a t  the  top of the vacuum relief line i s  exposed to a 
reduction in  p r e s s u r e  c rea ted  by the lessening in ves se l  liquid level. 
Weights 10 and 11, previously balanced by the liquid head in the vacuum 
relief l ine,  exe r t  a g r e a t e r  downward fo rce  on l eve r  7, causing upward 
movement  of rod 8 and unseating inner  valve 2. 
cu r ren t  dra inage  of liquid from the vacuum rel ief  l ine and the en t rance  
of a tmospher ic  a i r  p r e s s u r e  into the ves se l  with resul tant  breaking of 
the vacuum and prevention of the collapse of the ves se l ’ s  upper 
bulkhead. 
This  resu l t s  in con- 
The  following brief t e s t  descr ipt ion shows Sa turn  S-I1 u s e  of the 
modified vacuum relief valve. 
in the t e s t  f ix ture  and a s m a l l  quantity of water  admitted in o rde r  to  detect  
any leaks in the seal .  
cal ibrated.  
The bulkhead a s sembly  i s  secure ly  installed 
Air  i s  bled f r o m  ins t rument  l ines and a l l  ins t ruments  
W a t e r  is then admitted to the space  between the t e s t  specimen and the 
test f ixture  in accordance  with the following schedule: 
100 gallons p e r  minute  to  10% f u l l  level  
1000 gallons p e r  minute  to  90% full level  
300 gallons p e r  minute  to  95% full level  
25 to  5 0  gallons per  minute  f r o m  9570 full  level  
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Figure 2-1. Modified Vacuum Relief Valve 
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Figure 25 .  Typical Installation of Modified Vacuum Valve 
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The las t ,  o r  "topping, " r a t e  requires  2 0  to 30 minutes to reach the 
shut-off stage.  At 99.5 to  100% of the f i l l ing  level, the vent valve i s  
closed manually. 
At t h i s  point, a i r  is admitted through valve CV1 under manual control, 
until the p r e s s u r e  reaches 3 psig. 
valves a r e  removed, i f  still in  place. 
of 0. 5 to 1. 0 psi/minute by adding water with stops for checking a t  5 psi 
intervals.  
equatorial  level. 
whi.ch means that the p r e s s u r e  a t  the apex at  this t ime i s  19. 5 psig. 
The locking levers  of the vacuum relief 
The p r e s s u r e  i s  increased at  a ra te  
This  is continued until a p r e s s u r e  of 28  psig i s  reached a t  the 
The indicated p r e s s u r e  includes a head of 19. 7 feet of water ,  
After reaching 28  psig at  the bulkhead assembly equator, p re s su r i za -  
tion i s  continued i n  s teps  of 2 psi  to 3 3  psip. 
increment  of 2 psi  to permi t  visua1.inspection of the assembly for leakage. 
P r e s s u r e  i s  then increased slowly to 35. 5 psig a t  the equator reference 
point, o r  27. 0 psig a t  the bulkhead apex. 
period of 10 minutes. 
f rom the fifth floor control-room throughout the ent i re  filling and draining 
procedure,  
A pause i s  made after each 
This p r e s s u r e  is  maintained for  a 
P r e s s u r e  control is  maintained by remote operation 
The water i s  drained f rom between the bulkhead assembly and the tes t  
f ixture while the p r e s s u r e  inside the bulkhead assembly i s  controLled by the 
manual manipulation of the dra in  valve and the a i r  admittance valve. The 
p r e s s u r e  is not permitted to go  below 5 psig at  any time. 
valves a r e  aperat ive during this period as  well a s  the pressurizing period, 
and will open automatically to  admit atmospheric p r e s s u r e  should the bulk- 
head p r e s s u r e  dec rease  to  1. 5 oz /sq  i n  (0. 094 ps i )  of negative p re s su re .  
The  draining process  requi res  about 1 - 1 / 2  hours and i s  followed by a half- 
hour drying period in which heated a i r  i s  blown into the space between tes t  
f ixture and bulkhead. 
The vacuum relief 
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DAMAGE TO IN-FOAM WIRE HARNESSES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During removal  of foam insulation to rework w i r e  ha rnesses ,  the 
h a r n e s s e s  were  damaged by cutting tools. 
and degradation of the product. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
The effect was additional rework 
The f inal  solution to this problem was to  w r a p  teflon tape around the 
ha rness  and connectors p r i o r  t o  sp ray  foaming. 
DISCUSSION 
Severa l  methods w e r e  t r ied  to solve the problem of damage to  wi re  
h a r n e s s e s  embedded in foam when removal  of foam was necessa ry  to  per form 
rework. The  teflon wrap  was approved because it i s  e a s i e r  to handle than 
sleeving. In addition to  the protection of w i re  ha rnesses ,  another problem 
was resolved with the teflon tape wrap;  it eliminated the foam "creep" into 
the connectors.  
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WIRE I DE NTI FI CAT1 ON 
P R O B L E M  AND E F F E C T  
In r e g a r d  t o  w i r e  ident i f icat ion,  d rawing  r e q u i r  
Manufac tur ing  10-  02 
m e n t s  m a n u  1s spec i fy  
t h a t  w i r e  s e g m e n t  letters b e  used  to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  be tween w i r e  s e g m e n t s  i n \  
a c o m m o n  c i r cu i t .  Due t o  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  i f  eng inee r ing  m a k e s  a c i r c u i t  
path d e s i g n  change ,  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  is obliged t o  change  m o r e  than  one w i r e  
o r  g r o u p  of w i r e s  which o t h e r w i s e  need  not b e  changed ,  
b e c o m e s  v e r y  cos t ly ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t he  c a s e  of s p e c i a l  t e s t  equipment  
which is func t iona l ly  compa t ib l e  with v a r i a b l e  c i r c u i t  conf igura t ions .  
Rework  of w i r ing  
SOLUTION/RECOh.IMENDATION 
W i r e  ident i f icat ion r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  spec ia l  t e s t  equipment  ( S T E )  w e r e  
mod i f i ed  by  having e v e r y  w i r e  ident i f ied in  a n u m e r i c a l  s equence  and 
u t i l i z ing  the  l e t t e r  "A" t o  s e p a r a t e  the  w i r e  s e q u e n c e  n u m b e r  f r o m  the  w i r e  
s i z e  n u m b e r .  Example :  1A20, ZAZO, 3A16 
DISCUSSION 
i 
Accord ing  t o  d rawing  r e q u i r e m e n t s  m a n u a l s ,  w i r e  ident i f icat ion r e q u i r e -  
m e n t s  f o r  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  of a wi r ing  d i a g r a m  and w i r e  l i s t s  spec i fy  t h a t  t h e  
w i r e  s e g m e n t  l e t t e r  s h a l l  b e  used  t o  d i f f e ren t i a t e  be tween w i r e  s e g m e n t s  i n  
a c o m m o n  t e r m i n a l  o r  connect ion.  
Due t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of i n - p r o c e s s  t e s t  equipment ,  any  s t a g e  changes  by  
S-I1 Eng inee r ing ,  c a u s e d  c i r c u i t  path i n t e r f a c e  changes  i n  STE. Thus ,  
i n s t e a d  of having t o  change  one  w i r e  in  the  s t a g e  d u e  t o  t h i s  Engineer ing  
change ,  a l l  w i r e s  i n  the  t e s t  equipment  had t o  be changed only b e c a u s e  they  
no  longe r  w e r e  ident i f ied  c o r r e c t l y  f o r  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  flow i n  the  c i r c u i t .  
S T E  Eng inee r ing  e s t a b l i s h e d  the  me thod  of identifying w i r e s  i n  a n u m e r i c a l  
s equence  and u t i l i zed  t h e  letter "A" f o r  a l l  w i r e s  in  p l a c e  of s e g m e n t  l e t t e r s  
as shown i n  t h e  following excerpt from the  SMD w i r e  l i s t :  
2 . 5  
d i f f e ren t i a t e  be tween w i r e  s e g m e n t s  in  a c o m m o n  c i r c u i t s .  W h e r e v e r  
p r a c t i c a b l e ,  w i r e  s e g m e n t s  s h a l l  b e  l e t t e r e d  in  a lphabe t i ca l  s equence ,  
and t h e  letter "A" s h a l l  ident i fy  the  f i rs t  s e g m e n t  of e a c h  c i r c u i t  s t a r t i n g  
Wire S e g m e n t  L e t t e r  - T h e  w i r e  s e g m e n t  l e t t e r  s h a l l  be u s e d  t o  
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at  the power source.  A different le t ter  shall  be used for wire  segments 
having a common terminal  or  connection. Double le t te rs  AA, AB, e t c . ,  
shall  be used when m o r e  than twenty-four segments a r e  required,  
l e t te rs  and "0" shall  not be used a s  segment le t te rs .  See 
Figure 2 6  Wire segment le t te rs  have been underlined for i l lustration 
purposes.  
The 
EXTERNAL WIRING I P27C20N- 
P 27_B 20N P28A20- 
P27E 20 N - P27A20N 
P27D20N P29A20 - 
ELECTRICAL 
JUNCTION 
OR TERMINAL 
Figure 2 6 .  Use of Wire Segment Let ter  
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LOCATION OF WIRE HARNESS IDENTIFICATION PLATES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
W i r e  ha rness  identification plates were  installed a t  the center of the 
wi re  harness ,  thereby creating a problem i n  trying to locate the ID plate to 
verify a w i re  ha rness  pa r t  number af ter  the harness  was installed i n  the 
stage. 
' 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Standard procedures  were  revised to designate location of harness  
identification plates within 12 inches of the lowest alphanumeric numbered 
connector i n  the harness .  
a ha rness  was installed,  additional procedure i s  provided that locates each 
connector within a ha rness  by s t r inger  and station number. 
To a s s i s t  i n  locating the identification plate after 
DISCUSSION 
I 
The problem of wire  harness  identification became cr i t ical  with the 
inc rease  of change engineering o rde r s .  
i n  the af t -skir t ,  forward skir t ,  and Station 196 a r e a s  also contributed to 
the problem, 
numeric  connector worked fine for the smal le r  harnesses .  
harnesses ,  those with 15 or  m o r e  connectors, required m o r e  prec ise  
definition. 
locates  each connector by s t r inger  and station. 
The congested condition of wiring 
The location of the ID plate 12 inches f r o m  the lowest alpha- 
The l a rge r  
This was taken c a r e  of by the final installation document that 
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CRITICAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTION A N D  CERTIFICATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A Mate r i a l /Pe r  sonnel Handling Equipment (MPHE) ladder  broke during 
re t rac t ion  f r o m  the S-II. 
replacement  of the forward LHz bulkhead. 
The result ing damage caused the removal and 
SOLUTION / R E COMMEND ATION 
Breakage and s imi la r  problems associated with MPHE were  solved at 
Seal Beach by s t r i c t e r  adherence to specifications, design, fabrication, 
and inspection pertaining to safety-crit ical  MPHE equipment. 
It i s  recommended that init ial  p rogram planning identify cr i t ical  MPHE 
and insure  the adequacy of inspect ion and proof-loading requirements.  
DISCUSSION 
The welds on a re t rac tab le  aluminum ladder used i n  Station VU, Seal 
This fa i lure  permitted Beach, fo r  access  to the LH2 tank of 5-11-3 failed. 
a section of the ladder to drop  and s t r ike  the forward LH2 bulkhead. 
consisted of two cracks  which destroyed the s t ruc tura l  integrity of a gore  
Damage 
section. 
Personnel  had completed their  work i n  the tank. All personnel had 
climbed the ladder and exited through the tunnel. Removal of the re t rac tab le  
aluminum ladder  was begun by use  of the hand operated winch, When the 
ladder reached a position approximately 90% raised,  welds at the flanges 
used to bolt the two sections of the ladder together gave way, permitting 
the lower 1 2  foot section of the ladder to drop  away and s t r ike  the 
bulkhead. 
, 
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PATCHBOARD CONSOLE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Ground support  equipment changes and vehicle engineering changes 
w e r e  so  numerous on the S-I1 that  rework t ime  on special  t es t  equipment 
interphasing adapter  cables  was a continuous project.  
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
A console with patchboard capabili t ies and fully wired tes t  ha rnesses  
was devised to  provide the capability of making wige changes within seconds. 
It is recommended that special  t e s t  equipment be initially designed with 
patchboard capabili t ies.  
DISCUSSION 
One of the phases  in which manufacturing cos ts  increase  substantially 
i s  in the design t ime  and quantity of interconnecting tes t  cables fabricated 
and reworked by the contractor  for  checkout and Servicing of the product 
during the manufacturing p rocess ,  On the S-XI program.  engineering e lec-  
t r i c a l  design wiring changes were  numerous,  causing much rework  t o  
del iverable  equipment and to  special  t e s t  equipment used for  checkout and 
servicing of these  del iverable  i tems ,  This  rework was chiefly per formed 
on the unit under tes t  and the adapter  cables interconnecting the unit under 
t e s t  with the special  t e s t  equipment. 
t hese  adapter  cables ,  a patchboard console was devised to  se rve  a s  a junc- 
tion point in which re-connections would be performed on patchboards, thus 
allowing the use of the fully wired adapter  cables without having to  rework  
them, Any rewiring t o  the patchboards was made a s  pa r t  of the operating 
manual  procedure for  the t e s t  equipment niodel in question. 
outlines the  requi rements  t o  be followed in accordance with the applicable 
pr  oc e s s specification. 
' 
In o r d e r  to  reduce rework  time on 
This  procedure 
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DISPOSAL OF TOXiC POLYURETHANE SPRAY FOAM 
FUMES DURING APPLICATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
During spraying of polyurethane foam insulation, a toxic gas  i s  
generated which is harmful  t o  the r e sp i r a to ry  sys t em of man. 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
The problem of sp ray  foam fume disposal  during S-I1 manufacturing 
was resolved by purchase  a d  installation of exhaust fan units capable of 
removing the fumes at the source  and exhausting them to  the a tmosphere  
outside the a rea .  
a r e a  fo r  flexibility and mobility. 
Neoprene flex ducting was used between blower and sp ray  
It is recommended that the fume disposal  sys tem be installed a t  the 
t ime  of facility construction. 
DISCUSSION 
Exhaust of toxic o r  cor ros ive  fumes is always a problem, often 
endangering both personnel  and equipment. 
t o  a tmosphere  is permiss ib le  a t  cer ta in  levels  of contamination (Air Pollu- 
tion Control District) .  
sys tems,  water  wash, o r  a f te rburner  units, 
Posit ive removal  of such fumes 
Excessive levels can be decreased  through f i l t e r  
The SD requi res  personnel  present  during spraying of polyurethane 
foam to  wear  a i r t ight  breathing m a s k s  connected with a f i l tered a i r  supply. 
REFERENCES 
1. P r o c e s s  Specification for Polyurethane Foam Application and 
Mat e r ia ls ,  MA06 06 - 0 5 0. 
2. Genera l  Industrial  Safety Orde r s ,  Article 81, Group 9, 
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PARTS PROTECTION 
STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Repeated instances on the S-I1 p rogram of improperly packaged and 
protected component p a r t s  resul ted in excessive d isassembly  and recleaning 
due to  contamination. 
were being damaged during subsequent s tages  of assembly  o r  installation 
due to  lack of protection. 
delays and excess ive  costs .  
In addition, c r i t i ca l  sealing sur faces  on detai l  p a r t s  
The effect of this problem was to  c r e a t e  schedule 
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDATION 
En t r i e s  were  included in a l l  manufacturing planning documentation 
(manufacturing o rde r s .  pa r t s  replacement  reques ts ,  etc. ) for  packaging 
and protection requirements .  
adequate protect ive m e a s u r e s  be verified a n d  established p r io r  t o  operations. 
Implementation of this  method required that 
DISCUSSION 
Investigation of the contamination problem revealed that the protection 
applied a t  the detai l  level  was removed and not re-applied during assembly  
operations.  
contamination-free components and damage-f ree  detai l  pa r t s  in o rde r  t o  
preclude s y s t e m s  contamination and costly schedule delays. 
It was imperat ive that p rocedures  be implemented to  ensu re  
4-89  
SD 7 1 - 2 5 6  
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockvw4 
Manufacturing 14- 05 
CENTRAL FACILITY FOR THE HELIUM SUPPLY SYSTEM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Helium required for  proof and leak testing of the S-11 sys tems was 
The use of K bottles required t ime for supplied by portable "K" bottles. 
handling, sampling, and analysis  in addition to  the considerable floor space 
required for  the bottles in the testing a rea  and for the hoses and equipment 
used for the tes t  setup, which resulted in a generally untidy appearance,  
SO LUT ION / RE C OhlM E N  D AT ION 
A cent ra l  helium supply system was implemented in the Vertical  
Assembly Building (VAB) which eliminated the use of K bottles in 80 percent 
of t e s t s ,  
ear ly  s o  that when the use of K bottles a r r i v e s  at  a point where if  i s  no longer 
cost effective, a cen t ra l  supply sys tem can be instituted. 
It is reronimended that the helium supply problem be evaluated 
DISCUSSION , 
Special Tes t  Equipment Engineering designed a central  helium supply 
system for  installation in the VRB. 
and modification of an  existing helium distribution system, the use of an 
existing helium tube t r a i l e r ,  and a high p r e s s u r e  gas  booster for  high 
p r e s s u r e  t e s t s ,  
approximately two hundred 2000-psi K bottles. 
The system included the reactivation 
One tube t r a i l e r  contains a volume of helium equivalent to  
The cent ra l  sys tem resulted in a significant reduction in the cost  of 
proof and leak testing. 
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LH2 TANK SPECIAL I N G R E S S  L A D D E R S  
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Repai rs  and inspection had to b e  performed inside the LHz tank while 
the vehicle was  i n  the stacked configuration. 
min imal  a c c e s s  c l ea rance  and imposed cer ta in  haza rds  to the LH2 tank 
bulkhead insulation and S-IVB engine. 
This  condition provided 
SOLUTION/ R ECOMMENDATION 
The solution was to design and fabricate  l adde r s  utilizing a vacuum 
sys t em for  attachment. 
This  sys t em could be utilized for any a r e a  where a vacuum could be 
maintained (within l a r g e  tanks,  s i los ,  e tc . )  in  o r d e r  to gain a c c e s s  to  an 
otherwise inaccess ib le  a rea .  
DISCUSSION 
A study was conducted to de te rmine  the need and feasibil i ty of 
entering the S-11 LHz tank when the stage was i n  the stacked configuration. 
The study revealed that entry was  feasible  and that t he re  w a s  a need. 
The type of effort requir ing entry i n  the LH2 tank included: 
1. Inspection of LHz tank secondary s t ruc tu ra l  e lements  for  c r acks  
and other  suspected potential secondary fai lures .  
2. Repair  o r  replacement  of malfunctioning’hardware i tems .  
3. Configuration updating o r  modification to  eliminate potential 
problem a reas .  
Due to  the minimal  a c c e s s  c learance  between the S-IVB engine and 
the S-II forward  bulkhead while the Saturn s tages  a r e  i n  the stacked 
configuration, the S-II forward  bulkhead insulation and the S-IVB engine 
w e r e  subject to damage. 
umbre l la  type platform which could have been lowered into the LH2 tank 
i n  the closed position and then opened inside. 
to design a re la t ively s imple supporting s t ruc tu re  which minimized the 
hazard  of damage to the LH2 forward  bulkhead insulation and S-IVB engine 
and allowed t3e lowering of men  inside the LH2 tank i n  a basket  together 
This  sma l l  c learance  also prevents the use  of an , 
It  was  therefore  necessary  
1 
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with a set of "bat" l a d d e r s .  
s y s t e m  which  u t i l i zed  suc t ion  cups  as a m e a n s  of a t t achmen t  to t he  i n s i d e  
wall of the  tank. 
w o r k m a n  i n s i d e  the t ank  to de t ach  and r e l o c a t e  the  l a d d e r  whi le  s tanding  
on ano the r  l a d d e r ;  t hus  enabl ing h i m  t o  niove a round  without having t o  s t e p  
on  the LH2 c o m m o n  bulkhead. 
T h e s e  b a t  l a d d e r s  Lvcrc dcs i cned  wi th  n vacuum 
T h e s e  l a d d e r s  w e r e  des igned  with c o n t r o l s  to a l low 
4- 92 
SD 71-256 
Space Division @A!!! North American Rockwell 
I 
i Manufacturing 14-07 
IMPROVED LOAD-LIFTING HARDWARE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
A four  point lifting b a r  used  on the  S-I1 p r o g r a m  appeared  t o  c a u s e  
Excessive m a n h o u r s  w e r e  used in  rigging a hoisting 
s t r a i n  on cy l inder ,  t h r u s t ,  and s k i r t  s t r u c t u r e s  dur ing  mating,  lifting, and 
moving operat ions.  
b a r  with sand bags  t o  equal ize  loads.  
SOL UTION /RECOMMEND AT ION 
A s ix-way s p r e a d e r  b a r  provided a b e t t e r  dis t r ibut ion of load and 
reduced the  s t r a i n  on h a r d w a r e  s t r u c t u r e s .  
with six points  and t h r e e  equalizing arms in pairs to  d o  the lifting. 
8EH-0811 m o d e l  can  l i f t  a m a x i m u m  of 4200 pounds. 
h a s  the capac i ty  of a 10-ton lift. 
faci l i ta te  lifting, moving and mat ing  of cy l inders ,  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  a s s e m b l y ,  
f i r ing  s k i r t s  and i n t e r s t a g e s  w h e r e  leveling of loads is  r e q u i r e d .  
Two s p r e a d e r  b a r s  w e r e  designed 
T h e  
T h e  8EH-5016 m o d e l  
Both uni ts  w e r e  built  with 33-foot arms t o  
DISCUSSION 
Maneuvers  requi r ing  that  a s s e m b l i e s  o r  h a r d w a r e  r e m a i n  leve l  w e r e  
p e r f o r m e d  by uti l izing sand bags  t o  ba lance  the unit  while i t  w a s  being moved 
with the f o u r - w a y  s p r e a d e r  b a r .  T o  mate an item such  a s  a t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  
a s s e m b l y  t o  the f i r ing  s k i r t s ,  p e r s o n n e l  w e r e  s ta t ioned around the  s k i r t  t o  
faci l i ta te  a l ignment .  
review of the  method a s p e c i a l  equalizing s p r e a d e r  b a r  w a s  designed t o  
p e r f o r m  the moving function. 
However,  s o m e  d a m a g e  resu l ted  t o  r i v e t s  and after a 
REFERENCES 
NASA T e c h  Brief  69-10514. 
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LH2 TANK E N T R Y  E Q U I P M E N T  
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Personnel ,  tools ,  and equipment were  requirr.d inside the LH2 tank 
Pe r sonne l  were  lowered and removed to pe r fo rm the final closeout weld. 
on a boatswain 's  chair .  
by rope  s l ings,  make-shif t  w i r e  baske ts ,  etc. Thcase means  of t ranspor t ing  
personnel  i n  and out of the  LH2 tank crea ted  a high potential of tank damage 
and was  unsafe f o r  personnel.  
Tools  and equipment were  lowered and removed 
e 
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
A s t ee l  f r amed ,  w i r e  m e s h  enclosed, cylindricaly shaped device 
(8EH-0760) was  provided. 
long: This  device is  s t rong  enough to accommodate  personnel  safely,  
a l so  accommodates  tools and equipment t o  12 feet  i n  length. 
the  s ide of the cylinder has  a positive lock to prevent accidental  opening 
The cylinder i s  3 feet  in  d iameter  and 14 feet 
It 
The door i n  
! during i n g r e s s  and eg res s .  
DISCUSSION 
I n  o r d e r  t o  pe r fo rm the closeout weld on  the LH2 tank, personnel ,  
tools ,  and equipment had to b e  lowered into and removed f r o m  the tank. 
Th i s  operat ion was  accomplished through the u s e  of a boatswain's cha i r  
f o r  personnel  and slings for  tools and equipment. 
personnel  working on  the S-II-3 during this  in-tank operat ion that a high 
potential f o r  s tage  damage and personnel  injury was  present .  
and specification w e r e  p repa red  to provide a safe  means  by which to pe r fo rm 
th is  operation. 
into operat ion i n  September  1967. 
It became evident to 
A design 
The  cyl indrical  device was  fabricated by Tooling, and put 
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INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF P I N S  SECURING 
LARGE STRUCTURAL HANDLING FIXTURES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Saturn  S-I1 requi red  numerous l a rge  handling f ixtures  fo r  fabr icat ion 
and t ransportat ion.  
flexibility of the s tage forward  hoisting cone which allowed for  mismatch  
i n m a t i n g  to the  s tage forward  hoisting spider.  A lead mallet  was used to 
dr ive  the connecting pins through the spider and cone assembl ies .  
A par t icular ly  hazardous condition a r o s e  f r o m  the 
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
This  problem was solved a t  Seal Reach b y  the design and fabrication 
of hydraulic pin positioner s that  allowed the installation of pins without 
manual hammering.  
hardware.  
This  e l iminates  the possibility of damage to the 
. .  
It i s  recommended that this  hydraulic unit be used o n  l a rge  handling 
f ixtures  where i t  i s  necessa ry  to fo rce  mating alignrnent. 
DISCUSSION 
The matching holes  for  mating the spider to the clevises  of the 
forward  hoisting cone a r e  not i n  alignment. 
i n  by fo rce  with a lead hammer .  
The connecting pins a r e  dr iven 
This  operat ion i s  not only t ime  consuming and damaging to hardware,  
but a lso is a safety hazard for  the r igge r s ,  who work off a 20-foot 
Tel-Hi-Scoper when the s tage is i n  the horizontal  position. 
s tage could also r e su l t  i f  the hammer  o r  pins w e r e  dropped during 
i n s  tallatio n. 
Damage to  the 
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MANUFACTURING INFORMATION CENTERS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
P r o g r a m  Management was not provided sufficient visibil i ty On 
Manufacturing Operat ions to  su r face  problems i n  a tinie'ly manner  so as 
to reduce  o r  minimize  impact  to production schedules.  
SOLUTION/  R ECOlZlMENDATION 
In  August, 1967, manufacturing information cen te r s  w e r e  establ ished 
to provide manufacturing management  \\Fith the  necessary  tools to visual ize  
the total  production task ,  and thus  f ree  them to concentrate  upon their  area 
of responsibil i ty.  
This  p rogram gives d i r ec t  support  to the Direc tor  of Manufacturing, 
project  admin i s t r a to r s ,  inanagers ,  superv isors ,  and leadmcn. 
DISCUSSION 
A control  room in each of the t h r e e  manufacturing a r e a s  has  provided 
fo r  display and visual  survei l lance of the faci l i t ies ,  schcdules ,  work plans, 
and his tory  bf each manage r ' s  total task.  
The Di rec to r  of Manufacturing i s  provided with daily s ta tus  r e p o r t s  
(both visual  and o r a l )  and special  exe rc i se s  as  requi red  to weigh a l te rna te  
plans o r  methods i n  problem areas. 
Support i s  provided for  the manage r ' s  t ask  through char t s ,  g raphs ,  
and a breakdown of the m a s t e r  schedule on a departmental  and task  b a s i s  
through the  u s e  of a m a s t e r  plan which complements  the master p rogram 
schedule. The  plan \vi11 provide visibil i ty of stationization, tooling, and 
over t ime requi rements  on  a depar tmenta l  basis .  
The supe rv i so r  i s  supported by  providing coordinated s tandards  and 
operat ional  sequences f o r  each tool o r  station in  the f o r m  of an  hourly work 
plan \\*hich \vi11 complement  the manage r ' s  lvork plan. 
additional functions such as  Engineering Changes, Hardware  Repai r ,  and 
shor tages  will be incorporated through "work arounds" into the plan. 
Constraints  and 
SD 71-256 
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Support a t  the leadman level  will be provided by visual aids for  the 
leadman's  visibility and to aid him i n  providing interdepartmental  
coordination as  required.  
Support of the program i n  general  i s  provided through issuing a daily 
manufacturing status r epor t  and history f i le  on each assembly o r  task. 
4- 97 
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North Arnericrtn Rockwell 
Manufac tu r ing  I 5 -  02 
WIRE HARNESS MODIFICATION STATUSING 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  A N D  E F F E C T  
A m e t h o d  u ’as  lack ing  to  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  fabricate and  a c c u m u l a t e  c o m -  
ponents  for w i r e - h a r n e s s e s  t o  s u p p o r t  mod i f i ca t ions .  
S 0 L U  T ION / R E C OM A4 E N D A T  IONS 
T h e  probltbrn \t.as r e s o l v e d  by a s s i g n i n g  a n  M K - 1  s u f f i x  t o  t h e  ncw 
h a r n e s s  p a r t  n u m b e r  ancl by u t i l i z ing  the  Manufac tu r ing  \v i re  harncxss s u r v e y  
a n d  planning t i c k e t s .  
a c c o n i p l i s h e d  u n d e r  t h i s  o n e  p a r t  nun ibe r .  
P a r t s  a c c u m u l a t i o n  ancl h a r n e s s  p r c - p r o c e s s i n g  uzas 
It is d i f f icu l t  to  t r a c k  w i r e  h a r n e s s  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  a n d  to m a i n t a i n  a n  
a c c u r a t e  s t a t u s  accoun t  of conf igu ra t ions .  
a p p a r c n t  w h e r c  a m u l t i p l e  release drau . ing  s y s t e m  is u s e d  a n d  m o r e  
d i f f icu l t  v, h t r c . c h a n g e s  \\ it11 con t ingency  a s p e c t s  a r e  p r o c e s s e d .  
T h i s  p r o b l e m  b e c o m e s  m o r e  
A produc ib i l i t v  a n a l y s i s  shou ld  b e  p e r f o r m e d  e a r l y  in  the p r o g r a m  t o  
p r e c l u d e  l h i s  type  of p r o b l t m .  
shou ld  be deve loped  p r i o r  t o  the  f i r s t  mod i f i ca t ion  r c q u i r c m c n t .  
A p r o c e d u r e  f o r  handl ing t h i s  p r o b l e m  
DISCUSSION 
E a r l y  i n  t h c  dc f in i t i on  of t he  S a t u r n  S - I 1  P r o g r a n i  mod i f i ca t ion  r equ i r t . -  
m e n t s ,  both h a r d n . a r c  arid sof t t t .are  u e r e  iden t i f i ed ,  a c c u m u l a t e d ,  sh ipped ,  
a n d  i n s t a l l e d  u t i l i z ing  a l o g i s t i c s  f o r m  c a l l e d  a kit  a c c u m u l a t i o n  l i s t  ( K A L ) .  
A l l  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  i. c .  , p u r c h a s e d  p a r t s  m a n u f a c t u r e d  p a r t s ,  a n d  docu-  
m e n t a t i o n  \ v c r e  1istc.d on  t h i s  KAL.  In t h e  a r ea  of \ \ . ire h a r n e s s e s ,  s i n c e  
t h e r e  w a s  a m a n u f a c t u r e d  p a r t  n u m b e r  a f f e c t e d ,  e a c h  
e n d  f i t t ing u a s  l i s t e d  s c p a r a t t l y .  
consuming .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  u n d e r  t h i s  m e t h o d ,  m i n o r  p r e a s s e m b l y ,  i. e. . v. i r e  
end  f in i sh  o r  c o n n e c t o r  usiring could  not bc  done  thus  c r e a t i n g  u n n e c e s s a r y  
\ r o r k  f o r  t h e  t e s t  s i tes.  
i re  t e r m i n a t i o n  a n d  
T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  \ \ a s - c o s t l y  a n d  t i m v  
By u t i l i z ing  t h p  \\.ire s u r v e y  a n d  planning t icAets ,  a l l  m i r e  h a r n e s s  
d e t a i l s ,  i. e . ,  wirL,. t e r m i n a l s ,  I. D. b a n d s ,  c o n n e c t o r s ,  e t c . ,  w e r e  p r e -  
a s s e m b l e d  to  a point ,  a c c u m u l a t e d ,  a n d  sh ipped  u n d e r  one  p a r t  n u m b e r  
(ne\\. h a r n e s s  p a r t  n u m b e r  xvith t h e  MI(-1 suf f ix) .  
If s u b s e q u e n t  d e s i g n  c h a n g e s  a f f ec t  t h e  same h a r n e s s ,  a n  M K - 2 ,  M K - 3 .  
c t c .  is e s t a b l i s h e d  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
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CONTROL OF REQUEST FOR DRAWING CHANGES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
E a r l y  i n  the S-II program,  problems consisting of i nco r rec t  Request  
f o r  Drawing Change (RDC) fo rma t s ,  RDC's w'ritten without resolut ions,  
duplicate RDC's ( m o r e  than  one group making para l le l  r eques t s  o r  invest iga-  ' 
t ions) ,  and r eques t s  f o r  expensive design changes to  save  nominal mand-  
factur ing hours  w e r e  prevalent.  
The  effect of th i s  condition w a s  costly for- var ious  reasons:  
Engineering, f o r  instance,  had to answer m o r e  than one RDC fo r  a 
par t icu lar  problem, and manufacturing cos t s  were  inc reased  due to dual 
investigations.  
SOLUTION/ R ECOMiVENDATION 
A cent ra l ized  manufacturing control group was  established to  e l iminate  
inco r rec t  overlapping o r  conflicting r eques t s  f r o m  reaching Design 
Engineer ing and to  provide a focal  point fo r  changes requested by 
Manufacturing . 
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RED ANODIZING OF BMNKING PLATES USED FOR IN-PROCESS TESTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During the proof and leak test of an ear ly  S-11, a bellows was deformed 
when the sys tem was overpressurized.  The reason  for  the overpressur iza-  
t ion was  t raced  to a blanking p la t e  remaining in  the sys tem af ter  completion 
of a previous test .  
SOLUTION/ R E COMM ENDA TION 
Blanking plates were  anodized ( red)  to facil i tate identification when 
In addition, inspection points were  included installed in a s tage system. 
inaproof- and leak-test  operating manuals to verify removal, as well a s  
installation, of t e s t  blanking plates, 
DISCUSSION 
I 
During the final sys tems installation operations on ear ly  S-II's, a 
multitude of concurrent activit ies were  normally i n  progress .  System 
proof and leak in-process  t e s t s  were  also being accomplished, and were  
performed i n  a piecemeal manner  to enable inspection buy-off of partial  
systems.  As  a resul t ,  blanking plates were  required to isolate  these 
par t ia l  sys tems fo r  testing purposes. The use  of r ed  anodized blanking 
plates, and inspection points for  installation and removal  i n  the operating 
manuals resolved the problem. 
- 
, 
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LABELING OF CONSOLE CONTROLS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Console controls  and instrumentat ion w e r e  identified with functional 
descr ip t ions ,  pe r  established procedure  but difficulty was experienced i n  
t ra ining console  ope ra to r s  and test personnel  i n  re la t ing console controls  
to components actuated. 
SOLUTION/  R E  COMMENDATION 
Consoles of r ecen t  include s i lk-screened  schemat ic  r e fe rence  
designations in  addition to the functional descr ipt ions ( e .  g. , "Chart  DRIVE 
(SW8)) to identify console controls.  Reference designations of components 
actuated by each console control  w e r e  a l so  s i lk -screened  on the  console 
(i. e . ,  Function - U F  Corn BHD, SCII Designation (SW1) Actual Function - 
(Actuates - 011) ) .  
DISC U SSION 
During the prepara t ion  of acceptance checkout and operating p ro -  
cedures ,  and during subsequent trai.ning of operat ing personnel ,  i t  w a s  
found that functional descr ipt ions of console controls  w e r e  difficult to use.  
The wordiness  of these  descr ipt ions hampered  t ra ining of ope ra to r s  and, 
i n  addition, made  operating procedures  voluminous, as well  as difficult 
to use.  
The identification of console controls  with schemat ic  r e fe rence  
designations of both the control  and component actuated,  simplified t ra ining 
of personnel  and console operat ion,  
easily recognized and i t s  function be t te r  understood (F igu re  2 7 ) .  
labeling also allox\-s operating procedures  to be abbreviated.  
Each control  was the re fo re  m o r e  
This 
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LEAKAGE THROUGH PIPE THREAD FITTINGS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Teflon tape  was used to seal pipe thread fi t t ings in  facil i ty LOX c lean  
sys tems.  
P a r t i c l e s  of teflon tape would then contaminate the systcm. 
The  tape  would sh red  when the connection was tightened. 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
The fi t t ings w e r e  changed to A N  type connections and the use  of teflon 
tape discontinued. 
during the ini t ia l  des ign  phase of LOX c lean  systems. 
DISCUSSION 
Implementation of this "solution should be  considered 
A l a r g e  number of mechanical  components a r e  available off the shelf 
with pipe thread  fittings. 
instal la t ion i n  L O X  c lean  sys tems.  
Many of these components w e r e  o rde red  fo r  
Teflon tape  was  used to prevent leaks through the pipe thread.  
eve r ,  in  the p rocess  of tightening the connection, the tcflon tape would 
sh red  and en ter  the  system. 
detected during a par t ic le  count and caused the sys t em to fai l  to m e e t  LOX 
c l ean  requi rements .  
How- 
P i e c e s  of teflon tape ivere subsequently 
The fi t t ings were  changed to A N  type connections. The  AN fi t t ings 
are machined to  a c lose r  to le rance  and made  of a h a r d e r  m a t e r i a l  than 
r egu la r  pipe th read  fi t t ings.  
fit,  el iminated the problem of galling, and made  possible leak- f ree  con- 
nections without the u s e  of teflon tape. 
The  u s e  of the AN fit t ings resu l ted  i n  a better 
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ACLAR FILM CONTAMINATION 
PROBLEM STATELVENT AND E F F E C T  
ACLAR film used to protect  open f langes f r o m  contamination was left 
on  the flange when the  pa r t  was  incorporated into the s tagc  sys tem.  During 
s tage  t e s t s ,  s e v e r a l  pieces  of 2 m i l  f i lm  w e r e  found in  the enginc sys tems.  
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
Manufacturing procedures  w e r e  implcrnented to check for  A C L A R  
film o n  flanges p r io r  to hookup into s tage systems, rc 
In  addition, the ACLAR f i l m  \vas cut into square  pieces  to faci l i ta te  
i t s  detection. P r i o r  to that the ACLAR was cut to the same outline as the 
flange. The  film, being t ransparent ,  is  very  difficult to detect  when it 
adhe res  to a highly polished surface.  
DISCUSSION 
ACLAR i s  a flexible thermoplas t ic  film m'tdc f r o m  fluorinated- 
chlorinated r e s ins .  
spec t rum;  i t  t r a n s m i t s  over  95 percent  of the incident light. 
property,  together with the fact  that  the film was cut to the shape of the 
flange, made  it very  difficult to de tec t  i f  onel xvere not looking for  it. 
I t  i s  highly t r anspa ren t  i n  the x-isihle r q i o n  of the . 
This  optical  
During pressur iza t ion  of the  s tage  sys t ems ,  the A4CLAR film ruptured 
and was  dis t r ibuted throughout the  system. 
The  co r rec t ive  procedures  implemented b y  manufacturing solved the 
problem. 
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FAILURE OF NATORQ SEALS 
PRODLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
NATORQ s t a i n l e s s  s t e e l  bulkhead seals  fa i led  to  p reven t  h e l i u m  gas  
leaks. 
*. SOLUTION/R ECOhIMENDATION 
S i lve r -p l a t ed  NATORQ sc,ils i ve rc  subs t i tu ted  f o r  t he  stai n l c s s  sttxel 
seals. 
r e to rqu inq  the  f i t t ing tw ice  a f t e r  ins ta l la t ion .  
solut ion shoiild be cons ide red  t h e  init i  a1 d e s i g n  of hydrogen  he l ium s y s t e m s .  
I n  addi t ion ,  manufac tu r ing  p r o c c d u r e s  tverc  changed to r c q u i r e  
Implemen ta t ion  of t h i s  
DISCUSSION 
The re1,t t ivc softness. of the  s i l v e r  plating, t ogc thc r  with tlie 
r e t o r q u i n z  p rocedur  e s ,  :-e su l t  ed i n l e a k - f r c . c  conntbctions.  
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ADDITION OF CRUSH WASHER REQUIREMENTS TO 
TUBE ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Many l eaks  w e r e  found i n  tube assembly  fittings during manufacturing 
leak  tests of S-I1 systems.  
disconnected to  pe rmi t  instal la t ion of c r u s h  washers .  
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
Th i s  requi red  that  the tube a s sembl i e s  b e  
The r equ i r emen t  fo r  installation of c r u s h  washe r s  was added to 
It i s  recommended that consideration be  given t o  c r u s h  
assembly  drawings.  
significantly. 
washer  requi rements  during init ial  design when engineering drawings a r e  
being prepared.  
Addition of the c rush  w a s h e r s  reduced the leak problem 
DISCUSSION 
Vehicle assemhly  drawings did not cal l  out the instal la t ion of c r u s h  
w a s h e r s  on tube assembly  fittings. 
torquing the fi t t ings to a value specified on  the assembly  drawing. 
The tube connections w e r e  secu red  by 
This  method of making tube connections resul ted i n  many leaks ,  
which w e r e  d iscovered  during manufacturing leak t e s t s .  
allowed the u s e  of c r u s h  w a s h e r s  where  leaks  were  found; however, this  
requi red  that the tubes be  disconnected to pe rmi t  installation. The  leak 
tests then had to be repeated.  
The  drawings 
On the e a r l i e r  s tages ,  m o s t  of t h e  tube a s sembl i e s  did not p a s s  the 
leak  t e s t  and c r u s h  w a s h e r s  had to be instal led eventually at a much higher 
cost. Onehel ium actuation sys t em had over 150 recorded  leaks ,  To  
resolve this problem, the requi rement  fo r  instal la t ion of c r u s h  w a s h e r s  
was added to the assembly  drawings and the leak  problem was  reduced 
si g nif i ca ntly on sub s equ e nt s tage s . 
4-1 05 
SD 71-256 
Space Division @A!! North Arneric;cxi Rockwell 
Manufacturing 20-03 
FUNCTIONAL DRAWING OF NAFLEX SEAL LOCATIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
The determinat ion of the location, s ize ,  and test p a r a m e t e r s  f o r  
Naflex seals used throughout the S-I1 was difficult and time consuming s ince  
the information was  spread  over  a number of, drawings and specifications. 
SOLUTION/ R E COMMEND AT ION 
Engineering documents w e r e  evaluated and a single r e fe rence  
drawing was prepared  showing all seal locations,  s izes ,  applicable instal-  
lat ion draLving, and operat ing manual  to be used. 
recommended f o r  AN/multiple u s e  hardware  requiring, special  functional 
t es ti ng. 
This  solution i s  a l so  
DISCUSSION 
Manufacturing i i v a s  r equ i r ed  to pe r fo rm leak tests of Naflex sea l s  
J 
installed throughout the S-I1 s y s t e m s  and tank at tach points. 
tion requi red  to de t e rmine  the locations,  s i ze s ,  and test p a r a m e t e r s  
appeared on 17 sepa ra t e  instal la t ion drawings.  
The informa- 
It was difficult and time consuming to r ead  all the drawings to obtain 
the necessa ry  information for  each leak test, 
Engineering evaluated the applicable engineering documents  and prepared  
a single r e fe rence  functional drawing summar iz ing  all necessa ry  
information. 
Special test  equipment 
The locations of the s e a l s  are  shown o n  i somet r i c  views of the s tage,  
Reference  i s  m a d e  to s ta t ion numbers ,  s t r i nge r  numbers ,  position numbers ,  
engine nunitiers, f in  numbers ,  and ha rdware  to c lar i fy  the  location of each  
sea l .  
, 
Each s e a l  location is  coded to a table specifying s e a l  pa r t  numbers ,  
quantit ies,  and instal la t ion drawing numbers .  In  addition, the seal locations 
a re  coded to t e s t  numbers  in  the  leak- tes t  operat ing manual.  
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FLOWMETER CALI BRAT I ON 
PROBLEM STATEhIENT AND E F F E C T  
F lowmete r s  fo r  the S-I1 manufacturing operat ion w e r e  cal ibrated in  
the  labora tory  using p r e s s u r e  readings which did not duplicate the  working 
conditions i n  the  consoles  in  which they w e r e  to he i n s t d l e d .  T h e s e  p r e s -  
s u r e  differences resu l ted  in  inaccura te  calibration flo\\. curves .  
SOLUTION / R ECOhlhIENDATION 
The  solution to this  problem i s  to ca l ihra te  t h c  flon-ritcters while they 
a r e  instal led i n  the using console. 
DISCUSS10 N 
The method used to ca l ibra te  f lowineters  in  the labora tory  is  shown 
i n  F i g u r e  28. 
PRE SS UR E 
SOURCE 
OUTLET 
OUTLET 
CALI BRAT ED 
STANDARD 
F LOWMET E R 
Figure  2 8 .  Cal ibrat ion Setup 
OPEN TO ATMOSPHERE 
PRESSURE IS 0 PSIG 
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The  da ta  taken was  used to make  a cal ibrat ion c h a r t  (F igu re  29). 
Under actual  working conditions, t h e  f lowmeter  was used i n  the console as 
shown i n  F i g u r e  30. 
The problem is  evident when the labora tory  Calibration se tup  is  c o m -  
pared  to the console setup, 
p r e s s u r e  is  m e a s u r e d  d i rec t ly  at the  outlet  of the flowmeter while i n  the 
console setup, the outlet  p r e s s u r e  i s  measu red  after the gas  h a s  flowed 
through the  console tubing. 
the p r e s s u r e  d r o p  in  the console tubing, thus making the cal ibrat ion cha r t  
inaccurate .  
In  the  labora tory  cal ibrat ion setup, the  outlet  
The  cal ibrat ion setup does  not take into account 
This  problem is  ove rcome  by  calibrating the f lowmeter  while it is  
instal led i n  the console. 
tubing is  taken into account and maximum accuracy  of cal ibrat ion i s  
obtained. 
In  th i s  way, the p r e s s u r e  d rop  in  the console 
CY I 
0 PSlG 
2 PSlG 
4 PSlG 
Figure  29. Typicai Calibration Flow, Char t  
ICONSOLE TUBING 
PRESSURE 
SOURCE 
Figure 3 0 .  Console Setup 
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EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
F a i l u r e  of facility e l ec t r i ca l  power during c r i t i ca l  S-II hydrostat ic  
proof t e s t s  could r e su l t  i n  damage to stage components and injury to 
personnel.  
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
An emergency  e lec t r ica l  power s y s t e m  was  instal led a t  each  S-I1 
hydrostat ic  proof t e s t  facility. 
automaticdlly on fa i lure  of primaa-y power (F igu re  51). 
as follows: 
contacts  on and emergency  power off. 
coil i s  de-energized,  contacts  c lose ,  and emergency pbwer is routed to 
s y s t e m  e lec t r ica l  components. 
changed to  11 5 volt a c  by means  of an inver te r .  
Th i s  s y s t e m  was  dcsigned to ' ' cut  in" 
The sys t em opera tes  
facil i ty power energ izes  the  r e l ay  coil, which actuates  re lay  
On fa i lure  of p r imary  power, r e l a y  
The emergency  12 volt dc ba t te ry  power i s  
I 
DISCUSSION 
F o r  c r i t i ca l  operat ions,  such as the S-I1 hydrostat ic  proof tests, i t  
was  imprac t i ca l  to depend solely on fail-safe modes of s y s t e m  components. 
I n  the event of p r i m a r y  e l ec t r i ca l  power fa i lure  during proof-testing opera-  
t ions,  e l ec t r i ca l  components would cease  to function. An automatically 
actuated emergency  e lec t r ica l  power s y s t e m  allows continued control of 
c r i t i ca l  t e s t  components . 
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115 VOLT 
AC 
POWER 
BAT T E RY -POW E R E D 
I ELECTRICAL , COMPONENTS f I 
F igure  3 1. Emergency Electr ical  Power System 
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AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
F a i l u r e  of p r i m a r y  gas  supply (plant air o r  o ther  gas)  employed for 
the S-II to ope ra t e  critical pneumatic instrumentat ion and control  compo - 
nents  could r e su l t  i n  damage to equipment and injury to personnel,  
SOLUTION/ R ECOMMENDATION 
A bottled g a s  supply, regulated and automated, to "cut in" o n  loss of 
p r i m a r y  p r e s s u r e  source ,  was instal led i n  the  safety c r i t i ca l  S-I1 pneumo- 
s ta t ic  and hydraul ic  t e s t  s y s t e m s  (F igu re  32). The s y s t e m  opera tes  as 
follows: p r i m a r y  p r e s s u r e  source ,  set at a higher p r e s s u r e  than the 
emergency  p r e s s u r e  source ,  f o r c e s  emergency  p r e s s u r e  sou rce  check 
valve closed, and provides supply p r e s s u r e  to  sys t em instrumentat ion and 
pneumatic controls .  
p ressure-supply  check valve will  open, the  pr imary-supply check valve will 
c lose,  and the emergency  g a s  supply will p r e s s u r i z e  the sys t em ins t ru -  
mentation and pneumatic controls .  Supplementary components, such as a 
p r e s s u r e  switch,  l ights,  a l a r m ,  and solenoid valve ma): a lso be  added 
should fur ther  sophistication be  des i red .  
On l o s s  of the p r imary  p r e s s u r e  source ,  the emergency 
1 
DISCUSSION 
In  c a s e s  of c r i t i ca l  operat ions,  such as the S-11 pneumostatic and 
hydrostat ic  proof t e s t s ,  i t  was impractical .  to depend solely on  fail-safe 
modes  of s y s t e m  components. 
p r  e s s u r  e f a i lu r  e dur i  ng proof - t e sting oper  atio ns , the  pneumati c i ns t rumenta-  
tion and controls  would cease to  function effectively. An emergency  in s t ru -  
men t  p r e s s u r e  supply sys tem,  set to automatically ope ra t e  on  f a i lu re  of the 
p r i m a r y  s y s t e m ,  would allow continued control and recording of test 
p r e s s u r e s .  
I n  the event of p r i m a r y  ins t rument  supply 
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RAP10 PRESSURIZATION OF POLYETHYLENE HOSES 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Rapid pressur iza t ion  of polyethylene hoses  with helium gas resul ted i n  
the t empera tu re  r is ing above the melting point of polyethylene. This  con- 
dition led to the development of longitudinal c racks  and spli ts  in  the hoses 
af ter  a ,very shor t  se rv ice  life. 
SOL TJTION / R E COMMENDATION 
The use  of polyethylene hoses  for  pneumatic testing was discontinued 
and teflon hoses  w e r e  substituted with excellent results.  
DISCUSSION 
Several  polyethylene hoses  developed longitudinal c racks  and spli ts  
af ter  a very shor t  se rv ice  life, Visual inspection confirmed that the 
polyethylene appeared to have been softened b y  an over- tempera ture  
condition. 
The supplier conducted an investigation of the problem and concluded 
the hoses  had been pressur ized  a b  a r a t e  exceeding 20 ,000  psi per minute, 
causing the tempera ture  inside the hose to r i s e  above the design 
temper  atur e. 
The formula for  determining the approximate tempera ture  of gases  
under instantaneous compression as in  compressors  is: 
Where T 2  = compression tempera ture  of g a s  OR 
T i  = initial t empera ture  of gas OR 
P L  = compression p res su re  psia 
Pi  = init ial  p r e s s u r e  psia 
N = specific heat ratio 
A sample calculation using typical values for  the formula above 
demonstrates  how high the compression tempera ture  can r i se .  
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Assume: T i  = 750F  = 5350R 
P 2  = 4500 psia  
P1 = 1 5  psia  
N = 1.4 fo r  nitrogen; 1. 6 fo r  helium 
= 2730OR 
T 2  = 2270°F fo r  nitrogen 
T 2  = 4090°F for  helium 
I n  th i s  application, the  p re s su r i za t ion  r a t e  will  tie less  than  that i n  a 
c o m p r e s s o r ,  t he re fo re  the t empera tu re  will  be lower (about half the 
computed value). 
Since the melt ing point of polyethylene i s  approximately 275F ,  it is  
obvious that  the rapid p re s su r i za t ion  r a t e  c a p  damage the hose  without 
exceeding i t s  p re s s l i r e  rating. 
, 
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S-Il PARTS PROTECTION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
S-I1 tubing and h a r n e s s  damage  was  incu r red  due to  inadvertent  blows 
with tools by personnel  working i n  adjacent areas o r  by being stepped upon 
b y  pef.sonne1 working i n  c lose  q u a r t e r s ,  
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
Protec t ive  cove r s  w e r e  designed and fabricated to protect  selected 
components and a r e a s  f r o m  inadvertent  damage. 
instal led on S-11-3 S-E's following. 
of "Ding" type rework  squawks resu l ted .  
component handling protection be implemented during init ial  design. 
P ro tec t ive  cove r s  w e r e  
-4 significant reduction i n  the number 
I t  i s  recommended that stage 
DISCUSSION 
I D a m a g g  was incur red  to S-II t h rus t  s t ruc tu re  installations during suh-  
s y s t e m s  instal la t ions,  f inal  systems instal la t ions,  s tage checkout and 
t rouble  shooting proc  edur e s. 
Pro tec t ive  cove r s  w e r e  designed and fabricated to provide protection 
of specific components and s t ruc ture .  The  applicable manufacturing 
Xvorking documents  requi red  that protective covers  b e  installed,  thus 
insur ing  p a r t s  protect ion f r o m  inadvertent  damage. 
that  the p2otective cove r s  w e r e  instal led as pa r t  of the  job buy-off 
requi rements .  
Inspection ver i f ied  
REFERENCES 
" P a r t s  Protect ion,  I '  Specification MA06 16-002. 
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DEVl AT1 ON S TO SO LDERl N G SPEC1 F ICATI ON 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
MSFC-PROC-l58A had many soldering requirements  that were  
difficult to attain. 
SOLUTION/ R E  COMMENDATION 
Deviations to  the soldering specification w e r e  requested f r o m  NASA 
These  deviations were  then passed on to the requesting sup- ahd granted. 
plier.  Approved deviations should be extended to a l l  suppliers using 
MSFC-PROC-158A a s  soon a s  possible after receipt  of the deviation. 
DISCUSSION 
Throughout the Saturn program, deviations to  MSFC-PROC-158A 
were  granted to Space Division as a r e su l t  of: 
1. Requests {rom NR suppl iers  i 
2. NR Manufacturing Department requests  
3 .  NASA extending to NR cer ta in  deviations requested by other 
pr ime contractors  
All deviations were  received and accumulated i n  SID 61-3676, Only 
those for which specific deviations have been requested by a supplier were  
disseminated and then only to that supplier. 
granting a deviation, the customer was satisfied that quality would not be  
compromised, the requirement  was too stringent and a cost  savings could 
be achieved. 
It mus t  be  assumed that i n  
On future  programs,  a l l  specification deviations should be passed on 
to all operational divisions performing on the program as well as all 
suppl iers  who hold the specification as a requirement  of the procurement 
specification to  permi i  them to use  the modified specification when 
appropriate. 
f r o m  requiring supplier19 to m e e t  m o r e  stringent specifications than 
permitted by deviations. 
In  some cases ,  high cos t  and slipped schedules resul ted 
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STANDARDIZATlON OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRIC WIRE A N D  CABLE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Various requi rements  fo r  different types of wire created ma te r i a l  
shortages,  long lead time, and higher cos ts  t o  satisfy design specifications. 
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
At the outset  of a new program, a standard fo r  a l l  wi re  requirements  
should be established that keeps the number of configurations to an 
absolute minimum. 
b e  made af ter  the industry has  been canvassed for  advancements, avail- 
ability, lead t ime, and price.  
It i s  preferable  that a determination of requirements  
DISCUSSION 
Difficulty i n  meeting delivery schedules was experienced a t  the outset  
of the $-I1 P r o g r a m  when wire  requirements  were  made known to 
Purchasing. 
ments  which created overloads at the suppl iers  and extended delivery lead 
times. To alleviate the schedule problem, the buyer,  S-I1 Quality 
Engineer and S-I1 Design Engineer jointly reviewed the Apollo and S-I1 
specifications and negotiated standard wire  requirements  for  u se  on both 
programs.  Cost savings of approximately 1. 5 mill ion dol la rs  resulted 
f r o m  standardizing wi re  requirements  for  both the Saturn and the Apollo 
programs . 
This was due to the greatly differing specification requi re -  
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STRl N GENT SPEC1 FI CAT1 ON REQU IREME N T S  
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During the course  of design, development and fabrication of a coslfined 
detonating fuse  (CDF) pyrogen init iator for  the Saturn program, extremely 
stringent requirements  resul ted i n  costly qualification t e s t  fa i lures ,  
development of second source  suppliers,  and production lot rejections,  
Both the p r imary  and secondary suppliers experienced fai lures  i n  trying to 
maintain an  impervious bulkhead with a leak r a t e  allowance of 1 cc per  
minute tes ted a t  2500 psi of nitrogen gas. 
I 
SOLUTION/ R ECOMMENDATION 
* 
Although the technical problem was eventually solved by the suppliers 
through qualification testing, the cost  effectiveness of maintaining the 
stringent specification leak- r a t e  requirement  during design, development, 
and fabrication phases and during development of second sources  is question- 
able. 
obtain experimental  data  on the r i sks  associated with porous initiator 
bulkhead and relieve the specification requirements  accordingly. 
Subsequent events showed that it would have been advantageous to 
DISCUSSION 
Through bulkhead ini t ia tors  a r e  used for  ignition of the solid propel- 
' 
lant motors  on the Saturn V vehicle. 
launch vehicle. 
during the l a s t  f ive y e a r s  in  maintaining a completely impervious bulkhead 
af ter  u se  (firing). Since the expended init iator bulkhead i s  subjected to 
motor  p r e s s u r e  during motor firing, s t ruc tura l  integrity i n  this  a r e a  is  
essential. 
quickly enlarge small ,  bulkhead, leakage paths sufficiently to allow 
catastrophic venting. 
extremely stringent specification requirements  were  established. 
present  specification allows only 1 cc  per  minute leak r a t e  when tested with 
2500 psi nitrogen gas. This  stringent requirement  resulted i n  qualification 
t e s t  fa i lures  a t  Link Ordnance (1965) and a t  McCormick-Selph Associates 
(1968). Link Ordnance production lot 005 (1969) was  also rejected because 
r a t e s  of excessive post-firing bulkhead leakage (up to 43 cc/minute)  
resul ted during lot acceptance testing. 
Thirty-six ini t ia tors  a r e  used on each 
P rob lems  have been encountered by the two suppliers 
The concern has  been that the hot, erosive motor  gases  would 
Since the maximum safe leak r a t e  was not known, 
The 
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A special  t e s t  p rogram was conducted by 
experimental  data  on the r i s k s  associated with 
NR i n  July 1969 to obtain 
porous init iator bulkheads. 
This  p rogram consisted of the exposure of ar t i f ic ia l  leak specimens to 
simulated S-11 ullage-motor internal  burn  environments. 
pre-firing and post-firing leak r a t e s  indicated that combustion products of 
an  aluminized propellant tended to sea l  leak paths. No detr imental  effects 
were  noted when specimens having pre- f i re  leak r a t e s  up to 23 liters per  
minute were  exposed to in te rna l  motor burn  environments. 
Comparison of 
Since aluminized propellants a r e  known to deposit combustion products 
Therefore ,  
on internal  motor  surfaces ,  the observations noted above may not apply to 
a nonaluminized propellant such as  used i n  the S-I1 r e t r o  motor. 
another t e s t  p rogram was conducted by NR in  October 1970 utilizing S-I1 
r e t r o  motor (Thiokol Recrui t )  propellant to veTify safe,  bulkhead leak 
levels for all motors  on the Saturn V. 
This t e s t  p rogram was conducted for the purpose of obtaining data 
which will ( I )  provide g rea t e r  confidence that small bulkhead permeability 
under exposure to nonaluminized propellant does not jeopardize miss ion  
success  and ( 2 )  establish the maximum tolerable post-firing leakage r a t e  
to permi t  relaxation of present  stringent specification leak requirements.  
The t e s t  concluded that (1) the present  CDF pyrogen init iator 's  
specification post-fire maximum-leak requirement  i s  much m o r e  stringent 
than necessary,  (2)  damaging erosion f r o m  motor gases  can occur only i f  
the bulkhead leakage r a t e s  exceed the present  tolerance by m o r e  than a 
factor  of ten  thousand and ( 3 )  recommends that i n  the event minor bulkhead 
leakage i s  encountered i n  future init iator acceptance testing, the procure-  
ment  specification be  revised to allow 100 cc  per minute (nitrogen a t  
2500 psi) maximum leak rate. 
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TELEMETRY SPARES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
As a r e su l t  of design changes on te lemetry equipment for  s tages  
S-II-1 through S-11-10, t h ree  configurations were  identified. 
different Configurations would normally have required spa res  procurement 
for al l  three configurations. 
S@LUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
These  
Since c e r t  ai n te lemetry equipment was one -way 4 nt e r  changeable, 
excessive cost  would have resulted f r o m  procurement of a l l  configurations. 
All interchangeable configurations were  identified and where delivery’ 
schedules permitted,  the S-II-4 and S-11-5 configurations were  procured i n  
. l ieu of the S-11-1, S-11-2, and S-11-3 configurations. 
The u s e  of higher configurations f o r  spa res  should be considered 
whenever configuration differences a r e  planned i n  advance f o r  var ious 
vehicles, 
s p a r e s  should b e  modified t o  the latest configuration and interchangeability 
notes added to the drawings. 
When configurations a r e  changed a s  a resu l t  of design changes, 
DISCUSSION 
Normally, spa res  a r e  procured for a l l  configurations shown on 
drawings. 
te lemetry,  
second configuration was effective on vehicles four and five and the third 
was effective on vehicles six and subsequent. Three  tes t  s i tes  had to be 
supported. 
T h r e e  major  configurations were  identified for  Saturn S-II 
The first was effective on vehicles one through three,  the 
By norma l  methods, th ree  complete se t s  of each  Configuration would 
have been required. This  situation occurred  i n  April  of 1966. 
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CONFLICT OF NR-IMPOSED PROCESS SPECIFICATION REVISIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Automatic distribution of rev ised  process specifications to all suppl ie rs  
conflicts with S-I1 baseline. 
SOLUTION / REC OMMENDATION 
As a possible  solution, i t  is suggested that the p r o g r a m  approval  s ta tus  
of each  p rocess  specification be denoted on the specification faceplate. 
action has  been accomplished for the var ious precis ion cleaning specifications.  
This 
DISCUSSION 
Contractual  p rocess  specifications for  the S-I1 p rogram are baselined 
to a specif ic  revis ion by SD-61-367. Mater ia l  Operations,  however,  trans- 
m i t s  copies of the la tes t  specifications to all approved p r o c e s s o r s  upon 
i r e l ease .  This t r ansmi t t a l  d i r ec t s  immediate'implementation of the la tes t  
specification for  all Space Division projects .  In cases where  the la tes t  
specification is not approved for  S-I1 p rogram use,  Configuration Management 
disciplines are  obviously undermined. 
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CORROSION PREVENTION FOR ALUMINUM DISCONNECTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Aluminum castings for  S-LT 8-inch propellant f i l l  disconnects were  
incurr ing ex t reme corrosion during u s e  a t  the Kennedy Space Center test 
site. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The problem was  solved through the development of a detailed 
corrosion treatment.  
DISCUSSION 
This  t rea tment  was  established by NR for  use  under NR supervision 
a t  the supplier 's  facility pr ior  to refurbishment of the disconnects. 
The cor ros ion  t rea tment  procedures  a r e  outlined in  Let ter  099-303- 
68-125, October 23, 1968. Using this  procedure,  four disconnects were  
conversion t reated,  refurbished, and submitted for Mater ia l  Review Board 
disposition. The units so t reated passed acceptance testing and have since 
successfully supported launches. 
eliminated procurement of four new 8-inch propellant fill disconnects worth 
approximately $25, 000 each. The four units which underwent cor ros ion  
t reatment  had been declared uneconomical to repa i r  by  the supplier due 
to corrosion. 
Use of the corrosion t reatment  
REFERENCES 
Procedure  for  Hand Removal of Corrosion f r o m  A356 Aluminum 
Alloy Castings and Beryll ium Copper, attachment f r o m  Let ter  099-303 - 
b8-125 ( see  following pages). 
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Letter 099-303 -6 8-236 
PROCEDURE FOR HAND REMOVAL OF CORROSION FROM A354 
ALUMINUM ALLOY CASTINGS 
The following procedure i s  for  removing by noni e r s ion  methods, 
localized cor ros ion  f r o m  A356 castings. 
to assembled pa r t s  because of the danger of trapping chemicals i n  faying 
surfaces.  
of S-I1 Mater ia l s  and P r o c e s s e s  Laboratory ( D / 0 9 8 )  personnel, 
This  method should g& be applied 
The operations l isted below should be done under the  direction 
1. Remove loose residue with a soft, s ta inless  s teel  wire brush 
2, Apply with brush  o r  swab, Turco 5361 paste fo r  ten  to fifteen 
mi nut e s 
:::3. Rinse with tap water  for  two to three  minutes 
4. Apply with b rush  o r  swab a nitric-hydrofluoric acid solution 
(15-20 percent  by weight H N 0 3  and 3 (*1) percent by weight RF) 
€or one to th ree  minutes 
':'5, Rinse with tap water  for  two to three  minutes 
6. Inspect €or cor ros ion  removal,  
NR representat ive 
Verification of removal  to b e  by 
7. Repeat s teps  2-through 6 a s  required 
When the cor ros ion  residues a r e  removed, hand apply a chemical 
film finish to the reworked a r e a s  a s  follows: 
1. Deoxidize by applying the nitric-hydrofluoric acid solution 
( re ference  s tep  4 above) for  one to th ree  minutes 
Rinse with tap water  for  two to three  minotes 
. b  
Apply Type I chemical film per  Table IV, step 2, of MAOlO9-003 , 
xc2. 
3. 
*Note: The rework area may b e  r insed under flowing water ,  immersed  i n  
a tank, o r  wiped with a wet sponge o r  cheesecloth. 
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4, Rinse  with high puri ty  water  pe r  s tep  3 ,  Table IV, MA0109-003 
5. A i r  d r y  
PROCEDURES FOR REMOVAL O F  CORROSION FROM 
BERYLLIUM C O P P E R  
I. F o r  Disassembled  Parts 
1. Remove loose co r ros ion  r e s idue  with a soft, s ta in less  s t ee l  
wi r e  b r u s h  
2. Bright  dip p e r  Table  IV of MA0110-019 
3 .  Rinse  i n  flowing water  
4. Air  d r y  
I 5. Inspect  for  c o r r o s i o n  removal .  Verification of r emova l  to b e  by 
NR r epr  t sen ta t ive  
6, Repeat  s teps  one through f ive a s  requi red  
11. F o r  Assembled  P a r t s  
Remove co r ros ion  r e s idues  by mechanical  methods only (no chemica ls )  
such' a s  \vith a s ta in less  s t ee l  b rush ,  an ab ras ive  pad, o r  c rocus  
cloth. 
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SUPPLIER ON-SITE REPAIRS A N D  MODIFICATIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Supplier technicians were  handcarrying components to s i t e s  to make 
r e p a i r s  and modifications. 
that  handcarr ied components had not been  routed through Receiving 
Inspection. 
through Receiving Inspection rejections were  c o m o n  and led to delays and 
rescheduling of r epa i r s  and modifications. 
This pract ice  led to inspection pi-oblems i n  
When handcarried components were  eventually re-routed 
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
Y 
A procedure was initiated to provide for  normal  shipment, delivery, 
and receiving inspection of components pr ior  to scheduling of supplier 
technician on site. 
nents were  handed over and- rework o r  modification performed. 
Upon a r r i v a l  of the supplier 's  technician, the compo- 
It i s  recommended that the above procedure be  used i n  all cases  
where t ime permits.  
t ime does not permi t  the delivery of pa r t s  pr ior  to scheduling of the 
supplier 's  technician on-site,  the components can still be  handcarried; and 
receiving inspection performed while the technician stands by. 
In the case  of urgent repa i r  requirements ,  where  
DISCUS SI0 N 
In o r d e r  to effect on-site r e p a i r s  and modifications to equipment 
installed on an  S-11 stage,  o r  i n  laborator ies ,  supplier personnel were  
handcarrying the components required to effect the r epa i r  o r  modification. 
In many cases ,  the supplier 's  technician would immediately init iate r epa i r  
o r  modification and be  partially o r  completely finished, only to have the 
rework  rejected when it wa5 real ized that the components used had not 
been routed through Receiving Inspection. 
In other instances,  the supplier 's  technician would deliver the compo- 
This led to excessive standby t ime fo r  both the supplier 's  
nents and then stand by, while the components were  routed through Receiving 
Inspection. 
technician and NR personnel, particularly when the components were  
rejected o r  when the purchase o rde r  o r  supplier 's  data  required correction. 
In many instances,  it meant  that  af ter  a 2- to 4-hour standby, the supplier 's  
technician would have to r e tu rn  to h is  plant and the on-site effort rescheduled. 
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COMPONENT CLEANLINESS AFTER REWORK 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
P a r t s  were  returned for  minor  rework and then required extensive 
recleaning to meet  Specification MSFC-SPEC-164. 
SOLUTION / R ECOMMENDATION 
Minor rework was allowed on s i te  and specification deviations were  
granted to allow pa r t s  to b e  returned at the same level of cleanliness a s  
received for rework. 
. 
DISCUSSION 
Major equipmefit i t e m s  were  being returned to the supplier for  minor 
rework  o r  modification. In t h e  process ,  the cleanliness level  was lost  and 
i n  the case of a vent valve, it was necessary  to completely disassemble the 
vent valve to ensure  the specification requirement  of MSFC-SPEC-164. 
The cost  of the cleaning operation r a n  as high a s  $20 ,000 .  
Under the surveil lance of government and NR source  inspection 
personnel, deviations were  granted to: 
1. Have supplier technicians per form minor rework o r  modification 
while the vent valve was installed 
2. Remove the vent valves,  immediately install  end caps,  and perform 
the minor  rework in  an  on-site c lean room. 
3. Remove the vent valves,  instal l  end caps, place in  c lean bag, and 
ship to the supplier with certification of the cleanliness level. 
Rework was performed and supplier verified that the level of 
cleanli ne s s was maintained. 
This deviation permitted the down time to be  reduced f r o m  six weeks 
to a s  l i t t le  as t h r e e  days and reduced the rework costs  f r o m  a s  high as 
$20,000 to a s  low as $1,000, 
REFERENCES 
MSFC -SPEC -1 64 
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LOX CLEANING OF PARTS AT SUPPLIERS' PLANTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Requirements  i n  procurement  specifications for  c leanl iness  i n  
accordance with MSFC-SPEC-164 a r e  in te rpre ted  by government and 
source  inspec tors  a s  being applicable pr ior  to shipment of the equipment 
by the supplier. 
i n  the NR t e s t  laboratory.  
This  equipment cleaning is also d o n c  af ter  f inal  calibration 
SOLUTIOIC / RECOMMENDATION 
On future  p rograms ,  the cleanl iness  requi rements  should read  
similar to the following: "After f inal  calibration o r  t e s t ,  a l l  pa r t s  of the 
t ransducer  which come i n  contact with media  shal l  be cleaned i n  accordance 
with requi rements  of MSFC-SPEC-164 p r io r  to installation into the system. " 
DISCUSSION 
Numerous purchased equipment i t e m s  such a s  t r ansduce r s  and 
acce le romete r s  a r e  LOX-cleaned following acceptance testing and pr ior  to 
shipment. 
tes ted,  and recleaned. This  duplication of effort caused unnecessary  
monetary expenditures a s  well  a s  delays i n  delivery. 
determined tha't in-house effort  will be  required of an i t e m  of equipment 
which \%-ill des t roy  LOX cleanl iness ,  the procurement  specification should 
be so worded as to remove  this  requi rement  f r o m  the suppl ier ' s  effort. 
When these  pa r t s  are received a t  NR, they a r e  calibrated,  bench 
When it has  been  
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Materials  17-03 
LOX COMPATIBLE DYEPENETRANT REQUIREMENTS ON TEMPERATURE SENSORS 
PROl3LEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Transducer  procurement specifications allowed the supplier to u s e  
dyepenetrant ma te r i a l s  which were  not compatible with LOX, 
dyepenetrant mater ia l s  have a res idue which could have adverse resu l t s  
i f  installed i n  LOX systems.  
Some 
SOLUTION / R E COMMENDATION 
The dyepenetrant requirements  were  changed i n  the procurement  
specification to requi re  LOX compatibility. 
DISCUSSIOD; 
It i s  essent ia l  that  dyepenetrant mater ia l s  be  LOX compatible. 
However, the supplier could find no source to certify LOX compatibility 
through impact  testing. 
patible ma te r i a l s  which had been impact  tested and certified by NR. 
Fu r the r ,  NH trained and certif ied supplier personnel in  the u s e  of the new 
dyepenetrant proceclur e s. 
1 IYR solved that problem by furnishing L O X  com- 
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ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF CRYOGENIC DISCONNECTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
The  a i r b o r n e  and ground support  disconnects  f t 3 r  c ryogenics  w e r e  
acceptance-tested separa te ly  with a dummy disconnect  a t  the  suppl ie r ' s  
f a  ci li ty . 
SOLUTIOT\;/RECOM..MENDhTION 
I *  
Space vehic les  reqi i i re  the u s e  of disconnect. fo r  var ious  applications 
involving a i r b o r n e  and ground support  equipment. 
p rocuremen t  r e l eas ing  documentation should be xvorded to r e q u i r e  r e l e a s e  
of the r equ i r emen t s  a t  t he  s a m e  t i m e  so that schedules  will be establ ished 
to p e r m i t  de l ivery  of both disconnects  concurrently.  
On new p rograms ,  
DISCI J SSION 
In the ea r ly  p a r t  of t he  Sa turn  I1 p rogram,  the  a i rbo rne  production 
r e q u i r e m e n t s  \\?ere r e l e a s e d  considerably in  advance of the ground support  . 
equipment r equ i r emen t s ,  with schedules  call ing for  de l ivery  of the  a i rbo rne  
s e v e r a l  months be fo re  the GSE. 
suppl ie r  to f ab r i ca t e  t e s t  se tups  to p e r m i t  tes t ing of tht. a i rbo rne  first and 
l a t e r ,  the  GSE. Th i s  resu l ted  i n  unnecessa ry  duplication of acceptance 
test costs .  
A s  a r e su l t ,  i t  &.as necessa ry  for  the 
When follow-on r equ i r emen t s  w e r e  placed, th i s  excess ive  acceptance 
tes t ing cos t  was  recognized,  and the buyer  then a r r anged  fo r  a l l  ground 
suppor t  equipment r equ i r emen t s ,  as well  a s  a i rbo rne  r equ i r emen t s ,  to b e  
r e l e a s e d  and scheduled fo r  del ivery concurrent ly .  A considerable  cos t  
sav ings  resul ted.  
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LINE ASSEMBLY LEAK DETECTION 
Materials  23 -01 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Minute leaks  i n  the main  l ine of vacuum jacketed l ines could not b e  
located without di s a s  s embly. 
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
A,tool which wcruld locate leaks without destroying good welds was 
developed. 
DISCUSSION 
Throughout the line assembly production program, Solar had a 
difficult t ime meeting delivery schedules for  the long, complex, vacuum- 
jacketed line assemblies .  
type leaks. 
sea ls  to isolate  a section of line. 
could be  rotated to scan the inside surface of the line. As the needle device 
was rotated, helium was re leased  i n  a very small  quantity into the vacuum 
jacket. When the needle approached the leak, helium was pulled into the 
vacuum which was connected to a very sensit ive m a s s  spectrometer.  This 
would pin point the leak and allow the supplier to make the repa i r  without 
destroying good welds.on assembled components. 
It was  almost  impossible to locate slow, pin-hole 
A t e s t  device was developed using two inflatable doughnut type 
1 A needle extended through one sea l  and 
REFERENCES 
Tool T7322858, 
Tool T7402669, 
MS Sealer  Plug CD90420B, used with ME271 -001 1 Feed Lines 
M S  Sealer  Plug CD90252-D, used with ME271-0021 Vent Line 
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STRCJCTURAL INTEGRITY OF WELDED L I N E  A'>SLMBl.IES 
PROBLEM STATEMEKT AND EFFECT 
Changes i n  peaking and offset  r equ i r emen t s  c r  cd a problem f o r  
r e a s s e s s m e n t  and r e m e a  sureii ient of both c r i t i ca l  and noncri t ical  welded 
l ine assembl ies .  Undetected weld anoiiialics c~,nlcl r c su l t  i n  c r a c k s  which 
would p e r m i t  leakage of hazardous  inedia (siicti a <  Idax) o r  fur ther  propa- 
gation to the  point of line f r a c t u r e  with a possihlc,  laiinch delay o r  failure.  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENT)ATION 
Cr i t i ca l  m e a s u r e m e n t  areas w e r e  the inner  linc2 su r faces  a t  weld joints  
Sectioning and f o r  which no s tandard  measu r ing  tools (3r techniqucs existed. 
rewelding w e r e  the only known technique.; -- these  Lverc costly,  hazardous,  
and still did not a s s u r e  that  peaking and offset  noi i ld  not occur  upon reweld-  
ing. T h e  soluti'on was to develop nondestructive t cchniques and tools  which 
would provide a s s u r a n c e  that in te rna l  f inished su r faces  would be f r e e  f r o m  
s t ruc tu ra l  f laws o r  defects.  
DISCUSSION 
i 
NR developed a n  ins t runien t  identified a s  ct prof icorder  - a device 
which would p e r m i t  v i sua l  inspect ion a s  \vel1 a s  mechanica l  record ing  fo r  
height, width, and offset  and peaking of all itiner welds. The  device con- 
s i s ted  of a r e c o r d e r ,  T V  c a m e r a ,  TV scrt'er;, video rimnitor, i neasu remen t  
head and f lex  cable ,  m i r r o r ,  r e c o r d c r  arm, b ladders ,  power supplies,  etc. 
Two devices  - one a 7 inch  and the o ther  with an adjustabil i ty f ea tu re  to 
8 inches.  
l i nes  and the  high cos t  of cutting and rewelding w e r e  avoidcd. 
Through development and u s e  of these  uni ts ,  poss ib le  damage  to 
R E F E R E N C E S  
SD71-468, March  22, 1971. 
Offset  profile tool (T-7204193); Inspection Check F ix tu re  (T-7204339) 
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MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD (MRB) DELEGATION 
Materials  24-01 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
As required by cer ta in  suppliers,  purchase o r d e r s  were  negotiated 
with the understanding that the selected supplier would b e  granted MRB 
authority. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
At the time specifications are released a determination should b e  made 
The customer should be requested to approve a candidate 
as to whether Mater ia l  Review Board authority should be delegated to the 
selected supplier. 
list of appropriate i tems. 
source has been  selected and it has  been determined that they have an  
approved quality control sys tem and qualified personnel. 
The actual delegation would be  extended when the 
DISCUSSION I 
i 
During the period of both init ial  and follow-on procurement of the 
In many instances,  two to 
Saturn S-II Program,  delegation of MRB authority to selected NR subcon- 
tractors was historically a lengthy process.  
six months were  los t  awaiting a decision on supplier delegation, even though 
a number of these subcontractors were  also pr ime contractors  on  other  pro- 
g r a m s  with this same customer,  
NR documentation requirements  now invite subcontractors to request  
MRB authority. 
they will be granted this privilege whenever the need ar i ses .  
delays i n  obtaining customer approval has  an adverse effect on negotiated 
schedules and purchase o r d e r  prices.  
g r a m  los ses  were  caused by their  inability to obtain approval of the i r  request  
fo r  MRB authority, 
relaxation of schedules . 
In many cases  suppliers propose with the understanding that 
Resulting 
Some suppliers have indicated pro- 
The net r e su l t  invariably ends in  increased cost and 
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C O N  SOLI DATION OF PROCUREMENTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
It was  discovered that the Space Division was using seve ra l  procured 
i t e m s  common to other  Divisions. 
r e su l t  i n  higher procurement  costs.  
Separate  purchases  of the s a m e  i t e m  
SOLUTION/ R E COMMENDATION 
A consolidation of requi rements  was effected where  practical .  
DISCUSSION 
In  those c a s e s  where  common usage was discovered on equipment 
(specification controlled i t ems) ,  individual buyers  coordinated with* the other 
NR divisions, the supplier,. and the reques tor  to effect p r i ce  reductions 
through a l a r g e r  procurement .  
r e l e a s e  of requi rements  to allow one-lot manufacture. 
In some ins tances ,  this  requi red  the ea r ly  
For usage  i t ems ;  such as O-rings,  nuts, bolts,  etc. ; common to m o r e  
than one division, corpora te  buying agreements  were  used. 
combining requi rements  f r o m  al l  using divisions, purchases  under corpora te  
buying ag reemen t s  a lso save cos ts  through (1) the avoidance of s epa ra t e  
negotiations for  each buy within each division and ( 2 )  the protection of p r i ces  
against  inflatioh during the agreement  period. 
In addition to 
Additionally, i n  the production of S-11 sys t ems  / components, ce r t a in  
effor ts  w e r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  to o ther  divisions under Interdivisional Work 
Authorizations (LDWA). 
I D W A ' s  and Space Division Manufacturing was retained by Space Division. 
Th i s  avoided a separat ion of requi rements /purchases .  
The procurement  of many pa r t s  required for  these  
Space Division was  also awarded procurement  responsibil i ty for  a l l  
Saturn V common ordnance. 
was  a valuable tool in,reducing S-LI costs. 
This  common ordnance management p rogram 
The reduction of procurement  cos ts  through consolidating requi rements  
should be  an inducement to strengthen and expand consolidated procurement  
plans for  subsequent programs.  
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WELD X-RAY INTERPRETATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Inconsistent interpretat ion of radiographic x- rays  by supplier 
inspectors  and Government and NR source  inspectors  caused a high rejection 
rate, increased  costs,  and delayed delivery of c r i t i ca l  l ine assemblies.  
SOLUTION/ R E COMMEND ATION 
A certif ication p rogram for a l l  personnel associated with interpretat ion 
of radiographic x- rays  was established. 
programs a l l  suppl iers  and source  inspectors  associated with radiographic 
x- rays  be  requi red  to undergo training and certif ication s imilar  to that used 
on the S-I1 program. 
It i s  recommended that on fukure 
DISCUSSION 
E During calendar yea r s  1966 and 1967, all  welds on line assembl ies  
The cause of the 
required radiographic x-rays. 
the fai lure  of a line assembly i n  a c r i t i ca l  application. 
fa i lure  was  found to be  a faulty weld. 
in-process  inspection and Government and NR source inspectors.  Because 
of the lack of experience, welds were  inconsistently accepted and rejected,  
separately and collectively, by  the var ious inspectors.  
siderable delay i n  delivery and additional cost over runs  on the CPFF-type 
subcontracts . 
The need for  this requirement  resul ted f r o m  
Acceptance of the weld was by supplier-  
This caused con- 
This  condition was cor rec ted  by  a training course  established at NR, 
Manpower Development then imposed the requirement  
All inspectors  were  t ra ined to read  and in te rpre t  radiographic x- rays  to  
uniform standards.  
that  a l l  personnel doing source  inspection which required the reading of 
radiographic x- rays  be  recer t i f ied each year .  Recertification accounting is 
accomplished by an  automated tab run  which i s  distributed monthly and lists 
the name of the individual, and the date when his present  certif ication 
expires. 
to r  for  recer t i f icat ion pr ior  to expiration of the cur ren t  certification. 
This provides t ime for  management to schedule each source  inspec-  
REFERENCES 
NR Training Course 782 AE Radiographic Film Interpretation 
NR Training Course.  782 AF Radiographic Film Reading Recertification 
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CONTRACTOR NONCONFORMANCE S 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Many u n n e c e s s a r y  c o n t r a c t o r  nonconfo rmances  ( C N C ' s )  w e r e  wr i t t en  
a g a i n s t  S-I1 s t a g e s  d u e  t o  
1. L a c k  of unde r s t and ing  of c o n t r a c t  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
2 .  Lack  of knowledge of c r i t e r i a  f o r  gene ra t ing  CNC' s  
3 .  1rnprop"er p r e p a r a t i o n  of CNC' s  
U n n e c e s s a r y  expend i tu re  and time w e r e  spen t  f o r  cance l la t ion  of 
u n n e c e s s a r y  C N C ' s  o r  r e v i s i o n  t o  i m p r o p e r l y  p r e p a r e d  CNC' s .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
F a m i l i a r i z a t i o n  m e e t i n g s  w e r e  held t o  acquain t  the  p e r s o n n e l  of NR and 
gove rnmen t  a g e n c i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  with the  p r o b l e m  with c o n t r a c t  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  CNC' s ,  and p r o p e r  p r e p a r a t i o n  of CNC' s .  
It i s  r e c o m m e n d e d  tha t  t he  above  ac t ion  b e  t aken  e a r l y  in  a p r o i r a m  t o  
avoid u n n e c e s s a r y  expend i tu re  and time. 
DISCUSSION 
Dur ing  a r e v i e w  of nonconfo rmances  on S-11-5, i t  was  found tha t  a to ta l  
of 107 C N C ' s  w e r e  w r i t t e n  aga ins t  S-11-5 while  a t  a t e s t  s i te .  Many of t he  
CNC' s  w e r e  r e v i s e d  m o r e  than  once  and i n  two o c c a s i o n s  a s  m a n y  as four  
t i m e s .  To w r i t e  a nonconformance ,  an  a v e r a g e  of 32 h o u r s  of t echn ica l  and 
suppor t  p e r s o n n e l  a r e  expended by the  c o n t r a c t o r .  
app rox ima te ly  one m a n / y e a r  was  expended.  
In t h e  c a s e  of S-11-5, 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  t he  Manage r ,  S-I1 C o n t r a c t s ,  m e t  with m e m b e r s  of 
m a n a g e m e n t  at the  t e s t  s i t e  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  of developing a b e t t e r  knowledge 
of c o n t r a c t  r e q u i r e m e n t s  on t h e  par t  of site pe r sonne l .  
w e r e  t aken  t o  r e s o l v e  the  problem: 
T h e  following ac t ions  
1. NR nonconfo rmance  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  e f fec t  a t  t he  t e s t  s i t e  w e r e  
r e w r i t t e n  
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2 .  Seal B e a c h  c o n t r a c t s  support \vas  p rov ided  to t h e  tes t  s i t e  
3. C o n t r a c t  familiarization e t ings  w e r e  11eld X1it.h the  hfSFC 
C o n t r a c t i n g  Off lcer ,  t h e  t e s t  s i te  C o n t r a c t i n g  O f f i c e r ,  N A S A / M T F ,  
NASA managc rnen t  p e r s o n n e l ,  and  A i r  F o r c e  Q u a l i t y  M a n a g e m e n t  
p e r s o n n e l .  
A s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  above  ac t ion ,  t h e  number of C N C ' s  on S-11-6 and 
s u b s e q u e n t  s t a g e s  w e r e  r e d u c e d  s ign i f i can t ly  a s  fol lows:  
No. o f  C N C ' s  __ - - S t a g e  
s - I1 - 6 
5-11-7 
5-11-8 
s-11-0 
s-11- 10 
s-11- 11 
S-11- 1 3  
s-11- 14  
S-11- 15 
s -.I1 - 12 
72 
17 
18 
2 2  
3 0  
2 7  
1 2  
1'7 
1 6 
8 
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APPROPRIATE ECP REVISION SYMBOL ON AFFECTED 
NR DOCUMENTATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
All  af fec ted  N R  change  account ing  documenta t ion  did not r e f l ec t  t he  
c u r r e n t  eng inee r ing  change  p r o p o s a l  ( E C P )  r ev i s ion  symbol .  T h i s  condition 
c r e a t e d  ident i f ica t ion  p r o b l e m s  f o r  t he  Conf igura t ion  Con t ro l  M a s t e r  R e c o r d  
(CCMR)  of the  c u r r e n t  a p p r o v e d / s u b m i t t e d  E C P  rev i s ion .  I t  was  a l s o  d i f f i .  
cu l t  to r e l a t e  o t h e r  documenta t ion  t o  the  a p p r o p r i a t e  E C P  rev is ion .  
SOL U T  ION /R E C  OA4MENDATION 
The  implementing '  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and the  c o n t r a c t  (SID 6 5 -  15 16)  w e r e  
changed t o  e s t a b l i s h  c r i t e r i a  and ground r u l e s  t o  r e q u i r e  appl ica t ion  of t he  
a p p r o p r i a t e  E C P  r e v i s i o n  s y m b o l  on all affeqted documen t s .  I t  is r e c o m -  
mended tha t  t h i s  s y s t e m  be implemen ted  on new p r o g r a m s  a t  t he  t i m e  of 
in i t ia l  eng inee r ing  release. 
DISCUSSION 
Validat ion of end i t e m  conf igura t ion  as  p e r f o r m e d  in a c c o r d a n c e  with 
c o n t r a c t  ob l iga t ions  v i a  c o m p a r i s o n  of NR documenta t ion  t o  NASA MSFC 
documenta t ion  (Conf igura t ion  Ident i f icat ion Index and Modification S ta tus  
R e p o r t  - CM-017-003-2H)  w a s  a c u n i b e r s o m e ,  t i m e  consuming,  cos t ly  
e f for t .  By e s t ab l i sh ing  c r i t e r i a ,  g round r u l e s ,  and r ebase l in ing  end i t e m  
E C P L ' s ,  va l ida t ion  of t he  end i t e m  is now accompl i shed  a c c u r a t e l y  and a t  
l ess  c o s t  with a m i n i m u m  of e f for t ,  and configurat ion of the  end i t e m  m a y  be 
obtained a t  any given mi l e s tone .  
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ADDED ENGINEERING CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
A f t e r  NASA and S-I1 Eng inee r ing ' s  in i t ia l  ident i f icat ion of s t a g e  
eng inee r ing  c r i t i c a l  components  ( E C C ' s ) ,  NASA changed t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  
s e l ec t ion  of E C C ' s .  T h i s  new c r i t e r i a  added approx ima te ly  135 new ECC's  
and o c c u r r e d  subsequen t  t o  comple t ion  of f i r s t - a r t i c l e  configurat ion 
in spec t ion  (FACI) .  Con t rac tua l ly ,  t he  S-I1 P r o g r a m  w a s  obl igated t o  FACI  
the  added E C C ' s  u T h i c  h w e r e  p r o c u r e d  f r o r ,  65 d i f f e ren t  supp l i e r s .  
SOLL'T ION /R EC:OhIMENDATION 
C o n t r a c t o r  p e r s o n n e l  ve r i f i ed  tha t  of the  65  s u p p l i e r s  involved, 54  had 
provided  E C C ' s  t o  the  S-I1 P r o g r a m  tha t  had p rev ious ly  been  FACI 'd .  On 
th i s  b a s i s ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  r e c o m m e n d e d ,  and NASA approved ,  a change t o  
the  c o n t r a c t  t ha t  would r k q u i r e  base l in ing  r a t h e r  than  FACI of "old" 
Suppl ie rs  of "new" ECC's .  T h i s  approach  can b e  ut i l ized on any  new 
p r o g r a m  w h e r e  FACI of p r o c u r e d  i t e m s  of h a r d w a r e  i s  a con t r ac tua l  
r e q u i r e m e n t  . 
i 
DISC, IJSSION 
By c o n t r a c t  def ini t ion,  a FACI of S-I1 h a r d w a r e  would not b e  cons ide red  
a des ign  r ev iew and woiild c o n s i s t  of a NASA/NR FACI t e a m  r e v i e w  of t he  
eng inee r ing  def ini t ion (i. e . ,  d rawings ,  spec i f i ca t ions ,  p r o c e s s e s ,  e t c .  ) and 
ve r i fy ing  by the  r ev iew of manufac tu r ing  and qua l i ty  planninglbuy-off  docu-  
riientation tha t  t he  h a r d w a r e  "as -bui l t"  configurat ion confo rmed  to  the  
eng inee r ing  "as -des igned"  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
s u p p l i e r ' s  fac i l i ty ,  the  FACI t e a m  rev iewed  the  s u p p l i e r ' s  manufac tur i  ng 
planning,  eng inee r ing  r e l e a s e ,  and change  p r o c e s s i n g  s y s t e m s  t o  a s s u r e  tha t  
approved  a r t i c l e s  m e t  eng inee r ing  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and t h e  supp l i e r  e x e r c i s e d  
n ;Jositive i n t e r n a l  change  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m .  Subsequent  t o  FACI, f o r m a l  
change  c o n t r o l  was  imposed  on t h e  supp l i e r  and r e q u i r e d  NR Configurat ion 
Con t ro l  B o a r d  ( C C B )  a p p r o v a l  of a l l  des ign  changes  p r i o r  to  inco rpora t ing  
the  d e s i g n  change  in to  r e l e a s e d  eng inee r ing  documenta t ion  and h a r d w a r e .  
N R  and NASA a g r e e d  that  once  a s u p p l i e r ' s  i n t e r n a l  s y s t e m s  w e r e  val idated 
and that s u p p l i e r  w a s  acclirxiated to  f o r m a l  change  con t ro l ,  tha t  the  S-I1 P r o -  
g r a m  could obtain f r o m  the  "old" supp l i e r  an indentured  p a r t s  l i s t  (IPL) of 
the  ne=. ECC,  f r e e z e  the  des ign  a s  def ined on t h e  I P L ,  anti p l ace  the  des ign  
i indcr f o r m a l  change  con t ro l .  
base l ine  and p r e c l u d e  a FACI. 
Dur ing  the  FACI of h a r d w a r e  a t  a 
T h i s  approach  would p rov ide  a n  e f fec t ive  
i 
6 -  5 
SD 71-250  
Space Division @A!!! North American Rockwell 
P r o g r a m  Man  a g e m  e n t  1 3 - 0 3 
REVISION OR CORRECTION OF AN ENGINEERING 
CHANGE PROPOSAL 
P R O B L E M  S T A T E M E N T  ANI) E F F ' E C ;  I- 
T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  subrriit a c o m p l e t e l y  r e v i s e d  E n g i n e e r i n g  Change  
P r o p o s a l  ( E C P )  t o  a f fec t  a l l  c h a n g e s  t o  an  E C P ,  o t h e r  t han  m i n o r  e d i t o r i a l  
c h a n g e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  co!i t ract  (SID 65-1516,  S-11 P r o g r a m  E n g i n e e r i n g  
Change  P r o p o s a l  K e q i i i r e n ) e n t s ) ,  m a d e  non techn ica l  c h a n g e s  t o  an  E C P  
c o s t l y  and  t i m e  con.;uming and prodriced t i n n e c e s s a r v  p a p e r  tvork.  
c r i t e r i a  i s  n o r n i a l l y  iised on a l l  DOD c o n t r a c t s .  
T h i s  
SOLUTION /REC,O\IhIENDATION 
T h i s  p r o b l e m  w a s  resolxred by changing  the  c o n t r a c t  (SID 6 5 - 1 5 1 6 )  t o  
r e d e f i n e  t h e  c r i t e r i a  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  r e v i s i o n s / c o r r e c t i o n s  of a n  E C P  t o  p e r m i t  
s u b m i s s i o n  of n o n t e c h n i c a l  c h a n g e s  ( i .  e . ,  change  point  f o r  i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
e t c .  ), in  addi t ion  t o  n i i n o r  e d i t o r i a l  c h a n g e s  a s  a c o r r e c t i o n  E C P .  I t  i s  
r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  t h i s  c r i t e r i a  f o r  c h a n g e s  t o  a n  E C P  b e  iised on fut i i re  
p r o g r a m s .  
DISC UbSION 
T h e  requirexi lent  to  s u b m i t  a c o m p l e t e l y  I-evised E G P  t o  a f fec t  al l  
c h a n g e s  o t h e r  than  n i i n o r  e d i t o r i a l  c h a n g e s  t o  an  E C P  caused  e x p e n d i t u r e  of 
e x c e s s i v e  c o s t  and  nzan hoi i rs  of e f for t .  By changing t h e  c r i t e r i a  a p p l i c a b l e  
t o  r e v i s i o n s / c o r r c c t i o n s  o f  t h e  E C P  in the  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  w a s  
m i n i m i z e d  t o  r e q u i r e  r e s u b m i s s i o n  of on ly  t h o s e  p a g e s  of non techn ica l  ECP 
c h a n g e s / c o r r e c t i o n s  a f f ec t ed  with a c o v e r  page .  
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C h a n g i n g  t h e  c o n t r a c t  (SID 6 5 - 1 5 2 h A  a n d  SID 6 5 -  1 5 1 6 A )  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  
E C P L ’ s  i n  t l ie CALI spcc- i t  i L  ; i ti(iiis to  b c  d i v i c l c d  i n t o  n n  a c t i v e  a n d  a ( losed 
s e c t i o n  w i t h  o n l y  the. a c t i v e  s e c t i o n  t o  be used f o r  s e l e c t i o n  o f  ECP’s for 
v a l i d a t i o n  / v  e I- if 1 c :t t ion 1 I 8 I ii i n -  i z ed t !it? e f f o r t  t c) 11) c3t.t  t! 1-eciuir e n l e n t  a n d  
p r e s e n t e d  a m o r e  r e a l i s t i c  ~a l i c l a i ion /ve r i f : ca t i i , n  t e c l l n i q u e .  
mended t h a t  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  be t a k e n  o:i a i1  f u t u r e  p[-ogran:b,  
It i s  recorr i -  
j 
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DESIGN CHANGE EFFECT O N  CONTRACT END 
I T E  M SPEC I F I CAT1 0 NS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Cont rac t  NAS7 -200 contained cont rac t  end i t em (CEI) specification 
CP621M0001A fo r  S-II- 1 and addenda specifications CPh21MOO02A through 
CP621M0010A fo r  S-11-2 through S-II- 10  s t ages  respect ively.  
change with a mult iple  effectivity requi red  a specification change notice (SCN) 
fo r  each  addenda specification affected.  
A design 
Changing the cont rac t  (SID 65-  1515A)  to r equ i r e  one specification 
(CP621M0014A) fo r  S-11-3 and subsequent s tages  to define the s tage configu- 
ra t ion,  negated the prepara t ion /submi t ta l  of numerous  SCN's  to addenda 
specif icat ions for  the same des ign  change. 
a requi rement  on future  p rograms  for  two o r  m o r e  similar C E I ' s .  
It is recommended that th i s  be. 
D IS C USS ION 
The requi rement  to p repa re  and submit  for  approval  an  S C N  for  each  
CEI  specification and  addenda specification affected by a design change, 
requi red  up to  12 S C N ' s  for  a mult iple  effectivity design change. 
requi rement  was fulfilled by prepara t ion /submi t ta l  of only one S C N  fo r  a 
mult iple  effectivity design change. This was done by combining the C E I  
specification and addenda specification into one CEI  specification 
(CP621MOO14A) for  S-11-3 and subsequent s tages  making S-11-3 the c r i t e r i a  
f o r  s tage  configuration definition and using alpha-sub paragraphs  to define 
the delta r equ i r emen t s  for  subsequent s tages .  
This 
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P K  OB LE M S'T A T EM 1: N 7" 4 N i ) I 1 i ' I: T. i ' ? 
; DISCUSSION 
Dur ing  the  in i t ia l  negot ia t ion of CAT r e q i i i r e m e n t s ,  the  p r o g r a m  
ident i f ied only 11 N l i - f a b r i c a t e d  E C C ' s .  Sonle t w o  yea1 5 subsequent  to th i s  
n e got  i a t i on, t he  c 11 s t o  m e  r , t h r oi l  g h fa i lu I' e - r 1 i od e e f f e c t a 11 a 1 v s i s , id en t if i ed 
s o m e  289 addi t ional  I%R - f a b r i c a t e d  i t c x r n s  tha t  \f.oulcl be identificd con t r ac tu -  
a l l y  as  E C C ' s .  T h i s  ac t ion  woiild have caused  NR to  p r e p a r e  individual 
spec i f i ca t ions  for  each  of t l iese  i t e m s .  Because  of the  pos i t ive  c h a n g e / p a r t  
n u m b e r  con t ro l  s y s t e m  implemen ted  on the  p r o g r a m ,  the  c o n t r a c t o r  was  in  
a pos i t ion  t o  convince  the c u s t o m e r  that  h e  could e x e r c i s e  a c o m p a r a b l e  
d e g r e e  of con t ro l  on t h e s e  ECC's  by identifying the  ECC by p a r t  n u m b e r  
within the  s t a g e  CEI spec i f i ca t ions ,  thus  avoiding the  c o s t  of p r e p a r i n g  
individua 1 ECC spec i f ica t ions .  
0 -  10 
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FIRST-ARTICLE CONFI G U M T I O N  INSPECTION (FACl) 
AT SUBCONTRACTOR FACl LlTlES 
, 11 hCn NA S A / S R  F A C I  t c A a n i  conducts  first - a r t i c l ( >  configi i rnt ion inspc."  
( k ' r L C T )  of e n c i n e e r i n g  c r i t i c a l  components ( E C C ' s )  a t  st tbcontractor fac i l i -  
t i es .  i t  ge t i t ra l ly  rc.;ulted i n  the FACI  t e a m  devoting t?le f i r s t  txvo to t h r e e  
d a y s  n f  ;i schecf~i led f i v e ,  d a y  F A C I  explaining FACI reqitireunenl s a n d  identifv- 
v ~ . p t : r i ~ . i i t , i ~  r t *  o f  t h r  19 A C A  tclain effort .  
\ (1,11r7 $ 0  O f '  ?-t-'\ .\t.c%d bv t h t ,  F-ACI t e a m .  This \vas a n  t lnneressnry 
IIic-. XI! iiienibers of the N A S A / N R  F A C I  teani ai-rived a t  t h e  sub-  
c ~ n t i - a c t r ~ r ~ s  facil i ty a n d  s p e n t  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  d a y s  exp1;iitiinp the E"AC;I 
: i , e t h o d ( r l ( > g \ ,  acc~i : i~,ulat ing da ta ,  a n d  assenibl ing t h e  d a t a  i n  a presentab le  
i o r r i a t .  
n r d t > r l y  F ,\<'I v..c)iilrl be conducted  during the fourth a n d  fiftli d a y s .  
; r p p : - ~ - t ( - ~ ,  ~ ~ ~ ~ t j : i c i  h c  i o l l o w  e c l  o n  al l  subcont rac tor  I.' 4 C J I . ; .  
' I 'bt .  ?.:Ih4,? t e n n :  i i iembcrs  would  a r r i v e  o n  ttic ic.llrt1.l d a y  and a n  
This 
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3 .  Al l  r e q u i r e d  dociimentation \\'as not avai lable  and subcontractor  
p t r s o n n r I  ~ ~ v t * r c ~  n o t  aurare of otl icr types of dociimentation t h a t  
could  st1ff1c.e 
2.  NK t eam ~ n e i n b e r s  u ' e r c  conversant  I{ i t h  subcont rac tor  systernp 
and doctinlentation a t  t i m e  of E'ACI 
3 .  Subcontractor  personnel  became conversant  \vith 1:AC.T 
reqi i i rement  s 
4. A total  atir iospherc of cooperation ex is ted  a t  t h e  t i I : T c  o f  FACI ,  
5 .  Costs  m e r e  reduced s ince  the NI i  buyer could,  i n  some ins tances ,  
negotiate a level of effort  and cos t  plus  a loMrer fee vers i i?  a fixed 
p r i c e  c o n t r a c t .  
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THE PLANNINC- A N D  ACCOUNTING OF ENGINEERING CHANGES 
PIZOBLEhl STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
T h e  planning and accountabi l i ty  of approved  Engineer ing  Changes  du r ing  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  the  f i r s t  two y e a r s  of t h e  S-XI P r o g r a m  w e r e  not  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  
organized  and cont ro l led .  T h e  s y s t e m  w a s  unde r  t h e  ju r i sd i c t ion  of one of the  
func t iona l  d e p a r t m e n t s  which u t i l i zed  the  change implemen ta t ion  plan ( C I P )  
document  to  con t ro l  t h e  s y s t e m .  
au tho r i t a t ive  schedule ,  had no  r e b o a r d  s y s t e m  f o r  the  modif icat ion of in i t ia l  
planning, and had no  accountabi l i ty  o r  s t a tus ing  s y s t e m .  
However ,  the  C I P  w a s  not a n  off ic ia l /  
SOLUTION/R ECOMMENDATION 
In J u n e  1964, t he  p r o b l e m  w a s  r e s o l v e d  by t r a n s f e r r i n g  respons ib i l i ty  
f o r  the  planning and accountabi l i ty  of eng inee r ing  changes  t o  S-I1 P r o g r a m  
Management  for t h e  deve lopmen t  and implemen ta t ion  of new p r o c e d u r e s  to  
p rov ide  the  d e s i r e d  c o n t r o l  and accountabi l i ty  for  a l l  engineer ing  clianges.  
It i s  reconi i i iended tha t  a conf igura t ion  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m  s i m i l a r  to the  
S- I1  s y s t e n i  be  imp lemen ted  in the  f i r s t  p h a s e  of f u t u r e  p r o g r a m s .  
A s  tlie S-I1 P r o p r a n i  approached  i t s  peak  of developnient  and product ion,  
i t  \ \ a s  r ecogn ized  by S-I1 P r o g r a m  Managenlent  tha t  t h e  s y s t e m  for  planning 
and niaintaining accolmtabi l i ty  of engineer ing  changes  was  no longe r  adeq[tate. 
In J u n e  1064, the  r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  planning and accountabi l i ty  of approved  
engineer ing  changes  w a s  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  S-I1 Configurat ion h l a  nagement ,  a 
funct ional  unit of p r o g r a m  managemen t .  
fyoni manufac tu r ing  schedu le  change  boa rd  (MSCB) t o  schedu le  change b o a r d  
(SCB).  
s i rperseded  by a change  c o m m i t m e n t  s chedu le  (CCS). 
e n ci n e e r i n g c ha ng e c o nt r o 1 s y s t e m ,  t h e  S - 11 P r o g r a m  r e 1 e a s ed i n i  pl en1 e nt i n p 
inst r i rc t ions ( C -  100  s e r i e s )  tha t  comple t e ly  def ine  the 'de ta i l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
and methodology f o r  t he  p e r f o r m a n c e  of t he  S-I1 Change  Management  
s y t e m .  
T h e  n a m e  of t h e  funct ion w a s  changed 
The  p r e v i o u s l y  employed  change  implemen ta t ion  plan ( C I P )  w a s  
T o  f o r m a l i z e  the  
R E F E K E S C E S  
SSII C -  100. 3 ,  Planning  and Accountabi l i ty  of Approved Eng inee r ing  Changes .  
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P L4 N N ! N G IMP 1 E ME 1.1 TAT I 0 N OF E N G I P\I E E R 1 N G CHA N GE 5 
In t h e  e a r l y  phases ot t h e  1): c)t?r >, ; - r j t x L  r e  c f > s n  2 L ’ i  t r ,  Sati l rn  S-11 
s t a g e s  w e r e  planlied and intplenienteci at t h e  m o s t  (-c,nvenient cilange point.  
A l th  ou gh t h i s t e c h n i  y 11 c m a in ta in ed t h c s c h t‘d II 1 e ,  n UT, c r c)u s i In p r ov em e n t  
changes  w e r e  d e f e r r e d  to tes t  s i t c s  r a t h e r  tha; i  i n c o r p o r a t l n r  t hem i n - l i n e  a t  
S e a l  Beach .  This p roccd l r r e  r e s u l t e d  in C C J S t l y  aciuitional r equ i r emer i t s  f o r  
modi f ica t ion  k i t  d r a w i n g s ,  modi f ica t ion  in s t r l l c t ions ,  d a t a  packages ,  
modi f ica t ion  k i t  accumula t ions ,  and s h i p m e n t s  to  field s i t e s .  I n  addi t ion to 
h ighe r  cos t ,  changes  could not be  imp lemen ted  in the  f i e ld  a s  eff ic ient ly  as 
t h e y  could at Seal Beach  du r ing  the  manufac tu r ing  a n d  checkout  p r o c e s s e s .  
SOLUTIONS /K  ECOMMENDATIOX 
In  J u l y  1968, t h e  S-I1 P r o g r a m  h lanage r  issued a d i r e c t i v e  containing 
r e v i s e d  ground r u l e s  for planning and intpleinent ing changes .  The new 
ground r u l e s  s t ipu la ted  tha t  t h e  P r o g r a m  Schedule  Change  B o a r d  (SCB) 
would p lan  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of as m a n y  changes  as  p o s s i b l e  for  in - l ine  S e a l  
Beach ,  r a t h e r  than  d e f e r r i n g  t h e r .  t<> tc:,t ~ i t e s .  
p r o g r a m  m a n a g e m e n t  e m p h a s i z e  i n -  l i r i e  i n c  o r p o r a t i o n  of changes  on a l l  
f u t u r e  p r o g r a m s .  
I t  i s  rccommcncted tha t  
DISC USSION 
IC’ASA and NK a g r c c c l  tha t  co5t-s  could be r educed  by re f in ing  schedu le  
change  b o a r d  (SCB) planning t o  a c c o m p l i s h  a m u c h  h ighe r  p e r c e n t a g e  of 
changes  i n - l i n e  at Seal Beach  and s igni f icant ly  r e d u c e  the  p e r c e n t a g e  d e f e r r e d  
to test sites. 
T h e  f i r s t  f l ight  s t a g e  affected was  S-11-9, which was t u rned  o v e r  f r o m  
manufac tu r ing  t o  t e s t  operation:; at S e a l  Beach  in  F e b r u a r y ,  1969, and w a s  
scheduled  f o r  shiprrient to  a test si te in M a r c h ,  1969. H a r d w a r e  changes  (48) 
had been approved  for this s t a g e  and through a v a r i e t y  of t r adeof f s  and w o r k -  
a round  p lans ,  the  schedu le  change  b o a r d  (SCB) s u c c e s s f u l l y  planned i m p l e -  
men ta t ion  of 42 of the  48 changes  a t  Sea l  Beach ,  without s chedu le  impac t .  
T h i s  c o m p a r e d  f avorab ly  with 16 d e f e r r e d  changes  on S-11-8, 59 on S-11-7, 
60 on S-11-6, and 4 1  0x1 S-11-5. The action r e s n l t e d  in both ident i f iab le  c o s t  
s av ings  from e l imina t ing  sh ipmen t  of ex tens ive  d a t a  to t h e  f ie ld ,  and 
in tangib le  c o s t  s av ings  th rough  i m p r o v e d  eff ic iency and r educed  c o n s t r a i n t s  
on field s i t e s .  
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DD FORM 250 PREPARATION FOR SATURN 5-11 GSE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
A total  of 47 end i t e m s  of ground support  equipment (GSE) w e r e  
requi red  to support  shipment  of each  S-I1 stage.  
w e r e  p repa red  to document configuration, open work items, de fe r r ed  
changes,  etc. 
a r a t ion  and negotiation effort ,  and often resu l ted  i n  cons t ra in ts  to es tabl ished 
acceptance data  package ( A D P )  submit ta l  schedules.  
Individual DD F o r m  250's 
Th i s  caused the  expenditure of excess ive  manhours  i n  p rep -  
SOLUTION/lI  ECOhllclEENDATION 
Negotiations with XASA resu l ted  i n  a contractual  change to allow the 
init iation of a s ingle  DD F o r m  250 l is t ing of a l l  GSE end i t e m s  applicable to 
a specif ic  s tage  shipment.  
considerably,  and was a great  contribution i n  meet ing establ ished schedules.  
Th i s  method i s  highly recommended on fu ture  p r o g r a m s  where  multiple end 
This  reduced prepara t ion  and negotiation hours  
1 i t e m s  of GSE a r e  required.  
DISCITSSION 
At thc btbginning of the S-I1 p rogram,  many problems existed yelative 
These  problems to stagt./GSE acceptance data  package preparat ion (ADP) .  
~~~c.ludcbd I > i )  Forin Z 50 prepara t ion  requi rements ,  ADP ascumula t ion /subr l~ i t ta l  
rnetht>ds, operat ing time accumulation, and the process ing  of contractor  
noncc)nformance data.  Major  contributing f ac to r s  w e r e  insufficient and 
improper  data  record ings  of FAIRITAIR documents ,  fa i lure  to proper ly  
tlocunicbnt inspect ions,  and the  untimely process ing  of the paperwork needed 
to f<icil i tate i \DP preparat ion.  
f ac to r s ;  inexperienced personnel ,  p rocedura l  def ic iencies ,  and lack of 
pro  p e r fu nc t i o n a1 coo r di na ti o n. 
T h e s e  problems w e r e  at t r ibuted to seve ra l  
Since these  problems had f a r  reaching effects on the end product, 
c M p E? d i ti o ti s so lu ti o n s we r e mandatory  . Through coo r di nati o n m e  e t i  ng s , 
trdining se s s ions ,  and procedura l /cont rac tua l  changes,  methods of data  
accumulation, repor t ing ,  and submit ta l  w e r e  establ ished o r  rev ised  to 
a s s u r e  a significant,  e r r o r - f r e e  ADP f o r  the del ivered end i tem.  
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S-lI ACCEPTANCE DATA PACKAGE 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  AND E F F E C T  
S-I1 acceptance data  packages (ADP's)  u7ere accumulated during the 
fabr ica t ion  and tes t ing of t he  individual s tages .  
effort ,  the  fabricat ion,  test, and inspect ion documents  w e r e  reviewed and 
da ta  applicable to the ADP w e r e  extracted,  en tered  on  applicable ADP 
f o r m s ,  and submitted to NASA as a total  package fo r  review. 
volume of da ta ,  definite hardships  w e r e  imposed o n  NASA and NR personnel  
i n  completing the  review p r io r  to the scheduled signing of the  DD F o r m  250. 
Upon completion of the 
Due to the  
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATIOK 
A closeout schedule was  imposed on the  var ious  manufacturing, t e s t  
operat ions,  and inspect ion functions r e l a t ed  to the i r  documentation'and 
r eco rds .  As  these  r e c o r d s  w e r e  received by quality information personnel ,  
the  var ious  data  w e r e  ex t rac ted  and incorporated into the applicable ADP 
increments .  Submittal  of the  ADP to the  NASA fo r  rev iew was  scheduled 
incrementa l ly  and coincided with the  documentation and r e c o r d s  closeout  
schedules ,  thereby  allowing approximately 9 5  percent  of the total  rev iew 
effor t  to b e  complete  upon rece ip t  of the f inal  documentation and r eco rds .  
f inal  A D P  update and NASA approval  was effected through the review of the 
f inal  r eco rds ,  thereby  precluding any schedule constraints .  Th i s  method of 
data  prepara t ion  and subrnitLal i s  recommended fo r  fu ture  p r o g r a m s  where  
A D P ' s  a r e  requi red .  
A 
DISCUSSION 
See  d iscuss ion  in Quality Assurance  01-01. 
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PROCESS CONTROL LIMITATIONS DUE TO MOISTURE 
DURING BONDING OPERATIONS 
PRORI,Eh\.I S T A T E M E N T  A N D  E F F E C T  
P r o c e s s  c o n t r o l  t e s t  coupons  r e p r e s e n t i n g  S a t u r n  S-I1 p roduc t ion  
s t  ruc tu ra l -bond ing  o p e r a t i o n s  exhib i ted  e x t r e m e l y  h igh  ” d a t a  s c a t t e r .  ” 
1;r.y f a c t o r  was t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  a m b i e n t  m o i s t u r e  l e v e l s  a l lo\ \  e c l  by p r o c e s s  
s p t” c i f i c a t i c) n s . 0 p e r a t i o na 1 pd r a ni e t e r s f o r h o t h t e m p e r a tu  r e a n d r e I a t iv e 
huniictity \ \ e r e  c , s tab l i shed  as  m a x i m u m s  a n d  m i n i i n u m s .  
a 1 10x1 a b 1 c t c> 11 I 13 t’ ra t  u r t >  xx a s c n c  ount  e r e d s irn u Ita ne  ou s 1 y wi th  t h c ma x i m  urn 
allovaable r e l a t  ivc. huriiiclity, e x t r e m e l y  h igh  a b s o l u t e  m o i s t u r e  levels \ \‘ere 
p r e ’ s e n t .  
1% o r c ‘  c k t  rc.nic.ly h i g h .  
One 
When the  n t a x i m u m  
Dur ing  t h e s e  t i m e  p e r i o d s  r e j e c t i o n  r a t e s  d u e  to test coupon failure 
SO1,UTION A N D  R E C O M M  ENDATIONS 
Spec i f i ca t ions  govc.rning t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  of bonding m a t e r i a l s  known t o  
t ) t a  i-rioisturtl s t ~ n s i t i \ ~ ( ~  n e r e  rr.viewec1 f r o m  the  s tandpoin t  o f  a b s o l u t e  nioisturc.  
t t ~ v t ~ l s  a l loxzahl (~ .  I h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  \ v a s  e x t r a c t e d  f r o m  p s y c h r o m e t r i c  c u r v e s  
in  I c r n i s  o f  g r a i n s  of n i o i s t u r c  p e r  pound of d r y  a i r  a t  v a r i o u s  t c m p e r a t u r t  
antl  rtslntivt. humiclity cond i t ions .  
rch\riscct t o  pro\  t c l c ,  a ‘proccxssing pe rn t i t t cd  ‘ u indon in  lvhich the  m a x i m u m  
a l lo \ \ ah l t ,  t’elat ivc huni id i ty  d e c r e a s e d  a s  the  ternperaturcx i n c r c a s e d .  Sub- 
s t ra t r .  t c r n p e r a t u r t ~ s  were a l s o  c o n t r o l l e d  t o  prevent  thv poss ih  
n io i s tu rcx  condensa t ion  due> t o  a 10x1 e r  s u b s t r a t e  t e m p e r a t u r e  thcn  a m b i e n t  
7 cni  pe r a t u r  c .  
$ 
The p r o c e s s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  wCre t1it.n 
It i s  r( .cc)nimcndcd tha t  a l l  Spec i f ica t ions  gove rn ing  the  use  of r n o i s t u r e  
sc-nsitix-e o r g a n i c  m a t t > r i a I s  con ta in  th i s  t ype  of e n s i r o n n l e n t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
Cor p r o c e s s i n g  ( F i g u r e s  33  a n d  34 ). 
nxsc USSIOX 
Pl i t ,  problt.iiis e n c o u n t e r e d  duc  t o  eucessivcC n i o i s t u r e  1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 s  i n  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  bonding a r c a s  \\.ere not imniccl ia tc ly  a p p a r e n t  on thc  S a t u r n  S-  I1 
p roduc t ion  p r o g r a n l .  
C a l i f o r n i a  stbldom e n c o u n t e r e d  condi t ions  of high tcnipcraturca antl high 
rcalative huniii t i ty s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  
n i c n t a l  processing p a r a m e t e r s  did o c c u r  a t  both t h e  h l i s s i s s i p p i  Tes t  
Fac i l i t y  a n d  the  F l o r i d a  l a u n c h  fac i l i ty  w h e r e  c l i m a t l c  condi t ior is  w e r e  
s i n  3 11 1 ta nc,ou s 1 y hot a nd h u m  id .  
The p r i m a r y  r e a s o n  u a s  t h a t  p roduc t ion  at Seal B e a c h ,  
T h e  need  f o r  s t r u c t u r a l  bonding c n v i r o n -  
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RELATIVE HUMIDITY PERCENT 
Figure 34. Substrate Tempera ture  Cont ro l  
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0 pr' r a tin<? 
verifit.rt b y  i n s p e c t i t ~ n ,  .rnd in se r t ed  into the applicable t e s t  and inspect ion 
r e c o r d s  (TAIH) book. Since approximately 3 5  TAIR books w e r e  utilized to 
docuinent t c s t  a,ctivit,y fo r  each  s tage,  p roblems in  statusing and data  
estracti . :n v.-ert* cncountercd resu l t ing  in  a l o s s  of data and cons t ra in ts  to 
acceptdnc c ( l a t - -  p a c k a g e  ( A D P )  preparaticln, 
( I L ~  d a t a  w c s c  ~ - ~ c c ) i - , l t ~ d  $ > t i  apprctprintcx forn is ,  
SOL U T  IO h / R E C; O hilM E: XI31 AT I O N  
An Operat ing T i m e  Record  (OTR) log  w a s  init iated by Quality Informa-  
tion fo r  each  S-11 Stage. 
and contained sufficient pre-planned f o r m s  to sat isfy total  record ing  
r equ i r emen t s  d i i r i n g  the t c s t  and checkout of the s tage.  This  e l iminated the  
individual TAIR Book r equ i r emen t s  and, i n  addition to reducing the  manhours  
expended on book i s sue ,  i nc reased  the  ove ra l l  Quality Assu rance  efficiency, 
and eliminated any schedule constraints .  
v e r y  sa t i s f ac to ry  on  the S-I1 P r o g r a m ,  and i s  recommended f o r  fu ture  
p r o g r a m s  imposing Operat ing T i m e  / Cycle record ing  requi rements .  
The  log  was del ivered to Inspection personnel ,  
This  method of operat ion proved 
DISCUSSION 
S e e  discuss ion  in  Quality Assurance  01-01. 
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DD FORM 250 SHORTAGE 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
At the beginning of the S-LI P r o g r a m ,  DD Form 250 prepara t ion  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  included the l is t ing of ac tua l  s h o r t a g e s  and held u p  items that  
w e r e  accompl ished  at t i m e  of Stage del ivery.  
t r a c t o r  Nonconformance s (CNC 's) and C o v e r  nrne nt No nco nfo rrnances 
( C N C ' s )  tha t  authorized shipment  w e r e  a l s o  r e q u i r e d  to be l i s ted ,  the 
l is t ing of ac tua l  s h o r t a q e s /  held u p  iterris w a s  redundant ,  causing a n  
c SI) cl nd i  t u r e o f  un n e c e s s a r y m a  r h o  u r s . 
Since the applicable Con- 
SOL I:TION/RECOMMElVDATION 
Kegotiation n-ith the NASA r e s u l t e d  i n  procedura l  c h a n g e s  to delete  
t h r  r e q u i r e m e n t  of l i s t ing  ac tua l  s h o r t a g e s l h e l d  u p  i t e m s  o n  the DD F o r m  
250. The appl icable  Cr\;C'/GNC i s  l i s ted  on the DD Form 250 and  c r o s s e d  
r e f e r e n c e s  to a s h o r t a g e  report .  T h i s  method reduced the DD Form 250 
by approximately 2 5  percent ,  and r e s u l t e d  i n  a c o s t  savings in manhours  
;I nd t i 1  at P r i ~ i .  1 s . 
DISCT'SSION 
S e e  tliscussior. in  Quality A s s u r a n c e  01 -01. 
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TRANSFER OF OPEN WORK BETWEEN STATIONS/DEPARTMENTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Work authorization documents,  which provide detailed sequence of 
operation for  p a r t  and assembly  fabrication, a r e  preplanned and re leased  to  
the manufacturing a r e a s  i n  book f o r m  (fabrication and inspection r eco rds  
(FAIR) and/or  t e s t  and inspection r eco rds  (TAIR) books). During manufac- 
t u r e  of an end i tem,  the p a r t s  and assembl ies  a r e  processed  through a 
s e r i e s  of depar tments  and/or  stations where numerous FAIR and TAIR books 
a r e  applicable. At t ime of t r ans fe r  of an assembly  o r  par t ia l  end i tem 
between depar tments  and/or  s ta t ions,  one or  m o r e  sequence of operations 
m a y  be open in severa l  FAIR o r  TAIR books. 
incomplete work and el iminate  a g r o s s  amount of paperwork, each FAIR/ 
TAIR book i s  reviewed and open operations a r e  t ranscr ibed  to shortage 
repor t s  which accompany the assembly  or  par t ia l  end i tem to the next work 
station o r  department ,  while the FAIR and TAIR books a r e  t r ans fe r r ed  to  a 
bonded fi le a r ea .  
In order  to  accumulate 
The shortage r epor t s  a r e  integrated a s  a section of the 
I FAIR and TAIR books applicable to the next station and/or  department.  
The t ranscr ipt ion of open operation f rom FAIR/TAIR books to shortage 
r epor t s  c r ea t e s  a loss  of information o r  incomplete instructions.  
resu l t s  when such extracted information i s  taken out of context with related 
sequences which have been previously completed and signed off. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMEND AT ION 
This  
Representat ives  of Manufacturing, T e s t  Operations and Quality 
Assurance  were  appointed a s  m e m b e r s  of a FAIR/TAIR book r ecap  (closeout) 
team. 
problems crea ted  during r e c a p  operations on assembl ies  and end i tems  p r e -  
viously completed. Upon completion o,C the a s ses smen t ,  the r ecap  team was 
assigned the responsibil i ty of E'AIR/TAIR closeout on future  assembl ies  and 
end i tems .  
This  group of personnel  per formed a n  a s s e s s m e n t  of the type of 
An a l te rna te  solution which provides for l e s s  t ranscr ipt ion of dat; 
during r ecap  and t r ans fe r  of assembl ies  and end i t ems  between s ta t ions /  
depar tments  i s  warran ted ,  On future  p rograms ,  i f  magnitude and complexity 
mandates  the r e l e a s e  of la rge  quantities of preplanned work authorization 
documents, i t  is recommended that init ial  Manufacturing planning incorporate  
work descr ipt ions (Manufacturing sequence of operat ions)  within the FAIR/ 
TAIR sys t ems  which cannot b e  t ranscr ibed  out of context to  o ther  documents. 
Space Division 
Nortt i Amtwc.tiri Roc.kwrll 
Qiiality Ass i l r ance  0 1 - n h  
Each ope ra t iona l  d e s c r i p t i o n  would p rov ide  an adequa te  def ini t ion of urhat 
a pp 1 I c a b 1 e d r a \vi np s a nd / o r  s p e c i f i c a t  i on s . 
,rk \ \ a s  t o  b e  p e r f o r m e d ,  loca t ions  within asserr ibly o r  end i tcn i ,  a n d  t h e  
Fur t l le r  e c o n o m i e s  a n d / o r  i n ip roven ien t s  should b e  inco rpora t ed  into 
tlte FAIR /TAU? s y s t e m  through implemen ta t ion  of a n  au tomated  r e l e a s e  
s ).sten; \ri hich uroiild a l low f o r  t r a n s f e r  of open F A I R  /TAIEI docuiiients be tween 
s t ;~ t ions /depa r tn7e r i t s  i n  l i eu  of r e c a p  and closeout .  
FAIR ITAIR dtrcurnents to  r e f l ec t  l a t e s t  des ign  changes ,  t he  phys ica l  locat ion 
oi tlie r e c o r d s  n7ust be  knoLvn. 
LiADRl;) ,  1z i t t - i  m i n o r  p r o g r a r n  changes ,  xrirould p rov ide  t h e  r e q u i r e d  v is ib i l i ty  
of d or  1111 1 etit I oi a t io  t i .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  s t a t u s  open 
T h e  c u r r e n t  au tomated  s y s t e m s  ( P O I J A R /  
i ‘ ; c ) ~ k  aIitho1-ization docwxients,  a s  p rep lanned  arid r e l e a s e d  to  the 
?\.laniifactiii-ing a reas ,  contained ope ra t iona l  seq i iences  that  we r e  dependent  
~ i p c ~ n  i foi- riat ti on eri>bodied in  o the r  s ec t ions  ( P a r t s  L i s t ,  G e n e r a l  Notes ,  
Ope ra t ior ia l  Secluenc e s ,  e t c .  ) of t h e  s a m e  document .  IZJ hen work  defined in 
t h e  opera t iona l  , icquence could not b e  comple ted  due  t o  s h o r t a g e s  o r  behind 
schedule condi t ions ,  i n t e r n a l  p roced l i r e s  r equ i r ed  tha t  open i tenis be  t r a n s  - 
i c r  red to S t i o r t a g e  I i e p o r t s ,  and F A I R  / T A I R  books be  c losed .  Opera t iona l  
bequcnces, 1% hen  t r a n s c r i b e d  v e r b a t i m  f r o m  the FAIH /TAIR book t o  the 
L, !i $ 3  r t ;i g r t-p o r t , \v e r c n n t a c c on) pa ni cd bv ot h e r C, iipp o r t i n g i n fo r n i a t i  n n  
i x  I it i i  \\a;. ! ‘ t ’ c i \ i ; i ’ c . c i  by othcr  d e p a r t m e n t s .  In  o r d e r  t o  c o ~ i ~ p l e t c  t j i e  rcqi i i re t l  
’hx.rprk, 
i;e.as;>a:.ch tc-1 a s s  ire a c c u r a t e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  l i s t ed  s h o r t a g e  i t em.  
Q la 11 ty :I + s 11  ran^ e i n  c on 1 uiic t i on with hlanuf ac  t-rir i ng and T e s t Ope r a ti o n  5, 
ii.sl-ri>c.d a t a s k  teaill that  w a s  de lega ted  the  r e spons ib i l i t y  to  perforr i i  a l l  
1 .iIi< / I/IIj{ r e c a p  ope ra t ions  or! m a j o r  a s s e n i b l i e s  a n d / o r  end  i tems .  
g y ~ : i p  r t>v:eu eti a l l  F A I R  / T A W  books and t r a n s c r i b e d  incon3plete ope ra t ions  
t o  s 1:ortdge rupcirts a long  with r e q u i r e d  in fo rma t ion  extrac.ted Croni o the r  
seq1iencc.s or sec-tioris of the  san3e documen t .  T h i s  method,  a l tho r iph  not 
1\10 p e r c e n t  e f i ec t ive ,  e l imina ted  the  m a j o r  probleiri  and reduced  doc u m e n t a -  
ti<Jn 1 v h r ; i  rcli  ti!ne. Elowever, the  a forement ioned  a l t e r n a t e  r i : t . t h o d  o f  
i -e>oi i i t iot i  p rov ides  a n iore  cons i s t en t  approach  for open w o r k  c r a n s f e  r. 
t i . < .  n e x t  riepa r tn i en t / s t a t ion  w a s  r equ i r ed  t o  perforr i i  exter i5ive 
’1 his 
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LOSS OF TRACEABILITY/REIRIEVAL CAPABILITY FOR 
HA R DWARE/H 1 STO R I CA L DATA 
P R O B L E M  STAT EhilENT AND E F F E C T  
T h e  S-I1 P r o g r a m ' s  ident i f icat ion a n d  t r a c e a b i l i t y  (ICiT) s y s t e m  w a s  
e s t ab l i shed  upon concep t s  which provided  a capabi l i ty  of t r a c i n g  m a t e r i a l s /  
par ts  h i s t o r y  f r o m  the  incept ion  of manufac tu r ing  through c u r r e n t  s t a t u s  o r  
f r o m  c u r r e n t  s t a t u s  backward  t o  the  point of n3anufactu1-e. 
r e q u i r e d  d i s c i p l i n e s  for re t  ord ing  a n d  re ten t ion  o f  da t a  a t  each leve l  of 
m a n u f a c t u r e  and phvs ica l  appl ica t ion  o f  iiniqtie s e r i a l / l o t  n u m b e r s  to  both 
h a r d w a r e  and so f tware .  I-ioLvever, due  to  hiirrian e r r o r ,  s y s t e m  i n i p e r f e c -  
t ions  a n d / o r  confl ic t ing r c q u i r c m e n t s ,  s c r i a l / l o t  niui i l>ers  w e r e  omi t ted ,  
t r a n  s c r ib  ed i n c o r r e c t 1 y o r r e c or cl ed on n o r: r e t  r iev  a b  1 e cl o c uni en t s, wh i c h 
p reven ted  r e c o v e r y  of p a r t  h i s t o r i e s  a n d / o r  acquis i t ion  of ques t ionable  
m a t e r i a l  / p a r t s  for  a s  s e s sin cnt  and di  s pos i t ion.  
T h i s  p r o c e s s  
Loss of t r a c e a b i l i t y  a f fec ted  the  capab i l i t i e s  of Eng inee r ing  and Qual i ty  
A s s u r a n c e  du r ing  p e r f o r m a n c e  of f a i l u r e  a n a l y s i s  when the  phys ica l  h a r d w a r e  
had been expended.  
s e r i e s  could not  be  loca ted  for evali iation a n d / o r  d i spoq i t ion .  
In addi t ion,  n i a t e r i a l / p a r t s  which w e r e  of a s u s p e c t  
SOL UT ION / 1% E: C 0 h? M E N D  A TI ON 
Ident i f icat ion and t r aceab i l i t y  p r o b l e m s ,  a s  enco:intcred du r ing  man : i -  
f a c t u r e  of the  S-I1 Stage ,  w e r e  reso lved  t h r o u g h  en ip loyec  t r a in ing ,  rev is ion  
of Manufact i i r ing planning techniques ,  publ icat ion and d i s t r ibu t ion  of spec i f ic  
I&T p r o b l e m s ,  and phys ica l  r e inspec t ion  of h a r d w a r e .  P r o b l e m s  c r e a t e d  
b e c a u s e  of confl ic t ing r e q u i r e n i c n t s  a n d  s y s t e m  i m p e r f e c t i o n s  w e r e  not 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  r e s o l v e d  f o r  a l l  condi t ions,  and  m o r e  e c o n o m i c a l  w o r k  a round  
so lu t ions  w e r e  dev i sed .  
T r a c e a b l e  Par ts  Used in  E x e m p t  Appl ica t ions  
In o r d e r  t o  c i r c u m v e n t  accountabi l i ty  p r o b l e m s  the  u s e  of t r a c e a b l e  
p a r t s  in  e x e m p t  appl ica t ion  should b e  d iscont inued .  
t i ons  would d e g r a d e  the  capabi l i ty  of r e c o v e r i n g  ques t ionable  p a r t s  / m a t e r i a l s ,  
t he  above  solut ion is  the  only r ecommenda t ion  to  be m a d e .  
should be i m p l e m e n t e d  d u r i n g  the  des ign  p h a s e  on new p r o g r a m s .  
S ince  a l t e r n a t e  r e s o l u -  
D i sc ip l ines  
7-10  
SD 7 1 - 2 5 6  
Space Division 
North AmPri(;m RocI~wcII 
Qua 1 i ty  
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Act ountabi l i ty  f o r  t r a c e a b l e  p a r t s / m a t e r l a l s ,  which are d i sposed  of 
The Inventory  S (  hedules 
tli rot i f ih  the e x c e s s  p r o p e r t y  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  (Surp lus  Inven to r i e s ) ,  rcqtiires 
i n ~ p l e m e n t a t i o n  of an  au tomated  con t ro l  syFtem.  
R e c o r d ,  and o t h e r  f o r m s  used  t o  s u r p l u s  e x c e s s  p r o p e r t y ,  should be  r e v i s e d  
t r i  p rov ide  d i r e c t  keypunch capabi l i ty  t o  c i r c u m v e n t  addi t ional  t r a n s c r i p t i o n  
c o s t . C I I r r e n t a 11 t o n la t ed p r o g s am s w o u Id p r ovi d e i n p 11 t / o 11 t p 11 t c a pa bi  1 i t y 
x i t h  minor  s y s t e m  r e v i s i o n s .  
one p a r t  n u m b e r  on e a c h  s u r p l u s  documen t  and e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a manua l  
f i l e .  
factr i re  on ne\\. p r o g r a m s .  
A l t e r n a t e  r e s o l u t i o n s  would r e q u i r e  l i s t ing  of 
Tlie con t ro l  s y s t e n i  should b e  func t iona l  p r i o r  t o  d a t e  of p a r t s  m a n u -  
- 7  I raccablc.  P a r t s  in S p a r e s  Inventory  
Accniintabil i ty of t r a c e a b l e  p a r t s  / m a t e r i a l s  s t o r e d  i n  1 ,og i s t i c ' s  
in\rentnr)-  should b e  shown by s e r i a l / l o t  number  in the  n\echanized L o g i s t i r s  
In \ -en tory  l t a n a g e n i e n t  S y s t e m  (LIhlS). 
p a r t  nun ibc r ,  quant i ty ,  s i t e  locat ion,  r e p a r a b l e  s t a t u s ,  e t c .  , a n d  only m i n o r  
p r o g r a r n i ~ i i n g  changes  woiild b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  the  s e r i a l  / l o t  niLmber. 
An a l t e r n a t e  solut ion could b e  imp lemen ted  by l imi t ing  one  t r a c e a b l e  p a r t  
n u m b e r  on ea(-h M a t e r i a l  Inspec t ion  and Rece iv ing  Kepor t  and es tab l i sh ing  a 
rnaniial file. 
inent  of s p a r e s  i-eqii irenients.  
This  s y s t e m  c t ~ r r e n t l y  r e f l ec t s  t he  
\ 
.Spa res  accountabi l i ty  should be imp lemen ted  du r ing  develop-  
l i e u o r k  of Space  Divis ion and  Suppl ie r  Xlanufactiired P a r t s  
t I i t (-I 1- i c a 1 ci a t a r e 1 a t ed to  in  t e r n a 1 a nd / o r s upp li e r - ni a n u f a c t ii r ed it em s 
s l lo~i ld  he  ripdated throiigh au tomated  s y s t e m s  t o  r e f l ec t  modi f ica t ions  pe r  - 
forn ied  a t  t l > t  Space  Div is ion  o r  s u p p l i e r s  fac i l i ty .  F a b r i c a t i o n  and t e s t  
inspec t ion  re< o r d s  (FAIR and TAIR)  documen t s  gene ra t ed  in t e rna l ly  t o  modify 
p a r t s / a s s e m b l i e s ,  f o r  both n ianufac tured  and p r o c u r e d  i te rns ,  should be 
i n s e r t e d  in to  t h e i r  a p p r o p r i a t e  s y s t e m  book. 
n r e p a r e d  for  r e t u r n  of s i ippl ier  i t e m s  for  modif icat ion a n d / o r  r e p a i r  should 
sptscify ac ceptanc-e da ta  package  update  with copy distribit tzon a s  recliiired on 
o r i c i n a l  p u r c h a s e  o r d e r .  
nirri iber t o  nno t l i e r ,  t he  l a t e s t  accep tance  documenta t ion  (FA41R. ?'AIR, o r  
h\ioplier A D P )  ~ I i c ~ t i l d  sho tv  the  old p a r t / s e r i a l  niinider anti new par t  / s e r i a l  
nrirnbe r ex-en though tlie s e r i a l  n u m b e r  m a y  not change.  
I :I c. tl pt i o i  1 t if TI i a n ufa c t 1-1 r i n g and / o r p r o c u r e m  en t act ivi ty  . 
P u r c h a s e  o r d e r s  which a r e  
When p a r t s  a r e  r eworked  fron3 one p a r t / d a s h  
Y o  a l t e r n a t e  sc~lii t ion 
prohIc>m is  iost i f ied.  Implemen ta t ion  should be a c c o m p l i ~ b e d  di i r ine 
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Exempt Parts Requ i r ing  T r a c e a b i l i t y  
Spec i f ic  c a t e g o r i e s  of p a r t s  w h i c h  r e q n i r c  ( o:ifrol i o r  r c a s o n s  o t h e r  
than  c r i t i c a l i t y  m u s t  b e  des igna ted  a F  t r a c e a b l e  t o  ash i i re  r e t r i evab i l i t y  o f  
gene ra t ed  h i s t o r i e s .  T h e s e  c omponents  a r c  c a t e g o r i z e d  a s  r equ i r ing  da ta  
e l e m e n t s  r e l a t i v e  t o  ope ra t ing  t i m e / c y c l o ,  a g e  con t ro l ,  pe r iod ic  ma in tenance ,  
pressiire v e s s e l ,  e t c . ,  and inc lude  the  next  h ighe r  a s ~ e n - ~ h l i e s  containing siich 
items. 
new p r o g r a m s  should b e  accompl i shed  a t  incept ion of the  d e s i g n  e f for t .  
No  a l t e r n a t e  method o f  con t ro l  i s  w a r r a n t e d  and implemen ta t ion  on 
Loss of T r aceab i l i t y  Throrigh Human E r r o r  
Resolu t ion  of to ta l  p7-c:bIcn;s c rea te t l  tliroirg!~ human e r r o r s  a r e  m o s t  
diff icul t  d u e  t o  lack of v is ib i l i ty .  
m i n  in1 i z ed t 11 r o:1 g h p r e p a r a t  1 o n of d et a i 1 ed s y c t e m d e s c r i p t i c1 n s , t r a i  ni n g 
a i d s ,  spec i f i c  planning o p e r a t i o n s ,  and eniployee counci l ing apon ident i f ica-  
t ion of in i t ia l  e r r o r .  T'raining a i d s  shor i ld  b e  niaintaineci c u r r e n t  t o  type  
of e r r o r s  being i n s e r t e d  within the  s y s t e m .  
p r e p a r e d  and d i s t r i b u t e d  t o ' p t r s o n n e l  ttrorking a t  the  shop  level .  
EloLvevrr, a n o m a l i e s  c r e a t e d  can  b e  
Sys t em d e s c r i p t i o n s  should be  
DISC USSION 
Since  I&T p r o b l e m s  a r e  v a r i e d ,  r econ-~menda t ion -  a r t '  prr)l,-ided f o r  
e a c h  type  of p r o b l e m  de ta i led  \n.ittiin t h i s  paragrapl i .  
T r a c e a b l e  P a r t s  Used i n  Exempt  Applicat ion 
In o r d e r  t o  i-educe cos t ,  Engineer ing  r e v i s e d  the  S-I1 S tage  drawings.  
t o  p e r m i t  u s e  of t r a c e a b l e  iteirls p r o c u r e d  t o  Specif icat ion Con t ro l  Drawings  
in  e x e m p t  appl ica t ion .  
re ident i f ied  by addi t ion o f  an  "E" ins t ead  of t he  l a s t  d a s h  in the  p a r t  number .  
T h i s  p r a c t i c e  p e r m i t t e d  p r o c u r e m e n t  to  buy in  l a r g e r  vo lume  a t  reduced  
cos t .  However ,  when a d e f e c t / f a i l u r e  w a s  i so l a t ed  t o  a spec i f ic  s e r i a l i z e d  
series of p a r t s ,  and r e c o v e r y  ac t ion  w a s  n e c e s s a r y ,  only t h o s e  used  in  
t r a c e a b l e  appl ica t ion  cs.ere r e t r i evab le .  T h e  r ema in ing  p a r t s  coiild not  b e  
ve r i f i ed  a s  be ing  used  in exempt  appl ica t ion  o r  loca ted  i n  s tock .  
condi t ion p reven ted  c l o s r o u t  of the  anonialy and c r e a t e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  
ex tens ive  res e a r  c h. 
T r a c e a b l e  p a r t s  iised in e x e m p t  appl ica t ions  w e r e  
T h i s  
S u r p l u s  of T r a c e a b l e  P a r t s  
Manufac tur ing  and L o g i s t i c s '  p a r t s  mrhich w e r e  d i sposed  of th rough the  
e x c e s s  p r o p e r t y  con t ro l  s y s t e m  ( s u r p l u s  inven to ry )  w e r e  documented  on a 
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h i a t e r i a l  T r a n s f e r  O r d e r ,  and l i s t ed  on the  series Inventory  Schedule  R e c o r d s  
f o r  f inal  d i spos i t ion .  
C r o s s - r e f e r e n r e  of p a r t / s e r i a l  n u m b e r  t o  t r a n s f e r  d i spos i t ion  docziment w a s  
not  ava i lab le .  
not located as  ac t ive  p r o g r a m  items could only be  ve r i f i ed  a s  s u r p l u s  throtigh 
revienr of t o t a l  e x c e s s  p r o p e r t y  files. 
inef fec t ive .  
T h e  f o r m s  w e r e  f i led by an  a s s igned  s e r i a l  niirriber. 
Ques t ionable  m a t e r i a l s  which w e r e  to  be r e c o v e r e d  and w e r e  
T h i s  e f for t  w a s  cos t ly  and s o m e t i m e s  
T r a c e a b l e  P a r t s  in  S p a r e s  Inventory  
T r a c e a b l e  p a r t s  in s p a r e s  inventory  could not b e  accounted  f o r  except  
throtiph phys ica l  inspec t ion  of a l l  w a r e h o u s e  a r e a s .  
effectivch i f  v i s ib i l i ty  i s  main ta ined  o v e r  s e v e r a l  d a y s  t o  a s s u r e  accoi intabi l i ty  
o f  s p a r e s  i n - t r a n s i t  be tween w a r e h o u s e  loca t ions .  
n?a t t . r ia l /pa  r t s  a r c  t o  h e  r e c o v e r e d ,  t h e  por t ion  r e t a ined  in  s p a r e s  inventory  
i 9  cos t ly  t o  loca te  and d tspos i t ion .  T h e  s p a r e s  quant i ty  is  often’in doribt 
becauhe  o f  f luctuat ion i n  t o t a l  p a r t s  count due  t o  the  i n - t r a n s i t  condition. 
T h i s  e f for t  i s  only 
it’hen qi ies t ionable  
Rev, o r k  of Space  Div is ion  and Suppl ie r  Manufac tured  P a r t s  
S m c e  Divis ion documenta t ion  gene ra t ed  to  r e w o r k  i n - h o u s e  o r  s u p p l i e r -  
i-rianufactti red  coniponents  w a s  i n s e r t e d  in  FAIR /TAII< books unre la ted  t o  the  
s t a g e  s y s t e n i  being re\vorked.  T h i s  r e su l t ed  in p rob len l s  diir ing p r e p a r a t i o n  
of tlic accep tance  da ta  package  and c r e a t e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  for  e x c e s s  da t a  
r e s e a r c h  d u r i n g  f a i l u r e  inves t iga t ions .  In addi t ion,  p u r c h a s e  o r d e r s  p r o c -  
essed t o  coniponents  r e t u r n e d  t o  the  supp l i e r  fo r  m o d i f i c a t i o n / r e p a i r  failed 
to  identify acceptanc  e da ta  package  (ADI-’) update  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  F a i l u r e  to 
i ipdatc  the sul)plic.r data, o n  f i le  at  S p a c e  Division, \\as cos t ly  i n  r c s c a r c h  
t i m e  \I hcn pc r fo rn ied  i n  s u p p o r t  of the f a i lu re  invest igat ion.  
Ex  ern p t P a r t s R e y (1 i r in  g T r a c e a b  i 1 i ty  
S-I1 P r o g r a n i  con>ponents  ( s t a g e / G S E )  tha t  a r e  cont ro l led  b e c a u s e  of 
ope ra t ing  tiiiie cyc le ,  a g e  con t ro l ,  pe r iod ic  ma in tenance ,  p r e s s t i r e  v e s s e l  
l o g ,  e t r .  , r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e r e  not des igna ted  a s  t r a c e a b l e  o n  engineer ing  
dralf i n g s .  
thiy ca t egory  d u e  t o  s e r i a l  n u m b e r s  not being r e c o r d e d  o n  a l l  t r a n s a c t i o n  
cl ( - I C  rim en t a t 1 o n .  
Diffi(%ulty w a s  encoun te red  du r ing  pe r iod ic  evaluat ion of i t e m s  i n  
Loss of T r a c e a b i l i t y  Through Human E r r o r  
T r a c e a b i l i t y  w a s  lo s t  on p r o g r a m  h a r d w a r e  due  to omiss ion  of r e q u i r e -  
ment i ;  on FAIR /TAIR planning,  i n c o r r e c t  s e r i a l  n u m b e r s  r e c o r d e d ,  p a r t s  
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identified with inco r rec t  s e r i a l / l o t  ni imbers ,  a n d  fa i lure  to record data. 
This impaired the capability of retrieving h a r d w a r e  his tor ies  a n d / o r  
recovery  of questionable ma te r i a l s .  
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QUALITY DISCREPANCY DATA 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Ciis tonier  r e q u i r e m e n t s  spec i fy  tha t  each  c o n t r a c t o r  will  have  a 
method of r e c o r d i n g  d i s c r e p a n c i e s ,  r e w o r k ,  s c r a p ,  e t c .  This  r e q u i r e m e n t  
is e s t ab l i shed  f o r  the  p u r p o s e  of m e a s u r i n g  the  qua l i ty  l eve l  of the  p roduc t ,  
p r o c e s s ,  work  a r e a ,  and  workmansh ip .  T h e  d a t a  rnay b e  p r c s e n t e d  in v a r i -  
ous f o r m a t s  fo r  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ion  o r  mot iva t ion .  ?dany people  a r e  involved 
i n  the  p r o c e s s  of count ing,  r e p o r t i n g  and post ing d i s c r e p a n c i e s  and e a c h  m a y  
u s e  d i f f e ren t  me thods  of e s t ab l i sh ing  ground r u l e s  fo r  counting d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
and the  a s s i g n m e n t  of r e spons ib i l i t y .  
f o r  ground r u l e s  r e su l t ed  in  r e p o r t i n g  a m i n i m u m  count tha t  t he  cu 's tomer 
e r r o n e o u s l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  inabi l i ty  t o  d e t e c t  d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  
T h e  a b s e n c e  of a def in i t ive  p r o c e d u r e  
SOL UTION/ICE:COM~fENDATION 
Establis11 a p roced i i r e  with f o r m s  f o r  da i ly  inspec t ion  r epor t ing  of 
d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  
of colinting and coding of type and c a u s e  of each  d i s c r e p a n c y .  
be establis1:ed f b r  t r a n s m i t t a l ,  a n a l y s i s ,  type  and leve l  of r epor t ing .  
Personnel a t  a l l  l eve l s  should be t r a i n e d  in the  ope ra t ion  o f  the  s y s t e m .  
T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  should def ine ground r u l e s  a s  t o  the niethod 
A plan should 
DISCtJSSION 
Gove:-nment spec i f i ca t ions  req i i i re  r e c o r d s  t o  b e  inaintained and 
~ i t i l i z e d  f o r  ccononi ica l  and effect ive ope ra t ion  of a qua l i ty  p r o p r a n i .  
H e c o r d s  a r e  c ons ide red  one of the  p r inc ipa l  f o r m s  of ob jec t iv t  ev idence  of 
qi ia l i ty .  R e c o r d s  sliould, a s  a rninin>t im,  ind ica t e  the  n a t u r e  of the o b s e r v a -  
t ion5,  n u m b e r  of o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  and the number  and type  of de f i c i enc ie s  
found. 
b a s i s  of m a n a g e m e n t  ac t ion .  
T h e  qua l i tv  pro,grani sha l l  p rov ide  a n a l y s i s  and u s e  of r e c o r d s  a s  a 
C o r r e c t i v e  ac t ion  s h a l l  incli ide a s  a min imum:  
1. Analys i s  of d a t a  and examina t ion  of p r o d u c t s  s c r a p p e d  01- re \vorked 
t o  d e t e r m i n e  ex ten t  and c a u s e s .  
2 ,  Analys is  of t r e n d s  i n  p r o c e s s e s  o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  of work  t o  p reven t  
no n c onf o r niin p p r oduc t s . 
3 .  In t roduct ion  of r e q u i r e d  i m p r o v e m e n t s  and c o r r e c t i o n s .  A s y s t e m  
t o  n i e a s u r e  and m o n i t o r  the  e f f ec t iveness  of c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ion  
taken .  
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Data was maintained such a s  Mater ia l  Review Disposit ions,  and the 
result ing rework,  s c r a p ,  and O K  to use.  The  defects w e r e  noted on the 
squawk o r  disposit ion sheet  in the fabrication, tes t  and inspection r eco rds  
books, but the method of report ing w a s  not standardized and reported to  a 
cen t r a l  a r e a  for  analysis  and charting in o r d e r  to m e a s u r e  the t rends in 
p rocesses  and work. Standards did not include the counting of defects such 
as :  one a s sembly  might have 300 bracket  installations of which 170 were  
mislocated.  One inspector  or superv isor  would include the 170 mislocated 
bracke ts  in one squawk and count i t  as one defect against  the manufacturing 
depar tment  o r  group. 
170 mislocated p a r t s  a s  170 defects.  This  s a m e  problem existed in  r epor t -  
ing such i t ems  a s  dr i l led holes,  s c ra t ches ,  spot t i es ,  safety wire ,  etc,  
Another inspector  o r  superv isor  would r epor t  the 
The cus tomer  has  inspec tors  surveying work completion a t  var ious 
T h e  sys tems 
points of i n -p rocess  fabrication. 
a s  a single iten-,, each hole out of tolerance being a defect. 
used by the Company and cus tomer  mus t  be compatible. 
T h e  customer inspec tors  l ist  each defect 
In addition to report ing a defect,  the following minimum information 
is required for analysis  and reporting. 
Defects by department/work station 
Defects by station/leadman 
Defects / inspection s by le  adm a n  
Defects by responsibil i ty 
Defects by pa r t  nurnber 
Defects by disposit ion code 
D e f e c t s b y d e pa r t ni e n t / q ua n tit  y 
Defects by assembly  s e r i a l  N o .  o r  completed a r t i c l e  sequence 
number 
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CONTRACTOR A N D  GOVERNMENT NONCONFORMANCES (CNC/GNC) 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
P r i o r  to  inc lus ion  i n  the a c c e p t a n c e  da ta  package  (ADP), CNC/GNC 
At the  beginning of t he  da t a  m u s t  b e  r ev iewed  and approved  by  the NASA. 
S-II p r o g r a m ,  t h e s e  d a t a  w e r e  accumula t ed  and submi t ted  a f t e r  al l  
f ab r i ca t ion ,  t e s t  and in spec t ion  r e c o r d s  w e r e  c losed  and r e t u r n e d  t o  qua l i ty  
informat ion .  Due to the vo lume  of da t a  and the  l i m i t e d  t i m e  span  be tween 
revielv and scheduled  s t a g e  de l ive ry ,  "a round t h e  clock" e f for t  by NASA and 
NR p e r s o n n e l  w a s  of ten r e q u i r e d  to m e e t  d e l i v e r y  schedules .  
SOLLTTIOn'/RE COMMENDATION 
A method w a s  e s t ab l i shed  whereby  weekly  s t a t u s  m e e t i n g s  w e r e  
conducted f o r  t he  p u r p o s e  of t r a c k i n g  CNC's /GNC's .  
with s t a g e  a c c e p t a n c e  b y ' T e s t  Opera t ions  f r o m  Manufac tur ing  and cont inued 
un t i l  s t a g e  de l ive ry .  E a c h  open  i t e m  w a s  d i s c u s s e d  and CKC's /GKC's  w e r e  
in i t ia ted  fo r  t h o s e  i t e m s  expec ted  to b e  unaccompl i shed  a t  t i m e  of de l ive ry .  
P r e l i m i n a r y  r e v i e w s  w e r e  conducted wi th  NASA and CKC/CNC d o c u m r n t a -  
t ion  dpproved  i n c r e m e n t a l l y ,  t h e r e b y  e l imina t ing  the  to ta l  e f for t  a f t e r  book 
c l o s u r e  and prec luding  p o s s i b l e  de l ive ry  cons t r a in t s .  
prtlparcltion o f  t h e  ADP and DD F o r m  250. 
T h e  m e e t i n g s  b e g a n  
T h i s  method could 
ariopted to fu tur  c" p r o g r a m s  with a m i n i m u m  ef for t  and would f ac i l i t a t e  
DISCUSSION 
See  cl iscussion i n  Qual i ty  A s s u r a n c e  01-01. 
7 -  17 
SD 71-25t ,  - 
Space Division @A!! North American Rockwell 
Quality A s s u r a n c e  03-01 
POUR FOAM RAW MATERIAL STORAGE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
A l a r g e  port ion of f ie ld  r e p a i r  of Sa turn  S-I1 foam insulation is a c c o m -  
pl ished with pour  foam. 
5-gallon c a n s  m a k e  one ki t ) .  
i s  e x t r e m e l y  sens i t ive  to  m o i s t u r e .  
t o  e levated t e m p e r a t u r e s  (above 74 F). 
t e s t  sites a r e  subject  t o  e x t r e m e l y  high t e m p e r a t u r e s  and re la t ive  humidity 
conditions. 
uncontrolled outs ide environment  of the t e s t  stand o r  launch pad. 
pour  foam r e p a i r s  r e q u i r e  re la t ively s m a l l  amounts  of r a w  m a t e r i a l ,  
repea ted  opening of the conta iners  i s  requi red  in t h i s  a d v e r s e  environment.  
T h e s e  conditions m a k e  quality cont ro l  of th i s  r a w  material e x t r e m e l y  
difficult. 
P o u r  foam is procured  in 10-gallon k i t s  (two 
One of the two pour  foam components ( isocyanate)  
T h e  other  component (polyol) is sens i t ive  
During c e r t a i n  t i m e s  of the  y e a r ,  the 
In addition, the  vehicle  under r e p a i r  i s  quite often located in  the  
Since m o s t  
SOLUTION / R E C  OMMEND ATION 
T h e  p r o b l e m  was  n e v e r  fully resolved on the S-I1 P r o g r a m .  F ie ld  s i t e  
I n  addi-  
quali ty cont ro l  personnel  w e r e  requi red  to  p e r f o r m  re la t ive ly  high-level 
material validation t e s t s  t o  a s s u r e  continued raw m a t e r i a l  quality. 
tion, the  r a w  material would be scrapped  and replaced a s  requi red .  
An improved,  r a w  m a t e r i a l  handling technique was  developed in the 
labora tory ,  and is the subject  of this  writeup. 
A s t o r a g e  and dispensing s y s t e m  was  developed consis t ing of two s ta in-  
less s t e e l  tanks.  
m a t e l y  one inch of pour foam and was identified with r e s p e c t  to the  foam 
composi te  t o  be s t o r e d  in the tank. Each tank was  equipped with the n e c e s -  
s a r y  siphon tube, relief valve,  pressur .= gauge, and quick-disconnect  fitting 
f o r  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n .  
f r o m  s t a i n l e s s  s tee l .  
chmponents resul t ing in g r e a t l y  acce lera ted  reaction r a t e s  (20 seconds down 
t o  5 seconds) .  
ni t rogen to  b e  used a s  a dispensing g a s ,  w a s  designed to  c a r r y  the foam tanks.  
Each  10-gallon capacity tank was insulated with approxi-  
It w a s  c r i t i c a l  that  al l  meta l l ic  components b e  fabricated 
Other  m e t a l s  w e r e  found t o  chemical ly  r e a c t  to  the  foam 
A por tab le  c a r t ,  equipped with a h i g h - p r e s s u r e  bottle of d r y  
T h e  foam s t o r a g e  and dispensing s y s t e m  provided the  following fea tures :  
I 
1. Due t o  insulation on the dispensing tanks,  the s y s t e m  could b e  
allowed t o  stand in the hot sun a t  elevated t e m p e r a t u r e s  for  
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extended periods of t ime  without the foam components exceeding 
the 74 F allowed by the specification. 
2.  Mater ia l  could be s tored without f ea r  of l o s s  of the freon blowing 
agent, s ince a positive p r e s s u r e  head of GNZ was  maintained a t  
all t imes.  
3 .  T h e  potential fo r  contamination by ambient moi s tu re  was 
eliminated. 
. 4. The possibil i ty of component contamination during sample  
removal  was eliminated. 
DISCUSSION 
When Freon-blown foam sys tems were  procured for  use on the S-I1 
P r o g r a m ,  extensive testing was performed to  ver i fy  the proper  chemical  
balance of the two components and associated mechanical  proper t ies .  In 
o r d e r  to a s s u r e  repeatabil i ty of mechanical  proper t ies  to  meet  design 
requi rements ,  i t  was necessa ry  to  a s s u r e  that p roper  chemical  balance was 
maintained when the two components w e r e  mixed together.  
It was necessa ry  to  control two c r i t i ca l  e lements  to  a s s u r e  proper  
chemical balance; heat and moisture .  If the polyol component was  exposed 
to  t empera tu res  in excess  of 74 F, the F r e o n  blowing agent would vaporize 
thus reducing the quantity present  i f  the container were  ei ther  open o r  
leaked. If the isocyanate component was exposed to  moistt ire,  the isocyanate 
v. ould r eac t  with the moi s tu re  forming crystal l ine urea compounds. If e i ther  
o r  both of these  conditions were  allowed to  occur,  the proper  chemical  
balance could not be achieved by a predesignated proportional mixing of the 
two components. 
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SELECTED PROBLEM AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH SPRAY 
FOAM INSULATION 
PROBLEM STATEAIENT A N D  EFE'ECT 
Dur ing  t h e  deve lopmen t  of s p r a y -  on- foam insu la t ion  (SOFI) for  app l i ca -  
t ion  on t h e  S a t u r n  S-11, numeroi i s  p rob len i s  \ % e r e  encoun te red .  T h r e e  
p r o b l e m s  which w e r e  not ident i f ied p r i o r  to c c  nln1t :nc 'e rnent  of  product ion 
o p e r a t i o n s  have  been selected f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  h e r e i n .  Spec i f ica l ly ,  t he  
p r o b l e m s  w e r e  ar; follov,s: 
1. - SOFI DixFots. 
n u m e r o u s  s m a l l  p1ug.i (2 to  6 i n c h e s  i n  d ia r r ie te r )  of ioani i n s u l a -  
t ion  n~ou ld  pop o f f  tlle tank ctrall a t  randon\ lo t -a t icns .  
e n o m  ~t 'r?. t ,  caused  by rninute  l eak  pa ths  nhic.ii h a d  gone  undetected 
d u r i n g  product ion  o p e r a t i o n s .  
sTirface of the  insu la t ion  down t o  the LH2 tank wall p r o p e r .  
m a n y  c a s e s  s m a l l  pocke t s ,  o r  Xroids, Myere found a t  the  tank wa l l  
a long t h e  leak pa ths .  
hydrogen  ( - 4 2 3  F ) ,  an lb ien t  a i r  would e n t e r  t he  l e a k  pa ths  and 
liqiiefxr in the  pockets  at t h e  cold tank wa l l .  
s t r u c t u r e  folloxving de tanking ,  the pockets  of l iquid a i r  would 
e s s e n t i a l l y  explode  when the  boi l ing point of t h e  l iquid a i r  was  
reac l icd ,  t hus  caiisinR t h e  divot ing phenomenon to  o c c u r .  
Dtiring de tanking  o f  c ryngcr . s  irc11-11 tl,c 5-11 a t  k lTF,  
T h e  pl ienom- 
T h e  l eak  p a t h s  led i ron :  the  e x t e r n a l  
In 
IVhen the  s t r u c t u r e  was loaded Lvith l iquid 
Diiring w a r m u p  of t h e  
2. I_ SOFI  Rind. 
sound d u r i n g  cryogenic.  o p e r a t i o n s  is  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  the  low 
m o d u l u s  of e l a s t i c i t y  of foam a t  the  fnarii /cold t ank  wal l  i n t e r f a c e .  
T k e  foam insu la t ion ,  when p r o p e r l y  appl ied ,  d o e s  have the  ab i l i ty  
t o  wi ths tand  tlie s t r a i n  and s h r i n k a g e  l e v e l s  encoiinterecl on the  
S-I1 s t r u c t u r e  d u r i n g  c ryogen ic  ope ra t ions .  
T h e  ab i l i t y  of foam insiilati(7n t o  r e m a i n  s t r u c t u r a l l y  
Dur ing  s o m e  s p r a y  fc,arn o p e r a t i o n s  r ework ,  on the  S-11-7 veh ic l e  
i n  the  t e s t  s t and  a t  AITF, an e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  dcr is i ty  rind l a y e r  w a s  
encoun te red  a t  the  foan i / t ank  w a l l  i n t e r f a c e .  
undetected,  t he  f o a m  insu la t ion  would h a v e  becon ie  debonded du r ing  
c ryogen ic  ope ra t ions .  
spec i f ic  a t ion  pr oc e s sing requi r em.ent s ( temp? r a  t i l  r e ,  humidi ty ,  
e t c . )  had  been  m e t  d u r i n g  t h e  s p r a y  ope ra t ions  tha t  led to  the  r ind 
fo rma t ion .  
I I a d  t h e  condition gone 
A subseqi ient  inves t iga t ion  r evea led  tha t  a l l  
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3 .  Corrosion.  
the  S-I1 P r o g r a m ,  t h e r e  were  two different primer s y s t e m s  used 
with the foam composite.  The  ma jo r i ty  of the aluminum s t r u c  
was pr imed with hea t -cured  phenolic p r i m e r .  
w e r e  pr imed with room tempera tu re  cur ing polyester  p r i m e r .  It 
was  subsequently discovered that all a luminum s u r f a c e s  w e r e  
corroding under the  SOFI where  the  polyester  p r i m e r  sys t em was 
employed. 
considerable  p rogram impact  re la t ive  to  schedule and cost. 
When the SOFI concept was  originally implemented on 
Weld closeout a r e a s  
All such areas w e r e  redesigned and reworked with 
SOLUTION /IIECOM~MENDATION 
SOFI Divots 
u 
A comprehensive design review was  conducted to  de te rmine  those 
regions of the SOFI which would be m o s t  suscept ible  to  the formation. of leak 
paths that xvould lead to the divoting phenomenon. 
generally de te rmined  to be: 
Those  a r e a s  w e r e  
1. 
2. All ha rdware  penetrat ing the SOFI (hard spots,  w i r e  bundles, 
All foam t o  foam joints 
I 
h a rd  l ines ,  etc.  ) 
3 .  SOFI containing buried protuberances 
3 .  Areas  requir ing multiple sp ray  operat ions during init ial  
p r od 11 c- t i  on  
A redes ign  was  initiated to r e - s e a l  all SOFI a r e a s  prone to divoting. 
T h e  rework resul ted in  a l a r g e  reduction in  the number  of divots following 
cryogenic operat ions.  In addition to  the sealing rework,  a l l  insulated a r e a s  
w e r e  mapped out and ra ted  based on insulation c r i t i ca l i ty  and allowable 
heat  leak. 
es tabl ished for, each zone. 
that  occu r red  as a r e su l t  of f inal  tanking t e s t s  jus t  p r i o r  to launch of the 
vehicle.  
Zone numbers  w e r e  assigned,  and allowable divot a r e a s  w e r e  
Th i s  was accornplished specifically f o r  divoting 
SOFI Rind 
It w a s  verif ied that t h e  r ind condition occurred  even though a l l  spec i -  
fication process ing  p a r a m e t e r s  w e r e  met .  The  investigation of t h e  phenom- 
enon led to  the d iscovery  that  the rind l aye r  fo rmed  because  of immedia te  
lo s s  of the exothermic heat internal ly  generated during the foaming reaction. 
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e f reon  blowing agent Lacking the necessa ry  internal  sys tem heat to  expand 
contained in the foam reactants ,  the cellular s t ruc ture  failed to  form,  thus 
producing the rind layer.  
The  p rocess  specification in effect  a t  the time of the r ind problem 
eatablished environmental pa rame te r s  only for  the immediate a r e a  being 
processed (foamed). 
operations, the specification was revised to  requi re  a tempera ture  equilibrium 
for  the ent i re  s tage s t ruc tu re  p r io r  to commencement of 'spray operations on 
any portion of the stage s t ructure .  The requirement  for  tempera ture  equili- 
b r i m  is c r i t i ca l  and mandatory for  a l l  spray  foam operations on s t ruc tures  
designed fo r  cryogenic operations, 
Corrosion 
T o  preclude rind formation in  subsequent sp ray  foam 
It was determined by an extensive laboratory investigation that the 
F reon  11, used in the foam sys tem as a blowing agent, entered into a 
cor ros ive  reaction with the 2014 aluminum tank s t ruc ture  in all a r e a s  where  
the sole p r i m e r  sys tem was polyester. 
for selection of a room tempera ture  curing p r imer  that could replace the 
polyester sys tem and ac t  a s  an adequate corrosion b a r r i e r .  
a modified epoxy p r imer ,  was ultimately selected and applied to  a l l  affected 
surface s . 
A laboratory program was initiated 
Koropon 515-701, 
DISCUSSION 
SOFI Divots 
The divot phenomenon was f i r s t  experienced in July 1967. NR insulated 
a Thor  Del ta  LOX tank with sp ray  foam insulation for  LHz testing a t  the 
McDonnell Douglas Sacramento facility. 
cryogenic cycle, p r imar i ly  along the foam/foam joints in the closeout a r e a s ,  
The bas ic  cause of the divots was attributed to  pockets of cryopumped a i r  
which had been formed at the cold tank wall  f rom a leak path connecting the 
tank wall to  the outer fo?m mold line. 
Divoting occurred following each 
It was determined that the leak paths were  usually caused by one of two 
factors .  
o r  was the resu l t  of a foam joint that  had cracked to  the tank wall during 
cryogenic operations. 
E i ther  the leak path was the r e su l t  of a porous foam to foam joint 
The Thor  test tank program was used to  optimize the foam to foam 
joint configuration, which was finalized as a s t ra ight  ver t ical  butt joint, 
perpendicular to  the tank wall. The cut surface of the joint was sealed with a 
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polyurethane adhesive p r io r  t o  spraying the closeout. If the s e a l  coat was 
even slightly porous the  joint would invariably leak, result ing in foam divots. 
If the polyurethane adhesive was allowed t o  flow f r o m  the foam onto the  tank 
wall, t h e  joint would probably c rack  during cryogenic operations,  a l so  
resul t ing in foam divots during warmup following cryogenic testing. 
Optimization of the foam joints great ly  reduced the problem on the 
Thor  tank; however, some  divoting did occur on the f i r s t  foam insulated 
flight a r t i c l e s  tes ted a t  MTF. "A design modification was  finally implemented 
which required a coat of polyurethane adhesive on the outer joint mold line. 
Th i s  final seal coat reduced the occurrence  of foam divots t o  a relatively 
protruding through the outer foam mold line. 
, insignifica-nt level. Th i s  s e a l  coat was also applied to  hard  l ines,  e tc . ,  
SOFI Rind 
The  rind on s p r a y  foam was the noncellular layer  that was formed 
immediately adjacent to  the substrate .  On nominal foam, the layer  was 
only 2 o r  3 mils thick, looking very  much like a th in  skin. Immediately 
above the r ind was a region where  the foam density was somewhat higher 
than the nominal  2 pounds per  cubic foot. 
The actual  thickness of the rind and the actual  thickness and density 
of the high-density layer  w e r e  a function of the amount of exothermic react ion 
heat  absorbed by the subs t r a t e  during the  foaming reaction. F o r  this  r eason  
it was undesirable  to s p r a y  foam on cold sur faces ,  especial ly  l a rge  heat sink 
zones such a s  the Bolting Ring assembly  on the S-I1 vehicle. 
The high-density foam layer ,  including the rind, was undesirable f rom 
the standpoint of cryogenic s t r a i n  compatibility. 
of the rind layer  was considerably higher than that of the nominal foam. 
Labora tory  t e s t s  verified that foam samples  containing s e v e r e  rind conditions 
would not m e e t  the cryogenic s t r a in  compatibility requi rements  fo r  the 
S-I1 Stage. 
The  modulus of e las t ic i ty  
The p resence  of an excessive rind condition was never  encountered on 
any sp ray  foam applied to  an  S-I1 Stage during no rma l  production operations.  
Excessive rind lapproximately 1 / 8  inch thick) was  found only once during 
t h e  application of sp ray  foam to  the LH2 feedlines of the S-11-7 at the 
Mississ ippi  T e s t  Faci l i ty  (MTF).  
while the vehicle was located in the s ta t ic  f i r i n g  t e s t  stand. 
Quality Control r eco rds  verified that  all environmental  p a r a m e t e r s  in the 
s p r a y  foam a r e a  w e r e  within specification requi rements  a t  the t ime  the spray  
The sp ray  foam operation was  per formed 
A check of 
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foam operation was accomplished. 
change to the specification requirements relative to temperature conditions 
during spray foam operations at  field sites. 
The ensuing investigation resulted in a 
3 
The conditions that led to the severe rind formation were a s  follows: 
1. The S-11-7 vehicle was in the static firing test  stand. 
temperatures were low, i. e . ,  40 to 60  F. 
A portable cubicle with internal heating capability was built 
around the spray foam repair a rea  for the purpose of controlling 
temperature and humidity, 
Ambient 
2. 
3. Ground support equipment was used to heat the inside of the LHz 8s 
tank during spray operations. 
4. At the time of commencement of spray foam operations, the tank 
wall temperature and the temperature in the cubicle were in the 
5. 
6. 
7. 
The 
mid-70 F range. -The relative humidity was less  than 60 percent. 
Al l  equipment checks (ratios, cup densities, etc. ) were within 
s pe ci f i  c at  i on r equir em ent s . 
Test  coupons sprayed on 1/8-inch-thick aluminum, in the portable 
cubicle immediately prior to repair spray operations, did not 
contain the severe rind condition. 
The spray foam repair of the LH2 feedline cavity was completed. 
Subsequent dissection of foam samples from the metal substrate 
revealed the presence of the severe (1/8-inch thick) rind 
c ond iti on. 
explanation for the rind formation was that at  the time of spray - 
operations the total vehicle structure- except for the immediate area within 
the portable cubicle-was at a lower temperature than the spray foam repair  
erefore, heat dissipation was in a direction away from the repair 
1 directions. This heat flow pattern resulted in an accelerated 
dissipation of the exothermic reaction heat a s  the foaming reaction 
commenced. The required amount of heat was, therefore, not available for 
blswing the Freon in the foam system. Af te r  formation of the 1/8-inch-thick 
ayer, the substrate became sufficiently insulated to allow the remainder 
foam to be of nominal 2-pounds-per-cubic foot density. Since the test  
coupons had achieved a temperature equilibrium, heat flow was not a factor 
on the tes t  coupons sprayed simultaneously within the cubicle. 
formation occurred. 
No rind 
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A s  cor rec t ive  action, the NR/SD process  specification was revised to 
include the following requirement:  
When spray  foam operations a r e  performed a t  field s i tes ,  the 
work a r e a  environmental  conditions must  be cri t ically controlled 
during the application of spray  foam. In addition, the environ- 
mental  t empera ture  surrounding the ent i re  s tage during the 
preceding 3 hours  is to  be 77 F mimimun. The subs t ra te  must  
be a t  a stable tempera ture  of 80 F, minimum, during sp ray  foam 
application. I 
T h e r e  was no r ecu r rence  of excessive rind formation on spray  foam 
insulated s t ruc tu res  processed  within the revised environmental pa rame te r s ,  
.0 
Corrosion of the aluminum s t ruc ture  under spray-foam insulation was 
discovered to be a ma jo r  problem in August and September of 1968. 
problem was solved p r io r  to delivery of any affected flight hardware to  M T F . ,  
The  problem was limited in scope to those a r e a s  of the vehicle not pr imed 
with heat-cured p r imer .  
weld closeout zones of the vehicle. The  weld closeout a r e a s  were  pr imed 
with a solvent-based polyester p r i m e r  used a s  a s t ruc tura l  t ie-coat  for the 
f oam. 
The 
The  s t ruc tura l  a r e a s  affected were  essentially the 
A laboratory ikvestigation led to the following conclusions: 
1. Freon-blown polyurethane foam insulation i n  contact with the 
aluminum employed on the S-11 vehicle (pr imar i ly  2014 and 6061) 
would resu l t  in cor ros ive  attack. 
2.  Necessary ingredients for cor ros ive  attack a r e  Freon,  aluminum, 
and external  moisture .  
mois ture  within the foam sys t em would not produce corrosion. 
It was verified that the minute t r a c e s  of 
3.  Under conditions of accelerated aging, the s e a l  coat employed on 
the outer foam surface would not prevent mois ture  permeation in 
sufficient quantities to generate corrosion. , 
. Corrosion 
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N ~ ~ D ~ S ~ ~ l J ~ ~ l V E  INSPECTION FOR SHEET CORK DEBONDS 
PROBLEM STATEMETuT AND EFFECT 
Cork sheet  stock (1/4-i1ich thick) was bonded over spray  foam insula- 
tion in cer ta in  heat-affected zones on the Saturn S-11. 
t o  prevent  erosion of the foam insulation and the attendant loss  of thermal  
efficiency during the S-I-C boost phase of the Saturn V launch. 
a r o s e  a t  M T F  and KSC in that following detanking of cryogenics (s ta t ic  
f i r ing and CDDT), cork  ciebonding occurred in randorn locations clue to  
cryopumped entrapped a i r  under the cork. No inspection technique, other 
than visual, was available for detection of the discrepant  a r eas .  Analysis 
indicated that any cork/foam debond grea te r  than 3 inches i n  diameter  whs 
unacceptable for  flight. 
The  cork was designed 
A problem 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A nondestru'ctive inspection technique was developed. The principle 
of operation was based on the fact  that s t ructural ly  sound cork sheet will 
deflect  less under a given tensile load than will a debonded a r e a  of cork 
sheet. The  test device,  a "vacuum plate, was fabricated from one-inch- 
thick Lexan polycarbonate. 
fitted with standoff legs approximately 1/8-inch deep. A soft rubber sea l  
was located adjacent to  the legs to provide a positive s e a l  during application 
of the vacuum. 
the vacuum source.  A d ia l  deflection indicator was located in the geometric 
center  of the plate. During an inspection, the vacuUrn plate was placed upon 
the cork sheet. 
relief valve incorporated into the vacuum source.  
stabilized, the d ia l  indicator was se t  a t  zero.  
t o  20  inches of Hg, and the amount of cork  deflection was read off the d ia l  
indicator. Deflection as a function of debond s i ze  was determined by a 
laboratory investigation. 
LR 6491-4568, dated September 3, 1q70. ) On the par t icular  cork zone 
inspected on the S-I1 Stage, the maximum void allowable was established as 
3 inches in diameter .  
2-inch centers .  
The  plate (approximately 7 inches square)  was 
A hole was dril led through the plate t o  provide a hookup to 
A vacuum of 5 inches of Hg was applied and regulated by a 
When the vacuum had 
The  vacuum was then increased  
(Reported in Laborator ies  and T e s t  Report, 
Therefore ,  the applicable cork  zone was inspected on 
DISCUSSION 
The  vacuum plate inspection technique was highly efficient but extremely 
time consuming. Even after the development of the inspection technique, 
7-26  
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
Quality Assurance  03-03  
Quality Assurance  at the production level continued to r e ly  on p rocess  con- 
t rol .  During production operations,  the cork  shee t  was bonded to the foam 
insulation using vacuum as a p r e s s u r e  source.  The  relat ively permeable  
na ture  of the cork  shee t  coupled with the extended period of t ime  under 
vacuum resul ted in  void-free production bonds. It is  emphasized that the 
debond conditions detected between the  cork  sheet and the foam substrate ,  
following cryogenic operations,  resul ted f rom entrapped cryopumped gases 
and were  not or iginal  production defects.  
The sequence of events resul t ing in the debond conditions were  a s  
’ follows: 
1. 
2.  
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
The  vehicle was fueled with liquid hydrogen (LHz) a t  -423 F. 
Cryopumping would then occur  a t  any point in the insulation 
composite where  even a minute leak path existed to  the cold tank 
wall. 
Depending on the length of t ime  at -423 F, sma l l  pools of liquid 
a i r  would collect  a t  the tank wall. 
Following detanking, the s tage would slowly warm up to ambient 
tempera ture .  
reached, an ex t remely  rapid expansion G f  ga ses  took place. 
When the boiling point of the liquid a i r  pools was 
If these areas were  located under zones insulated with sheet c o r k ,  
the rapid expansion of gases  would invariably resu l t  in a debond of 
the cork  f rom the foam substrate .  
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CRACKS IN INCONEL 718 WECDMENTS 
AND E F F E C T  
Leakage through the wall of a stage pressurizat ion duct i n  a stage was 
uring production leak check. Leakage was  i n  the a r e a  of a 
Circumferential weld and was not detected during fabrication/checkout of 
the duct section. 
SOLUTION/ R E  COMMENDATION 
Improve the-inspection techniques used by the duct -manufacturer 
during the manufacturing build-lup of the l ine and rev ise  the acceptance t e s t  
procedure to a s s i s t  i n  the detection of leaks. 
DISCUSS10 N 
During the investigation of the cracking problem it was  determined the 
c racks  occur red  as a resu l t  of stops and s t a r t s  during the welding process  
producing uneven s t r e s s e s  i n  the forged Inconel 718 material .  
successful  method to eliminate the s t a r t s  and s tops was to change to rnachine 
welding. 
since al l  hardware  for  sta-ges on the existing contract  were  already fabri-  
cated and delivered. 
welding techniques determined along with an improved forging process  for  
the Inconel 718 rings. 
The most  
This .was not feasible a s  a solution for the j m n e d i a t e  problem 
However, t e s t  ducts were  fabricated and the machine 
The solution was to improve the quality of X-rays taken during duct 
manufacturing by increasing the number of shots per  weld, by controlling 
the film, X-ray machine,  distance f r o m  rnachine to  duct, and by using 
single wall  shots  and other  X-ray process  techniques. These  methods 
ass i s ted  i n  the detection of c racks  duri1,g the welding inspection. 
with the X-ray technique improvement,  the acceptance test procedure was 
resequenced to per form the p r e s s u r e  leak checks during the t ime the duct 
wars readily visible to inc rease  the possibility of detection. 
Along 
' 
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RUNNING WELD STOP TECHNIQUE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
No definite cause could be given for the c r a  
occurred in the S-11 aft common bulkhead horizon 
repeated weld repa i rs .  
the 3-cycle hydrostat  tes t .  
conditions which 
weld c rossover  a f t e r  
The aft common bulkhead had been repaired a f te r  
SOLUTION /REGOMMEND ATION 
The defective a r e a s  in the aft  common bulkhead were  grooved to  
approximately 60  percent.  The  defects remained. The  grooves were  
manually welded with penetration to  push the defects into the drop  through 
weld metal .  
tained microporosity.  
weld techniques. 
the waffle t o  sheet  weld with a ball up stop. 
the repa i r  showed l inear  indications adjacent to the weld stop a r e a  which 
were  interpreted as cracks.  
caused the c rack  indication. 
bet ter  weld stop technique. 
bes t  possibilities. This technique was refined to  allow a reliable c rack- f ree  
stop and included in a weld schedule. 
occurrence is t o  groove to  50 percent  from either the weld face or root  side, 
and reweld through the groove. 
Both manual-welded a r e a s  were  X- ray  acceptable but con- 
T e s t s  were  conducted to determine thenmachine 
The  weld- was the deposited t r ansve r se  meridian weld along 
Angled X- ray  views taken af ter  
It was decided the stop technique (ball  up stop) 
Weld t e s t s  were  conducted to determine a 
The  running stop was determined to  have the 
i 
An al ternate  solution to preclude 
DISCUSSION 
The defects remaining in the aft common bulkhead weld repa i r  were  
dispositioned to continue into the three-cycle  hydrostat  test and would remain  
acceptable a s  i s ,  provided the defects did not propagate during the hydrostat  
test. X - r a y  inspection after the hydrostat  test revealed that one 0.085-inch 
poroskty defect had propagated to a 0. 10-inch pore with tail which was 
unacceptable. The  cause was determined t o  be the ball  up stop weld 
technique. 
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THICK TO THIN WELD 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A thick-tu-thin weld performed on the S-II Stage gore  panels, 
exhibited peaking which caused microf issur ing when the meridian weld 
passed through this a r ea .  
5OLUTXON/RECOMMENDATION 
The  thick-to-thin welds a r e  to  be depeaked by using an Enerpac tool 
p r io r  to  loading into the meridian welding tool, 
An al ternate  solution was to  minimize the backing and hold-down fixture .- 
p r e s  su r  e. 
DISCUSSION 
The thick-to-thin weld performed at the  Los Angeles Division has  
peaking in  the gore  panel configuration. When the gore  panel is held in the 
tool for  mer id ian  welding into aft common bulkhead configuration, the peaked 
a r e a  tends to  straighten due to the backing and hold-down fixture pressure .  
The  result ing s t r e s s e s  in the weld caused microf issur ing when the meridian 
weld passed through this a rea .  
these  mic ro f i s su res  p r io r  to hydrostat  testing. 
the  mic ro f i s su res  could propagate into c racks  which are  then detectable 
by nondestructive testing methods. 
Nondestructive testing could not often reveal 
During hydrostat  testing, 
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WELD LAND DIMENSION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Weld land dimension6 were  discrepant  and caused excessive rew 
SOL UT ION /RE C OMNENDAT ION 
e The  solution used on the S-1.1 P r o g r a m  was issuance of engineering 
changes expanding the weld land dimension. 
DISCUSSION 
Due to  the excessive amount of oversize  weld land dimensional d i s -  
crepancies ,  Design Engineering and Quality Engineering investigated the 
problem, 
slight widt'h variations which exceeded allowable drawing tolerances.  
width variations caused squawks to be writ ten and an excessive amount of 
hand filing rework to  be performed. 
caused delay in schedules and programmini .  
investigation resulted in expanding the weld land dimension, 
It was found that LH2 qua r t e r  panels and bulkhead components had 
These  
This  rework being slow and tedious 
The  Design Engineering 
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WEtD L4ND MEASUREMENT - IN-PROCESS 
FAB RI CAT 1 ON VERI F I CAT i ON 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Two- inch plate stock was machined, Chem-milled, formed, and 
t r immed leaving excess mater ia l  for pre-weld trim 
for the material thickness at the weld land was cr i t ical  in order  t o  obtain 
a proper  butt-weld joint and minimize peaking. 
a t  the discretion of the individual inspector with no index points established, 
Repeatability of measurements  at different stations did not occur. 
tions in measurement caused excessive hand work a t  t ime of the weld setup. 
The design tolerance 
Each measurement was taken 
Varia- 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDAT ION 
, Measurement systems on large surfaces should be standardized for 
repeatability. 
Development par t s  and f i r s t  a r t ic les  should be reviewed to  establish 
and standardize measurements  in a formal  manner that will reduce the 
variations in reinspection measurements,  The standardization of measure-  
ments, on la rge  panels with cr i t ical  weld land thickness, was accomplished 
by establishing procedure and mat r ix  forms  of the par t  showing the weld 
land area ,  
'was established, Specific s ta r t  point for the first measurement, with incre- 
mental  points for subsequent measurements,  was established and the actual 
readings recorded on the mat r ix  form that traveled with the par t  and became 
par t  of the inspection records.  
Specific types of measuring equipment and the method of usage 
DISCUSSION 
Initial inspections of the weld land thickness were the responsibility of 
the inspector using measuring devices. The problem existed when, during 
the manufacturing sequence, an additional weld land inspection was con- 
ducted.by the same o r  another inspector. 
out-of-tolerance readings found were not found on the first inspection. A 
Quality Engineering review of five inspectors resulted in the findings that 
each inspector would start his measurements  a t  different points, In addition, 
a variation was found when inspections were made in small increments 
inboard o r  outboard the surface of the weld land. By controlling the start 
point index, distance between measurements,  approximate weld se r ib  line 
a r e a  of the weld land, and listing the actual measurement on a mat r ix  
sketch of the part, a close measurement repeatability could be maintained. 
The resulting readings varied and 
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EARLY REDUCTION OF DISCREPANCIES -- FIRST ARTICLES 
DELIVERED AGAINST PRE-DELIVERY ARTICLE 
P R O B L E M  STATEhIAND AND EFFECT 
A t ho rough  shakedo\vn i n s p e c t i o n  is e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  e a c h  m a j o r  a s s e m b l y  
a n d  e a c h  c o m p l e t e d  a r t i c l e  upon m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o m p l e t i o n  p r i o r  t o  t e s t ,  pos t -  
t e s t .  a n d  p r e - s h i p p i n g .  Some d i s c r e p a n c i e s  (de fec t s )  a re  not ev ident  un t i l  
a f t e r  f i na l  a r t i c l e  u s a g e .  
S 0 L U  T ION / RE C OM h I E ND A T  IONS 
Firm shalcc.do\vn p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  methocls should be  c3stablished f o r  
e a c h  point of t r a n s f e r  ancl r e c e i v a l .  
d o c  urn e nt a t ion  , i n c 1 ud in 
r ev iewed  a n d  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  documen ted  \ rhen  ind ica t ed .  A t a s k  t e a m  
( c o m p a n y  a n d  c u s t o m e r )  shou ld  be e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  i n s p e c t  ’ the  f i r s t  a r t i c l e  
de l iverec l  t o  t h e  c u s t o r n c r , ’  d o c u m e n t  th?c r e s u l t s  a n d  p e r f o r m  t h e  same s h a k e -  
c1oit.n a t p i n s t  t h e i r  f ind ings  o n  t h e  s e c o n d ,  t h i r d ,  c t c . ,  a r t i c l e  b a c k s t r e a n i  to  
the  t e s t  s i t c s  a n d  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  fac i l i ty .  The e f f r c t  urould b e  t o  surface the  
l a r g e s t  n u n i b c r  of dcfchcts p o s s i b l e  for detection ancl c o r r e c t i o n ,  e l i m i n a t e  
opinion p r o b l e m s ,  ancl f u r n i s h  e n g i n e e r i n g  d e s i g n  evidence> of p r o b l e m  a r e a s  
\\her<> c h a n g e s  m i g h t  b e  required. A qua l i ty  pro t luc t ,  on t i m e  and  a t  a 
rriinirraum c o s t .  v i 1 1  bt. r e a l i z e d  a t  a n  e a r l y  point. 
A m e t h o d  castablished f o r  f eedback  of 
photog ra ph s ,  a nd e a c h r e p o r t  e d d i s c r e pan c y 
DISCUSSION 
N e i ~  p r o g r d m s  push thc  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  on  in i t i a l  d e s i g n  a n d ,  as  
d e s i g n  d r a u  ings art .  r e l e a s e d  for  f a b r i c a t i o n ,  c h a n g e s  o c c u r .  
t i gh t ,  a n d  in  some cases  due  to  c i r c u m s t a n c v s  s u c h  a s  p a r t s  s h o r t a g e ,  a 
bcliind sch tc lu lc  cond i t ion  e x i s t s .  
f a b r i c a t i o n  e v e n t s  is  i n f r e q u e n t ,  c a u s i n g  v a r i o u s  o p e r a t i o n s  from becoming  
s h o p  p r a c t i c e .  
o f  p e r s o n n c l .  
t he  dcsigner’. 
d i s c r e p a n c i e s  in  e a r l y  p roduc t ion ,  t e s t ,  a n d  u s a g e .  
Schedu le  is 
‘The f r e q u e n c y  of r e p e a t i n g  s p e c i f i c  
P e r s o n n e l  t r a i n i n g  b c c o m c s  a p r o b l e m  due t o  a r a p i d  buildufi  
Sotm(, r c q u i r e m c n t s  a r e  a c c o m p l i s h e d ,  but not t o  the  in t en t  of 
Many in i t i a l  p r o g r a m  p r o b l c n i s  m a y  result  i n  n u n i e r o u s  
It is n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  s p e c i a l  effort be c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  a rea  of 
c r i t i c a l  i n s p e c t i o n  r c v i c u , s  by  s p e c i a l i z e d  t e a m s  of t e c h n i c a l  p c r s n n n e l .  T h e  
tc-arns shou ld  rcvicm the  end  p roduc t  a n d  usage  t o  l o c a t e ,  d o c u m e n t ,  a n d  
not i fy  a l l  c o n c e r n e d  p e r s o n n e l ,  a n d  m o n i t o r  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a n d  c o r r e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  rc*sults. 
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On a complex functional i tem i t  is  best  to establish m o r e  than one team 
and divide the tasks into product sys tems.  
the f i r s t  delivered i tem against  the same ar t ic les  in preparation for  deli 
tes t  and fabrication, will aid in a rapid decrease  of discrepancies and as 
the quality and reliability of the product. 
A comparison of the findings on 
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INSULATION SLEEVl NG 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
insulation was damaged f r o m  the high temper  e required to 
d a t i o n  sleeving. 
/ R E COMME NDAT ION 
The Saturn S-I1 P r o g r a m  changed the i r  engineering specification to 
use @leaving that shr inks a t  271F instead of the f o r m e r  high tempera ture  of 
to 600F, Engineering updated applicable drawings. 
It i s  r econimended that future prograrris evaluate compatibility 
between mater ia l s  and processcs pr ior  to production. 
J 
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USE OF BREAKOUT BOX FOR HAND CONTINUITY 
VERIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL HARNESSES 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Two technicians were used to check harness continuity, subsequent to  
stage installation modification, by each placing a m meter  probe t o  a con- 
nector pin and calling out the pin identification. 
pins erroneously being probed or  called out with two e r r o r s  (installation and 
testing) resulting in a miswired cable. Also, direct probing or  the use of a 
socket pin could result in marred, scratched, or bent pins or sockets, 
'' This sometimes led to wrong 
SOLUTION / REC OMMENDATION 
The S-I1 Program used mating receptacles which were connected to a 
simple interconnect box which one operator could use. This breakout box 
required a switch for operation, and reduced the operator e r r o r  to  wrong 
. _  pin or socket identification and testing, 
e r a l  miswired cables being detected, and avoided rejection of acceptable 
cables. 
This method of test  resulted in sev- 
I 
Recommend that a l l  future programs provide simple breakout boxes 
for technician use. 
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SUBSTANDARD QUALITY ELECTRICAL WIRE AND CABLE 
P R O B L E M  STATI.:MENT AND E F F E C T  
Dur ing  the i n i t i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  phast. of t he  S-I1 P r o g r a m ,  d e t e c t i o n  of 
Due to t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  of the S-I1 S t a g e  \ \ . i r t x  and c a b l e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  
d i s c r e p a n c i e s  i n  e l e c t r i c a l  w i r e  a n d  c a b l e  nerc. o c c u r r i n g  at a n  a l a r m i n g  
r a t e .  
i t  \ \as  n t . cc s sa ry  tbat  i n i m c d i a t e  a c t i o n  b e  talcen t o  r e d u c e  the  r e j e c t i o n  r a t e .  
L>tft.ctive w i r c  a n d  c a b l e  exhib i ted  de fec t  condi t ions  s u c h  as: b u r n e d  
s p o t s ,  s p l i t s  i n  the  in su la t ion ,  longi tudina l  s t r i a t i o n s ,  bu lges ,  a n d  f o r e i g n  
i n a t e  rial. T h e  x f o r c n ~ c n t i o n e c l  condi t ions  could  r e s u l t  i n  cliclc-ctric f a i l u r e s ,  
open  c i r c u i t  condi t ior , s ,  a n d  loss  of e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s e a l .  
. S 0 LTJ 7- ION / R E C OX1 M I< N -4 T ION 
The SrJLution t o  the  p r o b l e m  w a s  in  t h r c c  p h a s e s .  Thc f i r s t  p h a s e  
ttvfintBd specific c r i t e r i a  for a c c o m p l i s h i n g  t h e  r e i n s  pec t ion  -of assemblies i n  
v,c)rk.  
a n d  c a b l e  i n  qttnc!c. 
t n e n t s  for f u t \ l r ( ,  o r d e r s  a n d  the  e s t a b l i s h i n t n t  of a l i m i t e d  so i i r ce  capab le  of 
protlucing h i g h  cjunlitv n ire dnd cab le .  
Phase t \ r o  s e t  fort11 the  r e - t e s t  p a r a m e t e r s  for all  u n p r o c c s s e d  w i r e  
The t h i r d  p h a s e  \\'as rcbvisinp t h e  prvcurcr r icn t  r r q u i r e -  
Thr .  procurenitl i t  o f  h igh qua l i t y  u i r c  ,ind cablc  for u s c  in  sophis t ica ted  
at .roi:pacc veh ic l c s  p r e s e n t s  a f o r m i d a b l c  p r o b l e m  to tlic \*chicle  m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  
T ~ P  p ~ o t 3 1 ~ > i 1 1  a r i ses  from t\T o p r i n c i p a l  f a c t o r s :  
\T. i r e  a n d  c;ibIe m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  (2) the r e q u i r e m e n t s  p e c u l i a r  to 
acbrospace vehicle \I i r e  and cab le .  
( 1 )  t h t ,  n a t u r c  o f  the clomcstic 
I 'he c lonicst ic  u i r e  a n d  cable m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y  is highly c o m p e i i -  
F i r m s  xx host, p r i m a r y  source  of r e v e n u e  is  tlic m a n u f a c t u r e  a n d  sale  ti\,(.. 
of \'. i2-c. n i u s t  p roduc t  a t  niinirrial  c o s t  and s e l l  in l a r g e  quan t i ty  to real iz t .  
acccp tab l i*  r e t u r n s  o n  inves tn i en t .  
\sir t :  i n a n u f a c t u r t % r s  a r e  gea r t -d  t o  high sptxed p roduc t ion  o f  c oinr r tc rc ia l  and 
t ~ l c p l ~ o n ~ ~ - t y ! ~ e  u.irt= and  c a b l e  ltrhert. cost  r a t h e r  t h a n  q u a l i t y  is of p r i m a r y  
r o n c c r n .  
a t r o s p a c c .  v e h i c l c  t nay  bc f o r m i d a b l c  ( i t  is c s t i n i a t e d  t o  bc i n  t h e  o r d e r  to 
2 ,  0 0 0 ,  000 f<.ct for one Apo l lo -Sa tu rn  V v e h i c l e )  b c c a u s c  s o  f e \ r  units a r e  
prodtxccd. t o t a l  footage r e q u i r e d  f o r  one  p r o g r a m  is qu i t e  s rna  11 whpn cam- 
parcti to t h r .  produc t ion  c a p a c i t y  of e v e n  a sniall mill.  
, 
h o r d e r  to o p e r a t e  i n  t h i s  m a n n e r ,  mos t  
W71ilc. t he  t o t a l  c o n d u c t o r  footage r c q n i r e d  to prnf1tict.B ,i s ingle> 
'1 h u s .  t l ~ t .  c7arnings 
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supply of aerospace  wire  for any one program does not warran t  
res required to initiate special  production a n  
eces sa ry  for  the manufacture of the ve ry  hig 
This would be true e aerospace  programs.  
procurement of one type of material required for  one prdg 
f r o m  the same supplier. 
necessity of making buys based upon competitive bidding. 
the approval of a number of $uppliers ( there  a r e  nine presently a 
supply Saturn s tage wi re  and cable) which resu l t s  i n  reducing the quantity of 
m a t e r i a l  procured f rom any one source  to  a t r iv ia l  level. 
This situation is fur ther  compounded by th 
This 
There  i s  no quick and easy  solution to the problem of consistent pro- 
cureme'nt of high quantity wire  and cable. 
summary  should as s u r e  bet ter  quality ma te r i a l  i f  they are fully implemented. 
Beyond this ,  perkaps basic  concepts mus t  be examined. Among the concepts 
which should be examined a r e :  ( 1 )  procurement of wi re  and cable intended 
for  c r i t i ca l  aerospace  applications l ike any other raw mater ia l ,  (2 )  handling, 
storing and distributing of w i re  and cable like any other raw mater ia l ,  and 
( 3 )  classification of wi re  aad cable as a raw mater ia l .  
The measure8 outlined in this 
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ACI GNMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Variations and inconsistencies in performing precision optical and 
mechanical stage alignment measurements  resulted in incor rec t  o r  question- 
able data r i q u i r e d  to  meet  stage alignment requirements .  Measurements 
reflecting NASA, IMSFC requirements  were  performed in various stations 
utilizing noncontrolled measurement  techniques, and with varying tool setups. 
The result was rnifising or inaccurate  stage dimensional configuration 
111 c a s ti r e men t s . 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
Definitive stage alignment plans and requirements  documents that 
specified the location of tool setups, imeasurenient techniques, and data 
recording of a l l  stage alignment requirements  to a s s u r e  accuracy and 
repeatability of measurements  were  provided, 
DISCUSSION 
Precis ion optical and mechanical measurements  may vary  considerably 
depending on the type of nieasurement technique and tool setups used. The 
t ime  periods between s tages  and changes in personnel performing the 
measurements  crnphasize these variations. In order  to  definitively control 
contractually recju'red stage alignment data, 'Quality Eng inee r ing  and 
Manufacturing Engineering provided a five-phase plan and s e t s  of require-  
nierits documents. These  documents, implemented during the specified 
fabrication cycles,  resul t  in the accumulation of a l l  required data in a con- 
t rol led manner  and of known accuracy. Quality Engineering provided stage 
alignment inspection instructions specifying required inspections and data 
reflecting the MSFC interface control document (ICD), and stage alignment 
specification, 
a l l  tool and measurement  setups with measurement  instructions. 
inspection instructions and measurement  documents were  cross- re ferenced  
Manufacturing Engineering prepared  tool drawings specifying 
The 
a l l  measurements  requiring inspection ver i f ica t im of setup and 
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RIB STRINGER CRACKS ON LARGE MACHINED SURFACES (LH2 PANELS) 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
The LHz tank skin after machining has  a wall thickness of 0. 125 inch 
Large quantity of 
Cracks 
with th ree  machined horizontal  stiffener s t r inger  s and 19 longitudinal 
st iffeners,  1. 3 7 5  inch in height and 0. 125  inch in  width. 
material c racks  occurred  during machine and forming operations. 
were  found in the radius at the start of the s t r ingers  and at the base of 
s t r inge r s  adjacent to  the tank skin. 
action for  repa i r  o r  s c r a p  of LH2 tank qua r t e r  panel. 
Each c rack  resulted in  ma te r i a l  review 
Qo 
The effect of this problem was high cost  of machine t ime,  man-hours ,  
and schedule impact for rework and remake. 
ment  t ime w e r e  a l so  affected. 
Mater ia l  cost  and procure- 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The development of adequate machine tapes ,  machine capability studies,  
machine cutting ra te  should be established at an  ea r ly  period in the develop- 
men t  program and controls established to prevent variations to proven 
methods. Adequate personnel training and specific t a s k  ass ignments  should 
be used. The machine forming should a l so  be developed.and controlled in 
the ear ly  s tages  of development. 
Strain and stress analysis  a r e  required to m o r e  adequately establish 
thickness and radius tolerance €or producibility. 
DISCUSSION 
Panels of this s i ze  with ridged machined s t r inge r s  had not been 
previously fabricated and subjected to forming operations. 
automated tape machine programs,  inspection controls,  and handling methods 
had to  be developed by Manufacturing. 
tight for  adequate development and standardization. Engineeiing tolerances 
were  in some cases  beyond the capability of the machines and many hours  of 
hand work were  required.  As the schedule became m o r e  cr i t ical ,  machine 
sett ings and speeds were changed to speed up the fabrication process .  
changes resulted in m o r e  defects and loss of panels due to  s c r a p  action. 
Any change should have been coordinated with a t eam comprised of Manu- 
facturing Engineering, Tooling Engineering, and Quality Engineering pr ior  
t o  implementation. 
New equipment, 
The schedule need dates*were too 
These 
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ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE AND WORKMANSHIP 
PROBLEMS DURl NG PRODUCTION 
P R O B L E M S T A T E M E N T A N D E F F E C T  
During the init ial  phases  of production of Sa turn  S-I1 s tages  a t  Sea l  
Beach, a n  ex t remely  high percentage (21 to  39  percent)  of material review 
act ions w e r e  caused by accidental  damage and workmanship. During ea r ly  
production act ivi t ies  as  many  a s  200 m a t e r i a l  review actions of this type 
w e r e  processed  per  month, Disposition and rework  of these d iscrepancies  
consumed countless man-hours  and added considerable  cos ts  to  the program.  
SO zu T ION / RE c OMM E NDA T ION 
Workmanship and acc identa l  damage d iscrepancies  a r e  problems that 
A will  exis t  on any production contract  involving complex space hardware.  
significant reduction of these  types of d i screpancies  was accomplished,  
however,  on the S-11 program by concerted effort in  four s epa ra t e  a r e a s :  
1.  Personnel  t ra ining 
. 2 .  Implementation of P r ide  p rograms  
3 ,  Departmental  competit ion and awards  
4. Increased uti l ization of protective devices  
DISCUSSION 
On production p rograms  such  as  the Saturn S-11, much of the design 
This i s  fur ther  complicated by the problem of designing a minimum 
and of the fabricat ion p rocesses  r ep resen t  advancements  in  the state-of-the- 
ar t .  
weight s t ruc tu re .  
using new procedures  and techniques.  The end product also codtains ha rd -  
ware  that is subject to accidental  damage. 
fo rce  must  develop iiew ski l ls  on the job as often occurs  during initial pro-  
The r e su l t  is a n  end product,  built f r o m  new m a t e r i a l s ,  
In addition, the production labor  
' duction of such equipment. 
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PRODUCT REPEATABILITY - ITS CONCEPT PROBLEMS AND RESOLUTIONS 
EMENT AND EFFECT 
The Product  Repeatability P r o g r a m  w iated when the customs 
expressed concern about the functional capabilities of hi 
hardware. NR had an  inspection program where Source 
sentatives monitored the suppliers '  in-process  testing, cleaning, and 
packaging. Inspection representat ives  were  assigned to the suppliers '  
plants to eliminate the duplication of complex expensive test equipment for 
reinspection after receipt. 
customer.  
of supplier high reliability functional hardware to per form to designed 
c r i t e r i a  after final installation on  Saturn S-II stages. 
This control was not deemed adequate by the 
The original inspection plan would have resulted in  the inability 
The necessity to replace high reliability components during stage 
checkout operations at Seal'Beach, Mississippi T e s t  Facility, and Kennedy 
Space Center, contributed to schedule slippage and/or  complete redesign 
of the units. 
components o r  stage integrated testing. 
Subsequent effort required a par t ia l  r e t e s t  of either individual 
The reacceptance program produced the following results:  
1 8 2 7 Compo nent s pr e s e nted 
117 Rejected upon receiving inspection 
1711 Components subjected to test  
(18.6%) 319 Components failed to meet tes t  requirements  
F ai lur  e Cat e go r ie  s 
( 8.6%) 147 Hardware malfunction 
( 4. 2%) 72 Tes t  equipment 
( 3%) 52 Tes t  requirements  
( 1. 5%) 27 Unknown/unassigned 
( 1.2%) 21 Tes t  operator  
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S 0 L U  T I 0  i% / R I? C Oh4M ENDATION 
This  reacceptance program was initiated upon receipt  of the ha 
f r o m  the supplier for  in-house r e t e s t  to verify that the pa r t s  would f 
properly pr ior  to installation on the Saturn S-11 stage. 
This  type of program should b e  incorporated into the proposal pac 
on future programs and negotiated as pa r t  of the init ial  contract. 
Those i t ems  selected fo r  a reacceptance t e s t  p rogram should b e  phased 
to fulfill rnanuf acturing and installation schedules. 
month lead t ime should be planned pr ior  to the need f o r  installation and/or  
test i n  the end product. 
Approximately a six- 
DISCUSSION 
To obtain a high degree  of reliability for selected i tems ,  the Product  
Repeatability P r o g r a m  was initiated. It was found during the reacceptance 
test  phases of the program that there  was some incompatibility of the pa r t s  
to per form to their  designed cr i ter ia .  
1. P h E i c a l  I _l__l- Discrepancies  _ _  I -"I I--___- upon Receival --_---- (ID and ~ Damage). Units 
were  found to be  contaminated, scratched, etc. ,  upon receipt  
from the suppliers.  
packaging engineering was  initiated, 
dispositions (MRD's)  were  initiated for  those discrepancies  
resolved in-house and/or  returned to the supplier. In both 
instances,  to preclude a recur rence ,  cor rec t ive  action requests  
(CAR 's) were  initiated fo r  follow-up cor rec t ive  action to b e  
taken a t  the suppliers.  
Coordination through source  inspection and 
Mater ia ls  review 
2. T e s t  Specification Clarification. During testing phases, numerous 
instances a r o s e  where the specifications and detail  t e s t  procedures  
(DTP's )  were  not clarified sufficiently pertainin 
e t e r s  and equipment configuration. Task t eams  reviewed and 
updated specifications and t e s t  procedures ,  for  example, par t  
cleanliness verification was incorporated within the DTP, 
~I___-----I. _I__-... 
to t e s t  param-  
3.  Tes t  Equipment Compatibility. - I _ _ _ ~  During testing, numerous instances 
a r o s e  where the in-house t e s t  equipment would not produce the 
(des i red)  r e su l t s  previously recorded by the supplier 's  t e s t  data. 
This  w a s  due in  par t  to the different t e s t  equipment configurations 
utilized in-house and a t  the  supplier 's  facility. 
- _ I _ ~ - -  
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Task  t eams  reviewed the supplier 's  t e s t  sys tems and associated 
equipment for compatibility with the laborator ies  and t e s t  equip- 
ment, and the vehicle systems checkout equipment. The reviews 
resul ted in  changes to the test systems in-house and at the 
suppliers. 
change proposals (EDCP's ) ,  and specification revision sheets 
(SRS's l ,  etc. 
These  changes were  initiated by engineering design 
4. Functional Fai lures .  During the reacceptance testing of the 
selected,  highly cr i t ical  hardware,  numerous occasions a rose  
where the units would not per form to the parameters  of the 
specifications o r  DTP's.  
The task  t eam evaluated the anomalies and isolated the problems. 
In  some instances,  the failure analysis revealed internal par t  
fa i lures  o r  damage which caused a complete design review. 
These  reviews resulted in  component design changes o r  a 
complete redesign of the unit. 
a resolution had b'een established for  the next part. 
Fur ther  testing was delayed until 
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TEST PROGRAM FOR DETECTION OF COMPONENT DEFICIENCIES 
P R O B L E M  STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
The procurement  of S-I1 components requi red  specialized incrementa l  
production. 
this  type of production requi red  considerable  attention to detai l  to maintain 
consistency. 
vehicles caused concern  that component quality could e rode  to  a degree  
which wotilcl affect performance.  
component f a i lu re s ,  a comprehensive t e s t  p rog ram was init iated to de t r c t  
latent defects. 
The  spec ia l  p rocess ing  and assembly  techniques involved i n  
An extension of the S-LT production schedule f o r  five additional 
Due to the potential s tage impact  f r o m  
SOLUTION/RE COMMENDATION 
The qualification cer t i f icat ion t e s t  p rog ram (QCTP) was  initiated to 
verify that the pe r fo rmance  and quality of qualified S-II components had not 
degraded subsequent’to the achievement of reliabil i ty goals. A total  of 26 
different components were  selected fo r  the  QCTP.  Selections were  based 
o n  accumulated fa i lure  h i s to r i e s  f r o m  qualification t e s t s ,  quality mainte-  
nance t e s t s ,  the PAR sys tem,  and acceptance data. 
I 
T h e  p rogram was  successful  i n  isolating problems with 3 5  t e s t  
spc%ciniens out of the 6 8  spec imens  uti l ized for the tes t .  
preventative actions w e r e  init iated to reso lve  all problems while minimizing 
the  impact  on all s imi l a r  del ivered components. 
Correc t ive  and 
Four t een  of the anomalies  w e r e  detected during environmental  
esposure .  
acceptance testing, potential s tage impac t s  w e r e  prevented by e a r l y  action. 
Incrementa l  production sampling t e s t s  a r e  recommended fo r  any fu ture  
space  p r o g r a m s  where  production schedules  are s imi l a r  to-those of the S-II. 
Since these  problems would have escaped detection by no rma l  
DISC U SSION 
The  reliabil i ty of a component i s  influenced by the ability of a manu- 
f ac tu re r  to  continually reproduce  the item to a prescr ibed  set of s tandards.  
Maintaining the quality of a product becomes  m o r e  difficult when production 
cove r s  a lengthy t ime span. 
insti tuted to verify the  long term repeatabi l i ty  of component performance.  
The  qualification cer t i f icat ion p r o g r a m  was 
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The r e su l t s  of the qualification certif ication t e s t  p rogram indicated a 
predominance of anomalies attributed to lack of attention to good workman- 
ship pract ices .  The anomalies 
oriented, engineering o ri ent ed , 
Workmanship I 
Engine e r i  ng 
Unsatisfactory conditions 
were classified as either workmanship 
o r  unsatisfactory cdnditions as follows: 
Specimens Problems 
26 
7 
2 
8 
3 
2 
Although there  were  m o r e  problems than anticipated, the resu l t s  were  
understandable. 
were  par t icular ly  susc@ptible to quality-oriented problems. Fu r the r ,  each 
of the selected components was purchased for  follow-on stages after an 
interruption in  production. This  created an  .atmosphere which caused indi- 
viduals responsible f o r  fabricating and assembling components to r e l ax  
their  attention to detail. 
Components were  selected f o r  the program because they 
As a resu l t  of the qualification certification program, the following 
i actions were  implemented to improve component workmanship. 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5 .  
Reinspected and reworked tooling 
Added mandatory inspection points 
Increased quality surveil lance by source inspectors  
Reviewed and updated procedures  and processes  
Increased control of suppliers 
7-46 
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
Quality Assu rance  22-02 
Results of t h e  p r o g r a m  have been  t r ansmi t t ed  to the  NASA i n  18 
individual test r epor t  s. 
R cpo r t  Number 
51309 
SD 69-346 
ZQTR 56 3 0087M1 
SD 69-343 
SD 68-356 
lQTR5640011 
lQTR5640012 
193831A 
5450-00-1869-1 
12-4916 
F -3 074 1 
PX1-69 
F -3 06 72 
6b4 
7410 R E N  2 
2347 
0 r i g  i nato r 
Wyle 
NR 
P a r k e r  
NR 
NR 
P a r k e r  
W.O. Leona rd  
AETL 
B endix 
Ogden 
Cannon 
Ogden 
E le ctr o ni c 
R e s o u r c e s  
Durkee  Lab  
E ngine e r i  ng 
Magnet ics  
Component Name P a r t  Numb er 
LOX feed l ine  ME271-0010-0009 
Manifold a s sembly  
(COX) 
ARMA 
V e nt valv e 
ME272-0005-0019 
ME272-0005-0021 
ME 272-0005- 0023 
ME282-0028-0002 
ME284-0030-0034 
1 ME 2 84 -00 74 - 0003 Check valve 
Regulator 1 ME284-0161-0009 
I 
1 ME284-0161-0010 
I 
R e l i e f  valve ' ME284-0270-0001 
R F  coupler 1 ME413-0008-0002 
~ 
Separat ion plane ME414-0042-0001 
co nne cto r 
Cryogenic 
connector 
Umbilical  
connector 
Quick disconnect  
connect0 r 
RC-band p a s s  
filter 
Power  t r a n s f e r  
switch 
Inve r t e r  / 
f i l t e r  
ME414-0046-0001 
ME414-0046-0002 
ME414-0046-0016 
ME414-0055-0004 
ME414-0055-0008 
ME414-0082-0555 
ME414-0082-2550 
ME447-0004-0062 
ME452-0026-0011 
ME495-0006-0004 
ME495-0006-0006 
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Re sources 
Recirculation 
SD 69-331 
, 
T 
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FEED A N D  VENT LINE ASSEMBLY X-RAYS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
X - r a y  fi lm reviewed by NR disclosed defects in  feed and vent l i ne  
assembl ies  previously accepted by the supplier,  
a lack of confidence in  X - r a y  acceptance at the suppl ie r ' s  facility. 
Effect of the problem was 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
NR coordinated with the supplier i n  preparing weld charac te r i s t ics  
shee ts  depicting acceptance c r i t e r i a  to  be used a t  the supplier.  
recommendation was a weld s tandards  manual  with physical X- ray  examples 
of acceptable and unacceptable weld defects  utilized by both NR and the 
supplier . 
The 
DISCUSSION 
The film X - r a y  in te rpre ted  by NR of welds on feed and vent line 
assembl ies  disclosed defects previously accepted by the supplier.  
suppl ier ' s  welding specification did not ref lect  acceptance c r i t e r i a  for  
peaking a s  the supplier was not measur ing  for off-set  a s  required by 
specification. 
weld a r e a s  for peaking. 
w a s e s tab 1 i s h ed . 
The  
NR engineering reviewed drawings and designated c r i t i ca l  
A method of measur ing  and acceptance c r i t e r i a  
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"HEAVY PLATE STOCK - SHIPPING PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION, 
RECEIVING, INSPECTION AND WAR€HOUSE STORAGE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Heavy plate stock, 10 feet  x 18 feet x 2 inches, for  the S-I1 tank 
s t ruc ture  was ordered f rom the mill  and delivered to the SD and LAD in a 
c ra ted  condition. 
wood and caused damage to the plate stock. 
were  separated with heavy paper which absorbed moisture  and caused 
surface cor ros ion  on the plate stock thereby causing rejection and s c r a p  of 
long lead-t ime material .  
The c r a t e s  were  assembled with nails that penetrated the 
The multiple plate stock sheets 
r e  
SOLUTION /RECOMMEiV DATION 
Define method of preservat ion,  packaging and handling a t  the suppl ie r ' s  
mill. Upon receipt ,  t ransfer  the mater ia l  inimediat ely f rom outside dock 
to indoor protection. P e r f o r m  an ear Iy  inspection of each sheet,  conduct 
re -preserva t ion ,  and s to re  in a controlled warehouse condition. 
DISCUSSION 
Pla te  stock in l a rge r  s izes  than normally used was  procured without 
detail  specified packaging requirements  with consideration of the potential 
problems that would occur during shipment due to handling and weather 
conditions. After receipt  of the mater ia l  and unloading, the packaged 
mater ia l  was somet imes  lef t  in outdoor dock a r e a s  because of s ize ,  weight, 
and preparation of warehouse s torage a rea .  At the t ime of uncrating, the 
s ize ,  and weight of each plate made i t  difficult to handle and txrn over each 
panel for  inspection of each surface.  Special handling equipment with 
suction cups had to be designed and procured in o rde r  to handle without 
damage for  inspection and s torage of the plate stock, 
that the original crat ing was not sat isfactory as the protective wood crating 
was damaged during transportation leaving exposed sections of the metal  
plate and somet imes  damage to the exposed plate stock. The wood c ra t e  
was secured by nails which penetrated the wood crating causing gouges on 
the metal  sheet  surfaces .  
Inspection revealed 
This had to be changed to clamps. The exposure 
to a tmosphere 
paper be tween 
( ra in ,  mois ture)  caused corrosion.  The heavy protective 
plates  absorbed moisture which a l so  caused corrosion. 
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A review of the events f r o m  the mill supplier to the point of s torage 
in the warehouse resulted in an established requirement  of preservation, 
handling, packaging, inspection upon receipt,  re -preserva t ion  storage,  
and periodic inspections during s torage and pr ior  to release to the shop for  
fabric a ti on, 
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HYDROGEN LEAKAGE CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR SPRAY FOAM APPLICATIONS 
EM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The application of spray foam insulation to the LHZ stage tank elimin- 
ated the sidewall purge and hydrogen leakage detection system formally 
used with the foam-filled insulation. 
A s  a result of'the insulation changeover, a new system was required to 
inert and dispose of the hydrogen leakage to a place approved for  dumping of 
g a s  eo us hydrogen . * 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
A new sidewall drain system tapped helium from the LH f i l l  valve 
actuation system. This helium purge was manifolded past eac k N A F L E X  
seal  within each engine feedline proximity area. 
f rom a N A F L E X  seal  was diluted with the helium (inert gas), and carried 
off in the helium-purged drain manifold and deposited (vented) within the 
nitrogen purged engine LH2,feedline fairing. 
the discharge point to prevent the possibility of a backflow (cryopwnping) of 
contamination back up the purge system manifold drain line, 
Any hydrogen seepage 
A check valve was located at  
DISCUSSION 
Application of spray-on foam insulation eliminated the purged honey- 
comb insulation into which the leakage from N A F L E X  seals w a s  drained. 
investigation was made to determine the damage which might occur a s  a 
result  of leakage f rom N A F L E X  seals under foam insulation. 
An 
,It was determined that a seal  drain system was desirable: 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
T o  prevent failure of the foam insulation by over-pressure 
To prevent foam from becoming flammable by hydrogen saturation 
To prevent any damage due to f i re  from hydrogen leaking through 
the foam o r  openings in the foam 
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As a result of the potential damage to the insulation as a result of 
' leakage from the NAFLEX seals, a system to collect s 
dispose of the leakage was deslgned. 
When the system as deeiigaed was evaluated it s 
8 hazardous operational mode i f  cryogenic leakage was'dumped 
air -filled lines . 
The system was then re-designed to inert the lines with helium before 
on-loading of cryogenies . 
, 
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DESIGN OF CRITICAL TOOLING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A cutting tool was manufactured with an  aluminum s h a f t  and during 
use,  the cutting section separated f r o m  the shaft damaging insulation on the 
s tage and causing slight injury to an employee. 
SOLUTIO& /RECOMMENDATION 
The tool w a s  re-designed to use a s t ee l  shaft on t h e  cutting head. All 
other cutting /rotating tools used were  inspected to determine type of shaft 
mater ia l .  KO other tools with aluminum shafts w e r e  found. 
Designs of rotating cutting tools should consider t h e  fo rces  qpplied to 
rotating shafts and cut te rs ,  and ma te r i a l  that will provide the safety factors 
required should be specified. 
DISCUSSIOb 
D u r i n g  the  machining (using an  air motor and cut ter  tool) of sp ray  
foam on the forward  S-I1 sk i r t ,  the aluminum shaft  sheared at t h e  base of 
the phenolic cutting tool, the rotating phen’olic tool s t ruck and damaged t h e  
insulation, and t h e n  ricocheted, striking an employee on the left l e g  causing 
a minor lacerat ion injury. 
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TECHNIQUE FOR VERIFYING STRUCTURAC 
INTEGRITY OF SHEET CORK INSULATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
rrpability was needed to detect cork o r  foam debonds in the  vicinity 
of LHZ feedlines on the S-II vehicle, as a result  of static firing of the stages 
at a test  site. 
The inspection technique had to be ;f a nondestructive nature. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
A tool was developed where by the inspection technique consisted of the 
application by vacuum of a tension to  the cork or  foam composite while 
measuring the amount of induced deflection of the cork. 
small  as  2 inches in diameter will display a marked increase in deflection 
compared to structurally sound areas.  
Cork debonds a s  
DISCUSSION 
The objective was to provide assurance that the cork insulation was 
The general construction details were as  follows: 
1. 
structurally sound prior to a countdown demonstration test (CDDT) at  a tes t  
site. 
Standoff height was approximately 0. 125 inches. 
2. The seal was constructed from 1 /4-inch-diameter surgical 
tubing held in place with neoprene-base adhesive. 
A "vacuum control" unit was located between the vacuum plate and 
a vacuum pump consisting of two bleed valves and a vacuum gage, 
A 1/4-inch-diarneter hole was drilled through the vacuum plate to 
provide for  rapid vacuum relief between inspection poiDts. 
elastomeric ''flap" was provided to readily cover and uncover the 
relief port . 
A standard quick-disconnect fitting was provided in the vacuyrn 
plate for attachment to the  vacuum source. 
3.  
4. 
An 
5. 
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CRACKING OF 2020 ALUMINUM STRINGERS IN FABRICATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Cracks were found in the 2020 aluminum stringers in the aft s k i r t  and 
aft interstage assemblies. 
The cracking problem is  estimated to have caused a slip of 6 to 8 weeks 
in delivery of 5-11-4 assemblies to Seal Beach. 
SO L U  T ION /RE C OMM EN DATION 
d 
N o  impact riveting was permitted to be used on any 2020 material. 
Nonimpact type fasteners were used to attach 2020 alumhum stringers 
in and near all hard point a reas ;  i. e. , attachment of all 2020 aluminum 
alloy stringers and frame$. 
Defined allowable extrusion contour tolerances for attaching the 
I 
stringers and frames with nonimpact fasteners. 
Permitted limited use of shims to provide a snug fi t  of 2020 extrusion 
to skin, or  between extrusion and end fittings installed therein. 
DISCUSSION 
In the interest of weight saving, it was decided to replace 7075 alumi- 
num with 2020 aluminum on the  thrust cone, aft sk i r t ,  and interstage of the 
vehicle. 
With the s ta r t  of fabrication, cracks were noted which had been caused 
by impact of the rivet gun upon the stringers. 
exter nail ye  
These cracks were visible 
This problem appeared to  be solved by putting the manufactured head 
on the skin side; however, additional cracks were found between the hat 
section and skin. Standard inspection procedures; i. e, , dye penetrant, 
X-ray, did not bring out the cracks in other areas  until a caustic etch 
method was tried,  
been detected. 
This method isolated more cracks than had previously 
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A s  the result of an investigation of the causes of cracking, it was 
determined that low ductility of 2020 aluminum extrusion used as stringers 
did not permit impact riveting at  o r  near joints involving more than skin and 
stringer or  where tooling would back up skin, making a hard point 
attachment. 
It was also determined that tolerances on extrusion shape control were 
not adequate to eliminate excessive strain by fasteners on stringers during 
assembly. 
Lack of experience in impact rivet fabrication with 2020 aluminum 
extrusion contributed to the problem. 
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LEAKAGE OF TORSIONAL BELLOWS AS THE RE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Leakage due to cor ros ion  ha$ been found in t h e  torsional betlows used 
in  the LH2 and LOX feedlines on the stage engine$. 
Bellows showing signs of leakage had to  be replaced to  prevent a 
launch sc rub  o r  las t  minute delay. 
u 
so LU T ION /R ECOMMEN DATION 
\ It was determined that corrosion of the bellows mater ia l  was responsi-  
ble f o r  holes in the material through which the leakage was occurring. 
The following action was taken; 
1. Improve d r y  lubricant application to the bellows by assur ing  good 
p r e  - cle aning and coverage. i 
2. 
3 .  
U s e  more  cor ros ion  inhibiting d r y  lube. 
Assure  drying tors ion bellows cavity af ter  exposure to moisture  
= and cryogenic fluids. 
4. Investigate use of a m o r e  corrosion-resis tant  bellows 
5 .  Purge ports  were  added to the LOX and LHZ torsional 
the center engine. 
mater ia l .  
bellows fo r  
The initial indication that a problem existed on the LOX atid LM2 
torsional bellows was leakage of the center  engine feedline during a LOX 
tank leak tes t .  
determined that the  leakage was  the  r e su l t  of: corros ion  through t h e  bellows 
The line was returned to the manufacturer where  it was 
PlY 
The suspected cause was nonuniform dry-lube coverage. Fu r the r  
investigation determined that th i s  type of corrosion was due to chloride 
introduced into the bellows by var ious fluids used to clean the bellows such 
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88 : tap water, trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene, solutions containing 
chlorine. hadequate drying procedures and the inab to inspect the 
bellows after installation contributed to the problem. 
It of the manuf cturing investigation, recommendations were 
the bellows to 50 inchers in an extension fixture for the 
d e ,  and to increase the time and temperature during the 
dry cycle. 
- After cryogenic exposu’e, recommendations were also made to use 
the ports in t h e  center engine bellows for  purging. 
Recommendations were made to u s e  a superior, corrosion-resistant 
material  in place of CRES 321  (e. g. , INCO 600) for the bellows. 
, 
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ADDITION OF STRAIN RELIEF CLAMPS TO CRITICAL 
ELECTRICAL COMPONENT CONNECTORS 
PROBLEM S T A T E M m T  AND E F F E C T  
All connectors used on cr i t i ca l  electrical components m u s t  provide 
s t r a in  relief to  the w i r e  ha rness ' t o  prevent  damage to contacts of connector 
i n se r t s .  
F a i l w e  of components t o  opera te  when requi red  during f l i g h t  could 
r e su l t  in  m i s 3 i o n  loss .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Design Engineering added the requi rement  for use of connec tors  with a 
s t r a in  relief c lamp to the specification control  drawing. 
f o r  use of a s t r a i n  relief device should be included in the procurement  
specification when sen t  to the suppl ier  furnishing t h e  connector. 
DISCUSS1O;V 
The requi rement  
During manufacturing cycle of the ha rnesses  the s t r a i n  of t h e  ha rness  
on pins o r  contacts during e l ec t r i ca l  testing caused by t h e  weight bending 
act ion,  to rs ion ,  associated with handling, will  damage the mechanical  
cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the i n s e r t s  of the connector unless the s t r a i n  is t r a n s -  
f e r r e d  to the connector body through the s t r a i n  relief clamp. 
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CONNECTOR DISCREPANCIES DUE TO MISHANDLING 
OBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
recurring problems with electrical connectors on the S-IX 
ermsned to have resulted from mishandling by technicians. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Upgraded connector training courses. 
Renewed emphasis was placed on workmanship relative to connector 
handling in the technician meetings. 
Established a requirement that only technicians trained and certified 
could work on connectors. * 
Provided improved (modified) insertion tools for  installing pins in 
connectors and verified their use. 
Developed and implemented backshell tightening criteria. 
Implemented the use of contact pin alignment gauges to verify that the  
pins were not damaged prior to connector mating. 
DISC USSIQN 
ny problems were encountered during the assembly of electrical 
connectors to harness installation, and mating of harness connectors on the 
stage and demating of connectors for  test or checkout. 
list of some damage resulting from mishandling: 
The following is a 
Torn grommets lnser t  recession 
Scratched, chipped finish 
'Cracked contacts (due to crimping) 
Scratched or  scarred pins 
. 
Contact recess  ion 
Bent pins, torn grommet&, pin recession, and insert recession were 
ally the type of damage resulting from poor workmanship during 
ing and replacing elwAgica1 pins in a connector. This operation 
I 
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required the use  of the proper  inser t ion tool. 
incor rec t  tools,  connector grommets  were  damaged and pa r t s  of contacts 
were  broken or deformed so that e lec t r ica l  contact with mating pa r t s  was 
degraded o r  lost  completely. 
As a re su l t  of using 
Another instance of connector mishandling occurred  p r io r  to  and during 
S-11-7 stat ic  f i r ing  when anomalies were  noted with the LOX engine cutoff 
(ECO) sensors .  
indicating a possible open c i rcu i t  condition. 
revealed the in-tank connector coupling r ing to be loose result ing in inter-  
mittent open circuits.  These senso r s  were  used in  a two out of five voting 
network to shut down the engines in flight. 
They were  fl ickering I'wwet" and ' 'dryft  intermittently,  
Subsequent investigation 
A premature  shutdown could 
r e su l t  in possible miss ion  loss .  u 
To preclude the r ecu r rence  of a loose-in-tank connector, a specific 
requirement  to verify "tight" (bottomed out) coupling rings was established 
as a mandatory inspection point (MIP),  p r io r  to closeout of the LH2 and LOX 
tanks inzline and during tank entry. 
An evaluation of r eco rds  indicated that connector discrepancies were  
increasing to the point that  significant action was mandatory. 
A connector task team was established to  review the total problem and 
recommend actions requi red  fo r  correct ion.  
appropriate a r e  l isted under Solution/Recommendation. 
Those determined to be 
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. STAGE SYSTEMS RETEST REQUIREMENTS AFTER 
SYSTEMS DISTURBANCE AND REWORK 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Dur ing  the AS-502 flight, Engine 2 inadvertently shut down and was  
followed by the closing of the prevalve f o r  Engine 3 .  L <  
Closing of the Engine 3 prevalve resul ted in the shutdown of Engine 3 
which crea ted  an underthrust  and control problem f o r  the vehicle due to a 
two-engine out condition. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
A c r o s s  of e lec t r ica l  connectors to  prevalve solenoids was determined 
t o  be the condition responsible f o r  shutdown of the  second engine. 
Retest requirements  of sys tems broken into o r  modified w e r e  revised 
to requi re  individual testing of the sys tem f o r  operation in  a manner  that  
would show up any deficiencies, or fa i lure  of a system to perform as  
de signed. 
DISCUSSION 
lnvestigation into the inadvertent shutdown of the second engine, as a 
r e su l t  of the loss  of the first engine, determined that the connectors to the 
control solenoids f o r  the Engines 2 and 3 LOX prevalves had been installed 
in reverse. 
Normally,  this would have been detected during individual engine sys -  
However, the engine shutdowp t e m  checkout and shutdown sequence testing. 
sequence testing was  defer red  and then accomplished fo r  all the engines 
together which did not revea l  the c ros sed  signals to  the prevalve solenoids. 
In support  of the revision to the r e t e s t  requi rements ,  studies were  
conducted t o  es tabl ish means  f o r  identifying connectors to prevent mis -  
mating with the wrong component. 
W i r e  ha rnesses  to  components were  also re - routed  to t h e  prevalve 
solenoids so that the r ight  connectors to  each  component would just  reach 
the connector attach point on the solenoid. 
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ELIMINATION OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF MOISTURE FROM LOX 
AND LH2 PREVALVES AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS 
PROBLEM STATEMEN T AND EFFECT 
During the first s ta t ic  f i r ing countdown of the S-II-2 Stage at MTF,  the 
psevalve on Engine 1 fai led to close a t  recirculat ion start. 
the countdown being terminated. 
SOLUTION /KEGOMMEN DATION 
This resul ted in 
As a r e su l t  of finding water  in the vent por t  cavity of the prevalve,  
which f roze  and prevented operation of the prevslve during the s ta t ic  f i r i n g ,  
the following precautions and requirements  were  recommended to eliminate 
the potential source o€ water  to the prevalves:  
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4, 
5. 
6. 
A positive p r e s s u r e  should be maintained in the recirculat ion 
actuation sys tem during transportation. 
Enforce existing purge requirements  with backup dew point checks 
of g a s  during each blowdown. 
Provisions w e r e  made to purge and/or  apply vacuum to the GH2 
internal cavity exhaust system /flange seal leak detection system 
and propellant tank pressurant  sys tem,  and perform moisture  
checks p r io r  to propellant loading. 
Purge the GSE prevalve latch supply l ines pr ior  to stage hookup. 
P e r f o r m  periodic checks to ensure  that l ines a r e  free of mois ture ,  
and ends are properly capped to preclude the entrance of moisture .  
Established the c r i t e r i a  for actuating g a s  to meet MIL-P-27407 
Specification. 
Established prevalve check and purge aiid/or evacuating procedure 
f o r  t h e  vent por t  cavity. 
DISCUSSION 
A countdowii was terminated when a prevalve failed to d o s e  a t  start of 
recirculation. 
of water was poured out of the vent port  cavity, 
When the valve was disassembled,  approximately 10 to 15 eels 
8 -13  
SD 7 1 - 2 5 6  
Safety 09-02 
As a result of this problem, an investigation was conducted to deter- 
All  other systems mine th&origin of the water found in the LH2 prevalve. 
associated with the LOX and LHZ prevalves to determine sources of moisture 
were investigated. 
As a result of the first two investigations, recommendations and 
changes were made to preclude water from the systems by eliminating the 
eource of the moisture, and providing the means to remove and check for 
A indications of moisture. 
A Beries of tests proved the feasibility of using a vacuum to extract 
water from a valve. 
. pressure of water at the existing ambient temperature can be maintained 
. (approximately 0.73 inch of Hg absolute) by the vacuum pump, the valve 
cavity can be made free of water. 
It was concluded i f  a vacuum of no less than the vapor 
. 
It was also determined that the protective covering, used over the work 
area at the test site during the time of the installation of the valve that failed, 
was not adequate to preclude moist air or water from the valve. 
the recommendation w a s  made that a properly constructed and adequately 
maintained work structure for protection from rain and other detrimental 
environmental conditions be mandatory f o r  operations involving replacement 
of such critical components as the prevalves. 
Therefore, 
i 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Marginal operation and f a i l u r e  to pass  electrical tests were the f i r s t  
indications of problems with stage vent valve solenoid valves. 
of the valves indicated that the,  solenoids had failed electr ical ly  due to 
shorting a c r o s s  the windings. 
insulation to be peeling f r o m  the coil  w i re  leaving the bare 'wire  exposed. 
Disassembly 
Further investigation showed the enamel  
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
The investigation indicated that. coil  wi re  utilized in t h e  solenoid coils 
of 1967 and 1968 wire-type solenoid coils had the potential for  fa i lure .  
utilizing 1966 wi re  types were  of known integrity and were  acceptable. 
Those 
Those valves utilizing 1967 and 1968 wire  types in the coil windings 
were re-worked with coil  wi re  acceptable by testing, and wound to new 
requirements  and processes .  
DISCUSSION 
During S-11- 14 special  testing, stage vent solenoid valve became 
inoperable result ing i n  the vent valve cracking p r e s s u r e  exceeding i t s  relief 
p r e s s u r e  l imit .  
The coil 'was found to  be  shorted,  winding to winding, 'due to cracked 
coil wire  insulation. 
Tear-down inspection of seven solenoid valves,  f r o m  three  s tages ,  
and eight test solenoids established ' 'cracked coil wi re  insulation. " Specific 
w i re  o rde r  manufactured in 1966 was established as acceptable. 
manufactured in 1967 and 1968 was established as not acceptahle. 
Wire - 
Para l le l  efforts with coil t ear  down inspection were N R  Mater ia ls  and 
P rocesses  Lab t e s t s  of the solenoid mater ia l s  of construction including 
var ious coil w i re  lots ,  N o  major incompatibilities were  demonstrated 
except those wherein 1320, alcohol, and acid f l u x  were  introduced in t h e  
grouping to simulate inadvertent processing retention o r  post-closeout 
mois ture  leakage. 
c r  aclc. 
All th ree  liquids noted caused t h e  w i re  insulation to 
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The following revisions were made to the design and/or processing, 
and were required down to the subsupplier who manufactured the coils and 
who assembled the coil into the valve. 
I. Required receiving inspection of coil wire to N R  requirements 
ed machine winding €or precisian tension co 
3.  Required coil winding using varnish to r e s u l t  in "wet wound coil" 
4. Changed coil closeout wrap to teflon tape in lieu of glass tape 
9 
5. Replaced closeout plug and solder with pinch tube 
6 .  Revised potting procedure 
v 
7 .  Required leakage test  of electrical connector by receiving 
ins p e c t ion 
8. Added dehydration procedure before closeout of coil cavity 
9. Added post-closeout leak tes t  to verify acceptability of hermetic 
cavity sealing using "tracer gas ' I  method 
10. Add requirement for hi-temp solder for  solder plug closeout 
All of the above changes were required to  correct and control design and 
processes down to the subsupplier level in order to guarantee t h e  integrity of 
the S-I1 Program vent valve solenoid valves. 
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TEST OPEREITiON ~EQUIREMENTS FOR LH2 TESTS 
An accidont occur red  on a t e s t  tank  while the unit was  wrtdergoing an 
LW, chilldown prepara tory  to start ing a scheduled tes t .  
A s  a restilk of the accident, the t e s t  ar t ic le  was  totalLy destroyed, 
SOLUTION /RECOM.MEN DATION 
As the r e s u l t  of the total  destruction of the t e s t  a r t ic le ,  the following 
6 olut io ns a% e r c c oinm e nd e d : 
1, Ensure  rigid enforcement,  by periodic monitoring, of w o r k  
activity acceptance procedures  ancl hazardous operational 
procedures .  
2, Provide continuous multiple tape video c a m e r a  coverage with a 
minimurri 5- to 10-minute loop recording f rom initiation of a 
hazardous t e s t  including pre- tes t  operations (such as t rans-  
fe r r ing  f luids ,  gases ,  pressurizat ion,  e tc ,  ), 
Per fo rm a r ev iew of a l l  ma jo r  S-I1 t e s t  p rograms to' ensure proper  
instrumentation and/or  video coverage, 
, 
3 ,  
4. Review present  tes t  procedures  to ensure  that all LH2 propellant 
tanks a r e  sampled,  top and bottom, and a r e  within specification 
l imits  f o r  0 2  and/or  other incompatible gas before t ransfer .  
5. Per fo rm a Saturn S-I1 review of all conditioning, t ransfer r ing ,  
and tanking procedures ,  including safety. 
6. Review procerluree f o r  vent stack operation and standby copditions 
to e n s u r e  their  adequacy including safety. 
7 .  Initiate action to continually monitor and record  al l  c r i t i ca l  
instrumentation during chilldown LH2 t r ans fe r  or  pressurization. 
8, Ensure  that changes on a working GH2 sys tem or operational 
procedure are system6 analyzed to  ensure  that no detrimental  s i d e  
elfccts will  r e su l t  f r o m  the change. 
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DISCUSSION 
A test vehicle was deatroye a relatively low-level explosion at t 
Santa Susana Test  Facility COCA N Test Stand. The incident occurred 
immediately after the initiation of system chilldown during the countdown 
operation pr ior  to loading propellant for  application of structural  loads. 
Damage to the test  vehicle was  total and the structural loading f iqtuses  
were severely damaged. 
the explosion report  and were extinguished several  minutes later through 
action of stand firex and site firemen. 
Several fires were observed simultaneously with 
The facility LH2 storage tank had been vented to 3 psig to s ta r t  sys- 
tem chilldown, and the stage was vented through the smaller of two vent 
valves in order to maintain back pressure in the stage during chilldown. 
Approximately one minute l a t e r ,  the. explosion and f i r e  occurred. 
Tests conducted on the Battleship vehicle, duplicating the procedures 
used on the test  vehicle, indicated the possibility that the oxygen content of 
the test  vehicle had stratified in the bottom of the tank and in combination 
with the chilldown hydrogen gas,  set  up the mixture responsible for t h e  low- 
level explosion. Sampling of the tank oxygen level subsequent to the purging 
o r  prior to  chilldown was not performed. 
The investigation of t he  incident required the implementation of the 
eight  items noted above. 
control needed to assure  no reoccurrence of the incident in future testing. 
These were accomplished to provide the positive 
xc 
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TOLERANCE RELAXATION FOR ALIGNING AND POSITIONING 
SECTIONS OF TANK STRUCTURE FOR WELDING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Drawing to le rances  f o r  indexing position m a r k e r s  on the forward  LH2 
bulkhead and the posit ion m a r k e r s  on Cylinder 6 w e r e  l is ted on the drawing 
as * O .  010. Manufacturing init iated a drawing change reques t  t o  change the 
tolerance to  f 0. 030 because the drawing tolerance would not pe rmi t  a proper  
f;’,-up between the two assembl ies .  
RESOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
An investigation into the problem indicated tha t  * 0.  030 tolerance of 
the c i rcumferent ia l  alignment coincided with that of Manufacturing tooling. 
A genera l  note was added to the assembly  drawing changing the posit ion 
m a r k e r  1 of the fo rward  LH2 bulkhead to  be aligned to  posit ion m a r k e r  1 of 
Cylinder 1, allowable tolerance fo r  alignment of these components not to 
exceed f 0. 030. 
Coordination should be completed between Engineering and Manufactur - 
i ng  to es tab l i sh  reasonable  engineering requi rements  f o r  tolerances of t h i s  
category that  wil l  p e r m i t  tooling to  be designed and used to  acceptable 
design requi rements .  As a r e s u l t  of the difference between design to le rances  
and ability of the positioning tool to  control  alignment of the tank a s sembl i e s ,  
MRD action was  requi red  to  c l ea r  the squawks generated.  
DISCUSSION 
Design engineer ing investigated the c i r c u n s t a n c e s  responsible  f o r  t h e  
requested drawing change in  to le rances  f r o m  *to. 010 to *O.  030 fo r  c i r -  
cumferent ia l  alignment of forward  LH2 bulkhead and Cylinder 6. 
I t  was  determined that the manufacturing tool used to position the 
assembl ies  f o r  welding could not locate the p a r t s  t o  c lose r  than *O.  030 
to ler anc e. 
An engineering evaluation of the possible  effects  of granting the to le r -  
ance relaxat ion was performed.  N o  effect on the s t ruc tu ra l  integrity of the 
s tage was found; therefore ,  the requested tolerance change was  incorporated 
into the drawings.  
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DAMAGE TO STAGE STRUCTURE RESULTING 
FROM UNSAFE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A portable floodlight shorted against  the in te r ior  tank wall  causing 
damage to  the tank. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
All e lec t r ica l  equipment to be used inside the stage tanks will  be 
subjected to  testing by tool c r i b  personnel using the Rucker Safety Sentry,  
a device f o r  detecting electr ical ly  shorted equipment. 
The existing method of running extension cords  and air hoses  f r o m  the 
building, through the tunnel, downthe ladder ,  and into the tank wil l  be 
replaced with a permanently attached outlet on bottom of the ladder.  
i The s tage will  be groundedfrom the faci l i t ies  power panel and a 
second ground attached to  the s tage t ranspor te r .  
DISCUSSION 
During the in-tank cleaning operation on the S-11-7, a portable flood- 
light shorted out causing four  a r c  burns. 
0.026 and 0.025. 
The two deepest burns were  
The floodlight was a hand-held type with an  aluminum reflector.  The 
arcing occurred  between the edge of the ref lector  and the tank surface.  
, 
8-  20 
SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North American Rockwrll 
Safety 11-04 
POST PROOF-PRESSURE TESTING INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 
FOR PROPELLANT TANKS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Structural  weld inspection requirements  fo r  testing of the LHZ and LOX 
tanks were  requi red  in four  separate  accounting sys tems.  
A s  a r e su l t  a degree of inconsistency existed between documents which 
could have resul ted in inspection discrepancies .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMEnT DATION 
All of the inspection requirements  for  post-hydrostat  and post- 
pneumatic tests w e r e  t r ans fe r r ed  to the propellant tank proof-pressure - 
te sting drawing . 
These weld inspection requirements  were  previously called f o r  on tank 
component drawings . 
The requirements  f o r  inspections. mus t  be kept cur ren t  and revised as 
the resu l t s  of the data f rom the inspections dictate. 
requirements  should be called out on the  applicable engineering drawings at 
the beginning of the program before initial re lease  to  Manufacturing. 
The basic inspection 
DISCUSSION 
S-11 s t ruc tu ra l  weld inspection requirements  fo r  testing of the LH2 
and LOX tanks were  established in specifications, internal  l e t t e r s ,  Quality 
and Assurance documents,  and on seve ra l  drawings. Because of the 
diversity of requirement  sources  a degree of inconsistency existed between 
these individually established requirements .  'Post proof -p re s su re  testing 
inspections,  f o r  instance,  were  not completely identified on the engineering 
drawings. 
Another example was  the requirement  for the forward LH2 bulkhead 
The penetrant inspection was called out on t h e  drawings and inspections. 
the radiographic inspection was required by Quality Assurance documents. 
The problem of updating and revising requirements  can only be accom- 
plished and controlled to the degree requi red  by revis ions to  t h e  drawing. 
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A s  indicated by the information l isted relative to the preceding 
problem, it i s  suggested that all requirements  fo r  inspection criteria for 
p r e -  and post  proof -p re s su re  weld inspections (or similar inspection 
requi rements )  be incorporated within t h e  f ramework  of engineering drawings. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS RESULTING FROM S-11-T TANK RUPTU 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
An S-II Stage tank ruptured while being pressur ized  in the t es t  @$and 
at the Miss i ss ippi  T e s t  Facil i ty.  
The tank rupture  totally destroyed the stage and resul ted in the injury 
of s i x m e n .  
. SOLUTION /RECOi’vfMENDATlON 
m 
Redesign was  do* on the LHz feedline elbow, integral  boss of the 
feedline elbow, s t r inge r s ,  and r i b  spl ices  to  eliminate s t r e s s  concentrations 
and provide s t ronger  par ts .  
Design changes provided separa te  s e w i n g  sources  for  monitoring tank 
p r e s s u r e  and tank control p r e s s u r e  switches. 
I 
The f i l l  link coupling length was increased 3 inches and support legs 
added f o r  load distribution. 
The facility vent system f rom the tank was changed to provida auto- 
matic relief and fail-safe-open provisions f o r  the blocking valves. 
Procedures  and Implementing Instructions were  revised to control the 
performance of t e s t  operations,  and preparat ion and control of test  
procedures .  
Responsibilities were  established fo r  sys tem test engineer 8 .  
Requirements were  established fo r  c rew qualification fo r  c r i t i ca l  t e s t s .  
The instructions f o r  cryogenic sys tem installation and opwations were  
up-dated. 
The Safety Manuals and Procedures  were  rev ised  and new Standard 
Operating Procedure  s we r e  established. 
Required instrumentation to r eco rd  all c r i t i ca l  valve positions on event 
r e  cor der .  
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scuss10l\r 
During attempts to pressurize the LMz tank on the S-11 Stage at the 
Mississippi Test  site, the LHz tank failed. 
associated systems were destroyed. 
Both propellant tanks and 
Six men were injured. 
preliminary investigation showed the probable cause of tank 
failure to be the result of overpressurization due to t h e  absence of pressure 
indications. 
involved disconnection of the prelersure switches’. 
pretssure indications being monitored at  the time of the failure were con- 
nected to transducers on the pressure sensing line, common to the line from 
which the switches were disconnected. 
Previous incomplete testing of the LHz tank pressure regulator 
All Test Control Center 
e 
This resulted in zero pressure indication at  the Control Center where 
they attempted to pressurize the tanks to 8 psig, the pressure at which 
leak checks were to have been made. 
The LH2 tank rupture’occurred at  a tank pressure well below the 
design pressure limits. 
The investigation after the incident determined that the facility blocking 
valves, in the LHz tank vent line downstream of the LHz tank vent, were 
closed before the.last five attempts to pressurize the tank were made. 
The lack of a relief provision or  fail-safe device in this vent system 
was considered to have contributed to the tank failure. 
It was concluded that the origin of the structural failure was localized 
in the regian of the LHz tank feedline outlets. 
following etage revealed cracks in the same location as the failed a rea  of 
the S-11-T. 
Dye penetrant teste- on a 
It was determined that it was necessary to forcibly stretch and position 
the flexible f i l l  line to permit attachment to the stage f i l l  and drain coupling. 
This was a result of deviations between planned and actual location of the . 
facility interface with respect to the stage. 
As a r e h t  of bending s t resses  combined with tensile s t resses ,  cal- 
culations indicated maximum surface s t ress  of 46,000 psi  was possible in 
the localized area of the f i l l  and drain coupling. 
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The investigation resulted in recommendations for  changes in stage 
structure management, procedures , safety requirements, facility systems, 
instrumentation, and inspection r equir ements . 
8 - 2 5  
SD 71-256 
Safety 16-01 
USE OF ARROW-TYPE DECALS TO CLARIFY FIND NUMBERS 
PROBJLEW STATEIMENT AND EFFECT 
Incorrect mating of systems between the ground half and stage half aE 
the disconnects on all aft and forward umbilical lines can occur due to find 
number location, and when an actual umbilical car r ie r  plate is not being 
used. 
Misinterpretation is possible because the find numbers cannot always 
be located directly adjacent to the  disconnects. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Decals with arrows were provided and placed adjacent to the find 
numbers, and pointing to the disconnect that the find number was to identify 
on the stage half-disconnect; 
Identification of single connect/disconnect points should appear on the 
drawing, particularly if the disconnect cannot be sized or designed to 
preclude inadvertent misconnection. 
DISCUSSION 
During checkout operations of individual systems requiring hookup of 
lines to the disconnects on all aft and forward umbilical locations, the find 
numbers were found to be located such that the disconnects w e r e  not readily 
identifiable. To preclude the inadvertent cross-connection of systems and 
the possible resultant damage to the system, the use of decal "arrows" was 
used in conjunction with the find numbers. 
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PROBLEM. STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
nation of var ious  types has  been fo d i n  the fue l  tanks 
components in the s y s t e m s  of the S-I1 s tages .  
The re  have been repea ted  component f a i lu re s  due to hard  contamination 
and s o m e  objects removed from the tanks which subsequently could c a m e  
an  engine abor t ,  Iildfunction, o r  per formance  shift  during a s ta t ic  f i r i n R ,  
SOLUTION /RE(;OMhtEN DATION u 
P a r t s  to be assembled  into the tanks w e r e  kit ted so accountability 
could be establ ishcd.  
callouts w e r e  added to fabr icat ion,  assembly ,  and inspection (FAIR) t ickets  
during in-tank installations.  
All tools w e r e  checked in and out of the tanks.  Torque 
Dlack-light inspections w e r e  implemented to show up contaminatioii. 
Rotation of the s tage (tinkle test) was  implemented to detect  loose 
objects in the tanks.  
The  s tage sys tems w e r e  subjected to  blow-downs af te r  installation of 
a mic ron  mil l iport  f i l t e r  in the sys tem to catch the contaminants.  
A coiiicnl-type f i l t e r  e lement  was added to the LOX and LHz f i l l  arid 
drain flex hoses  at the CSE/stage connection. 
A Saturn contamination control  t eam was establ ished to look into the 
to t a l  picture  of contarnination sources  and control,  . 
DISC 'USSION 
I 'arious f o r m s  of contamination have been removed f r o m  the tanks and 
sys t ems  of the  s tage .  
The "tinkle t e s t ' ' ,  used to  a sce r t a in  the condition of t h e  tanks relat ive 
to foreign objects ,  h a s  produced many i t ems  of loose hardware  that inspec- 
t ions have not disclosed. 
8 -  27 
SD 71-256 
Safety 17-01 
The inspection performed in the LOX tank disclosed bolts that were 
not torqued to the required values. Corrective action was takezl to add a 
torque callout to FAIR tickets during in-tank installations. 
Some components that had been installed had been cleaned 
to specification; however, when inspected by black-light, they 
tamination sensitive to LOX. 
This condition was determined to be residue from tape used during the 
installation of rivets in the component. 
eliminate the tape and require black-light inspection after in-house cleaning 
of all LOX-cleaned system components. 
Specifications were changed to '  
Numerous particles of a teflon material  were found in an'LHZ tank 
during a routine post-cryoproof inspection of the tank. 
to be 80 percent of a teflon gasket f rom the flapper on a check valve down- 
s t ream from the fi l ter  in the LHz transfer system. 
source of the contamination was modified for  the LHZ and LOX transfer 
systems, and a screen added to the stage interface on both LH2 transfer 
systems. 
The material proyed 
The flapper valve 
The problem of contamination from an overall standpoint was studied 
by a contamination control team, 
systems, manufacturing procedures, shipping procedures, quality control 
procedures, and made recommendations to control or  eliminate sources of 
contaminat ion. 
This team investigated associated facility 
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REQUIREMENTS FOR SAMPLING OF FACILITY FLUID SYSTEMS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Specific r equ i r emen t s  for the quali ty of f luids  supplied to  the CSE/ 
faci l i ty  in te r face ,  if not available when t h e  GSE is t ied into t h e  faci l i ty ,  
could r eeu l t  in  contamination of GSE,  s tage,  and faci l i ty  systems. 
SOLUTIOH /REGOMMEN DATION 
u. 
Specific requi rements  f o r  fluids should be negotiated with the  cus tomer  
at the beginning of the p rogram.  
hel ium, ni t rogen,  m i s s i l e  grade  air, hydrogen (liquid o r  gas )  and oxygen 
(liquid or  g a s ) .  
These  should include those applicable to 
The s p e c s i c s  should list the impur i t ies  by name ,  a n d  niaximurrl 
allowables in p a r t s  p e r  riiillion by volume o r  purity shall  not  be less  than a 
spec i f ic  pe rcen t  by volume f o r  each  and to any other  f luids  or  gases  added to 
the above list. Par t icu la te  count permi t ted  sha l l  a l so  be l is ted.  i 
The r equ i r emen t s  es tabl ished above should then be  l i s ted  on drawings,  
specifications,  and i n  all documents w h c r e  fluids arc '  uspd a s  n a r t  o f  a d e s i g n ,  
in test, o r  furn ished  to a f a c i l i t y  for use during s y s t e m  t e s t s  o r  rmc l  iteni 
use .  
Sampling requi rements  should a l so  be establ ished on a periodic  bas i s  
and the location specified f r o m  which the sample  sha l l  be taken for cer t i f i -  
cation purposes .  
bott le,  provided the GHe o r  GN2 purge  f o r  the faci l i ty  hydrogen s y s t e m  is 
sampled at the GSE/facil i ty interface and meets the establ ished requi rements  
for  helium o r  nitrogen. Verification of papticulate count shal l  be made  of 
purge  g a s  only and shal l  mee t  the requi rements  f o r  hydrogen. 
Gaseous hydrogen should be cer t i f ied a t  the s torage  
Liquid oxygen a n d  hydrogen, i f  furnished by barge ,  should be sampled 
at the barge.  
DISC USSIOlw 
Therc  tvere no r equ i r emen t s  es tabl ished in specifications o r  on 
drawings f o r  quality of fluids supplied to  the GSE /f aci l i ty  interface e Although 
a number  of documents l i s ted  fluid quali ty r equ i r emen t s ,  none applied to 
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facility systems. 
gases entering the GSE/stage a r e  of sufficiently high quality to enable the 
Requirements must be established to assure that fluids/ 
E to meet stage/GSE fluid requirements. 
Unless the requirements a r e  established in the negotiated contract, 
and required in all associated engineering documentation, codus 
result in selecting cr i ter ia  suitable for certification of fluid samples. 
situation could result  in rejection of fluid sample and test  delay. 
contamination of stage systems could result  if unqualified fluid is supplied 
from the facility. 
This 
In addition, 
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LOX CLEANLINESS OF TEST EQUIPMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A stainless  s tee l  hand valve exploded when a K-bottle containing oxygen 
was introduced into the tes t  sys tem.  
and f lame.  
SOLUTION /KECOhlblE.X DATION 
The detonation was followed b y  sparks  
The cause of thc explosion was determined to be coritaminated 
trichloroethylene used in the cleaning process  of t h e  t e s t  compoiieiAts. 
Cleaning procedures  were  changed to s t a r t  t h e  p rocess  with t r ichloro-  
ethylene a s  an initial r i n se  of the test equipment components followed with a 
r in se  of F reon ,  and finally purged d ry  with gaseous nitrogen. 
DISCUSSION 
Apollo mater ia l s  and components had been undergoing oxygen 1iuri:idit.y 
tes t s  over a 3-year period in the Engineering Development Laboratory.  
During a s e r i e s  of events required to s t a r t  a tes t ,  an explosion occtrrretl in 
an  oxygen hand valve that was part of the t e s t  equipment. 
The general  c l ean ing  procedure,  previous to the incident, was  to clean 
tubing, fittiiigs a id  valves with trichloroethylene followed with a purge of 
nitrogen. 
At the s t a r t  of the t e s t  the t e s t  chamber was evacuated to 80 ,000fee t  
and the valve on the K-bottle containing oxygen w a s  opened, and as  the nex t  
valve in the tes t  sequence was about to be opened in the manifold, the 
explo s io n oc c urr e d. 
The investigation of the yalvc revealed that spontaneous combustion had 
occurred interiially. 
3 ,  000 ps i .  Special prccautions had been talcen to preclude incidents d u e  to 
the use of the \-alvcs uzith oxygen by installing a teflon val\rc scat,  and using 
K E L - F  o r  Flurolube as a lubricant on the valve s tem.  
The valve was made of s ta inless  s tee l  and rated a t  
Investigation determined that contamiiiated trichloroethylene trappccf ill 
the valve was ignited when the oxygen supply was turned on. 
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PROCEDURES FOR CONTAMINATION CRITERIA 
ATEMENT AHD EFFECT 
Check valves subjected to pretest  cleanliness verificat on have s iown 
contamination in excess of the LOX cleanliness requirements imposed on the 
supplier by specificahon. 
’ 
Those valves which do not meet the specified cleanliness requirements 
require additional blowdown checks that consume 6 1 /2  hours each. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Higher flow rates were established as  criteria for the supplier. 
DISCUSSION 
During pretest cleanliness verification i n  the Product Reliability 
Program test program, 21  out of 3’7 engine isolation check valves were 
contaminated in excess of the LOX cleanliness requirements in t h e  
as -delivered condition. The existing cleanliness verification tests imposed - 
on the supplier facility were in accordance with the specification require- 
ments. The specification required only a flow rate of 7*l standard cubic 
foot per minute which did not establish a sufficient velocity to maintain 
larger particles in suspension. 
supplier’s facility, all t h e  check valves delivered would meet the cleanliness 
level required, 
require additional blowdown checks of up to 6 1 /2  hours each. 
By imposing a h igher  velocity on the 
Those valves not meeting the cleanliness requirements 
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VERIFICATION OF CRYOGENIC SEALS BY LEAK CHECKS, NAFLEX TYPE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Early in the S-LI Program problems were encountered with seal leakage 
due to installation difficulties and lack of experience in the handling of seals. 
A s  a result  of the possibility of LOX/GOX concentration in the 
presence of non-LO=C’/GOX compatible materials,  positive checks were 
required as  to the integrity of the seals during cryogenic conditions to pre- 
vent a hazardous concentration which could result in an explosion or fire. 
SOLUTIOS /REGOMMEN DATION Q 
Checkout specifications were written f o r  use during manufacturing, 
test  and operations, and test  operations at  test  si tes.  
Allowable seal leakage is based on total seal circumferential inches - 
and is imposed on that basis by the procurement‘ specification when written. 
Hazardous concentrations of cryogenic gas in specific areas can be con- 
trolled when the total s e a l  leakage of all the seals is within specification 
limits and purge flows into the a rea  have been designed based on anticipated 
permitted maximum total seal  leakage. 
All drawings, procurement specifications, and checkout specifications 
f o r  individual seals and systems should require leak checks at  specific 
points during procurement, installation and checkout of cryogenic seals and 
systems, and purge systems which a r e  designed to control and neutralize 
hazardous cryogenic gas concentrations. 
DISCUSSION 
Engineering response to LOX/GOX compatibility inquiry, pertaining 
specifically to external leakage from seals 
and the conditions responsible for the leakages. 
but failed to list LOX s u m p  to tank leakage information. 
reviewe$ t h e  leakage history 
&The review listed 80 seals 
The failure to include the LOX sump leakage in thc list required a 
re-evaluation of the purge requirements for the boattail area of the stage 
when the maximum L O X  sump permissible leakage was added to the total 
seal leakage being dumped in the area.  
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Althoug,, the pro -1em presentec, above was concerned with only 
one seal in one area,  other areas have been investigated relative to sus- 
pected concentrations of hazardous gases such as  the tunnel area on the 
outside of the S-LI Stage. 
sitive requirements exist for periodic leak che 
a for seal  leakage and the data available for re 
lems of suspected accumulation of hazardous garae 
specific areas cannot be answered to any degree of accuracy. 
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DESIGN OF COMPONENTS TO PREVENT REVERSE ASSEMBLY 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A turbine wheel of an engine fuel pump was  found to have been 
assembled in r eve r se .  
ing to s t a r t .  
This condition was responsible f o r  a J - 2  engine fail- 
so LUTION /RECOMM E N  DATION 
Mechanical design c r i t e r i a  were  updated to include a design approach 
which would preclude the design of a par t  which could resu l t  in the r e v e r s e  
ins tallation of a component during a s  s em bly. 
DISCUSSION 
A problem developed during the at temptedfir ing of a 5-2 engine at  the 
Rocketdyne Tes t  Facil i ty,  
that  an engine had stalled twice and a hot gas  generator  temperature  indica- 
tion had been received. 
The symptoms of the problem were  stated to be 
Inspection of the turbine determined that the f irst  stage turbine wheel 
of the fuel  pump had been installed in r eve r se .  
The correct ive action recommended was to update the Mechanical 
Design Cr i t e r i a  Manual to requi re  designing of component pa r t s  so  that it 
would be impossible to assemble  the par t  in any other except the as-designed 
configuration. 
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BELLOWS DAMAGE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Damage to stage line bellows occurred approximately 116 times in the 
As a result  of these bePlow discrepancies period of 1965 to the end of 1968. 
many of the lines had to be removed from the stage and re-cycled back, 
through the supplier. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
~ 
The flange bolt installation drawings were revised to require instal- 
lation of bolts so that torqueing could be accomplished on the side of the 
flange away f rom the bellows. * *  
Provide and require protective bellows covers to be used from the 
- time the bellows leave the supplier's facility and removed only as  required 
for installation, and then replaced until removed for f l i gh t .  
Special skills qualifications were defined for  the technicians doing the 
ins tallation of the bellows. 
Planning ticket procedures were revised to require callout of special 
skills trained technicians to do the installation. The planning ticket pro- 
cedures were then revised to call out procedures for  removal of bellows 
protective devices as  required by the planning ticket work requirements, 
and replacement will follow verification by an  inspector. 
Material Dept. procedures incorporated a maintenance procedure 
for  records of pfotective covers from re-cycle through the supplier of 
bellows through final removal a t  the tes t  site. 
Inspection procedures were revised for source inspection at the 
supplier and receiving acceptance testing of protective covers at N R  
facilities. 
All desk instructions for  inspectors were updated to reflect the change 
nts relative to correctionof the bellows problem, and to the special 
skills requirement for technicians installing lines. 
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DISCUSSION 
Damage to stage line bellows in  the 1965 to 1968 period incurred the 
loss  of t ime a s  well  as doll 
occurred during t ransporta  
causes  as a resu l t  of work in tbe a r e a  of t h e  bellows with protective devices 
removed f r o m  the bellows. 
background of the bellows problems f rom the beginning of the f i r s t  reported 
damage to a bellows and, as a resul t ,  recommended changes to drawings, 
specifications, procedures  in the responsible a r e a s  of Engineering Material  
Manufacturing, Quality Assurance,  and Logistics. These a r e  listed above 
under Solution/Recommendation, and contributed to a very high percentage 
Feduction in bellows damage incidents. 
Investigation revealed that the damage 
installation on the stage,  and f rom other 
System Safety made a complete analysis of the 
a 
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BACKUP CONTROLS FOR EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN OF C L EQUIPMENT 
d around a feed duct during static f i r i ng  and destroyed 
ess controlling the engine cutaff system and solenoid 
sed f o r  venting the start tanks. 
Due to damage to wiring, the start tanks could not be vented down to 
a safe pressure to permit technicians to work in the area. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION . 
As an immediate solution for the condition a temporary pneumatic line 
was attached to the vent valve and operated to drop the high pressyre in the 
start tanks. 
As a permanent solution, redundant start tank vent control system was  
designed and installed so that actuation pressure to control the vent solenoid 
could be appliedfrom an off-stage source if the normal system was damaged 
or malfunctioning. 
of the area. 
; 
The relief devices were also manifolded and vented out 
Redundant controls to shut down and safe critical equipment should be 
designed into facilities as  a normal facilities design safety requirement. 
DISCUSSION 
During a static firing of an S-I1 engine at Santa Susana Test Facility 
a leak  of LH2 into the annular space of the vacuum-jacketed line resulted 
in a hydrogen fire around the LH2 feed duct which burned some stage electri- 
cal  harness near the duct. 
When an attempt was  made to reduce the pressur’e in the engine start 
tanks the vent valves would not actuate due to damage to the wire harness 
which contained the control wires to the solenoid which in turn, controlled 
the pneumatic pressure required to operate the vent valves. 
A jury r ig  was used to bring pressure directly to the vent valves so  the 
engine s ta r t  tanks could be relieved of their high pressure.  
\ 
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A redundant s t a r t  tank vent control system was designed and installed 
so  that actuation p r e s s u r e  could be applied f r o m  an off-stage source  if t h e  
normal  control systenis  were  damaged or malfunctioned. 
The overp res su re  device which relieved gaseous hydrogen into the 
atmosphere and was responsible for the fire was manifolded with other relief 
devices and vented out of the a rea .  
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CRACKED SOLDER CONNECTIONS ON PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 
M STATEMmT AND EFFECT 
Cracked solder connections on etched circuit boards have resulted in 
I *  
instrumentation equipment failures. 
The equipment failures caused loss of critical data, failure analysis 
of each board, corrective action on each board, and re-cycling of the boards. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
As a result of instrument failures, the following solutions a re  
sacommended : 
E 
Use proper swaging tools for bifurcated terminals. 
Enforce cleanliness in production process area.  
Defer all conformal coating until al l  soldering has been completed. 
Where re-flow of solder is required, such as bifurcated terminal 
soldering, use a 47-watf soldering iron and liquid f l u x .  
Change assembly specification so conformal coating can not be trapped 
in solder joints. 
Train inspection personnel in the proper methods and criteria for 
inspection of solder joints. 
Provide sufficient details in the specification for the soldering of 
bifurcated terminals where a re-flow of solder would occur so  as  to 
prevent weakened solder joints. , 
The S-II Program has experienced numerous instrumentation equip- 
ment failures caused by cracked solder connections during the various phases 
of the S-II vehicle test. 
Considerable time and effort have been expended in re-cycling, failure 
analysis, and esffectfrzlg corrective action on each failure occurrence. 
8-40 
n SD 71-256 
Space Division 
North American Rockwe4 
Safety 25-01 
Due to  variation of each failed pr inted circui t  board, the  fa i lure  
analysis and cor rec t ive  action of cracked solder connections varied.  
general ,  the  major  loading mechanism in solder  joint fa i lure  was  entrapped 
conformal coating o r  contaminants s t r e s s ing  the joint during the rma l  
excursions and/or  soldering. The major  objective in the establishment of 
correct ive action was, to strengthen solder  joints such that the joints could 
withstand stresses caused by the rma l  excursions during equipment usage 
o r  during s torage.  
revising production p rocess  specifications to call  out the use of 30X power 
magnification glasses in place of 7 X  power. All s t r e s sed  solder joints 
detected were  strengthened by improved production process  and quality 
control. 
that could be visibly inspected. 
In 
Detection of s t r e s s e d  solder  joints was improved by 
The above w a s  accomplished for  the pullout printed c i rcu i t  boards 
The ebuipment that could not be visually inspected for  s t r e s sed  solder  
joints due to non-transparent protective coating such as silicone rubber ,  but 
had experienced high fa i lure  r a t e ,  was determined to be too costly to 
re-work due to the packaging design; therefore ,  the correct ion was 'con-  
centrated in the production p rocesses  on follow-on units. 
A s  a r e su l t  of equipment fa i lures ,  a refurbishment re-cycle  was set 
up f o r  PCM te lemet ry  components installed in the stage at t ime of launch. 
The components required re-work to  requirements  specified within a period 
no g rea t e r  than 6 months p r i o r  to a scheduled launch. 
, 
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SAFING HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT FOR MAINTENANCE OR REWORK 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The power to  a substation was turned off before clean-up was to  be 
However, accomplished in the immediate area by e lec t r ica l  technicians. 
there  was a second source  of power into the substation that was not known. 
The two technicians were  injured as a r e su l t  of coming i n  contact with 
one leg of a 12,000-volt 3-phase f eede r ,  fed f r o m  an unknown source  that 
did not show up on the schematics .  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Drawings were  revised to reflect  the actual configuration of t h e  e lec t r i -  
cal sys tem,  and posted in each main and substation to show a l l  12 kv breaker  
and distribution sys t ems .  . 
I 
A lockout procedure was prepared  and implemented which conformed to 
the requirements  of the System Safety Manual, 
The 12-kv power indicating l i g h t s  w e r e  installed on the  feed side of t h e  
t r ans fo rmer  disconnect switch in each substation to  indicate power s ta tus  
between the substation and the main switchgear cubicle. 
Instruction manuals were  prepared  f o r  issue to  each department 
e lec t r ican  to  inform them of t h e  se rv ice  and operation of each main station 
and substation. This manual will  include copies of the  single l ine d iagrams 
of the lockout procedures .  
A lock-controlled properly equipped tool cabinet was  installed i n  each 
main and substation to ensure  that all tools and s d e t y  equipment required 
a r e  always available.- All technicians were  given a r e f r e she r  course on 
proper  operating procedures .  
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Two technicians rece ived  an e l ec t r i ca l  shock when corning in  contact 
with an energ ized  12,000-volt f eede r  line while cleaning insulators  in a 
substation. The bas ic  causes for the accident c a n  be summar ized  a3 follows: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
Primary power schemat ic  d i ag rams  w e r e  not up-to-date to  show 
modifications a s  new buildings w e r e  added to the Sea l  Beach 
complex. 
A t e s t  f o r  the p re sence  of voltage on t h e  p r i m a r y  feeder  l ine was  
not made  as a doublecheck before beginning work on the 
equipment.  
A switch lockout procedure  using individually assigned padlocks 
was not in  effect .  
Power indicating l ights on  the f ron t  panel of the substation equip- 
men t  do not exist. 
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FOR LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMPS CAPABLE OF WITH 
ALL TESTING A N D  M U N C H  CONDITIONS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
LHz recirculation pump bearing failures were due to inadvertent. 
pneumatic turbining (pressure differential across  pump) and/or excessive 
electrically powered (dry spinning) operations. 
Because of bearing failure on four stages and without backup test data 
as to speed and duration of overspeeds on installed pumps prior to launch, 
many pumps had to be replaced in order to guarantee integrity of the pumps 
for f l igh t .  
SOLUTSON /RECOMMENDATION 
The supplier was required to tes t  the pumps and determine the cause 
of the! bearing failures. 
ascertain the cause of pump overspeed and make changes, as required, to 
the test  procedures to preclude a recurrence of the conditions responsible f o r  
overspeeding the pumps. 
Procedures were reviewed by design engineering to 
Design engineering should be cognizant of the total test and service 
conditions that the pump will be subjected to from time'of supplier tests 
through tes t  operations launch, and flight. 
Procurement and Process Specifications should contain the require- 
ents to design to the eventual service environments and sufficient develop- 
ment testing completed to prove that the pump is qualified for production 
and service use. 
DISCUSSION 
i 
LHz recirculation pump bearing failures -occurred on pumps installed 
on S-I1 Stages. 
tur  bining (pressure differential across pump) and /or excessive electrically 
powered (dry-spinning) operations. 
of dry-spinning to 25 hours of cryogenic operation. The bearings contained 
phenolic-micarta retainers. 
The pump bearing failures were due to inadvertent pneumatic 
Time to failure ranged from one minute 
I 
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The analysis of the bearings after failure indicated a considerable 
unt of f r ic t ion between t h e  bearing rotating pa r t s  as a resu l t  of turbining 
ch caused chatter of the micarta retainer  against the bearing outer race. 
This action caused fatigue fai lure  of the retainer  r ive ts ,  separation o r  
breaking of the re ta iner ,  and/or  fa i lure  of the aluminum side retainer8 
resulting i n  damage to bearings and races .  
The probability of pump failure was determined to be a function of the 
frequency and/or  duration of unscheduled pump operations. 
A fa i lure  of a pump during f l i g h t  would cause loss  of recirculation on 
the affected engine, no engine start, and resultant loss  of mission. 
A design change was approved to replace the Barden bearings, with 
reinforced-phenolic (micar ta)  re ta iners  , with tef lon-impregnated f iberglass  
(Rulon) re ta iners .  
' All applicable process  specifications and detailed operating procedures 
which could produce a differential p re s su re  ac ross  the pump were  reviewed, 
and caution notes added where .required. 
1 
The improved lubricity of the Rulon mater ia l  increased the allowable 
electrically powered (dry-spinning) operations to 8 cycles  per 40 minutes 
total t ime and, together with a change in re ta iner  design, eliminated bearing 
damage caused by pneumatic turbining overspeed operations. 
In addition to t h e  bearing change and updating of the procedures ,  the 
capability of monitoring the LHz recirculation pump output in revolutions 
per minute has  been incorporated at tho! test site f o r  use during d ry  spin 
tests, 
following ei ther  unscheduled d ry  spin of the pumps o r  replacement to validate 
purnp integrity. 
The W 2  recirculation pump d ry  spin test is performed as required 
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PROBLEM S T A T m E N T  AND EFFECT 
A transportation bolt, one of 203 used to  ship the interstage,  was 
found to have been overlooked and still in place, 
.. 
If a transportation bolt was inadvertently left  i n  place, the end result 
would be a fai lure  of the  stage to separate and a probable mission abort. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
* 
Controls were  established whereby the bolts would be color coded and 
removed and accounted f o r  by a fabrication, assembly, and inspection 
record  (FAIR) ticket. 
A second inspection was recommended p r io r  to stacking. 
DISCUSSION 
A transportation bolt, which is one of 203 bolts used to ship the inter-  
As 
stage from the Tulsa Faci l i ty  to  SeaLBeach, was found still i n  place on the 
interstage. 
a resu l t  of discovery of the  bolt, action was taken to color code the trans- 
portation bolts and account fo r  each bolt shipped with the interstage. This 
was accomplished by a FAIR ticket. 
the shipping point fo r  re-use.  
Even one bolt could cause a mission fa i lure  if left in  place. 
The bolts were  then processed back t o  
A eecond inspection was included fo r  re-inspection of the holes to  
a s s u r e  they had not been fi l led by a technician assuming that  the holes should 
have a bolt. This was to be accomplished pr ior  to stacking the stage. 
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SAFETY HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH STAGE T~NSPO~TATION ~ ~ U i P ~ E N T  
PROBLEM STATEMENT ABID EFFECT 
The S-II stage t ranspor te r  e lec t r ica l  system malfunctioned during a 
move of the s tage to a new location. 
followed, it was determined that the sys tem did not have an e lec t r ica l  
ground from the facility power supply (480-volt 3-phase a c )  to the t ranspor te r  
and f r o m  the portable remote  control unit (115-volt single-phase a c  power) 
to the t r anspor t e r .  
As a r e su l t  of the investigation that 
A potentially hazardous condition existed which could have resul ted 
in injury o r  death to personnel working on o r  operating t h e  t ranspor te r .  
SO LU TlON /RE C OM MEPi DATION 
Replaced 3 -wire cable connecting to facil i ty power with a 4-wire cable. 
Connected the fourth wire between the t ranspor te r  frame and facil i ty ground. 
Replaced 4-conductor cable with a 5-conductor cable and connected the 
fifth wi re  between ground and dr ive control case.  
. Added protective covers  over  the te rmina ls  of control switches exposed 
to  operator  contact. 
Added protective covers  to the microswitch terminals of stabilization 
circui ts  exposed to working personnel  arid not protected f r o m  environmental  
conditions. 
During troubleshooting activit ies result ing f r o m  malfunctions of th; 
s tage t r anspor t e r ,  conditions were  observed which required correct ive 
action to’prevent injury or  death to  personnel  o r  malfunction of the  t r ans -  
por te r  e lec t r ica l  system. 
A shock hazard existed in the stage rotation sys tem through lack of 
a n  e lec t r ica l  ground f r o m  the facil i ty p r imary  power supply (480-volt 
3-phase ac) to  the t r anspor t e r ,  and f r o m  the portable remote control unit 
( 1  15-volt single-phase a c  power) to the t ranspor te r .  
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A shock hasard existed in the operator 
r because the terminal8 of control 8 
req: exposed (115-volt ac potential) to 
A shock hazard was present during ope 
transporter stabilization Bystem because the 
stabilization circuits were exposed to working peraonne 
The microswitches were directly exposed to rain and other environ- 
mental conditions. 
*. 
, 
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HAZARD PREVENT1 ON FROM CAPACITORS 
f 
PROBLEM S T A T E M E N T  AND EFFECT 
Radio noise  filters w e r e  inadvertently plac'ed i n  a c i rcu i t  ahead of the 
noise c i r cu i t  b reakers .  
This  is technical ly  c o r r e c t  but creates a potentially hazardous condi- 
t ion f o r  people. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Circui t  r e -wi red  to put the rad io  noise f i l t e r s  on the load side of the 
c i rcu i t  and behind the c i r cu i t  b reake r s  and bleedec r e s i s t o r s  i n  the load s ide  
of the c i rcu i t  to d i scharge  the capaci tors .  
Technical  and operat ing personnel  had rece ived  e l ec t r i ca l  shocks when 
working around a piece of ground suppor t  equipment. 
vacuum pump,  and had a three-wire  sys t em with a 480-volt input to the pump 
from the faci l i ty  sou rce  through t h r e e  c i rcu i t  b reake r s .  
f i l t e r s  ( capac i to r s )  w e r e  in  the l ines  between the faci l i ty  power supply and 
the c i rcu i t  b reake r s .  Whenever the c i rcu i t  b reake r s  w e r e  opened, the 
capac i tors  w e r e  s t i l l  connected to the 480-volt power sou rce  and s to red  an  
e l ec t r i ca l  charge  capable of giving a s e v e r e  e l ec t r i ca l  shock to  anyone 
coming in  contact  with the circui t .  
The equipment was  a 
The rad io  noise  
- 
The c i r cu i t s  w e r e  re -des igned  to  put  t h e  capac i tors  on the load s ide of 
the c i rcu i t  so that power would be disconnected f r o m  t h e  capaci tors  whenever 
the c i rcu i t  b reake r s  w e r e  opened. Also,  bleeder r e s i s t o r s  w e r e  added to 
each  l ine to bleed off the capaci tor  charge  to  ground, thereby  getting r id  of 
the' potentially hazardous condition responsible  f o r  the e l ec t r i ca l  shock to 
people. 
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GROUNDING REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLODING BRIDGEWIRE FIRING UNITS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The eight exploding bridgewire (EBW) f i r ing units on the S-I1 flight 
stage were  found to be unbonded to  the stage s t ructure .  
In their  unbonded condition the f i r ing units could have produced radio 
frequencies ,  and could have been hazardous to  personnel  working around 
them i f  they w e r e  charged to  the i r  flight-working voltage of 2300 volts dc. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
The faying sur faces  of the EBW f i r ing  units support  assemblies  and 
inters tage s t ruc tu re  w e r e  prepared  to  provide a metal- to-metal  contact with 
a low res i s tance  of less than 0. 1 ohm ta s t ructure .  
DISCUSSION 
Review of the e lec t r ica l  bonding requirements  ascer ta ined that the 
requirement  to bond the eight EBW firing units on t h e  S-L? flight stage had 
not been complied with. 
MA0303-025 Specification which was applicable f o r  S-I1 airborne sys tems.  
These units in  the unbonded condition could have produced undesirable 
radio frequencies and, f r o m  a personnel hazard standpoint, could be a 
shock hazard  i f  charged to their  flight-working voltage of 2300 volts dc. 
A requirement  was added to documentation to  a s s u r e  the required bonding 
between units and s tage s t ructure .  
The requirements  were  delineated in the 
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During- a checkout station verification, the test resu l t s  indicafed that 
noise was being developed a c r o s s  current-l imiting resistors causing o 
tolerance measurements  and rendering low-level signal measurements  
a n y  degree of accuracy  virtually impossible.  
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
bu 
Malfunction sensing circui ts  were  added in a random access  switchtng 
drawer to monitor the th ree  coordinate solenoid/relay dr ivers .  
outputs f r o m  any two solenoid/relay d r ive r s  in one coordinate will  inhibit t h e  
coil excitation in  less t h a n  t en  microseconds.  
DLSCUSSIOIY 
Simultana 
* 
The t e s t  resu l t s  during a G S E  station verification indicated that with- 
out malfunction sensing and inhibit c i rcu i t s ,  inadvertent apil ication of power 
to  otherwise de-energized circui ts  on the s tage and in  GSE can  occur  due to 
the stacking of t e s t  points. 
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EXCESSIVE E LECTRI CA L STAT IC BUILDUP A N D  DISCHARGE 
PRQBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
Static buildup and discharge has been responsible f o r  e lec t r ica l  shock 
to technicians working on stages. 
to cause momentary loss  of musc le  control. 
The shock has been of suEficient magnitude ’ 
Insufficient grounding of equipment to adjacent grounded s t ruc ture  
contributes to t h e  problem. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
Ground s t r a p  requirements  w e r e  added to the drawings and to the 
installation procedures .  After installation of the equipment into the stage 
and installation of ground s t r a p s ,  specific res i s tance  testing of the ground 
s t r ap  grounding verification was required as p a r t  of the procedure.  
I DISCUSSION 
There  have been incidents of e lec t r ica l  shock to technicians working 
These a r e  the r e su l t  of static e lec t r ica l  buildup charges on on the s tages .  
stage equipment that  have not been grounded through the stage s t ruc ture .  
One instance concerned protective pads used on the stage forward  
bulkhead. 
on the stage forward  bulkhead as the r e su l t  of dragging and sliding the 
protective pad into place. 
A maximum voltage was generated when the pads were  installed 
Revisions to the installation procedure were  made requir ing the 
technicians to  wear  clothing not subject to  s ta t ic  buildup. 
t ion also requi red  the pad to be rolled into place r a the r  than dragging o r  
sliding. 
points o r  methods of grounding the pad to the s t ruc ture  was possible. 
The pad installa- 
Grounding could not be requi red  in this installation since no attach 
Another s ta t ic  problem involved the heat shield protective platform. 
This unit requi red  s ta t ic  s t r a p s  to be installed when assembled into the 
s tage ;  however,  provisions fo r  the s t r aps  and points of attachment w e r e  not 
provided. In this instance,  the drawing f o r  the platform was revised to 
requi re  the s t r aps  to be a p a r t  of the heat shield protective platform and 
provide specific grounding s tuds f o r  ground s t r ap  attachment. 
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Addition a 1 do c urn e n t  at io n c ha ng e s r e qui r e d r e s i s tan c e c h e c k s af t;e r 
i n s t a l l a t ion  of the  grounding straps. 
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PACKAGING MATERIAL FOR ORDNANCE ITEMS - 
PROBLEM STATEMENT W D  EFFECT 
Packaging material  used for shipping ordnance items to a test B i t s  , 
(KSC) waa found to have a static charge. 
Static electricity discharge could cause an explosion of ordnance items, 
ignition of flammable material ,  or  shock to personnel. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION Q. 
Do not permit the use of static generating packaging materials €or 
explosives. 
Use all safety precautions necessary when presence of a static 
electrical charge is evident: or suspected. 
a ground wire.  
Bleed off static charges by nsing 
DISCUSSION 
When a shipping container used to ship a single bridgewire Apollo 
standard initiator (SBASI) to NASA/MSC was opened, the packaging material 
(Styrofoam) was found to contain a static charge of 4500 volts dc. 
problem was detected because the packing material stuck to the  side of the 
container, 
The 
A problem similar lm this was reported by Andrews A i r  Force Base, 
Maryland. 
It was stated that during unpacking, ignition of the Styrofoam lid 
occurred due to static discharge. 
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CONTROL OF ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEMS 
PROBLEM STATEhlEN T AND EFFECT 
During a f ie ld  test checkout of a s tage ,  lightning s t ruck  the test s tand  
and caused the p r i m a r y  source  of power to  the f a c i l i t y  to fail. 
The secondary  backup power sou rce  fai led to come on the line. 
so LUTION /RECOMMEN DATION 
A procedure  was  wr i t ten  to  r equ i r e  that the electrical backup sys t em 
be checked out  f o r  operat ion and that  the sys tem is on the l ine before start 
of te sting . 
Verification that the sys t em is operat ional  and on the l ine is requi red  
by Quality Control. 
DISCUSSION 
A test was  in p r o g r e s s  a t  t h e  h4ississippi T e s t  Facility when the test 
stand w a s  s t ruck  b y  lightning and all power to the facil i ty,  G S E ,  and stage 
was  immediately lost. The n o r m a l  backup s y s t e m ,  consisting of genera tor  
and ba t te r ies ,  fa i led to come on t h e  line as designed to do in such c a s e s  a's 
l o s s  of p r i m a r y  power. 
An investigation de te rmined  that  the control  switches were in the off 
positiol: and, t he re fo re ,  could not back up the t e s t  operat ion as the secondary  
s o u r c e  of power.  
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NADVERTENT ELECTRICAL STRESSING AND OPERATION 
OF LIMITED LIFE COMPONENTS 
OBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Limited life electrical components can inadvertently and unknowingly 
' be energiqed and damaged by continuous operation during stage checkout. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
All limited life items were identified on the drawings and in the design 
engineering checkout specifications. 
expanded to l ist  the switch and circuit positions to be used for supporting, 
monitoring, and/or partial testing of other stage systems while the GSE is 
in standby periods. 
switch and circuit breaker positions used during stage monitoring and/or 
partial testing of stage systems. 
The detailed operating procedures were 
Cautions and Warnings were added for  all alternate 
Redesign the control circuits in the GSE to preclude the possibility of 
Limited 
their inadvertent energizing and/or provide a warning light on the console 
whenever the circuits are  energizing the limited life components. 
life components must  be identified, monitored, and controlled early in a 
program. 
DISCUSSION 
During a stage checkout the  stage and GSE *ere interfaced electrically 
and pneumatically with the GSE operating on a standby status. 
the technicians were accomplishing modifications to the stage thrust structure 
and conducting line leak checks. 
Meanwhile, 
The GSE had been configured according to a section of the Stage 
Checkout Operating Procedure manual. 
GSE standby operation, it was discovered that the main hydraulic purnp 
solenoids had inadvertently and unknowingly been in an energized condition 
for this f u l l  period of time. 
P t e r  91 hours and 22 minutes of 
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REQUl R E M E N T  F O R  OPERATING TIME/CYCLE ~EASUREME NT 
AND RECORD1 NG R E Q U I R E M E N T S  
STATE3ANIENT AND EFFECT 
A helium tank of the Saturn V disintegrated during a s ta t ic  f i r ing d t e r  
The stage was sys tem p r e s s u r e  had been brought up to  operating p res su re .  
last as  a r e s u l t  of the tank disintegration. 
The number of high p r e s s u r e  cycles that the tank had been subjected 
to before disintegration had taken place was determinea.  
NR did not have a r eco rd  of? the number of cycles that  S-I1 tanks had 
been subjected to during test and checkout operations and, since the tanks 
were  f r o m  the same  suppliel: a s  the helium tank that had exploded, all 
testing o n  the S-I1 Stages was  stopped until the cause of tank fai lure  could 
be determined. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
A requi rement  f o r  monitoring and recording a l l  high-pressure cycles 
applied to t h e  helium tanks f r o m  acceptance testing through checkout and 
launch operations was added to the p r e s s u r e  ves se l  drawings. This was 
done by referencing the procurement  and specific process  specifications 
which detailed the methods of logging and recording p r e s s u r e  cycles.  
This requirement  should be l is ted on all p r e s s u r e  ves se l  drawings , 
while In vellum stage before re lease ,  so the requi rement  wil l  be established 
ea r ly  in the program. 
DISCUSSION 
During a s ta t ic  f i r ing an explosion occurred  to  one stage of the S - V  
stack that was t raced  to t h e  disintegration of a helium sphere  on the stage.  
The investigation indicated that  the shrapnel  from the helium sphere  
resul ted in loss  of the stage by penetrating the fuel tank. 
P rogram used he l ium spheres  from the same supplier,  all testing that 
required pressur iz ing  thr?t spheres  above 50 percent of operational p r e s s u r e  
was stopped. 
Since the S-I1 
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The supplier of the tanks,  af ter  a careful  investigation, determined 
that the wrong titanium welding wi re  was used f o r  a cer ta in  series of t anks  
manufactured in their  facility. N R  was  able to ascer ta in  that the tanks on 
the S-II Stages w e r e  not any of those assembled with the incor rec t  welding 
rod. 
the S-I1 P rogram,  
This was accomplished through the  traceabili ty sys tem in effect on 
The verification of the acceptability of the tanks fo r  use was done by 
'determinat ion and verification that the weld rod used was that specified on 
taking samples  of weld material f r o m  each of the tanks and making a material 
the s upplie r s d r  awing s . 
Immediately after the loss  of the s tage,  tests on duplicate helium 
spheres  showed that  c r acks  appeared in the welds of helium tanks welded 
with an incor rec t  weld rod af ter  a specific number of high p r e s s u r e  cycles ,  
and that af ter  additional high p r e s s u r e  cycles the tanks disintegrated. It 
was at this point in  t ime that it was necessa ry  to know the exact number of 
high p r e s s u r e  cycles  that  each tank on the S-I1 Stages had been subjected to. 
It was revealed that the requirement  had not been imposed by Design 
Engineering on the drawings. 
Design Engineering then changed the drawings and imposed the 
requirement  to  r eco rd  p r e s s u r e  cycle data in t e r m s  of p s i  and t ime duration. 
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AUXILIARY PRESSURE REDUCING PANELS FOR SYSTEM 
PROOF-PRESSURE T E S T I N G  
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
The existing ground support  equipment, used to  supply pneumatic 
p r e s s u r e  to  the s tage a t  t h e  f ield s i t e s ,  was not adaptable fo r  use in p r e s s u r e  
and leak-checking s tage sys tems.  
The capability to reduce p res su res  and rel ieve overpressure  to meet  
the safety requirements  for people working in t h e  a r e a  was not available 
and, therefore ,  was unacceptable to the S d e t y  Department. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
P r e s s u r e  reducing panels with the capability to reduce sys tem p r e s -  
su res  to "people sa fe ' '  rahges and rel ieve any ove rp res su res  above "people 
safe" p r e s s u r e s  were  provided and temporar i ly  installed in a system as 
required f o r  specific tests. 
DISC U SSION 
T h e  requirenient to field proof -p re s su re  and leak t e s t  "isolated 
components" within stage p r e s s u r e  sys tems to industr ia l  safety standards 
brought out the fac t  that  the existing ground support equipment was not 
readily adaptable to the configuration needed to per form to safety s tandards.  
Industrial  safety r equ i r e s  that  there  be  a relief valve in the t e s t  system set 
a t  10 percent  above the maximum "people safe'' p r e s s u r e  which is 25 pe r -  
cent of the design burst  p r e s s u r e  of the sys tem to be tested.  Due to  a wide 
variation of p r e s s u r e s  used in the ground support equipment, it was an 
almost  impossible task to readjust  regulators  and relief valves,  within 
each console, to t h e  lower p r e s s u r e  and relief requirements  established f o r  
testing. 
A s  a r e su l t  of the l a c k  of capability of ground support  equipment to 
be adapted to  a usable configuration fo r  proof-pressure and leak testing of 
stage p r e s s u r e  sys t em,  individual p r e s s u r e  reducing panels were manufac- 
tured and made available to the test s i tes .  
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MINIMUM DESIGN SAFETY FACTORS FOR FACILITY A N D  GROUND 
SUPPORT PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
- 
Pressure systems containing a g a s  o r  liquid, and compressed to a 
pressure  exceeding 150 psig around which people a re  in close proximity, 
must be designed to a minimum safety factor of 4 to 1. 
mandatory by local, State and Company safety standards; and applies to 
lines, fittings, valves, tanks, regulators and gages. 
The requirement is 
Failure to comply with thewrequirement could result  in injury to 
personnel and damage to equipment, or red t ag  of equipment until cornpli- 
ance is complete with resultant loss of schedule. 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
Design Engineering established the 4 to 1 safety factor on the draw- 
! ings for all components on the s-I1 Program. 
be specified in procurement specifications and for all off-the-shelf items 
that a re  standard commercial components. 
The requirement should also 
Data which establishes the satisfactory results of burst pressure 
tests of supplier components and proof-pressure tests of production units 
should also be required in procurement specifications which a re  referenced 
on the drawings. 
DISCUSSION 
Two instances which occurred on the S-11 Program point up the con- 
sequences of failing to provide the minimum 4 to 1 safetyfactor. 
.I The first problem concerned a warning horn system (57-44). This 
system is used to provide pressure to the S-I1 LOX and hydrogen tanks 
during the times the S-I1 was being transported. 
The problem was diacovered during a drawing review. It was deter- 
mined that the relief valve used to relieve an overpressure in the warning 
horn tank did not meet the ultimate tensile strength of 4 to 1. The warning 
horn system pressure was 2200 psig and the design burst of the valve body 
was 5000 perig. 
valve design burst should have been 8800 psig. 
In order  to meet  the minimum safety factor of 4 to 1, the 
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The operat ing p r e s s u r e  of the 57-44 units was  lowered to  1250 psig in 
o r d e r  to comply with a safe environment  until  the relief valves w e r e  rep laced  
with new units meet ing the r equ i r ed  design bu r s t  p r e s s u r e  of 8800 psig. 
The second problem assoc ia ted  with design of a part to less than a 
4 to 1 safety factor in a component occur red  when the  weld on a regula tor  
s epa ra t ed  at 8700 p s i  during rece iv ing  inspection in the Quality Control 
labora tory .  
p r e s s u r e  9000 p s i ,  and the b u r s t  24,000 psi. 
ponent was  welded into the body of the pa r t ,  and the weld failed during the 
proof p r e s s u r e  test at 8700 psi. 
’ The working pressure of the valve wa8 6000 psi ,  proof 
The” inlet  port of the com-  
The investigation that  fallowed de termined  tha t  over  300 valves and 
e regula tors  w e r e  suspec t  of having undersized welds  that  would not meet 
a 4 to 1 s a f e t y  f ac to r .  These 300 valves and regula tors  w e r e  only those 
on the S-I1 Program.. 
undersize weld beads were  returned fa r  rework .  
to  suppl ier  drawings .  
The valve weld f i l le ts  were  measu red ,  and valves with 
Weld fi l let  s izes  w e r e  added 
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MAINTENANCE, INSPECTION, PROOF-LOAD REQUIREMENTS FOR HOISTS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A w i r e  rope separated f r o m  its wench d rum result ing in  damage to 
the insulation covering the hatband of an engine, 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
Correct ive action was  to paint the wi re  rope fo r  the l a s t  seven turns  - on the drum,  and to maintain at least 5 tu rns  of w i re  rope on the drum during 
hoisting operations. 
Additionally swaged balls were  added to all terminat ion ends of the 
wi re  rope on all cables. 
Inspections of all hoisting and lifting equipment to a s s u r e  c o r r e c t  cable 
terminat ion (p r io r  to  ne& usage) were  required.  
Reviewed proof-loading and preventive maintenance procedures  to 
a s s u r e  that  specific callouts with mandatory inspection points were  included 
f o r  c o r r e c t  cable termination. 
The proof -load requirements  were  expanded to include both a s ta t ic  
and dynamic proof load of the assemblies .  
T e s t  checkout procedures  were  reviewed f o r  adequacy. 
DISC USSION 
In the low-bay checkout cell  of the Vert ical  Assembly Building, the 
center engine was s t ruck  by the engine compartment work plafform. One of 
the four  hand hoists used i n  this operation failed which allowed the platform 
to swing against  the engine. The insulation covering the engine was 
damaged. 
cable on the hoist drum. 
swage fitting was missing f r o m  the drum end of the cable. 
The basic cause was determined to be an improperly secured 
Subsequent investigation revealed that t h e  ball end 
Mil i tary and F e d e r a l  specifications do not c l ea r ly  define the exact 
method of terminat ion of w i re  ropes to  drums.  However, there  a r e  standards 
for cable-to-drum diameter  ra t ios  which should be followed whenever possible.  
This will help to  preclude cable slippage on drums with too smal l  a d iameter .  i 
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A l l  requirements for  termination of wire rope should use swaged balls 
at the hoist end of the cable to provide the factors of safety required by 
safety standards and criteria.  
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PROOF-LOAD T E S T I N G  OF PERSONNEL ACCESS E ME 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
and 
to a 
Ac 
test 
4 to 
cess  equipment 
operations is r e  
1 s d e t y  factor ,  
used by personnel during manufact 
quired by Federal  and State codes 
and to be proof-loaded to 1 1/2 times the maxirnurn 
load the unit is designed to be subjected to. 
Unless the required safety-factors a re  designed into the equipment 
and the proof -loading is accomplished after manufacture, the equipment: 
would be considered unsafe and in violation of safety codes which would 
negate usage of the equipment. 
c 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
All top assembly drawings for  end items were up-dated to specify a 
requirement for  proof loading, loads required to meet  the 1 1/2 times 
maximum use, methods of application of proof -loads, and requirement for  
records to substantiate acceptable proof -loading of the equipment. 
DISCUSSION 
A review of records at  the test  site (KSG)  ifldicated that several  pieces a 
of personnel access equipment had not been subjected to proof -loading tests 
to prove that the equipment did "in fact" meet the 4 to 1 safety factor, 
required by the design on the drawings in compliance with the Federal  and 
State Safety Codes. 
call ' o 
load, 
An investigation determined that the top assembly drawings did not 
ut a requirement for proof -loading, method of applying the proof - 
the load required to be applied for  the proof-load, or  a requirement 
for records to  show accomplishment of a proof-load. 
Since the designer of the access equipment is the most knowledgeable of 
the equipment and its use, his requirements f o r  proof-loading (frequency and 
weight) should appear on the drawing. 
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PROOF-TEST REQUIREMENTS OF ON-SITE VENDOR EQUIPMENT 
PROBLEM STATEMEST AND EFFECT 
A one-inch inside diameter  flexible p re s su re  hose burst  at 2000 
causing violent whipping of the  remaining portion of the flexible hose and 
bending and kinking of the hard  line to  which it was attached. 
p re s su re  line was vendor equipment. 
The f l ex  
The fa i lure  of th i s  line created a hazard to the S-11 Stage that  was 
adjacent to the burst  line and to personnel within 100-feet of the incident. I 
SOLUTION /REGOMMEN DATION 
U s e  of flexible hose was required to be kept to a minimum. Hard l ines 
were  to be used if possible. 
All high-pressure hard  lines used in  the system were  required to be  
proof-pressure tested before use. 
Flexible hoses were  required to show evidence of proof-test identifica- 
tion and approved res t ra in ts  on each end, as required by the  SD Safety 
Maliual. 
The high p res su re  hard line re-installation required concrete "dead- 
men ' '  o r  lead ingot-type res t ra in ts  over the hard line. 
Changes were  made in procedures  that controlled the preparation of 
the test site f o r  use. 
tion of compliance with the requirements  noted above before testing could 
proceed. 
DISCUSSIQN 
These changes consirjted of Quality Control veriffca- 
I 
Shortly after start of the pnewnostat retest of the S-I1 Stage, an 
Since the line was not res t ra ined,  the force  bent and kinked two sec- 
8-foot-long flexible line broke f rom the fitting connecting it: to a converter 
unit. 
tions of r igid piping which runs about 75 feet to  a GNz tube trailer, used as 
a g a s  accumulator. 
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The operator of the converter st 
psig when the line b 
recharged at  the ti 
1850 psig. ’ 
the convoluted int 
the converter end. 
The investigation determined that the flexible line was not proper 
supported o r  restrained at the time of the incident. 
There was no evidence of proof-pressure prior to the s t a r t  of the t ea t  
of the flex line, hard line, o r  assembled system. 
rs 
The sandbags which had been laid over the hard line had buret open, 
showing rotted burlap which rendered them ineffective in restraining the 
hard line f rom flailing and whipping. 
One piece of the hard Nne had been thrown about 100 feet, and could 
have damaged the stage o r  caused injury to personnel. 
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PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO VEHICLE COMPONENTS 
MANUFACTURE AND TEST OPERATlONS * 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
everal incident$ have occurred during the manufacture and test 
on8 of aerospace vehicles which have resulted in damage to large 
structur a1 components of the vehicles. 
I 
The damage to the components has been due to falling crbje 
inadvertently become detached from facility equipment used 
. a manufacturing process or from access equipment used by 
reach area@ not accessible by normal means. 
result oh these incidents, were corptly and affected mandacturing and teet 
schedules adversely. 
The repairs required, as a 
The investigation of- inci’dents that fall into this category require 
customer and contractor teams, and are  time consuming in ascertaining 
cause or cause8 responsible f o r  the incident. 
b 
/RECOMME;NDATION 
.An analysis of one of the objects which fell and caused damage 
indicated that a rotating part in a piece of cleaning equipment had been 
assembled in reverse. During operation, the assembly baclied out of its 
structure and fell  with force sufficient to damage an LMz tank 
inspections were instigated which fnc 61 tests to verify 
ionsil performance. Additional back provided by the 
y wire to asrmre that the equipment wou ome apart during 
Analysis of a second part  that caused damage re 
asaembly hsd come apart at welded joints while being 
A section of the ladder fell with resultant damage to th& tank. 
aled that a ladder 
moved from a tank. 
ysirr of welds that failed disclosed that all operational modes of the 
e not conaidered as part of the criteria requirements that dictated 
of the failed joint, 
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As a result  of the 
imposed on all 
DISCUSS 
terfar of an Id32 tank, in 
d when a washes spray he 
ert ical  Asse 
' _on the spray arm"'assemb1 
above floor level striking 
sigted of a skin fracture on one gore and five scratches on the second gore. 
Investigation disclosed that the rotor, on the spray head that fell, 
rotated in a counterclockwise manner which tend$ to loosen the threaded 
joint holding the spray head to the cleaning assembly adapter. 
Action was taken to verify correct rotor assembly by functional 
tests at receiving inspection, and safety wire added to provide backup 
integrity for aU threaded coinnections. 
* 
The ladder assembly of the horizontal tank entry platform failed while 
being retracted on completion of work in the LH2 tank of an S-I1 Stage. 
failure of two weld joints of the ladder permitted a section of the ladder to 
f a l l  causing damage to the forward LH2 bulkhead. 
Weld 
The weld joints consisted of channel stringers butt-welded to plates 
The joint was designed for a that were bolted for  disassembly purposes. 
safety factor of 5 to 1, predicated on the down position usage. Subsequent 
investigatian disclosed that ail operational modes of the ladder were not a 
part  of the criteria requirements that dictated &he design. The ladder .was 
used at d a e r e n t  elevations, from horizontal to a f u l l y  lowered position. 
. 
The use of the ladder in a horizontal position caused an increase in 
s t resses  and a reduction in safety factor below the 5 to 1 originally con- 
sidered in the design. 
B 
The welds w e r e  not fabricated per the drawings aurd no Quality Control 
inspection was made of the joint after manufacture. 
The proof load of the ladder was conducted to the f u l l  down position and u 
did not take into consideration any other operational modes of the ladder. 
8-68  
SD 71-256 
SURVEILLANCE OF VENDOR EQUIPMENT USED ON 
COMPANY-CONTROLLED FACl LlTlES 
PROBLEM STATEM T AND EFFECT 
Vendor equipment used to sppport work being 
Company-contralled facilities has been in  violation 
resultant damage to the facilities. 
SQLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
Criteria was established to r,equire equipment coming into Company 
facilities to be scrutinized fo r  optimum working .condition and safety. 
All contracts going to outside vendors should induda a clause requiring 
$ 8  meet  the safety standards required by local, State, and Federal  
DISCUSSION 
A vendor's vehicle was stationed in the water qonditioning tank area, 
of the NASA site at Seal Beach, -pumping liquid. 
pumping, a considerable loss of fluid was taking place at the p m p  
(approximately one gallon of hydrochloric acid a minute). 
stopped w d  the acid runoff diluted with water. 
the operation completed. 
During the  process of 
The operation was 
The leak was repaired and 
The vendor was advised that all future equipment brought into C o m p ~ y  
property would be Bcruthiaed for  optimum working condition end safety.  
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i T e s t  01-01 
CONTROL OF NONFLIGHT HARDWARE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT ANT) EFFECT 
Nonflight, s tage mounted hardware  was not controlled by a 
oMi ci a1 d o cum e nt . 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Although multiple documents may  b e  utilized for  the installation o r  
removal of s tage mounted hardwar.e, the top s tage drawing should be the 
document that controls o r  specifically l i s t s  the control documentation for  
this type of hardware.  .v 
In the ear ly  s tages  of the program, the identification of nodl ight ,  
s tage mounted hardware,  was gradual and complicated. 
picked up momentum, Engineering was  unable to i s s u e  Engineering O r d e r s  
(E. 0. 'E?) and change drawings rapidly enough. 
the requirements  on schedule, manufacturing and test utilized their  in- 
process  documentation to supplement engineering documentation. 
s a m e  t ime,  engineering l isted hardware  requirements  i n  a specification 
without the specification being called out on a drawing. 
the above descr ibed situation was that hardware  removed subsequent to 
manufacturing completion and controlled by manufacturing documentation was 
not r e instal  because,  manufacturing documentation does not control 
As the p rogram 
In  an  effort to accomplish 
At the 
I 
The end resu l t  of 
was it recognized, during in-process  effort by the t e s t  
ea1 Beach o r  at the s i tes .  Fu r the r ,  hardware  l ist ings 
defined i n  specifications w e r e  only partially implemented; usually, only 
upon hardware  availability. 
lam faced the tedious t a sk  of drawing EO changes until final 
reso1utio"r was attained pr ior  to the shipment of the final vehicle f r o m  
Seal Beach. 
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GROUND MEASUREMENT PROGRAM (GMP) 
PROBLEM S'XATEMENT AND 
. N o  single locally control 
ground measurement  and data recording 
testing a t  the Mississ ippi  Tes t  Faci l i ty  for  u5e by NASA and the Site Support 
Contractor.  (GE) .  This  p rob lem caused numerous difficulties in government- 
furnished proper ty  (GFP) hardware  and recording facil i t ies installation and 
use.  The wors t  c a s e  was measurement  data  not obtained during stage 
testing. 
. SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATIQN 
. A  Ground Measurements  P r o g r a m  was published and controlled by 
the si te.  The GMP contains all ground measurement ,  GFP  hardware,  and 
recording facil i ty requirements  to support stage testing. 
that f o r  all future  programs using government-operated/controlled ground 
measurement  facil i t ies for vehicle/engine testing, u se  of a local 
site-controlled requirements  document, such as the S-I1 G M P ' s ,  be  
cons ide red . 
DISCUSSION 
It is recommended 
I 
Confusion resulted due to lack of control documentation on the hard-  
w i re  instrumentation (ground measurement )  system. 
contractor  was responsible for  maintaining G F P  t ransducer  stocks,  t es t  
s tand - to - data acqui s it i on facility ( DAF ) in terfac e,  c lo sed - c i r cui t t elevis ion 
(CC T V )  sys tem,  fi lm photographic system, and the data  acquisition facility 
for ground measurement  recording. NR was responsible for  maintaining 
test-stand signal conditioning, stage and tes t  control cen ter  (TCC) to t e s t  
stand signal-conditioning interfaces ,  and TCC data  recorders .  NASA and 
N R  had to develop a control document to ensure  that all data requirements  
necessa ry  for proving the S-I1 stage flightworthy were  met. 
The s i te  suppoyt 
The S-I1 CMP, controlled and published by local MTF NASA, is 
basically the measurement  requirements  document for use of government 
facil i t ies in support  of S-I1 acceptance testing. 
into three sections. Section I, containing NR' s requirements ,  included the 
f o 1 low in g info r ma ti on: 
The document is divided 
1. A measurement  l i s t  for  each acceptance/cr i t ical  S-II stage tes t  
and recording sys tem to be used. 
/ containing the measurement  number,  measurement  title, range, 
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ent stocks by the site 
o r t  contractor to NR fo r  use in stage testing. 
Section IT of the S-I1 CMP contains inputs f r o m  the s i te  support con- 
t ractor  - for instance, facility system measurements  to be recorded for 
his use  during S-IJ testing, such as LOX transfer sys tem temperatures  
inc r e  manta1 monitoring points . 
of the 5-21- GMP contains inputs f rom NASA on measurements  
I 
to be recorded for NASA use  during S-I1 testing. 
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ACCEPTANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS DOCU 
PROBLEM MENT AND EFFECT 
Post-manufacturing and static fi 
stagess was performed to the requirem 
ance specifications. The specificati 
created redundant checkout requirements. Co 
mining if the detailed operating test procedure pr 
fulfilled the acceptance specification requirements. 
h time to  maintain, led to confusion d 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
All post-manufacturing and static-firing requirement 
' dated into three acceptance specifications, ,Each detailed 
procedure incorporated an. engineering requirements section which containe 
the acceptance requirements €or that test procedure. 
consolidation along with the incorporation of engineering requirements in the 
tes t  prwedure,  permitted better control of the changes to the requirements 
and eliminated the confusion that previously existed on the validity af the /  
procedures test. 
The specification 
" 
* The method of making engineering requirements part  of the detail test 
procedure should be implemented from the s tar t  of any program, 
ensures accuracy of the test  operating procedures and eliminates confusion. 
This wi l l  also allow acceptance requirements to be gathered together in a 
minimaim number of documents 
This 
DISCUSSION 
The original S-If stage acceptance requirements were contained in 
numerous subsystem specifications. 
procedure for  each requirement document. 
The test  group prepared a detail test  
The maintenance of all these 
ents required a tremendous amount of time, test procedures often 
portions of several  different requirements to accomplish 
est, and keeping track of all  requirement tasks contained in 
nte, were often confusing. The requirement documents were 
three specifications: test kequirements (mechanical); 
ring test requirements; and test req 
requirements documents were main 
ants (e le c t r ic a 1 1. 
by a central 
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T e s t  01-03 
engineering group and all changes were  coordinated through them. 
detail  t e s t  procedures  were  changed to eliminate redundant op 
to incorporate  an engineering requirements  section to  establi  
procedure requirements  baseline. 
would send the t e s t  group a specification revision sh  
The  
Changes were  eaaily made  as engineeri  
i r emen t s  change (engineering r e  
make  the necessa ry  changes t 
on sheet. Subsequent approval of the 
changes were  incorpprated.  
REFERENCES 
Manual Acceptance Specification, MA0201 -4369 
Pressur iza t ion  System Checkout, MA0706-1046-118 
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DIAGRAMS F 
T AND EFFE 
, drawn to the rack 
thout system si 
e l  had to spe 
numerous drawer-level schematics; rack wiring lists, an 
diagrams to determine zt function's signal routi 
correct the indicated malfunction in khe GSE. 
SOLUTION /RECOMMENDATION 
I; 
A solution was implemented in the farm 
GSE schematics, These schematic diagrams 
the GSE from the command generation source to the vehicle 
response displayo. It i s  recommended that gystems-type a 
be used to develop and maintain signal flow di 
development and maintenance should .be based Qn the stimuli generation 
source through the response displays throughout the entire prograni. 
DISCUSSION 
i 
To achieve system signal flow diagrams of their respective ground 
support equipment (GSE) systems, Test Operations personnel used training 
manuals and hand-drawn flow schematic's frOm engineering sources. 
infotmation sources were not updated by any forma 
the same status a s  the engineer's personal notes, 
on the S-I1 test program, considerable time was lo 
atics were produced to avoid this prob 
These 
Wile 
GSE signal flow by, in many cases, t r  
during cryogenic operations were g 
not afford excesfsive time in searching through various 8€! 
and interface diagrams to trace out a signal, li  test points, and then 
s ta r t  truubte shoo ting, 
erally Zimite 
, 
i 
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AUTOMATIC CHECKOUT DATA REDUCTION 
Considerable t ime  was required to  reduce the da ta  acquired 
automatic test to ver i fy  sys tem acceptance. 
" e .  sources  w e r e  manually cor re la ted  fo r  this verification on the f i r s t  two flight 
s tages ,  
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Data fro& th ree  different 
-a 
A data  reduction sys tem was  developed that reduced processing t ime, 
eliminated mos t  operator  e r r o r s ,  increased data accuracy,  relegated 
correlat ion activit ies to the computer, and improved data format  for a 
higher degree  of readability. 
ca r r e l a t e  r eco rde r  output (MACRO), reduced the rnanhours required to  
verify sys tem acceptance by one-half. 
The  data reduction sys tem,  called m e r g e  and 
The MACRO sys tem is highly recommended for u se  where an events 
t r a i l  (a complete listing of a l l  events that occurred during a t e s t )  f rom m o r e  
than one soiirce is an output of a computer checkout and must  be  verified for  
sys tem acceptance. 
DISCUSSION 
The events t r a i l  obtained during automatic checkout of the S-I1 stage 
came f rom th ree  different sources .  The requirements  for  stage acceptance 
established a need to verify and compare  the th ree  data sources .  
verification required methodically checking each data source  for  t h e  proper  
sequence of events and the elimination of extraneous events. 
sources  w e r e  then compared to  verify the proper  sequence of events. This 
analysis  required extensive effort to  per form due to  the amount of t e s t s  that 
were  accomplished and data obtained. 
on the f i r s t  two flight s tages .  
The  
The  th ree  
This  manual reduction was performed 
The MACRO data reduction sys tem was established for use  with the 
third flight s tage and a l l  subsequent stages,  
S-II t e s t  data  f rom the computer complex conducting the automatic testing, 
the digital events r eco rde r ,  and the pulse-code modulation ( P C M )  data 
te lenietered f rom the stage. The program processed data events f rom the 
input sources  i n  a t ime-sequential  manner .  If an event could not be c o r r e -  
lated, a discrepancy message  would appear. 
MACRO merged and cor re la ted  
The confidence level in the  
1 .  
9 - 7  
SD 71,-256 
% 
) 
a1 data w a s  very high becau 
detected during the real tim 
remaining ten (10) percent woul 
detected directly by MACRO. T single listing obt 
MACRO provided for exped 
ations procedure 
ta reduction sys 
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S-ll AUTOMT ECKOUT PROGRAMMING 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
1 ~ ?  following problems were encountered in  developing autom 
r controlled) checkout for S-11: 
1 .  A complete computer tape evaluation p r o g r a m  was not conductqd 
before  the tapes were  used on the flight stages.  Many automatic 
p rogram timing problems resulted. 
automatic checkout equipment (ACE) were  not allowed enough 
time to r eac t  a f te r  a stimulus had been applied. 
The stage subsystems and 
2. The automatic checkout programs were  writ ten to accarnplish 
subsystem tes t s ,  but they did not check for interactions between 
subsystems o r  initialize the stage before a par t icular  tes t  was 
perf o r  med. 
* b  3. After acceptance testing, the complete automatic program,  
requiring many manhours,  had to be conducted to re tes t  when a 
component, had been replaced due to a failure o r  modification, 
Several  automatic tes t s  required the same preparat ions and 
utilized some of the same subsystems during testing. 
effopt and testing resulted.  
Program tape changes made at the Mississ ippi  Tes t  Faci l i ty  and 
subsequent engineering approvals required processing the 
ork through the California facility. 
to the tes t  facility in c lear ing discrepancy reports .  
Redundant 
4. 
This procedure meant 
SOLUTION/RECr3MMENDATION 
The following solutions /recommendations a r e  direct ly  relative to each 
problem statement:  
s 
1. The computer checkout tapes were  evaluated during the checkout 
of the f i r s t  flight stage. 
e lectr ical-mechanical  mockup (EMM),  but due to severa l  problems 
the final evaluation was not performed. 
The tapes were  to be evaluated on the 
Because the evaluation 
ad on the flight stage,  the checkout schedule was 
premium t ime was expended in o rde r  to evaluate and 
c o r r e c t  the tapes. 
i 
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Future programs that use aut  
tapes  on a test  vehicle 
n on the production 
2. Common sub-procedures were  deveIo 
subsystem checkout tapes. T 
throughout the sub$ystern tapes to ch 
subsystems and to initialize the s tag 
The common sub-procedure method 
severa l  subsystem tapes a r e  used. 
used as necessary,  and thk programming is limite 
procedure. 
Each sub-pro 
4. 
3. The automatic checkout programs were rnodulariked to provide 
the capability to check out partial  subsystems. This method of 
checkout af ter  a component failure o r  a subsystem modification 
and for an  evaluation test. 
re-evaluated, where preparations for  the tests '  were the +same 
o r  the tes ts  were redundant, the tapes were combined into one 
test .  
' programming was especially effective fop par t ia l  subsystBm 
The subsystem tes t s  were also 
The modular method of program'ming is be3eficial for 1 
The method 
testing. The preparations for the tes t  are usually min and 
the time required for testing is considerably reduced. 
is recommended for applications where component failure o r  
subsystem modification is  a consideration. 
4, n the automatic tes t s  were  scheduled 
programmer  was sent to the Miss'issippi 
any necessary  changes. The engineer w 
authorizing changes and assist ing in identifying program e r r o r s .  
" E r r o r s  occurred throughout the program due to stage modifications 
requiring changes to the checkout tapes. 
It i s  recommended that engineering representatives be on site 
where automatic checkout will be performed and authorization is 
required for  any test  changes. 
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DISCUSSION 
The problems and solutions previously noted a r e  discussed 
following paragraphs.  Each i tem is direct ly  related to the previo 
1. An EMM was designed for  the S-XI p rogram to pe r fo rm sub 
f i t  check and manual and automatic tes t  verification. 
matic checkout tapes were  to  be evaluated in the EMM, but 
s eve ra l  p roblems developed; therefore ,  the schedule did not 
pe rmi t  the verification. 
equipment, station activation problems,  and an ea r ly  deactivation 
of the E M M  were  the contributing factors  to the problems. The 
evaluation, therefore ,  had to be performed on the f i r s t  flight 
stage. The checkout schedule d id  not allow for this extra  effort ,  
e S Q  the schedule had to be changed and.prernium time had to be 
expended to accomplish the work. This problem should be taken 
into consideration when planning a tes t  p rogram where, automatic 
checkout will be usgd. 
The 
A la te  delivery of automatic checkout 
2. The initial r e l ease  of the automatic checkout programs required 
ten separa te  subsystem tapes for test. 
sys tems (applied stage e lec t r ica l  power, activated ACE, and 
checked for  hazardous conditions) required for the par t icular  
test .  Because there  was no standard procedure,  i t  was necessary  
to p rogram and maintain ten separa te  activation procedures.  
Each  tape was a t so  programmed to ver i fy  only  the'responses 
urhich Lvould resul t  if a par t icu lar  stimulus was applied. 
method did not allow for responses  that may react  to the st imuli  
Lvhich were  unrelated. 
Each tape aciivated the 
! 
. 
This 
i 
A sys tem of common sub-procedures  was developed to be used 
with al l  subsystem tapes. Each common sub-procedure was 
developed by an engineer who was most  famil iar  with the 
par t icular  stage or  ground support equipment in coordination 
with the subsystem engineers responsible for the checkout tapes. 
The most  common of the sub-procedures  w a s  the stage , 
initialization and the s tage d iscre te  response evaluation. The 
stage initialization procedure provided a standard method f o r  
stage e lec t r ica l  power activation, stage r e se t  conditions, and 
ACE readiness;  established an initial conditions d iscre te  
refel-ence profile;  and verified the overall  s tage-ACE readiness  
for automatic checkout. The stage d iscre te  response evaluation 
was used for a l l  d i scre te  measurements  a f te r  a stimuli had been 
applied. This ex.-aluation would indicate any d iscre te  that did 
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not respond to the stimuli, plus a 
erroneously. Using common sub 
gramming effort, ensured quality with use 
engineers, and reduced the program li8t ing 
3 .  checkout tap 
t s  from s ta r t  
a problem developed 016 a man 
two flight stages were checked 
developed; When a component failed and subsequently was 
replaced, the retest  required repeating the complete automatic 
test. The same problem also developed when a modification had 
been performed after the acceptance test. This time-consuming 
method of .retest resulted in excessive workloads. 
checkout tapes were also developed with each subsystem test  on a 
separate tape. This method often presented redundancy in testing 
and pretest preparations. , 
The checkout programs were revised to provide a modular sub- 
system program testing philosophy and to combine tests that were 
concept, the subsystem test was divided into a ser ies  of component 
tests. For,exarnple, the engine subsystem test consisted of a 
spark system test, an engine cutoff system test, an engine sequence 
test, etc. Therefore, any of these tests could be conducted 
without performing th; complete engine subsystem checkout, 
combining of subsystem tests into the same tape also resulted in 
reducing the number of the separate tapes from 10 to 7, whic 
resulted in cost savings because of the reduced manhours r e  
to perfoSrm the tests. ’ 
The original 
+ redundant in testing and preparation. By using the modular 
The. 
4. The automatic checkout program tapes were developed and 
released by Saturn S-TI Engineering. 
had to be authorized by Engineering. 
in the program, a t  the Mississippi Test Facility, in making and 
approving changes because processing through the California 
facility was required. 
crepancy report, and in order to clear the report, an Engineering 
Change Release was required. 
process the authorization through the California facility often 
caused delays in clearing the paperwork before shipping the stage, 
The problem was solved by sen ng an engineering representative 
to the test facility a t  the time the automatic tests were scheduled. 
The engineer was responsible for authorizing changes and assisted 
in identifying program er rors .  
Al l  changes that were made 
A problem developed early 
The changes were documented by a d i s -  
The amount of time required to 
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1Hz TANK ACCESS HATCH, INSUIAfiON REMOVAL 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
1 engineering des  
of the S-IZ etage 
mstances  (suqh 
ects in  the tank, and malfunctions of in-tank in s t  
the need f o r  tank entry. The  removal  of the permanent  insulation was  a 
tedious,  time &consuming manual operation. .Reifistallation of the insuflation 
was  a potential schedule constraint ,  due to the requirement  for  t h ree  days 
of chemical c u r e  t ime. 
S O L U T I O N / R E C W E N D A T I O N  
Engineering r eas ses sed  the heat loss through the access  hatch and 
determined that it was fea.sible to change the design to leave the bolting 
ring for  the hatch uninsulated, 
. 
During pre l iminary  design review and maintainability evaluation,. .prior 
to the original design r e l ease ,  consideration should b e  given to the segment 
fqam insulation on  a c c e s s  hatches or covers.  
DISCUSSION 
Although i t  was not the  or iginal  intention to enter the LHz tank after 
completion by manufacturing, it waa soon determined that the requirement  
to en ter  the tank was  i n  exces8 of that  originally scheduled. 
the modification of indtank installations should have been  considered, 
requirement  did not cauae the  original problem but accentuated it, 
most significant requi rements  for  tank entry were  pointed out by foreign 
objects i n  the tank and by new incremental  inspection requirements.  
Tank entry fo r  
This 
The 
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FIELD REPAIR TECHNIQUES FOR SPRAY FO 
E N T A N D E F F E C T  
pment and use of ~1 
1op.field repair t 
techniques, comples and costly manufacturing 
I 
SOLZTTIQN/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Spray foam insulation repair  kechniques and procedures were developed 
and certified to support S-11-6 and subsequent vehicles for static biring an 
launch activities. Of particular importance was the develo t and cer 
fication of Cook pour foam as a suitable repair  materia1;'t e need for 
spray foam equipment and facilities at the telat and launch sites waa 
e lirninat e d . 
I 
DISCUSSION 
NR f i rs t  used spray foam on the S-11-6 and S-It-7 stage forward 
bulkhead, bolting ring, and Cylinder 1 areas ,  and totally foam insulated 
54-11-8 and subsequent vehicles. The spray-foam not only saved considerable 
stage weight, but also proved to be a much better thermal insulator than the 
previously used foam-filled honeycomb insulation. 
The exter-nal spray foam insulation proved to' be much more rugged 
than the prsv iwsly  used foam f i  
and minor debonds were cQntinu problems during m acturing, field 
site testing, and launch operations. To assure timely ade quat e 
insulation repair ,  specifications were written and the repair  procedures 
were verified by application and inspection at the static firing t ea t  site. The 
development and proving out of the procedure for repairing damaged spray 
foam insulation by using Cook pour foam was particularly significant since it  
eliminated the need to procure equipment and facilities for spray-foaming 
operations at test  sites. 
d honeycomb, but st i l l  insulation damage 
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1. Repair Procedures for Saturn S-I1 Foam Insulation at  Field Sites, 
MA0606-057 
2. Foam-In-Place Application of Two-Pound Density Polyurethane 
Foam, Saturn S-11, MA0606-060 
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UMBl LICAL ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR fXTENSlON ADAPTER 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The S-11 and ground support equi 
were damaged during mating because of the weight 
eliminated the feeling normally associated with electrica 
engagement. 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
A cable extension (adapter) was designed to facilitate the mating 
operation. 
and bolts were installed to maintain the proper positioning to the stage 
connector, 
(see Figure 35) .  
m, The adapter was positioned and mater with the stage connector, 
The GSE Umbilical was then connected to the adapter 
An adapter of this type,should be used in applications where bulky 
cables a re  used and visibility is limited during the mating procedure. 
use of adapters should be given consideration in the initial design of car r ie r  
plates. 
The 
DISCUSSION 
The mating of the stage and GSE umbilical connectors required 
extreme care because of the bulky cables used. 
were a major problem in connecting these umbilicals. 
resulted from the ruggedness of the carrier-plate design dictated by the 
forces required to disengage all  of the umbilical connectors simultaneously. 
The use of the extensio’n adapter eliminated the connector damage problem, 
The adapter was utilized successfully a t  the California and Mississippi S-11 
Test Facilities. 
Bent pins and damaged keys 
Limited visibility 
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Figure  3 5 .  C a r r i e r  P la te  Assembly With Adapter 
9-  17 
> .  I A specification for  the control of s tage movement was generated and 
plans of action f o r  the definition of responsibil i t ies and schedules w e r e  
established for  both equipment and personnel.  
DISCUSSION 
After initiation of control procedures ,  whenever a n  S-II stage was i n  
a station, the vehicle was under the Control of a test conductor. 
test conductor full  stationlvehicle visibility, a f loor  sen t ry  was  ap 
for  each level of the station. The  floor sen t r ies  observed the v e  
preparat ions far a move and enforced the disciplines of control a 
descr ibed and defined i n  the move controlling specification. 
The move conductor 
scheduled al l  required mo 
associated functions that were  planned and 
vents. The resul tant  plan wa6 signed by a U  
responsible participating functions. 
The stage-oriented GSE and other  related support equipment requir ing 
modification, maintenance, o r  other  scheduled e as l is ted and 
scheduled on the master move schedule, a a  an  ef 
schedule compliance. 
e means to ensure  
i 
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$41 TEST CREW WALIFICATION PROGRAM 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Due to the high degree  of test complexity and the necessi ty  to  d 
defect-free S-II's, personnel  knowledge and skil l  had to  be developed 
excess  of no rma l  requirements .  
competent and dedicated personnel  conducting s tage t e s t s  could cause 
catastrophic failures.  
' Fa i lu re  to  have anything less than fully 
A test c rew qualification p rogram was implemented, with p r i m a r y  
emphasis on accurately defining test c rew position t a sk  descriptionls, 
Personnel  were  t ra ined through fo rma l  c lassroom, formal  "On-The- Job" 
(OJT)  and informal OJT to f i l l  the required t e s t  positions. The  program 
was  administered effectively and records  were  maintained to  a s s u r e  that 
only qualified t e s t  t eams  conducted s tage tes ts .  
It i s  recommended that a formal  t e s t  crew qualifications program be 
instituted a t  the s t a r t  of any future vehicle development program, and the 
t e s t  c rew member  records  used actively during a specific t e s t  program be 
data banked for continuous availability. 
DISCUSSION 
All test operations s i tes  involved with checkout of the Saturn S-I1 had 
the requirement  to develop highly skilled personnel to per form the functions 
of post-manufacturing verification, captive static firing, and launch 
operations. 
A program was  se t  up to  a s s u r e  personnel  qualifications at a l l  job 
levels  (technician and engineering) and at t e s t  sites by developing and 
enting S-II and GSE sys t ems  training courses:  developing and presenting 
s certification courses ,  such a s  soldering, Scott a i r -pak  use,  br idge 
c rane  operation; and both fo rma l  and informal  OJT training under the super -  
vision of qualified personnel,  
p rogram by using personnel  as a cad re  for the t e s t  sites who had gained 
experience by working in the developmental t e s t  a reas .  
An additional factor  was real ized on the s-II 
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Manufacturing vepif ic at  ion wa 
tions 9 and 9, Th 
of cryogenic liqu 
a s  hazardous.  
ell  a s  t ra inin 
ncs  that pers 
cr i t i ea l  tes ts .  
These  a s ses smen t  sheets w 
and were  located with departmen 
each individual test superv isor  t 
positions and qualified personnel  
Personnel  Book" located in the S 
on of test team 
Seal  Beach test&g encountered many c a s e s  of improper ly  installed 
sea l s  and e lec t r ica l  connectors,  dam to  vacuum- jacketed line bellows 
assembl ies  caused by installation e r  , and lost  time due to  lack  of 
technician sys tem knowledge. e .  
The solution was to  implement an informal OJT  program during down- 
t ime between s tage testing, using tes t  erigineers as ins t ru  
a s ses smen t  sheets  f o p  record  keeping. 
Static fir ing testing was conducted at NASA's Mississ ippi  T e s t  Facility. 
Both c r i t i ca l  t es t s  (non- cryogenic) and hazardous tests (cryogenic) were  
performed,  and a stringent te'st c rew qualification program was establiehFd. 
The "Team Position Descriptian & Cri te r ia  Sheet, ' I  !'Team Position 
Requirements Analysis, '' and T e s t  Per formance  and Evaluation Records 
were  maintained by Mississ ippi  Test: Operations (MTO) personae1 depart-  
ment for  use In selecting test c 
Crit ical  t es t  c rew personnel  were  selected by the t e s t  conductor, aqd 
Per- t h e  list of c rew m e m b e r s  and al ternates  were  submitted to Personnel.  
ed the t e s t  c rew reco rds  of each crew member  selected to 
This  le t te r  was processed by Quality Control as ZL p a r t  
on qualification, and released a formal  c rew let ter  denoting each 
member  by position. 
of t h e  tes t  records.  
Personne'l for  hazardous te c rews  required formal  review board 
action €or selection. Two weeke ior  t o  the test ,  an  internal test operations 
c rew coordination board meeting was conducted to  review qualifications and 
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availability of each individual proposed, 
qualification board f o r  final approval at  least one week p r io r  to test .  
board approved t e s t  c rew m e m b e r s  and their  positions were published a s  a 
le t te r  by t h e  NRlMTO di rec tor ,  and was a par t  of the 
This l i s t  was submitted to  the c rew 
The 
Two days p r io r  to  the tes t ,  a redline observer  meet ing was 0 
ensure  each observer  understood his  redline pa rame te r  and requi 
reaction. 
Each hazardous t e s t  t eam member  was position qualified through a 
_1 th ree  phase-out program conducted during actual testing. In-Training 
Phase  I ( IT-I)  was the development phase, during which the potential c r ew 
member  gained background knowledge, such a s  fo rma l  training required to 
per form his task.  
crew member  observed a qualified c rew member  performing the position 
task.  
c rew member  performed the position task under c lose surveil lance of a 
qualified c rew member .  
a s  approved by the c rew qualification board,  certif ied the potential c rew 
member  a s  qualified to per form his specific task in support of stage testing. 
IT-I1 was the observation phase during which the potential 
IT-111 was the supervised performance phase during which the potential 
Satisfactory completion of the in-training phases,  
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WORK STATUS TABULATION RUN SYSTEM 
ND EFFECT 
n work i t e m s  had to  be; identif 
sk a t  the 3-11 test  s i tes  was pe 
perwork was scann determine te  
This t ime-consuming method resulted and to schedule work.  
. manhours .  
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
A status  tabulation run sys t em was established to  grovide visibility 
into all open work i tems  on the s tage .  
the receipt  of a stage in the station. 
and made available a t  the beginning of the day ehift. 
the visibility necessa ry  to  establish pr ior i t ies  for  work i tems  and thus 
ensured the bes t  use of personnel to per form the work. 
The tabulation run was established a t  
I t  was updated daily by the n i  
This docume 
The tabulation run sys t em i s  recommended for all applications where 
the work volume i s  controlled by open paperwork that can change daily. 
sys tem aids  management with constant insight into problem a r e a s  and pro- 
vides an order ly  method of scheduling work.  
DISCUSSION 
The 
The statue tabulation run sys t em was established o 
program af te r  testing of the first production s tage.  The 
keypunching the data into IBM keypunch c a r d s  and printin 
a line p r in t e r ,  
an action block (for comments) ,  and a code for eBtablish 
item constrained.  AsBignmentrJ were made to  update the tabulation run daily.  
This updatin enabled supervision to schedule a l l  work items on a 24-hour 
bas is ,  and a disciplines ( T e s t  Engineering, Quality Assurance,  and the 
NASA representat ive} were  made aware  of any constraints  
tee t .  The camment  portion was especially important to m 
foreeeeing probleme that  could impact schedules.  
used for the ground support  equipment to document discrepancie 
figuration control. 
Each item was l isted with the responsible su 
This same  sys tem was 
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ction procedure initially used for  the S-SI resulted 
load a t  the conclusion of post-manufacturing t e s t  due to  
accumulation of discrepancies .  
€or total shgkedown inspection af ter  'testing and before shipping. 
required to co r rec t  discrepancies  resul ted in schedule problems. 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
The S-I1 was presented to Cualfty Control 
The t ime 
' An in-process  incremental  inspection procedure was established in 
which Cuality Control inspected a r e a s  as they became available ( tes t s  com- 
plete in that a r e a )  and inspection personnel were  instructed to identify 
discrepancies  as testing progressed .  
co r rec t  deficiencies incrementally;  thus the large workload a t  the completion 
This procedure allowed personnel to 
, of testing was eliminated. 
The progress ive  in-process  inspection procedure is recommended 
where  the end i tem is a s  la rge  o r  complex as  the S-U stage and an acceptance 
type of inspection i s  required.  
they created excessive workloads when allowed to accumulate, 
D E  C USS ION 
Most of the discrepancies  were  minor ,  but 
A total  inspection of the S-33 was required after post-manufacturing 
t e s t  and before shipment to the s ta t ic  fir ing tes t  s i te ,  
du re  for the f i r s t  two production articles was to pe r fo rm the inspection all 
at once and then c lear  the discrepancies .  
discrepancies  required days to correct .  An agreement  between T e s t  Opera- 
tions and Quality Control resul ted in establishing the progress ive  in-process  
inspection. 
that  were  found (through visual inspection), and t e s t  personnel  corrected the 
defects as time allowed during test .  
when testing was complete in a par t icular  stage a r e a  and when the area was 
ready for inspection. The a r e a  was then inspected: the discrepancies  were  
corrected:  and the a r e a  was closed. This method resulted in m o r e  efficient 
u se  of personnel  by providing work during slack periods and eliminated the 
large workload a t  the and of test .  
The inspection proce-  
The accumulation of all the 
Inspection personnel were  instructed to document any defects 
Tes t  Operations notified Quality Control 
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STATIC FIRING TERMINAL COUNTDOWN PROCEDURE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The countdown fo r  the first s ta t ic  fir ing of the Saturn S-11 Battleship 
(a heavy weight stage designed for  experimental  testing) was performed as a 
command and response type of operation under manual  control. 
a single-engine ra ther  than a cluster  (all five engines) firing. Significant 
difficulties in the command and response method were  encountered in  the 
countdown for the single-engine operation. It was considered that these 
difficulties xould be magnified in the cluster  operations; therefore ,  the need 
for  improvement of the countdown, par t icular ly  in the te rmina l  portion, was 
c lear ly  indicated. 
The t e s t  was 
S O L U T I O N / R  ECOM.MENDATION 
The t e rmina l  portion (final 3 minutes) of the Battleship countdown was 
changed f r o m  a command response type of operation to a false  time-keyed 
operation. The las t  seven seconds of the countdown was also changed to an 
automated procedure.  Commencing with T-  3 minutes,  a l l  operatione w e r e  
performed b y  the console opera tors  when the countdown time was called out 
by the ass i s tan t  tes t  conductor. The operations were  a r ranged  to prevent 
any detr imental  consequences regard less  of which operation w a s  performed 
f i r s t  on the s a m e  count. The response of the console opera tors  on a false 
time-keyed countdown, combined with the automated T-7 second portion of 
the countdotvn, proved ve ry  successful  in conducting the operation efficiently 
and smoothly. 
The false  time-keyed countdown procedure is recommended for 
applications where numerous simultaneous operations are being performed; 
many pa rame te r s  a r e  being monitored; and automatic (computer- controlled) 
procedures  are not prac t ica l  o r  possible. 
DISCUSSION - 
The init ial  Battleship s ta t ic  fir ing countdown procedures  were  writ ten 
for the t e s t  conductor to conduct the tes ts  by issuing a command to pe r fo rm 
p required and the console Operators answering when the response 
occurred.  
due to the number of operations occuring at thie t h e  (simultaneous operations, 
multiple responses ,  etec. ). 
the procedure was acceptable, 
The te rmina l  portion of the countdown presented many difficulties 
Since the init ial  t e s t  was a single-engine firing, 
The forthcoming cluster  f ir ing presented a 
' 
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e complex problem. The 
procedure was arr 
taneous operations. A panel 
test conductor of t 
countdown. The 1 
a stage sequencer  
perform the terminal countdown. 
1 
Test 15-05 
PERSONNEL C ~ ~ T I ~ ~ ~ A ~ ~ ~ N  PROGRAM FOR TANK ENTRY 
NT AND EFFECT 
be accomplished f 
seout. Test Oper 
e haaards and precautions 
ne1 not experienced in working in confined spaces 
nt could incur serious o r  possibly fatal injury. 
in special precautions (for instance, preca s 
c t 8 ,  such a s  safety wire cuttings, were 1 
re to stand or place ladders, e tc .  1 could cause 
physical ccmditions or damage leading to a worst-case failure mode of total 
' stage destruction 
SOLUTION/RE MENDATION 
A training program was established and implemented to qualify per- 
sonnel f o r  entry into the stage propellant tanks. 
recdived formal certification rec,ords and recertification was required and 
accomplished annually. 
participate in tank entries.  
DISCUSSION 
Graduates of this program 
Only currently certified personnel were allowed to 
I 
Peraonnal working in  closed, confined areas ,  such a s  propellant tanks, 
generally sncounte r 
an example, braathin 
whert emergency pro i r e  taken by the man? The! area  
maintained in a low- 
aditions for which they must be prepared. As 
s t  be supplied; i f  this supply is 
y condition. Long exposure will adversely affect 
* .  petrsonnel ( i ,  e . ,  no chapped lips, eye irritation, etc . ) .  Other 
ously listed, a r e  numerous and point out the 
m i s  a mandatory requirement for  personnel 
working in these area@. The program must incl 
examination, U E J ~  of e m e r g m c i  breathing and co 
comprehensive medic a1 
ications equipment, use 
ing and handling equipment, and special precautions 
ing, toolr, etc . , ussd in the confined a rea .  
REFERENCES. 
MA0701- 1181-210, LkI2 Tank Horizontal Entry 
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Tes t  15-06 
IDENTIFICATION O F  STAGE TEST CRITERIA A N D  STAGE MODIFICATIONS 
P R O B L E M  S T A T E M E N T  AND EFFECT 
No single document exis ted at the Mississ ippi  Tes t  Facil i ty (MTF)  to  
fully identify stage t e s t  c r i t e r i a  and modifications to  be  incorporated while 
the stage was a t  the t e s t  s i t e .  
conflicts in scheduling s tage act ivi t ies  and contributed to poor definition of 
ce r t a in  range act ivi t ies  required to  support  s tage process ing ,  
Lack of this  type of information c rea ted  
SOLUTION / RECOMMENDATION 
A catalog of p rogram requi rements  (COPR) document was prepared  
which completely delineated stage tes t ing,  inspection, and modification @ 
r equ i r emen t s .  
statusing the noted act ivi t ies  and thereby allowed s tage work schedules to 
be planned and impleme'nted with a minimum of work conflicts.  
The COPR document served  a s  a tool in monitoring and 
DISC U SSI ON 
A contract  change directed that the S-I1 contractor  a t  M T F  compile 
and submit t o  N A S A / M T F ,  eight weeks before end i t e m  (s tage)  a r r i v a l  a t  
M T F ,  a catalog of p rogram requirements  (COPR).  
the following data: 
The COPR was to  contain 
1 .  
2.  
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
Tes ts  and checkouts to be implemented a t  MTF.  
Pe r fo rmance  c r i t e r i a  to  be  met for  each  acceptance demonstrat ion.  
Measurement  and data requirements  t o  prove performance c r i t e r i a ,  
including acceptance,  operational,  and special  measurements  for  
end i t em,  GSE, and fac i l i t i es .  
Configuration of end i t e m  a t  .time of shipment to M T F .  
Configuration of end i t e m  a t  t ime of demonstrat ion a t  M T F .  
Configuration of end i t em at t ime of depar ture  f rom M T F .  
Dwell t ime a t  M T F  with a r r i v a l  and shipment da t e s .  
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Requirements specified in  the COPR were valid 
by s i te  and home plant engin 
following elements:  
r ing personnel. 
1 .  f h e  technical tent of a design chan 
terns analysis  
2 .  Engineering drawings,  engineering ord 
and specification revision sheete (SRS' 
cor rep tness  and clar i ty .  
3 ,  Test  action requirements  (TAR'S)  *ere examined and rewrit ten 
as  required for cor rec tness  and c la r i ty .  
* 4. Test  Operations procedures were  reviewed to  e n ~ u r e  proper 
incorporation of all engineering and acceptance requirements .  
u 
5. All. 'engineering design change's were  examined for conflicts. 
Because processing of the 6 0 P R  was automated, updating, deletion, 
o r  addition of line i tem en t r i e s  could be accomplished rapidly; COPR revision 
notices were  published daily and a total  document revision was puslished 
we e kly , 
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TEST PROCEDURE REVISION PREPARATION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The detailed t e s t  procedures  to check out the Saturn S-I1 required 
periodic revision due to changes of stage configuration and t e s t  philosophy. 
Delays were  encountered result ing in t ime  los ses  and schedule impact  due to 
the t ime required to type, proof read ,  and review the revisions af ter  a rough 
draf t  .had been submitted.  
s o L u - r I o N /  RECOMMENDATION 
The problem was solved by establishing a sys tem to prepare  the pro- 
cedures  on IBM punch c a r d s  using a keypunch machine and printing the 
documents using a l ine p r in t e r .  In addition, the t e s t  s i te  s tored the informa- 
tion on i-nagnetic tape and used the computer with a line pr inter  for  procedure 
printout. 
the applicable ca rds  (each card representing a line of text) and keypunching 
new c a r d s  for the necessa ry  change. - The document was then printed and i t  
was only necessa ry  to  proof read and review the text that had been changed. 
The line pr inter  is a l s o  capable of producing vellum o r  multilith m a s t e r s  
for reproduction. This method represented not only an efficient and expedi- 
tious method of preparing revisions but a l so  resulted in cost  savings and the 
more  efficient method of s torage using magnetic tapes .  
Revisions to the t e s t  procedures  were  accomplished by changing 
If a sys tem of this type is established, i t  should be initiated a t  the 
beginning of t e s t  procedure preparation when the baseline documents can  be  
prepared and revisions can be easi ly  implemented. This method of revision 
can be utilized in any application where a baseline document has  been estab-  
lished and revisions a r e  expected. 
DISCUSSION 
* 
The problem of document revision f i r s t  developed on the Saturn S-I1 
Battle8hip la heavyweight stage designed for init ial  sys tems testing).  The 
procedures  were  typed using conventional methods. The development pro-  
g r a m  required many configuration and t e s t  philosophy changes and therefore  
required a m o r e  expedient method of t e s t  procedure revision. Tes ts  were  
often delayed until the revised document was available.  This problem was 
a l so  prevalent during testing of the first two production s tages .  The t ime 
required to type,  proof read ,  and review a revised document caused many 
delays.  
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The sys t em was developed to  keypunch each t e s t  procedure.  
were  then placed in a line pr in te r  (o r  on magnetic tape) which printed the 
procedure in page fo rma t .  
the t i t le on each  page, number each page, and automatically number ,  sequen- 
tially, the subparagraphs.  
proof reading, on four-par t  paper for review, o r  printed on vel lum or 
multilith m a s t e r s  for  reproduction. 
The c a r d s  
The line pr in te r  had special  patchboards to  pr int  
The print-outs were  made on or'dinary paper for  
Revisions were  made t o  each  document by keypunching the'cards 
required to  make the change and inser t ing them in the ca rd  deck to  r'eplace 
the old c a r d s .  
s teps  and i t  was only n e c e s s a r y  to proofread the t e s t  that  was changed. A 
revision page was included in each procedure which l is ted the changed para- 
graph numbers  s o  it was necessa ry  to only review the l isted paragraphs to 
verify the changes that w e r e  made .  This procedure required a minimum of 
time for the disciplines (engineering, quality a s su rance ,  safety, and NASA) 
to  review the procedures .  
The line pr in te r  automatically renumbered the procedural  
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SOLUTION IRL'COMMENDATIQN 
A procedure (Tes t  Action Requirements) was established to control 
requests  dealing with spec ia l  t es t s  and inspections a t  t e s t  s i tes .  
procedure required explicit definition o f  the tasks and the data  required.  
p r ime  importance in the procedure was the nee 
disciplines (Engineering, Cuality Assurance and Test)  
could be honored. The procedure also insured 
w a s  not affected, that the proper  r e t e s t  was accom d, that the ta 
i properly scheduled, and that a l l  disciplines we 
Such a procedure is recommended for  an 
tasks must be performed on a production a r t i c  
properly controlled, the effect can be detr imental  to tes t  s i te  operations,  
DIS CJ. USS ION 
The 
E a r l y  in the S-11 P r o g r a m  a need developed 
special  tasks on the s tage and GSE. These  spec  
dis as s embly of sys  terns subsystems,  Tbese  
initiated to callect  data valuation of desig 
o prevent a possible ch 
revalidate the sys  tern 
ss ible  schedule imp 
d to allow these t a s  
g ,  Cuality Assurance,  and Tast 
positive method o 
were  submitted by different di  
requi res  preparation of a f o r m  to provide detailed instructions to 
the task,  re turn  the sys tem o r  subsystem to des i  
to the or iginal  c r i te r ia .  The form requires  a 
the Director  of Quality Assurance,  
9 - 3 1  
6 
and Logistics. 
group. The cool  
establish feasibil 
mentation, maintain pending and corn 
task etatus report. 
A central coordinator was appointed f 
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EDiCTION PR 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Performance  of the  S-II ge, when compared to p r e  
rmance,  resul ted i n  the at a lower alt  
hat predicted. Because 
to u s e  m o r e  of the flight prop 
/RECOMMENDATION 
1. Flight th rus t  tag values be based upon engine acceptance tests 
and biased by -3100 pounds thrus t  a s  established from a 
s ta t is t ical  history of comparison of engine acceptance t e s b  
and flight 
2. Specific impulse tag a low engine-mixture ratio to be e ed 
from a nominal specific impulse curve derived i n  engine 
acceptance testing and referenced to the high engine-mixture 
ra t io ' s  tag value 
Engine t r end  charac te r i s t ics  exhibited on the vehicle st 
data of specific vehicles be utilized i n  the flight predict  
respect ive stage 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 .  
Trend influence caefficients be fur ther  evaluated to decrease  their  
magnitudes and dependence upon trend b i a s  fac tors  
Mixtur e - ra t io  eo nt r o alve (MRCV) excursion 
assuming a change i n  mixture  ra t io  of -0. 700 u 
with the two sigma variations obaaaved on S-11 
e ratio and *6000 pounds thrust 
Propellant utilization ( P U )  excursion data and vehicle acceptance 
b e  evaluated to determihe any re1 
diction of the MRCV excuraton re  
in  a1 engines 
P U  influence coefficients be $valuated for  possible revision to 
improve predictability with the MR 
onship that may  allow 
a rac t e r i s t i c s  o 
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DISCUSSION 
The procedures of s R and determination o 
thrust ,  specific impulse,  xture ratio 
found that the prediction of thrust  waa susc  
due to the occurrence  of run-to-run res 
h of the flight of S-If vehicle 
tic t e s t s  indicated that thrus  
d s  on a two sigma basis ,  Between 
rmined that 3 7 . 1  percent of the en  
shifts of which over 90 percent  were  negative and average 
Consideration of the l a s t  four flights showed th  
predicted to within *3800 pounds (two sigma) u 
baseline and subtracting a bias of 3100 pounds thrust .  
Specific impulse a s  given for  individual engines during vehicle 
acceptance and/or  flight is a n  assumed value f rom the respective engine 
acceptance t e s t s  and variations a r e  attributable to e r r o r s  i n  prediction of, 
independent variables ( in le t  conditions, pressurization flows, et@, ) o r  
selection of the t ag  vaiue. 
impulse a t  low engine-mj-xture ra t ios  due to instrumentation variations 
between the Rocketdyne facility'$ engine acceptance data and vehicle telem- 
e t ry  data. T o  rectify this e r r o r ,  a procedure was devised utilizing nominal 
specific impulse excursion data from engine acceptance as referenced t o  the 
tag value at  high engine-mixture ratios.  
Differences were  noted i n  prediction of specific 
Prediction tag values of engine mixture  ratio were  found to exhibit 
p o d  repeatability between etatic t e s t  (both engi 
and flight. 
and vehicle acceptance) 
In-run, 5-2 engine, performance t rend characteristicls fo r  individual 
engines a r e  considered and acrcounted for  i n  flight predictions utilizing bia 
fac tors  i n  conjunction with a set of nominal trend-defining influence coef- 
ficients. A procedure was devised for  determining these bias fac tors  bas  
upon the vehicle acceptance test data and the run-to-run repeatability of 
engi ne trend char act  e r i  sti cs . 
, 
MRCV performance during S-33. flight has shown significantly grea te r  
Data from S-n vehicles 9 and 15 variations than predicted by  Rocketdyne, 
have concurred the prediction of an average mixture-ratio excursion of 
-0, 700 rnru but with two sigma variations in thrust  on the order  of 
k6000 pounda ra ther  than the original predicted of +=3000 pounds, Variations 
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s e  character ia t ics  to a M R C V  excursion (i. e . ,  variations 
as a function of delta mlxture  ratio) were  shown to be 
Effort  is  continuing to ascer ta in  whether these 
Characterist ics may b e  definable from engine and vehicle acce 
demon strati 
reaBon for  e r r o r 6  in predicted performance at low engine * 
xture ratio. 
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RECOMhtIENDATION 
fallow. 
1. Vent half of the propellant tank pressure/vent c 
2, 
3. 
4, 
Hold pressure in  tank for 5 minutes,before venting 
Flow-through LH2 tank from top to bottom 
Increase engine feed line (8-inch diameter) press 
pressure from a maximum of 15 prjig to 20-25 psig. 
number of cycles from 20 to 13 
30-second flow-through of feed lines after presbure/vent cycles 
Decrease 
5 .  
adended linscl a d  
subeeque,nt t o  the purging operations and hazardous gas 
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concentrations w e r e  not detected. After the "mini B" accident, a complete 
investigation evaluated a l l  of the existing S-11 purging procedures,  revising 
and updating them a s  necessary.  
Both the cyclic purge and the flow-through purge approaches were  
evaluated. 
concentration f r o m  100 to 1 percent,  it takes  12. 5-volume changes for 
cyclic purging of the S-I1 while only 4.6-volume changes a r e  required if 
flow-through techniques a r e  used. 
components having deadended cavities,  the flow-through purge had to be 
augmented with cyolic purging. 
CH2 level used on t h e  S-11 was ar r ived  at by dividing the lower explosive 
limit of hydrogen by a safety factor of 4. 
considerabiy i f  the allowable GH2 concentration level is reduced to 
The  r e su l t  of this  investigation clear ly  showed that the f 
To reduce cont through purge was the better of t h e  two procedures .  an t  
However, on the S-Iz, due to l ines and 
As a point of interest ,  the present  1 percent" 
Purging t imes  can b e  reduced 
2 to 3 percent. e 
Flow-through purging effects a reduction i n  hazardous gas  concentra- 
t ions by the continuous expulsion of res idual  gases  in a tank by an action 
s imi la r  to  a piston effect. 
admitted a t  the top of the tank when the purge gas  is lighter than the residual  
gas  and at the bottom of the tank when the purge gas  is heavier than the 
residual  gas. 
f r o m  the point where the purge g a s  i s  entering the tank. 
for  flow through purging i s  shown by the relationship C ~ / C F  = Vp/Vt where 
Co i s  the init ial  concentration of the res idua l  gas ,  C F  is  the final concentra- 
t ion of the residual  gas ,  Vp is  the total  volume of purge g a s  required to 
purge the tank and Vt the volume of the tank being purged. 
To facil i tate the piston effect, the purge gas  is  
/ 
Venting being accomplished a t  the opposite end of the tank 
The requireiiient 
The most  significant consideration for  cycling purge i s  the del ta  p r e s -  
s u r e  of the purging g a s  over the init ial  gas  i n  the tank, keeping in  mind that 
the higher the del ta  p re s su re ,  the g rea t e r  the usage of purge gas. 
delta p r e s s u r e  is  increased,  fewer cycles a r e  required for  purging a s  shown 
by the equation C1 / C 2  = (P1 / P 2 ) N  where C1 i s  the init ial  gas concentration, 
C2 the final gas concentration, P1 initial tank p res su re ,  P 2  elevated p res -  
s u z e  caused by purge gas and N the number of p r e s s u r e  cycles required. 
During every p rcs su re /ven t  cycle, a p r e s s u r e  hold should be  instituted to 
benefit f r o m  the effects of diffusion, 
experimentally but "Fick ' s  Law" generally applies. 
If the  
Diffusion r a t e s  a r e  determined 
It is highly recommended that a l l  purging operations should use  the 
pressure/blowdown cycling purge combined with flow-through purging (piston 
effect with top o r  bottom of the tank). 
a t  the top and the bottom of the tank should be taken. 
In  addition a t  l eas t  two g a s  samples  
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WATER SPRAY HEAT SHIELD 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND E F F E C T  
During sea level s ta t ic  f i r ing  of the S-II stage engines, it i s  necessary  
to shield the inoperative center  J - 2  engine nozzle and components f r o m  high 
levels of incident radiat ive heat  flux. 
s eve re  damage  to the engine. 
Failure to do so could result in 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
A water  spray  sys t em was  installed in  the b a s e  of the S-II-8 stage 
during static f i r ing such that the center engine was  effectively shielded f r o m  
the incident radiative flux. 
f i r ing which was  subsequently flown on the AS-508 flight. 
No damage resul ted to the engine during static 
w 
Based on the s ta t ic  f i r ing  resu l t s ,  it was concluded that  water spray  
was an effective means  of blocking 95 percent  of incident radiative heat 
flux i n  the inf ra red  spectrum. 
DISCUSSION 
In o r d e r  to reduce the longitudinal vibrations experienced during S-II 
boost on AS-501 through AS-504 flights, it was proposed that the center  
5 - 2  engine of the S-11 stage 5 J-2 engine cluster  b e  shut down during the 
la t te r  pa r t  of S 4 I  stage boost on the AS-505 flight, 
this procedure was to b e  verified by a s ta t ic  fir ing test on the S-11-8 stage. 
Since the 5 - 2  exhaust plume radiation levels  are considerably higher a t  sea 
level than at altitude, the inoperative center  engine would b e  subjected to 
high levels  of incident radiat ive heat  flux, 
is no longer regenerat ively cooled by LHz circulation, s eve re  damage to 
the engine nozzle was possible. 
center  engine from the  high levels  of incident radiat ive heat flux during 
etatic firing. 
The  effectiveness of' 
Also, since the inoperative engine 
Therefore ,  it was  neceesary to  shield the 
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VORTEXING AT LOX TANK OUTLET 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During ear ly  s ta t ic  f i r ings  of S-II vehicle 
Facil i ty,  signs of LOX pump cavitation ea 
ea r l i e r  than the other four engines, indic 
that engine. 
between the radial-vane antivortex baffles i n  the LOX sum 
eddies around t h e  edge of a b r a c e  used to support the antivortex baffles. 
This condition can requi re  ea r l i e r  shutdown of the engine cluster  and result 
in  a n  inc rease  of trapped propellant weight. 
This  condition was  attributed to small localized vostexing 
ea  caused by 
SOLUTION/R E COMMENDATION 
For s ta t ic  fir ings,  engine cutoff was initiated severa l  seconds ear ly  to  
avoid gas  ingestion. No action was taken in  flight s ince premature  gas  
ingestion only hastened the s t a r t  of chamber p r e s s u r e  decay but did not 
greatly affect  the level a t  which the maximum allowable decay occurred. 
I n  the des ign  of propellant tanks, c a r e  should be  taken to s t reamline 
all internal hardware near propellant outlets to prevent the forrnaMon of  flaw 
eddies a r i d  localized vortexing which could cause premature  gas  ingestion. 
This  reconilllendation applies even though antivortex baffles m a y  be present,  
since localized vort ices  may form between the baffles. 
DISCUSSION 
Scale model  vortex t e s t s  of the S-II LOX tank indicated that  the SbII 
antivortex baffle design i s  adequate to prevent gross  vortex action in* the  
LOX sump, It is believed, however, that  minor, localized vort ices  were  
generated between the rad ia l  antivortex baffles by flow around the edge of 
b r a c e s  used to support the baffles. 
with t n e  position of the sump outlets feeding the engines which first showed 
evidence of gas ingestion. 
The location of these  b r a c e s  corresponds 
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EFFECTS OF BUBBLES ON CAPACiTA 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
During var ious S-II countdown demonst 
, sudden decreases  sf LH2 capacitance 
in  fastfill and/or  steady-gtate replenis 
this phenomena was the result of a sud 
vapor bubbles entering the coaxial probe (through its ope 
through perforations in  the outer element) . 
The dec rease  i n  probe readout lasts up to 20 seconds and could cause 
the automatic loading system (PTCS) to temporar i ly  ,overload the LH2 tank, 
If this occurs  at the end of loading, it could violate the loading redlines and 
resu l t  i n  a launch delay, ”= 
SOLUTION /RECOh/LMENDATION 
No action was taken to redesign the cap probe since the problem did 
not occur frequently and the probability of causing a launch delay was smill. 
dn future designs, means (such a s  baffles and stillwells) should be 
provided to  prevent vapor bubbles f r o m  entering cap  probes. 
DISCUSSION 
9-40 
Extensive trouble shooting of the problem revealed no electr ical  caupl;eB 
for the sudden changes in  probe readout. Since the shifts were  always i n  a 
negative direction and of a temporary  nature, it is reasoned that they were  
caused by bubbles introduced between the electrodes of the probe. 
explanation is supported by the phenomenon of “geyseri  
i n  la rge  tanks of cryogenic fluid when w a r m  slugs of li 
surface and evolve l a rge  quantities of vapor bubbles under the reduced etatie 
hard, 
This 
h often occurs  
* 
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LOX TANK Ut. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
S-11-1 LOX tank ullage prass  
r o  NPSH margin was reached. 
from starting, causing mission 
SOLUTION /REGO MMENDATIQN 
'- The problem was resolved by evacuating the common bulkhead to 3 psid 
maximum before flight to minimize heat transfer across the bulkhead. 
DISCUSSION 
The ullage pressure decay was experienced during static firings of the 
Analysis revealed f i r s t  three flight stages a s  well as during the first  flight. 
the ullage pressure decay was caused by high heat transfer across the 
bulkhead resulting from the temperature differential between LE32 at -420 E 
on ane side and GOX at about -300  F on the other side. 
cancagt, purged insulated common 6ulkhead was used, which was vented in 
flight. 
when corrected confirmed the probability that ullage pressure decay had 
occurred. 
' For  the initial design 
Re-evaluation of thermal characteristics rervealed an e r r o r  which 
The most feasible design correction was determined to be evacuation of 
the common bu 
vacuum was as  d with self-sealing disconnects. Flightworthiness of the 
design correction was demonstrated during tanking and static firing tests of 
the S-11-3 and S-11-4 vehicles, and from countdown demonstration testes and 
flight of the AS- 502 vehicle. 
d to increase insulation characteris tics. The. bulkhead 
Test 36-01 
HYDROGEN FIRE DETECTION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
A need was e s t  lished early in the experimental testing of the 
Saturn S-I1 Battleship (a stage designed for initial systems testing) for a 
means of detecting fires caused by hydrogen leaks. 
difficult to detect with the naked eye during daylight hotirs due to the trans- 
parent flame. 
Hydrogen fires a r e  
SOLUT ION/RECOMMENDATION 
Television cameras with infra-red vidicon tubes were obtained which 
detect hydrogen fires,  and were used fo r  monitoring the battleship stage 
during static firing. 
The use of the infra-red television camera is recommended in any 
application \\.here the possibility of fires caused from hydrogen leaks exist. 
DISCUSSION 
The Saturn S-I1 Battleship engine area was  vulnerable to fires from 
hydrogen l eaks  due to the use of hydrogen as a propellant, 
flame from a hydrogen fire precludes the use of normai visual means to  
detect, therefore, infra-red vidicon television cameras were used. The use 
of this sytem was very effective in pin-pointing hydrogen leaks during firing. 
The transparent 
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Tes t  36-02  
PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM FILTERING SCREENS 
Foreign par t ic les  were  found in the batt leship s tage e 
The par propellant tanking tes t s  ear ly  in the S-II program. 
be lip sea l  material f rom the facility prevalves 
tanks during tanking. Problems were  also enco 
within the tanks during f i r s t  tanking of some  pro 
SOLUTIO;c’/RECOMMENDATIOK 
I 
A fi l tering sc reen  was installed in  each propellant feed line to prevent 
contaminents f rom entering the engines. 
flight hardware and were  removed pr ior  to s ta t ic  firing. 
effective in protecting the engines as wae  indicated during f i r s t  tanking tes t s  
of the production s tages .  
found on the sc reens .  In mos t  instances these were  found af ter  m r k  bad 
been performed in the tanks a f te r  init ial  closeout. 
The sc reens  were  installed as non- 
They were  very  
. 
Severa l  instances occurred where par t ic les  were  
The temporary  installation of filtering sc reens  in propel1 
sys tems is recommended where the possibility exis ts  for contaminants to 
enter  the propulsion system. 
taminants entered the engines and were  not detected p r io r  to firing. 
Cri t ical  damage could resu l t  i f  cer ta in  con- 
DISC. USSION 
The initial problem of contaminants in the propulsion sys tem of the 
S-I1 was discovered during propellant tanking procedures  of the battleship 
stage.  The problem developed as a resul t  of the facility bal l  valve lip s e a l  
failure. The m a t e r i a l  entered the engine and caused Contamination of the 
fuel injector.  The resultant correct ive action was to instal l  
engine propellant feed lines and establish a periodic inspecti  
to ensure  sys tem cleanliness.  Subsequently, the sc reens  were  installed in 
the production s tages  to prevent propulsion sys t em contamination. 
The contamination within the LH2 tank of production s tages  derived 
f rom personnel  traffic and f r o m  equipment and mater ia l s  used to instal l  
in-tank modifications. For production s tages ,  the sc reens  were  removed 
a f t e r  the tanking tes t s  and p r io r  to s ta t ic  firing. In some  cases par t ic les  
were found o n  the sc reens  which ‘could have resulted in damage to the engines. 
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Te St 38 -0 1 
STAGE PROTECTION AGAl NST 
PROBLEM STATElMENT AND 
capability was not considered of concern a 
( M T F ) ,  since there were adequate backup 
Seal Beach test  site no hazardous testing 
checkout, a momentary dropout occurred on the facility ac  power system at  
MTF.  It was noted that the digital events recorder (C7-.77) did record 
discrete status changes, including indication of the presence of extraneous 
stimuli. 
system. Random command generation had occurred. The delay in transfer 
indicated an inadeqtaacy in the facility backup ac power system. 
SOLUTION/ RECOMMENDATION 
Special testing revealed a delay in the facility ac  power Cransfer 
An automatic master  reset  function capability wa5 incorporated into the’ 
stage command generation GSE. 
loss  o r  application of ac power. 
The reset  function became operation upon 
During initial design, the incorporation of power failure rhaster reset  
circuitry should be considered in any GSE which generates commands to an 
opexational system. 
DIS C U SSI ON 
Design of ACE/GSE did not prevent random command neration for 
an ac power failure. This GSE was used at two locations: t Seal Beach, 
manufacturing complex and the Mississippi Test  Facility (MTF)  
complex. A t  each location were two ACE/GSE stations for S-XI 
checkout. 
and de backup power sources were provided a s  part of the 
facility This facility power backup system was considered adequate and, 
therefore, turthetr power failure protection was considered unnecessary. At 
Seal Beach np backup power sources were provided, since no damaging or 
onditions could be envisioned for the low pressure checkout 
conducted there ,  
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kout a t  M T F ,  pr ior  to a L N z / L H 2  tanking t e s t ,  a mornen- 
uption occurred ,  ta ry  ac  power N o  s'pecific detai ls  were Aoted or 
available exce he digital events recorder  ( 6 7 - 7 7 ) .  This recorder  
indicated d iscre te  status chan had occurred ,  including the appearance o i  
extraneous stimuli  . NASA / M  t e s t  operations personnel decided 
form a special  t t to a sce r t a in  the charac te r i s t ics  and effecti 
facility automat power t ransfer  ePuipment. The tes t  revea l  
t ransfer  between Louisiana and Mississ ippi  main a c  power requir 
niately 1 . 4  seconds; dc power was not lost  nor  dirt the t ransfer  to backup 
ba t te ry  sources  occur during this period; random GSE command generation 
to the stage did occur during both a c  power on and off cycles .  
In o rde r  to ensu re  that improper  commands were  not generated to the 
stage a s  a resu l t  of ac  power interruption and/or  fa i lure  during tanking or  
static firing t e s t s ,  the command generation GSE was modified to  automatically 
mastler r e s e t ,  thus removing all ACE/GSE commands f r o m  the s tage.  
GSE modification 'was a l s o  implemented in the Seal  Beach automatic checkout 
equipment for  use in emergency shutdown procedures .  
This 
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OPERATIONAL FAILURE OF NEON BLQWN FUSE INDICATORS 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
Neon blown fuse indicators failed to operate when used with fuse- 
protected high impedance circuits. 
Neon blown fuse indicators a re  installed on GSE fused circuits to allow 
for visual quick-look statusing during troubleshooting. 
indicators to operate forces the technician to remove the suspected fuse and 
check continuity, o r  else to conclude, perhaps erroneously, that the fuse is 
not blown, and look elsewhere for the malfunction. 
Failure of these 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
Install mechanical (pop-out type) fuse status indicators in high 
impedance circuits. 
It is recommended that operating parameters of fuse status indicators 
be considered during initial design so that blown fuse statusing can be 
reliably and quickly accomplished. 
, 
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It was  determined that the ma jo r  portion of,this data coukl be processed 
by  the automatic checkout equipment (ACE) into a comprehensive tabulation, 
tion revealed that GSE synchronous timing was not present  in the ACE 
puter and without synchronized timing throughout the data recording and 
processing equipment, the automatic data evaluation program could not be 
implemented. 
thus reducing data  evaluation time f rom days to hours. However, inve - 
e 
SOLUTION /RE GOMMENDATION 
The ACE computer was modified to operate on either its internal 
clock o r  synchronize on an  external clock supplied from the ACE’time code 
rack,  thus allowing a data merging and correlating automatic program 
(MACRO) to be implemented. In addition, a second automatic checkout 
station was modified to be used as  a r e a l  time pulse coded modulation (PCM) 
data station. The modification of the second checkout station not only elimi- 
nated t ime- consuming P C M  data reduction and manual evaluatfon, but also 
increased the comprehensiveness of the ACE processed data  merging program. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
Stage systems automatic checkout w a s  a s timuli-generated response- 
verified (go no-go) type of test. 
were  the ACE computer-generated tes t  resul ts  magnetic tape (C7-  105 events 
t ra i l ) ,  a digital events recording system ( C 7 - 7 7 )  and a stage flight te lemetry 
recording station multi track wideband magnetic tape ( 6 7 -  516). 
Due to the many measurements  (in excess of lOOO), detailed.leve1 of 
testing, and three completely separa te  data listings, it required an excessive 
amount of time for test  engineering to manually merge  and car re la te  each 
t-ecorded stage event status change to ensure i t  was a proper occurence, and 
not a malfunction. 
and correlatiQn functions into a single data listing with all st imuli  and 
responses properly noted for validity. 
Real time data recordin systems on line 
* 
The decision was made to attempt to automate the merging 
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Two major har  problems had to be overcome to allow for 
performance of the program. First, the problem of common time 
base s ynchronizatio be considered, Since the m e r  
baeed on time of day (AMR-D5 Code), as  recorded on the C 
C7-516, it was n s sa ry  to provide a synchronization pula 
time code rack (Ci"74 
the computer w a  this external clock. Thi 
ensured accurate data correlation with regard to real-time event occurrence 
in merging the data from three separate data recording system6 (C7-77, 
C7-516, C7- 105) into a single test evaluation document. The second problem 
to be met was actual use of the C7-516 data. Since both Seal Beach and the 
Mississippi Test Facility contained two identical automatic checkout stations, 
provision was made to use the second computer and digital data acquisition 
station (C7-400) as a real-time PCM data recording station. This resulted 
in elimination of post-test processing of the C7-516 data tape into a com- 
puter format suitable for data correlation. 
E computer (CDC-924A). 
. 
UF" 
GROUND SUPPORT E ~ U I ~ ~ E ~ ~  
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND EFFECT 
The ground support equipment (GSE) 
Test  3%-U4 
used for ch 
capable of dual control of the functions of the stage: rn 
controlled) and automatic (computer controlled). The 
could control cer ta in  functions to per form leak checks 
station had control over  the same functions. 
was also required for automatic checkout. 
The electr ical  control, s tation 
The problem developed while the stage systems were  pressurized 
under control of the pneumatic console a,nd two commands were simulta- 
neously sent  f rom the electr ical  station. 
performing two different tes t s  at the same time. 
damage to stage sys tems could have resulted. 
This was the resul t  of two engineers 
Injury to personnel or 
SOLUTION/RECOMMENDATION 
An interlock circuit  was installed in the CSE to prevent any commands 
from being executed from the electr ical  station when the pneumatic console 
was being used for leak check. A three-position selector  switch w a s  installed 
on the tes t  conductor’s console to control the interlock. 
allowed selection of the pneumatic console, the electr ical  station, o r  a combi- 
nation of both. The requirement was established that when leak checks were  
being performed, the switch position had to be selected which eliminated the 
possibility of commands being executed from the electr ical  station. 
The switch positions 
A vehicle as complex as the S-I1 dictates paral le l  testing i n  o rde r  to  
complete checkout expeditiously. It is recommended, therefore, that during 
init ial  design of GSE Tor such a’ vehicle, interlock circuits be incorporated 
into the dual control equipment. 
(fluid and gas)  a r e  utilized to operate systems through these controls. 
D IS C US5 JON 
This is especially essent ia l  where pressures 
The S-I1 checkout consisted of approximately 27 subsystem tests.  In 
The dual control of certain functions 
All testing was coordinated through the station tes t  conductor but it 
o r d e r  to accomplish these tes t s  in a reasonable length of time, it w a s  neces- 
s a r y  to perfor’m- the tes ts  in parallel .  
was also necessary  as the same GSE was used for manual and automatic 
tes ts .  
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was impossible for each enffineer to know what 
performed in detail. The greatest hazard exist 
was applied to the stage eubsystems and the pos 
a control valv ut of sequence. This possibili 
ins  tallation of interlock circuit. 
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